The Leningrad Military District : the past and future of the Northwestern direction
Kukkola, Juha (2024)
Kukkola, Juha
Maanpuolustuskorkeakoulu
Sotataidon laitos
Maanpuolustuskorkeakoulu
2024
Julkaisun pysyvä osoite on
https://urn.fi/URN:ISBN:978-951-25-3478-4
https://urn.fi/URN:ISBN:978-951-25-3478-4
Tiivistelmä
This working paper is meant for those who are interested in understanding why the Russian Armed Forces have re-established the Leningrad Military District (LenMD), first established as the Petersburg Military District in 1864, in the northwestern part of Russia. The paper uses Russian concepts to understand Russia’s interests and actions and examines the long history of the military district system from a Russian perspective. The paper provides also an overview of the current military strategic situation in the Russian Northwestern strategic direction to provide a starting point for a more nuanced and throughout strategic, or even operational, analysis. Sources used in the text are public, and the opinions presented are author’s own and do not represent those of the Finnish Defence Forces.
The Russian military theoretical concepts are currently in motion. However, the Russian concepts of theatre of military actions, strategic direction, military district, military-political and strategic situation and force posture, and strategic and operational operations provide tools to understand the history of the LenMD. They help to understand the historical logic behind Russia’s and the Soviet Union’s efforts to find responses to its changing strategic environment, and to pursue its own political interests by using the military districts as tools of military strategy.
Historically, military-political and strategic situation, as well as military geography, have been the defining factors in the development of the military district system – taking also into consideration administrative and economic issues. A land-locked imperium must build its forces to accommodate all possible types of war in every direction. The composition, borders, roles and forces of the military districts have changed with the Russian political and military leadership’s understanding of power relations between states and military threats and interests(!) in Russia’s geographical proximity. A strategic posture is thus a suggestion, but not a commitment to a certain action. A military district, therefore, a manifestation of a need to specifically operate military forces in a certain direction – and/or to produce forces for a certain direction.
The military districts have provided for the Russian Armed Forces, in theory, a flexible, efficient and clear command and mobilization structure for peacetime and wartime. Military districts are territorial military administrative tools to provide security, and create military power and facilitate its use, if necessary. The military districts are historical and continuously developing organizations. The Russian Armed Forces command hierarchy is not set in stone and is case, meaning conflict, specific. The command relationship with the Supreme High Command representatives, the General Staff, the service branches and various Main Commands, and commanders of Group of Forces or Fronts will be flexible, although not always successful. The number and composition of the MDs is also connected to the assessments of future war. Technology will affect the way the strategic defensive, counteroffensive or offensive force posture will be built in the MDs.
The period between 1998 and 2023 may have been an anomaly in the history of the military districts, as economic realities, foreign ideas and aspects of modern operational art (jointness) have perhaps disproportionally, in relation to the strategic situation, influenced the number and borders of military districts. That is why the current Joint Strategic Command (OSK) concept might be, at least partly, be a temporary experiment. However, the role of the military districts as tools of comprehensive security to counter the so-called hybrid threats will define their development in the future. Military districts will reflect Russian ideas about the whole-of-government and even whole-of-nation security thinking.
The enduring existence of the LenMD testifies to the persistence of some strategic issues in Russia’s northwestern direction. It is, therefore, natural to think of this area as a theatre of military actions or a strategic direction, that is, a basis for organizing the use of armed force for political and strategic purposes in a certain geographical area. The geographical dimensions of the LenMD, in all its historical versions, have remained remarkably similar. The forces Russia has deemed necessary to deploy in the northwestern direction have usually consisted of three armies or corps, two fleets, and, later, one air army under one or two Fronts. Also, after Finland gained its independence, two operational directions, one from the St. Petersburg westward and the second through the Cap of the North, have recurred in plans, estimations and military academic research.
The currently planned Russian strategic force posture in the Northwestern strategic direction is basically defensive, but potentially offensive. ‘Defensive’ is, in the light of Soviet and Russian doctrine and conduct, a provisional concept. A defensive posture can be changed into offensive quite quickly, if plans are in place, and there are enough trained and equipped forces – and the opponent’s readiness and strength are on a lower level.
Ultimately, the re-establishment of the LenMD as a ‘military-technical measure’ is proof that, after analysing the military-political and strategic situation, the Russian leadership has decided that a land war in the Northwestern strategic direction is possible in the 2030s onwards. The composition of the military districts reflects the Russian views on military threats, interests gained using military force, and foresight on the future character of war on a map.
The Russian military theoretical concepts are currently in motion. However, the Russian concepts of theatre of military actions, strategic direction, military district, military-political and strategic situation and force posture, and strategic and operational operations provide tools to understand the history of the LenMD. They help to understand the historical logic behind Russia’s and the Soviet Union’s efforts to find responses to its changing strategic environment, and to pursue its own political interests by using the military districts as tools of military strategy.
Historically, military-political and strategic situation, as well as military geography, have been the defining factors in the development of the military district system – taking also into consideration administrative and economic issues. A land-locked imperium must build its forces to accommodate all possible types of war in every direction. The composition, borders, roles and forces of the military districts have changed with the Russian political and military leadership’s understanding of power relations between states and military threats and interests(!) in Russia’s geographical proximity. A strategic posture is thus a suggestion, but not a commitment to a certain action. A military district, therefore, a manifestation of a need to specifically operate military forces in a certain direction – and/or to produce forces for a certain direction.
The military districts have provided for the Russian Armed Forces, in theory, a flexible, efficient and clear command and mobilization structure for peacetime and wartime. Military districts are territorial military administrative tools to provide security, and create military power and facilitate its use, if necessary. The military districts are historical and continuously developing organizations. The Russian Armed Forces command hierarchy is not set in stone and is case, meaning conflict, specific. The command relationship with the Supreme High Command representatives, the General Staff, the service branches and various Main Commands, and commanders of Group of Forces or Fronts will be flexible, although not always successful. The number and composition of the MDs is also connected to the assessments of future war. Technology will affect the way the strategic defensive, counteroffensive or offensive force posture will be built in the MDs.
The period between 1998 and 2023 may have been an anomaly in the history of the military districts, as economic realities, foreign ideas and aspects of modern operational art (jointness) have perhaps disproportionally, in relation to the strategic situation, influenced the number and borders of military districts. That is why the current Joint Strategic Command (OSK) concept might be, at least partly, be a temporary experiment. However, the role of the military districts as tools of comprehensive security to counter the so-called hybrid threats will define their development in the future. Military districts will reflect Russian ideas about the whole-of-government and even whole-of-nation security thinking.
The enduring existence of the LenMD testifies to the persistence of some strategic issues in Russia’s northwestern direction. It is, therefore, natural to think of this area as a theatre of military actions or a strategic direction, that is, a basis for organizing the use of armed force for political and strategic purposes in a certain geographical area. The geographical dimensions of the LenMD, in all its historical versions, have remained remarkably similar. The forces Russia has deemed necessary to deploy in the northwestern direction have usually consisted of three armies or corps, two fleets, and, later, one air army under one or two Fronts. Also, after Finland gained its independence, two operational directions, one from the St. Petersburg westward and the second through the Cap of the North, have recurred in plans, estimations and military academic research.
The currently planned Russian strategic force posture in the Northwestern strategic direction is basically defensive, but potentially offensive. ‘Defensive’ is, in the light of Soviet and Russian doctrine and conduct, a provisional concept. A defensive posture can be changed into offensive quite quickly, if plans are in place, and there are enough trained and equipped forces – and the opponent’s readiness and strength are on a lower level.
Ultimately, the re-establishment of the LenMD as a ‘military-technical measure’ is proof that, after analysing the military-political and strategic situation, the Russian leadership has decided that a land war in the Northwestern strategic direction is possible in the 2030s onwards. The composition of the military districts reflects the Russian views on military threats, interests gained using military force, and foresight on the future character of war on a map.
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