Mutually assured distraction : analysis of Sergey Karaganov's doomsday rhetoric in the context of Russian nuclear deterrence
Hyppölä, Oona-Maaria (2024)
Hyppölä, Oona-Maaria
Maanpuolustuskorkeakoulu
Sotataidon laitos
Maanpuolustuskorkeakoulu
2024
Julkaisun pysyvä osoite on
https://urn.fi/URN:ISBN:978-951-25-3453-1
https://urn.fi/URN:ISBN:978-951-25-3453-1
Tiivistelmä
Alongside conventional warfare, Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 has reminded us about the prevailing relevance of deterrence issues and nuclear weapons even in modern-day conflicts. The deterrence rhetoric promoted by the Russian state leadership and certain prominent foreign policy experts has become increasingly hawkish and aggressive. Many of the statements consist of outright nuclear threats and doomsday lexicon. This raises the question, whether such threats are merely a final attempt to salvage what is left from Russia’s faltering position as a military superpower. Or, perhaps an attempt to discourage Western support in fear of Russian nuclear retaliation and to intimidate Ukraine to submission.
This research paper has a special focus on nuclear and deterrence rhetoric, namely, the statements of a long-standing Russian foreign policy expert, former advisor to the president, Sergey Karaganov. He has been a prominent figure in security policy debates for decades. He is most well-known for his long career in academia, but he also has an exhaustive list of positions in various Russian governmental organisations. The paper draws on Karaganov’s writings and ideas from the past decade. Main focus is on statements made after February 2022. The status and possible leverage power of Karaganov within the Russian state apparatus is evaluated. The aim is to also observe change in nuclear rhetoric and look for the origin and objective of certain claims. Moreover, the authority of Karaganov’s arguments and the prevalence of similar as well as contesting views is assessed. Karaganov’s statements are also related to the official line in the context of Russian, as well as Soviet nuclear debate.
Karaganov’s ideas have grown gradually more radical amidst Russia’s war against Ukraine. His most prominent and extreme idea is the introduction of a Russian preemptive nuclear strike on European soil to restore the Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD) doctrine and bring the war in Ukraine to a favorable conclusion. For Karaganov, humanity has become dangerously indifferent to the threat of nuclear war. Peace is taken for granted. The threshold for the use of nuclear weapons needs to be “lowered”, so that nuclear rhetoric is no longer automatically perceived as a verbal saber rattling without real effect. Karaganov certainly has no direct political power, but judging by his current affiliations, he still has adequate authority left to enjoy trust and hold a place within the state apparatus and in Putin’s orbit. By allowing a myriad of figures like Karaganov with varying, even contradicting views and statements to take part in the deterrence debate Russia is utilising a strategy aimed at creating confusion, fear and hesitation in the opposing side. I call this the Russian mutually assured distraction strategy.
The grim reality is that the current Putin regime – Karaganov as part of it – lives and breathes conflict. Its very existence is tied to it and it has no genuine vision of Russia free from conflict. Therefore, it can be assumed that escalatory rhetoric and confrontation will continue, without Russia showing any real desire to work towards peace. The role of strategic forces and nuclear weapons will undoubtedly be emphasised in building deterrence, not least because of the poor performance of the conventional forces in Ukraine. However, the state leadership, primarily Putin himself, has stuck to strictly reciting the Military Doctrine and seemed even moderate in some of his statements compared to e.g. Karaganov. It might largely be an attempt to burnish Putin’s reputation to make him seem more rational. However, it does also signal that it is in Russia’s own interests to prolong the rhetorical, non-forceful, coercion and intimidation for as long as possible, and to avoid nuclear escalation from words to action to the last. A shared understanding still exists that any form of nuclear weapons’ use will have devastating effects.
This research paper has a special focus on nuclear and deterrence rhetoric, namely, the statements of a long-standing Russian foreign policy expert, former advisor to the president, Sergey Karaganov. He has been a prominent figure in security policy debates for decades. He is most well-known for his long career in academia, but he also has an exhaustive list of positions in various Russian governmental organisations. The paper draws on Karaganov’s writings and ideas from the past decade. Main focus is on statements made after February 2022. The status and possible leverage power of Karaganov within the Russian state apparatus is evaluated. The aim is to also observe change in nuclear rhetoric and look for the origin and objective of certain claims. Moreover, the authority of Karaganov’s arguments and the prevalence of similar as well as contesting views is assessed. Karaganov’s statements are also related to the official line in the context of Russian, as well as Soviet nuclear debate.
Karaganov’s ideas have grown gradually more radical amidst Russia’s war against Ukraine. His most prominent and extreme idea is the introduction of a Russian preemptive nuclear strike on European soil to restore the Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD) doctrine and bring the war in Ukraine to a favorable conclusion. For Karaganov, humanity has become dangerously indifferent to the threat of nuclear war. Peace is taken for granted. The threshold for the use of nuclear weapons needs to be “lowered”, so that nuclear rhetoric is no longer automatically perceived as a verbal saber rattling without real effect. Karaganov certainly has no direct political power, but judging by his current affiliations, he still has adequate authority left to enjoy trust and hold a place within the state apparatus and in Putin’s orbit. By allowing a myriad of figures like Karaganov with varying, even contradicting views and statements to take part in the deterrence debate Russia is utilising a strategy aimed at creating confusion, fear and hesitation in the opposing side. I call this the Russian mutually assured distraction strategy.
The grim reality is that the current Putin regime – Karaganov as part of it – lives and breathes conflict. Its very existence is tied to it and it has no genuine vision of Russia free from conflict. Therefore, it can be assumed that escalatory rhetoric and confrontation will continue, without Russia showing any real desire to work towards peace. The role of strategic forces and nuclear weapons will undoubtedly be emphasised in building deterrence, not least because of the poor performance of the conventional forces in Ukraine. However, the state leadership, primarily Putin himself, has stuck to strictly reciting the Military Doctrine and seemed even moderate in some of his statements compared to e.g. Karaganov. It might largely be an attempt to burnish Putin’s reputation to make him seem more rational. However, it does also signal that it is in Russia’s own interests to prolong the rhetorical, non-forceful, coercion and intimidation for as long as possible, and to avoid nuclear escalation from words to action to the last. A shared understanding still exists that any form of nuclear weapons’ use will have devastating effects.
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