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II

FATALISTIC BELIEFS

IN RELIGION, FOLKLORE, AND
LITERATURE

*Papers read at the Symposium on Fatalistic Beliefs
held at Åbo on the 7th-9th of September, 1964*

Edited by

HELMER RINGGREN

ALMQVIST & WIKSELL

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The Problem of Fatalism

By HELMER RINGGREN

It seems that the hardest task in the study of religion is to define its object, in other words, to determine what religion is. A new work in the history, psychology or sociology of religion almost inevitably begins with a new and original definition of the concept of religion. It is not my intention to add another definition to the number of those already existing. But I think it is possible to state on a purely empirical basis that one of the functions of what we normally call religion is to help man to adjust himself to the realities of life, to give him some kind of understanding of what happens to him, to enable him to relate himself in some way or other to what he regards as his destiny or fate.

Since in most languages the words for 'destiny' are rather ambiguous, it is necessary to make it clear from the outset what we mean when referring to a man's destiny. As has already emerged, there are two English words that should be taken into consideration, "destiny" and "fate". According to the Oxford dictionary, "destiny" means (1) That which is destined or fated to happen. (2) That which is destined to happen to a particular person, country, institution, etc.; (one's) appointed lot or fortune. (3) What in the course of events will become, or has become, of a person or thing. (4) The power or agency by which events are unalterably predetermined. The word 'fate' is analyzed as having approximately the same shades of meaning, although in a different order.

I should like to concentrate here on the second of the meanings listed, but I prefer to start from a somewhat broader concept with less emphasis on the element or predetermination. Things happen to man, they come upon him, so to speak, from the outside, and he has no power to change or to control them. It is to this part of his existence that man has to get into some kind of relationship, and the first step in this direction is an attempt to define what

happens to him and to interpret it in a satisfactory way. It is here that the categories 'god', 'destiny', and 'chance' enter the scene, depending on whether the events are derived from a personal power, an impersonal order, or no order at all. We disregard, then, the pure scientific, causal explanation of the world.

If the power of destiny is regarded as impersonal, it is impossible to enter into any kind of relationship with it. The decree of destiny cannot be changed or averted and it is no use praying or offering sacrifices, for there is no one to hear or to receive and to react. On the other hand, if man's fate is decreed by a god, it is possible to enter into relationship with him, and sacrifices, prayer and obedience may be thought to avert an evil destiny or create a good one, and so forth. In other words, the belief in a personal determiner of destiny produces religious behaviour, while the belief in an impersonal Fate does not. But the problem is complicated by the fact that both of these attitudes seem to occur together in one and the same religion, even in one and the same person.

It is above all in the Greek and in the ancient Teutonic religions that the problem of the relation between the gods and Destiny becomes acute, and students in these fields were aware of it long ago and paid due attention to it. The first to carry out a more comprehensive investigation of the ideas of destiny in various religions seems to have been E. Engel who wrote *Die Schicksalsidee im Altertum* in 1926. But this is a rather superficial work, based for the most part on secondary evidence, and does not reach the core of the matter. Some special investigations concerning particular religions supply valuable details of information but, as a rule, do not touch upon the problem under discussion here.

Some recent works by Swedish scholars were, directly or indirectly, influenced by J. B. Pratt's definition of religion as people's "attitude toward the power or powers which they conceive as having ultimate control over their interests and destinies".¹ This definition was taken up by Hj. Sundén in his dissertation on Bergson's theory of religion (1940),² and by Widengren in

¹ J. B. Pratt, *The religious consciousness*, New York 1920, p. 2.

² Hj. Sundén, *La théorie Bergsonienne de la religion*, Uppsala 1940, passim. See e.g. p. 203: "... la vraie définition de la religion: la religion est une explication de la détermination de la destinée humaine." Cf. also p. 153 f.

Religionens värld (1945).¹ In the last mentioned work, Widengren also points out that Pratt's definition, and especially his term 'Determiner of Destiny' applies remarkably well to a particular form of theism (this term will be used here for any belief in a god, or gods), namely the idea of the so-called high god. Thus Widengren's *Hochgottglaube im alten Iran* (1938) also comes into the picture. In this book Widengren, on the basis of African and Iranian evidence, wanted to show that the idea of a sky-god, who is the Determiner of Destiny responsible both for good and evil, is an original phenomenon which cannot be understood as a late development or as a result of Christian missions. Pratt is not mentioned in *Hochgottglaube*, but some statements in *Religionens värld* show that this combination is not alien to Widengren's thinking.² It seems to me, however, that there is a slight change of emphasis from Pratt's 'interests and destinies' to Widengren's 'destiny' or 'Schicksal'. Pratt's term is broader, as indicated already by the plural form, 'destinies' and, in addition, includes the more active term 'interest'.

Widengren thinks that the idea of god is primary in religion and does not derive from anything else (such as the idea of mana, or supernatural power, the belief in spirits, etc.). But then it would follow that the religious interpretation of destiny as decreed by a personal god is also primary and that all instances of an impersonal Fate that exists independently of the gods or even stands above them, represent a later development, which may be described as a hypostatization of a function of the god, or gods. This view seems to be present behind Ugo Bianchi's work on the idea of destiny in Homer (*Dios aisa*, 1953). For here the main emphasis is placed on the fact that destiny is the decree of Zeus, and the writer makes every effort to explain away all passages in which destiny seems to be independent of Zeus so as to strengthen his main thesis. According to this view, it was only considerably later that the Greeks separated destiny from Zeus and finally came to regard it as a power that was even stronger than the gods.

It is not difficult to proceed beyond this point to the idea that theistic religion originated in man's reaction to destiny, attributing it to a personal being, or 'high god'. This view is actually defended by Sundén in his book

¹ G. Widengren, *Religionens värld*, 2nd ed., Stockholm 1953, pp. 10 f.

² E.g. p. 11: "Vi skola se att denna definition särskilt väl passar in på den typ av gudstro, höggudstro ..." Cf. also pp. 58 f., 68 f.

Gud, ödet, slumpen (1947). According to him it is man's reaction to that which happens to him that forms the very kernel of the religious experience: he feels dependent, powerless, guided; he seeks, and finds perhaps a purpose or a meaning behind the events—or he finds no meaning at all. If he conceives of the power behind the events as personal, the result is a god, if not, it is Fate or chance. Sundén thinks that the ability to ascribe a meaning or a purpose to events is universal and that it constitutes what he, following Andræ,¹ calls the religious disposition (*Anlage*). G. Klingberg in his *Studier i barnens religiösa liv* (1953) applies the same theory on evidence drawn from the religious life of school children.

Prof. E. Ehnmark of Lund has also given some attention to the theoretical problem of fatalism, or perhaps rather of destiny, in his dissertation on *The Idea of God in Homer* (1935), and in his popular book *Världsreligionerna* (1955). According to him, belief in destiny and belief in god(s) (or, religion) are two basically different and incompatible attitudes. "It is typical of destiny that it is conceived of as something given, as an order of things. Destiny is understood as something natural, as 'the way of the world'. That which is one's destiny is the normal, that which follows from the nature of things and life as they happen to be". It is no use complaining about destiny, for there is nobody to listen, "for destiny is not a power that governs, but an order that exists." When it is said, "nobody dies until his time has come" or that somebody "has lived out his time", this does not mean that the hour of death has been fixed by some power, but "only that the general conditions of life are such that every man has a certain life span allotted to him".²

One might ask if the order factor is not somewhat exaggerated in this argument. At any rate, it does not seem to fit in with certain concrete manifestations of fatalism (i.e. belief in fate). It is often not only its inexorableness, but also its capriciousness that gives destiny its character.

From a theoretical point of view Ehnmark's distinction may be of significance. But like the distinction between religion and magic it is sometimes hard to apply in practice. In reality theism and fatalism are intertwined, and there is in the realm of religion a great variety of interpretations of destiny in

¹ T. Andræ, *Die Frage der religiösen Anlage*, Uppsala 1932.

² E. Ehnmark, *Världsreligionerna*, 2nd ed., Stockholm 1961, p. 19.

the sense of that which happens to man, the predetermined lot, the inescapable. The 'fatalism' of Islam is strictly speaking not a belief in destiny but presupposes the predetermination of the almighty God. The Persian national epic *Shāhnāmah* at times refers to destiny as some kind of moral retribution. And, as already hinted at, in Homer, *aisa* and *moira* as a rule denote things allotted by Zeus. The Indians often call destiny *daivam*, i.e. the divine, the godsent, but at the same time, they regard it as the result of *karma*, the deeds performed in a previous existence.

Ehnmark is aware of this. He writes, "From a psychological point of view the difference between fatalism and theism is one of outlook. Therefore, the same man can have both opinions, although, of course, not with reference to the same event. At one time he says perhaps, 'this was my destiny', at another 'it was God's will'".¹

The first thing to be done in order to clarify these questions, it seems to me, is to ascertain what, in each case or in each milieu, is meant by 'destiny'. The concept is by no means clear and unambiguous, and further complication arises from the fact that some languages have several words for 'destiny'. It is necessary, then, to examine linguistic usage very carefully.

It turns out that, in spite of rich variation, there are certain characteristic ways of expression that are common to several cultures. The preislamic Arabs as well as ancient Teutons had a certain preference for passive verbal forms in order to express the predetermined lot: "it was destined for him", "it was allotted to him", or simply the impersonal form "it became (was)".² Especially in the case of Arabic is it important to bear in mind that the passive form in itself implies that the allotter is not defined: the Arabic passive form does not take an agent. The Persian phrase *būdandah būd*, "what was to be, was (i.e. happened)", which is very common in the *Shāhnāmah*, expresses the same idea combined with that of the inexorable necessity of fate.³

To the same group of words for 'destiny' we might perhaps reckon the passive participles that denote destiny as that which is 'destined', 'decreed',

¹ *Ib.* p. 22.

² H. Ringgren, *Studies in Arabian Fatalism*, Uppsala 1955, p. 7; *id.*, *Journal de Psychologie* 53, 1956, p. 410, with reference to Gehl, *Der germanische Schicksalsglaube*, Berlin 1939, p. 39.

³ E.g. H. Ringgren, *Fatalism in Persian epics*, Uppsala 1952, p. 16 (note 6), p. 58 (note 9), p. 62 (note 13).

'allotted', or 'sent', as e.g. *fatum*, "(that which is) said, decreed"; *heimarmenē*, "(that which is) allotted"; the old Swedish *audhinn* > mod. Swedish *öde*; certain Indian words. But it is often difficult to see the difference between a simple noun formed from the same root and such a participle. Is it possible to maintain a clear distinction between the Greek *moira* and *heimarmenē*, (both from the same root), or to say why Arabic uses *manīyah*, allotment (i.e. death) rather than a participle? Other such words are Icel. *skop*, Ags. *giscapu* (the allotted), German *Schicksal*, *Geschick* (*schicken* = to send).

Words meaning 'lot' or 'share' are rather common. But do they not presuppose somebody who allots or distributes? In Persian there is a word *bakht*, 'fortune', from Pahl. *bakht*, 'something allotted', but in the oldest texts there is also a *bagha*, as a divine epithet, the Allotter, and *baghōbakht* is 'that which has been allotted by the Allotter'.¹ The modern Persian word connotes personified fortune or luck, in some respects comparable to the Nordic *hamingja* and *fylgja*. Among the Indian terms for destiny we find *bhagadeyam*, 'god-given lot', and, as we saw, *daivam*, '(something) divine' or 'determined by god(s)'.

In a fairly well defined area, words for 'time' have come to be used to denote destiny. This is true of Iranian religion—where Time even appears as a god, Zervan, but also in a more general sense in the epics—in India, where *kāla* is 'destroying time', in preislamic Arabia, and to some extent in Israel.² This usage has two aspects. On the one hand, time is equal to time with its contents, i.e. the events that take place within time, and in this connection certain Pahlavi writings present philosophical speculations on time and space as prerequisites for all that happens. When the O.T. writer says, "my time is in thine hands", he means not only time in itself or the lifetime of man, but all that is contained in his lifetime, i.e. his destiny. On the other hand, time is the destroying factor, the power of destruction: "nothing resists time, not even the firm mountains", says an Arabic poet; consequently death and destruction are the inescapable lot or destiny of man. The inexorable course of time serves as a symbol for the inescapability of fate.

There are also words that emphasize the course of events: destiny is

¹ Ringgren, *Fatalism in Persian epics* pp. 90 f., with reference to G. Widengren, *Hochgottglaube im alten Iran*, Uppsala 1938, pp. 377 ff.

² Ringgren, *Fatalism in Persian epics* pp. 35 ff.

chance. Greek *tychē* belongs to this category; for *tynchanō* means 'to happen by chance'.

However, there is a risk in placing too much emphasis on etymologies and so-called original meanings. The significance of etymology has been exaggerated both in comparative religion and in Biblical research, and James Barr's criticism in *The Semantics of Biblical language* (1961) is applicable also to much that has been done in the field of the history of religions. It is the actual use of words in the textual connection we are studying that is important, not what the words meant "originally", but what they mean in the present linguistic or cultural context. Used with caution and common sense, etymologies can provide us with certain historical evidence, inform us about the previous history of an expression, but if the "original" meaning is applied to a much later context, the result is likely to be a distorted picture.

As applied to our present problem, this means that we should not base our argument too much on the original, etymological meaning of the words for 'destiny', but concentrate on the elucidation of the ideas and beliefs that are connected with fatalism, the attitudes it produces, etc. A good example is provided by the use of the ancient Arabic words for 'fate' in early Islamic poetry. Used in a new context, the words acquire a new and different meaning. Furthermore, it often turns out that several words are used to denote more or less the same thing; then it is not the *word* that is important, but the *thing*, in this particular case the idea of destiny.

In the light of this there are above all two sets of problems that come to the fore: 1) How is what happens understood and defined, and how is it related to theistic beliefs, if there are any? and 2) How do people behave, and what attitude do they take toward that which is understood as destiny?

As to our first question, Bleeker has tried, in *Numen* vol. 2,¹ to outline five different types of what he calls reaction to destiny-like events.

1. The universal insight that the wheel of fortune turns arbitrarily. One is a Sunday-child, the other is an unlucky fellow. Fortune and misfortune alternate in life without any visible ground or reason. Experiences of this kind do not always crystallize in a consistent doctrine. Often the result remains

¹ C. J. Bleeker, "Die Idee des Schicksals in der altägyptischen Religion", *Numen* 2, 1955, pp. 28 ff., reprinted in *id.*, *The sacred bridge*, Leiden 1963, pp. 112 ff. The typology quoted is found on pp. 31 ff. and 114 ff. respectively.

empirical wisdom of life with a religious colouring: you must accept adversities and remain calm when unexpected luck comes; for there are, after all, forces you cannot influence or change.

2. The idea that a man's destiny is in some way linked with his birth. Tales are told about fairies who give the new-born child all kinds of good things, or about evil spirits, witches or magicians who determine for it misfortune in some form or other. In a more systematic form this idea is found in astrology: it is the position of the stars at man's birth that determines his destiny. In addition, Hellenistic astrology, at least, was anchored in a comprehensive doctrine of universal cosmic laws and of correspondence between celestial and earthly phenomena.

3. The ancient idea of a world-order, which is inscrutable but reliable: all events are subject to this order, which will finally be realized in good as well as in bad men. This is basically an optimistic attitude. Examples include Indian *rta*, Chinese *tao*, Egyptian *ma'at*, and Greek *themis*, which, according to K. Lehr is the divine order that the Moiras follow in determining the destinies which are then sanctioned by Zeus, *heimarmenē*, *anankē*, Dike, Nemesis and the Erinyes. The *karma* of Hinduism and Buddhism belongs here, too, at least to some degree: an inexorable law of causality makes every action create results which appear as destiny in a subsequent existence.

4. The pessimistic conviction that man is subject to a mostly unhappy fate which he cannot escape. In Greek tragedy we find people with a curse resting upon them who in spite of their best intentions are entangled in guilt, who are driven by overwhelming forces till they, although innocent, appear guilty. and can assert their dignity only by devoting themselves to destruction. Bleeker finds something of this idea also in ancient Nordic religion, especially in the myths of Balder's death and Ragnarök. The theme is here intensified to the level of heroic defiance: the Islandic sagas relate how the warriors undauntedly meet fate(death), when their 'fortune' has abandoned them. Similar ideas are also found in preislamic Arab poetry.

5. The belief that an omnipotent god with supreme power determines, or has even determined in advance, man's destiny, both good and ill fortune, both salvation and eternal damnation. This idea is possible only in monotheistic religions or religions in which lesser gods are at least not able to interfere in the course of world events as predetermined by the supreme god.

Bleeker refers to Calvin's doctrine of predestination and the religious 'fatalism' of Islam, which even if they differ in content are similar in structure. He says, "However, in both cases, this belief is burdened with a problem that constantly repeats itself: the human drive to freedom revolts against a purely deterministic conception of God, and where trust in divine providence is predominant, the realisation of evil destiny is a constant cause of disturbance".

It seems to me that this classification does more justice to the actual manifoldness of these ideas than Ehnmark's strict distinction between two alternatives: fate—god. Nevertheless, the relation between fatalism and theism remains one of the most important problems we have to face. I am not so much concerned, then, about the question of priority: which one was there first, fatalism or theism? Rather, our task concerns the interrelationship between the two in the religions actually existent, and perhaps ultimately envisages the use of possible results for a definition of the essence of religion. Here we meet with questions like these: Is destiny that which God, or the gods, determine, or is it something that is more or less independent of the divine will, a power on which even the gods are dependent? Both opinions exist—and it is perhaps not worthwhile to ask which one of them was absolutely first, but in some cases, e.g. in Greece, it is possible to follow the course of development for some centuries. How is impersonal fate related to a personal god? How is it possible that these two ideas can exist side by side? Is it an example of the general lack of logic that is often met with in religion, as, for instance, when Christian preaching sometimes says that the deceased have gone to their home in heaven and sometimes speaks of resurrection and the last judgment? Is it an instance of the phenomenon that Hultkrantz has called attention to in his interesting paper on 'Configurations of religious beliefs'.¹ In other words, are there certain situations, certain contexts in which fatalism is actualized, and others in which theism naturally appears? If so, what are they?

The second main question concerns the attitude to take toward destiny. What does man do, or what should he do, when he is hit by that which is destined? To what extent is destiny contingent upon his own doings? This

¹ Published in *Ethnos* 1956 pp. 194 ff.

last question is not as absurd as it might sound. It is a fact that Babylonian religion reckons with a destiny, *šīmtu*, fixed by the gods. But there is a phrase saying that a man "died on a day that was not that of his destiny".¹ Consequently, destiny is not unalterable. The question is: why and how is the predestined fate changed so that a man dies too early? Is it a punishment for sin, or something else? If it were not so often expressly stated that it is the gods who "determine the destinies", one might be tempted to use Ehnmark's category of an order: an untimely death is a death at an abnormal time, it breaks the order. But the texts are not explicit on that point.

Just as in Christianity and in Islam the relation between predestination and man's own work has been discussed, there are also in India discussions of the relations between destiny (divine decree) and human activity. Kautilya, a politician living about 300 B.C. states that human activity and destiny together rule the course of the world. Man's activity is wise or unwise, destiny is reflected in good and bad fortune. In the section of Matsyapurāṇa that is called Rājadharmā and deals with the duties of the king, it is asked whether destiny or human activity is more valuable. The answer is that destiny, i.e. the *karman* of a person's earlier existence, has not the same value as action. Good action can reverse an adverse fate, and not even good *karman* will be realized without human activity. Only those who lack energy refer to destiny. The opinion is expressed that success is determined by three factors: destiny, activity and time.²

The question of man's attitude toward destiny has never, as far as I know, been treated systematically. I permit myself to quote, as a basis for our discussion, some sentences from a paper by a German colleague,³ which, unfortunately, is available only in a private edition. He mentions four basic interpretations of destiny, namely:

1. First, what he calls the *primitive* interpretation, which "derives all that happens to us, all that we experience in the world, from the caprice of mysterious, for the most part hostile and malicious gods, demons, or powers and

¹ For *šīmtu*, see C. Fichtner-Jeremias, "Der Schicksalsglaube bei den Babylonern" (*MVAG* 1922, 2), M. David, *Les dieux et le destin en Babylonie*, Paris 1949; and the remarks by A. L. Oppenheim, *Ancient Mesopotamia*, Chicago 1964, pp. 201 ff.

² H. Losch, *Rājadharmā*, Bonn 1959, pp. 103 f.

³ Fr. Maass, Professor of Old Testament exegesis at the university of Kiel.

thinks that these powers can be placated by sacrifices or escaped in some way." To this view no meaning or purpose is found in destiny.

2. The *heroic* view of destiny believes in an inflexible law and an inescapable predetermination in world history. This interpretation occurs when the tragic hero comes to appear guilty or has to face destruction. He cannot do anything against destiny, but he can remain constant and thus vindicate himself. (This category is more or less identical with Bleeker, No. 4.)

3. Destiny can be *denied* or rejected. Man will not let the outward happenings, be they ever so terrible or painful, move or shake his mind. He tries to exclude the possibility of a real interference of destiny in his life, to screen himself off from destiny and to bear it calmly and indifferently. (This is more or less the attitude of ancient Arab poetry—*ṣabr*, patience in the face of the strokes of destiny is the ideal. In stoicism this attitude concerns a destiny that is not really denied, but accepted as a manifestation of the rational order of the world.)

4. The *acceptance* of destiny, which the writer thinks to be especially characteristic of Christianity, but, as a matter of fact, is found wherever destiny is derived from the will of a god and, therefore, is supposed to have a meaning even if this meaning is sometimes, or perhaps even in most cases, hidden to the individual.

It is only the first of these types that needs further comment. It sums up too much under one heading. The gods are not always malicious. The destiny they decree is not always capricious and meaningless—this is more true of an independent and impersonal fate—and it is not at all certain that destiny can be escaped or avoided by sacrifices or otherwise. There are few concrete manifestations of so-called fatalism that do not contain traits from the other types.

It is not my intention to anticipate the discussions that will be pursued here. I have only tried to sketch some of the problems that seem important to me. It is obvious that some of the classifications proposed are not entirely satisfactory. It seems that whatever basis we choose for our classification, there will always be some phenomena that do not fit neatly into the pattern.

For my own part, I should like to start from man's attempt to adjust himself to his existence, to understand and define it and to arrange his life accordingly. We are dealing with the interpretation of that which happens.

From one point of view the alternatives God, fate, and chance overlap in a series of transitional and blended forms. From another point of view, there is a whole spectrum of beliefs, ranging from the feeling of total dependence to the proud conviction that man is the architect of his own fortune. And from a third angle there are the attitudes of heroic defiance, pessimistic resignation and positive acceptance. The interrelation of fatalism with other aspects of man's way of looking at life as a whole is an interesting subject for research from each one of these angles.

Divine and Demonic Necessity in the Oresteia

By CARL-MARTIN EDSMAN

*Aeschylus' religion*¹

Aeschylus remains wholly within the context of the ancient religion. He forms his dramatical works with stern gravity and deep religiosity, so that a pervading piety is natural and there are no godless people. The archaic attitude of the poet appears not the least in his view of the departed. They are (as in Homer) bloodless shadows without emotions or perceptions (Agam. 568). But at the same time the murdered ones cry for vengeance, Nemesis rules over all and everything, and Dike looks after the right of the angered dead. The departed, therefore, have a dangerous power (Choeph. 479 ff., 315 ff.). When the earth has drunk the blood of a murdered person there is no turning back, even Zeus himself is then powerless (Eum. 647 ff., Choeph. 66 f.). The entire Oresteia is concerned with the necessity and the problem of blood-revenge, with retributive justice, but also—one must add—with atonement.

The fickleness of fortune and the vanity of human life (Agam. 1237 ff.) in Aeschylus retreats, however, before the omnipotence of the gods. *Koros* creates *hubris*, and this, in its turn, *atē*, which is already in itself a punishment (Agam. 370 ff., Eum. 530 ff.). The envy of the gods, to be sure, is found also in Aeschylus, but at the same time the poet turns against the idea that great fortune leads to great misfortune (Agam. 750 ff.). An unrighteous act gives birth to misfortune, while a righteous house happily flourishes with children.

¹ For this general background I rely particularly on M. P. Nilsson, *Geschichte der griechischen Religion* I (Handbuch der Altertumswissenschaft V: 2: 1), 2. Aufl. München 1955, pp. 750 ff., supplemented by W. Schmid, *Geschichte der griechischen Literatur, Die klassische Periode* 2 (Handbuch der Altertumswissenschaft VII: 1: 2), München 1934, pp. 265 ff., 222 ff.

There is no mechanical happening. Misfortune comes from the gods, but men have both free will and responsibility. Determinism and indeterminism stand naturally side by side. Religious thinking about that which has happened ascribes this to the gods. But in the ethical decision man is free (Eum. 531 ff.). There is also a combination of these views (e.g. Agam. 1505 ff) so that it is said that God's hand is also present when somebody hastens into destruction. (Pers. 742).

The principal theme of the tragedy is the tension between personal predisposition, personal will and personal desire for freedom on one hand, and divine, human or other necessity on the other. At the time of Aeschylus, the purposeful individualism of the new Attic democracy throws doubt upon the divine righteous order of the world. Solon had already struggled with this problem, making the ancient belief in a divine providence his own. The development prosperity—satiety—hubris and ensuing divine punishment (ἄλβος, κόρος, ὕβρις, δίκη) is firmly laid down, and it places the responsibility on man. Aeschylus builds further on this and wants to illustrate the problems of god and man, state and individual, fate and freedom. Man does not unpunished break the laws of righteousness which, for humanity's own welfare, stand under the omnipotent protection of the gods.

In *The Seven Against Thebes* (687) it is said that Eteocles acts in blindness (ἄτη). But the chorus reckons with his free choice, and he himself blames the gods for the evil. In the same way Cassandra acts and speaks under the necessity of Fate which she herself anticipates. Still none of Aeschylus' dramas is a tragedy of Fate. In his view the idea of hubris is bound up in a peculiar way with the requirements of justice and with the family's guilt. Posterity has to atone for the crimes of the ancestors, and punishment draws near as blindness, *atē*. Retributive justice rests as a curse on a certain house. It does not, however, strike an innocent person but, as it says later in the Bible, "Whatever a man sows, that he will also reap" (Gal. 6: 7), or in the words of Cicero, *ut sementem feceris ita metes* (*De Or.* II, 65, 261). Aeschylus puts this rule in the following way, "Who acts shall endure. So speaks the voice of the ageold wisdom" (δράσαντι παθεῖν, τριγέρων μῦθος τὰδε φωνεῖ) (Choeph. 313, cf. Agam. 1563 f., Eum. 489 ff.).

Good fortune follows the moderate one, a kind of reward of righteousness, while punishment is a consequence of hubris. Filial piety and hospitality

are not moral duties, however, but religious demands. In the same way the popular saying "Wisdom comes through suffering" has been lifted up by Aeschylus to a higher level, when he speaks of *πάθει μάθος* (Agam. 177, cf. Eum. 521).¹

It is true that man at first understands god-sent suffering as an evil. In such cases Aeschylus avoids speaking of a certain god but mentions quite generally a demon, as if he wanted to distinguish between the supreme judge and the one who carries out his will. The "Allotter" often takes the shape of a wild beast that strikes its claws into its prey. But in the *Oresteia* the doctrine of *πάθει μάθος* is the keystone in Aeschylus' theodicy: man cannot escape suffering, it belongs to his existence.

The gods rule the world, and everything comes from them (Agam. 1487), even misfortune. One might say, to use a later Christian expression, that what happens is "God's will". The question why something happens is often lacking. When it is touched upon (Agam. 677 f., cf. 649), it always deals with guilt and righteousness, the latter being most frequently bound up with Zeus or appearing as his daughter Dike (Choeph. 949, 639 ff.). Zeus' virgin daughter Dike appears shining with light in the smoky cottages of the poor (Agam. 773 ff.), while she turns her eye away from the golden palaces of the soiled rich. Sometimes she weighs with her scales (Agam. 249, Choeph. 61), sometimes she fights with the sword of retribution in her hand (Choeph. 639, 947 ff.), sometimes she is the firm rock against which the ill-deed is crushed (Eum. 565), sometimes she is a firm trunk or root-stock (Choeph. 646). With Zeus and Kratos she forms a trinity (Choeph. 244 f., cf. Agam. 182). It is she who protects the foreigner and secures gods and parents the veneration that is due to them (Eum. 270 f., 545 f.). She has justice dispensed sooner or later in life (Choeph. 651, 936, 957, Agam. 463), or judgment may also come after death (Choeph. 61 ff., Agam. 1527, 1555 f., Eum. 274 f., 339 f., 355 ff.). Through familial solidarity the punishment may also hit the descendants of the guilty person (Agam. 373 ff., 758 ff.). The relationship between the dead and their descendants is illustrated by the fishing net in

¹ For this, see H. Dörrie, "Leid und Erfahrung. Die Wort- und Sinn-Verbindung *πάθειν-μαθεῖν* im griechischen Denken", *Akademie der Wissenschaften und der Literatur in Mainz, Abhandlungen der Geistes- und Sozialwissenschaftlichen Klasse* 1956: 5.

the sea, held up by the floats (Choeph. 505 f.), quoted among others by Clement of Alexandria. Also evildoers may be the instruments of divine punishment, e.g., Clytaemestra (Agam. 912 f., 1396, 1406, 1432, 1526). At the mythical level retributive justice takes the shape of the Furies, who like indefatigable dogs or good archers hunt their prey. The Furies in their turn forebode the magically effective curse of Alastor or Ate. According to one interpretation of Aeschylus Dike is in the center of the poet's religion (Schmid).

Zeus is both omnipotent and righteous (Agam. 160 ff., 355 ff., 1563 f.) to such an extent that he sometimes becomes rather a principle than a personal god (Agam. 160 f.). The other gods are subordinated to Zeus, as e.g. Apollo in *The Eumenides*. In a famous fragment there appears even a pantheistic idea of the supreme god. Aeschylus' Zeus religion, which has hardly influenced posterity, is a "grandiose creation" (M. P. Nilsson).

The drama *The Suppliants* forms the first and the only preserved part of the trilogy on the Danaids, who fleeing from the threat of marriage come to Argos. There the king hesitates between the risk of a war and the refusal of the sacred right of asylum. "The central and the most sublime thing in the choruses of the tragedy is the monotheistically coloured Zeus religion that embraces and pervades the entire work of Aeschylus" (E. Zilliacus).¹ Danaus states that the righteous order of the world cannot be altered:

Who not even in hell,
Where another Zeus among the dead (they say)
Works out their final punishment, can flee
Their guilt of lust.²

(229 ff.)

The Danaids also appeal to Zeus when King Pelasgus hesitates to receive them into his protection:

¹ In his Swedish translation, Stockholm 1933, pp. 15 f.

² Translation here as in the following from *The Complete Greek Tragedies*, ed. by D. Grene-R. Lattimore, Vol. I: *Aeschylus*, Chicago 1959, which is based on H. W. Smyth's text in *Loeb Classical Library* (1922-26). Since this translation has not always managed to combine poetical beauty and faithfulness to the original in the same brilliant way as Zilliacus, it has been utilized somewhat sparingly for verbal quotations.

Both sides of related blood he sees,
Zeus holds a sensitive balance,
To evil and the righteous weighing
Just and unjust fairly.
Why fear to act justly?

(402 ff.)

.....

Do what you will,
Thy house remains to pay,
Fined in thy children:
Justice is equal.
Mark the justice of Zeus.

(434 f.)

When the Argives have granted them asylum, the Danaids pray that the gods might preserve them from war because they have shown mercy. But there is also prayer for welfare in all respects instead of war and plague. Let fear of god, wisdom, obedience to the law and filial piety prevail, let the women bear their children, let the earth be blessed with crops, and let the herds increase.

In their utmost distress, when the virgins are violently forced to the waiting ship, they exclaim:

Earth, Mother Earth,
Avert his fearful cry.
O son, son of Earth, O Zeus.

(890 ff.)

The first part of the drama concludes with a prayer to Zeus, which consists of a dialogue between the two halves of the chorus and which emphasizes that Zeus' will is inalterable and inscrutable. The last strophe of the united chorus (= the Danaids) runs:

And strength may he assign us.
I am content if ill
Is one-third my lot,
And justly, with my prayers,
Beside the saving arts of god,
To follow justice.

(καὶ κράτος νέμοι γυναί-
 ξίν τὸ βέλτερον κακοῦ
 καὶ τὸ δίμοιρον αἰνῶ,
 καὶ δίκᾱ δίκας ἔπε-
 σθαι, ξὺν εὐχαΐς ἑμαῖς, λυτηρίοις
 μαχαναῖς θεοῦ πάρα.)

(1069 ff.)

Thus Zeus and justice belong naturally together also in this drama. In the final strophe there is a glimpse of the tension between the different factors that determine man's destiny. The strict order of justice is to some extent broken through by the lot of Fate, which is met with fortitude and—it is hoped—will contain twice as much (δίμοιρον) good as ill. But this regularity does not prevent divine intervention. However, the prayers seem primarily to be aimed at having justice dispensed regardless of whether this is done through the normal course of a righteous order of the world, or whether it is aided by special divine action. On the other hand, it does not seem possible to find any opposition between justice and mercy in this passage. The laconic expressions of chorus lyrics are equivocal in themselves and in this case they also allow of different philological interpretations. Smyth's English version interprets both δίκας and πάρα differently from Lattimore and harmonizes the different components with each other: "(Content that,) through means of deliverance vouchsafed of Heaven, conflicting rights, in accordance with my prayers, should attend the course of justice." The term δίμοιρον, which, by the way, is also ambiguous, leads us to proceed to the problem of Fate in Aeschylus.

The Problem of Fate in General in Aeschylus

Aeschylus uses the traditional Greek expressions for Fate, even if he sometimes gives them a more or less peculiar content. Also the statistical distribution of words for Fate may suggest characteristic features in him. Thus the words for fate include *Tyche* (τύχη), luck or fortune, which is

rarely personified in Aeschylus and usually means unforeseen or uncontrollable luck rather than Fate. Thus Tyche can be good or bad and is sometimes bound up with the gods (Agam. 661). There is further *Moirā* (μοῖρα), the portion or share allotted to man, also personified, with its synonym *aisa* (αἴσα), and in addition *ananke* (ἀνάγκη), necessity, while the related terms *adrasteia* and *heimarmene* are used in a few exceptional cases.

Dike (Δίκη) which has a strong fatalistic character, is naturally enough very frequent. To the same semantic sphere belongs also *Themis* (Θέμις).

To some extent also divine *phthonos* (φθόνος), envy or jealousy of man's good fortune, is one of the factors that determine man's destiny (Agam. 904, cf. 1008 ff.). Its content is related to *nemesis* which follows *hubris* (cf. Agam. 370 ff., 468 ff., though the terms are not found here).

A peculiar position is taken up by the *Demon* (Δαῖμον, probably from δαίεσθαι, to apportion) which as family curse and hereditary guilt comes upon the members of a family, even on an innocent person like Orestes. It also appears with other names, such as *Ate* ('Ατη) and *Alastor* ('Αλάστωρ).

Ate, who in mythology is the oldest daughter of Zeus (Il. xix. 90), means "injury", "wound", moral blindness, disintegration and destruction. In Aeschylus *Ate* denotes primarily in a passive sense the condition of the injured, the act of suffering injury (= λύπη, βλάβη). There is only one scholion in Homer which explains the word in an active sense as ἐκοῦσιος ἀμαρτία, and Suidas as a secondary meaning renders it with the Christian synonym ὁ διάβολος ὁ ἀντικείμενος. Also the figures of *ate* as the field on which the corn grows, or as the fruit of *hubris*, are primarily passive. But in *The Persians* and *Agamemnon* the metaphors take on an active sense, and *Ate* becomes instead of a passive misfortune a demon and a diabolic destructive power, which lures man into its net, has the evil eye, and deprives man of his own will. She is furious and murderous, she can be sent by the gods, though she does not attack innocent people but is the fruit of *hubris* (Agam. 764 ff.).

Alastor is the spirit of the murdered one, which cries for revenge and atonement, personified as *Ate*'s son or incarnated in some survivor, e.g., Clytaemestra. Etymologically *Alastor* has been related to λαῶν (to behold), thus "the one who cannot be beheld" without the demon's evil eye striking the person in question, to the root λαθ (to forget), thus "the one who does

not forget", and finally and most probably to ἀλάσθαλι, to rove, thus "Irrgeist" or roving ghost.¹

The relationship between Fate and the gods is not univocally defined in Aeschylus. In *Prometheus Bound* Zeus seems to be subordinated to *Moirā* or inevitable Fate. Sometimes Fate is identified with Zeus' decree. A Fate that is entirely independent of Zeus is hardly to be found in Aeschylus.² As far as man is concerned there is also the opinion that Fate is something inescapable. A man who has got many wounds does not die until his time is up (fragm. 362),³ and one does not evade one's fate by staying at home.

However, Aeschylus purifies the Greek conception of the Olympian gods and subordinates them to an omnipotent Zeus. His will coincides with Fate, which now becomes not only inexorable but also good. "The Erinyes, once the chthonic powers of relentless vengeance, are persuaded to accept the beneficent rôle of demons of fertility. The sense of guilt is appeased by the discovery that only wilful sin knows no forgiveness. The last lines of the *Oresteia* present in festal song the union of all-seeing Zeus and the rule of *Moirā*" (Eum. 1045 f.).⁴

When *Moirā* at other places in Aeschylus appears as superior to Zeus, as in *Prometheus Bound*, there have been various attempts to solve the contradiction. W. Schmid for this reason regards this drama as spurious. Others (Zilliacus,⁵ Greene, Vian) point to the fact that *Prometheus Bound* is only the first part of a lost trilogy. Fragments of the sequel show that Zeus himself is changed and is reconciled with the titan, who is set free by reason of a vicarious sacrifice of the centaur Cheiron.

Moirā is the moral law that Zeus himself has broken by outraging his father. Therefore he too is struck by the Erinyes. Zeus must transform

¹ For the terminology, see W. C. Greene, *Moirā, Fate, Good, Evil in Greek Thought*, Cambridge, Mass. 1944, pp. 21, 105 f., 124, Schmid, *op. cit.* pp. 27 f., U. Bianchi, ΔΙΟΣ ΑΙΕΑ, Rome 1953, *Der kleine Pauly*, s.v. "Alastor". Cf. also E. Peterich, *Die Theologie der Hellenen*, Leipzig 1938, pp. 173 f., 213 ff. For the frequency of words, see G. Italie, *Index Aeschyleus*, Leiden 1954-55.

² Nilsson, *loc. cit.*, Schmid, *loc. cit.*

³ Cf. R. Wildhaber, "Die Stunde ist da, aber der Mann nicht", ein europäisches Sagenmotiv, *Rheinisches Jahrbuch für Volkskunde* 9, 1936, pp. 65 ff.

⁴ Greene, *op. cit.* p. 110

⁵ *Aiskylos Prometheus* tolkad av E. Zilliacus, Stockholm 1931, pp. 13 f.

himself in accord with the pattern or the harmony constituted by *Moirai*, which is the law of evolution and the meaning of history, as Greene puts it.¹

The Problem of Fate in the Oresteia

The contents and the tragic conflict of the *Oresteia* are briefly the following. Those who have suffered a violent death have a right for vengeance. Orestes has to take revenge for the murder of his father even if he is thereby forced to do violence to his mother and to the relative who is her lover. Apollo himself points this out as a sacred duty and threatens him with terrible punishments if the deed is not performed. Also the goddess *Dike*, the personification of justice, unconditionally demands blood revenge. As soon as the blood has flown, the soul of the murdered person cries for revenge and does not rest until a revenger appears, who, in his turn, has to atone for his deed. Each ill-deed generates a new one, not only in the individual but in the entire family to which he belongs. The evil is incarnated in the spirit of curse and vengeance, the demon Alastor. He requites ill-deeds committed, but at the same time he instigates new ones till he is satisfied with revenge.

In the family of the Atrids the family curse comes from Thyestes, who pronounces it when his brother Atreus reveals that the meat of a meal is that of Thyestes' own children. Thyestes' surviving son Aegisthus kills his uncle Atreus and entices Clytaemestra to murder her husband Agamemnon, son of Atreus, on his return from the Trojan war. This in turn forces Agamemnon's son Orestes to the murder of his mother and an uncle, although he shrinks back from such a deed.

But Apollo who has instigated it all, also finally brings about a reconciliation. The Furies, or spirits of retribution, who take the shape of the women of the chorus, pursue Orestes with their songs of curse to Delphi and Athens. The goddess Athene appoints a court, the Areopagus, which acquits Orestes. As Eumenides, the Furies receive a permanent cult place in Athens. They must, as Wilamowitz puts it, "recognize the state as the bearer and

¹ Greene, *op. cit.* p. 124; cf. also Vian, "Le conflit entre Zeus et la destinée dans Éschyle", *Revue des études grecques* 60, 1947, pp. 190 ff., and L. Pearson, *Popular Ethics in Ancient Greece*, Stanford, Calif. 1962, pp. 90 ff.

guardian of justice and relinquish their revenging task to it. They do this at the same time as they find a home in the same state."¹

The repeated allusions of the chorus to the curse that rests on the house and to the inescapable power of Fate form a recurring motif which puts its stamp on the entire trilogy.² The title of this paper, "Divine and demonic necessity in the Oresteia" consequently refers to something that is essential to this drama.

In *The Libation Bearers* the chorus invokes the deities of vengeance (377, 399, 471 ff.), the *Moirai* and *Dike* (306-314, cf. 461 ff.), as well as Zeus (395, 409) and Agamemnon himself (315 ff.). Just before Orestes kills his mother he quickly reviews what has happened: if *Moirai* shares the accusation of the murder of Agamemnon with Clytaemestra, she also bears the responsibility for Clytaemestra's imminent death (910 f., cf. 622, 635 ff., 927: *aisa*).

For all that justice has to be dispensed by human hands.³ The persuasion and transformation of the Furies in addition to Athene's merciful voting imply that compassion, mercy, and divine grace are allowed to supplement the voice of reason. In the same way the human parties in Rafael's *Disputa* have their counterparts in the heavenly hosts.

The Furies claim kinship with their sisters the *Moirai* and thereby also with *Dike* (Eum. 961 ff.; cf. 172, 334 ff., 724), even if they only represent partial aspects of these powers. For it is a restricted *Dike* who pays heed to the murder of a mother as in the case of Orestes, but not to the killing of a husband, as in the case of Clytaemestra. There is also a conflict between the primordial *Moirai*, with whom the Furies are connected—they are not only devils and representatives of evil—and Zeus' later government which looks after suppliants and people not protected by the law. The murder of Clytaemestra is a just murder because the intention is good; therefore Orestes guilt is diminished.

¹ Quoted from G. Pfannmüller, *Tod, Jenseits und Unsterblichkeit in der Religion, Literatur und Philosophie der Griechen und Römer*, München-Basel 1953, pp. 81 f.

² Greene, *op. cit.* p. 126. I have not had accession to J. W. Pugsley, "The Fate Motive and its Echoes in the Oresteia", *Transactions of the American Philosophical Association* 60, 1929, pp. 38 ff.

³ Greene, *op. cit.* pp. 129, 131.

The change and transformation in *The Eumenides* cannot be brought about by the Zeus of *Prometheus Bound*, the merciless tyrant who is subordinate to *Moirai*. But it is possible for the Zeus whom we know from *The Suppliants* and the end of the Prometheus trilogy. This Zeus "has learned by suffering to be wise and to feel pity, to relax the letter of the law and to forgive in order that real justice may be done, to conceive of goodness not as something external and objective but as the will that moves from within".

It might seem that Greene is here reading into Aeschylus the New Testament idea of God. But it is the inner logic of the drama that actualizes such language, even if one has to be on one's guard against anachronisms and disregard for peculiarities in comparing documents dealing with similar problems. "In interpreting *The Eumenides* even the most careful philologists become, whether willing or unwilling, halfway theologians."¹ It is impossible to get away from the question of meaning, however much, to a student of classical history and literature, it be inspired by classicistic aesthetics or bear the stamp of the drama of ideas, or otherwise be kept away from the Attic theatre. The gods, ancient and new, the primordial powers and the Olympians, the protectors of the family and the state, enter the stage replacing the human actors.

The innumerable scholarly interpretations of modern times are classified by Reinhardt into three main groups: the juridical, the religio-historical, and the political-ethical one, the latter with either a humanitarian or a political-patriotic emphasis. The educational effect that is connected with all these interpretations must have been more obvious to Aeschylus' contemporaries than to the modern reader. The glorification of Athens is of mainly historical interest to us. Possibly the idea that ancient social institutions remain but are reinterpreted and re-created in a progressive society may still fascinate us and have some relevance.

The juridical interpretation finds in *The Eumenides* the process of the state's taking over justice, the replacing of blood revenge by a regulated lawsuit. Society says, "The revenge is mine", thus abrogating the law of retribution, "An eye for an eye and a tooth for a tooth". A humanitarian

¹ K. Reinhardt, *Aischylos als Regisseur und Theologe*, Bern 1949, pp. 140 f.

public justice takes the place of ancient blood-revenge. It is only a pity that the case is so complicated.

The religio-historical interpretation finds in *The Eumenides* the triumph of the Olympian, heavenly and light gods over the earthbound, dark and terrifying powers of the primordial period. It is also the human and the formed that overcomes the demonic and the formless. On one side there are such notions as spirit—male—new, on the other side instinct—female—ancient, or according to Bachofen, patriarchy and matriarchy.

The political interpretation discovers in *The Eumenides* the birth of the *polis*, the description of the human spirit finding itself in a politically organized existence, the liberation of man to individual responsibility, his development from subordination to magical rites to the cultivation of right and truth in the spirit of Athene, etc.

After this brief exposition of the contents, the problems and the possible interpretations of the *Oresteia* we proceed to an examination of some specific passages. In *Agamemnon* the family curse has different names. Sometimes (1461) it is called the spirit of discord (ἔρις ἐρίδματος, Lattimore: "Demon of death"), sometimes (1468) it is called a demon (δαῖμον, Lattimore: "divinity") who attacks the two brothers of Tantalus' family. This thrice blood-fed demon of the family (δαίμονα γέννης τῆσδε) kindles the thirst for new blood (1475 ff.). But Clytaemestra tries in vain to blame the furious play of evil powers. While admitting that a great and angry demon (Lattimore: spirit) ravages the house the terrified chorus corrects her by saying that this happens through Zeus, who causes and brings about everything:

For what thing without Zeus is done among mortals?

What here is without God's blessing (θεόκραντον)?

(1487 f.)

At the same time the chorus states that it is Clytaemestras own hand that has wielded the two-edged weapon. The queen herself maintains that it is the old fierce spirit of vengeance (παλαιὸς δριμύς ἀλάστωρ) who has assumed her form and thus performed the deed (1500 ff.). The chorus, however, insists on the queen's individual guilt, even if the revenging spirit of the family has contributed:

What man shall testify
 Your hands are clean of this murder?
 How? How? Yet from his father's blood
 Might swarm some fiend (*ἀλάστορ*) to guide you.
 (1505 ff.)

Thus, at the transcendental level the dialectics is concerned with demonic versus divine necessity, and at the human level collective versus individual responsibility and guilt. Freedom and bondage is another question which does not coincide with the antithesis divine-human. The poet does not end up in any philosophical antinomies but includes all these viewpoints in a living religious view of reality. To this belongs also the fact that the scale of justice (*Dike*) sooner or later sinks for the guilty one, as it is emphasized in the second part of the *Oresteia*, *The Libation Bearers* (61 ff.). The congealed writing of blood is not to be blotted out. A painful destruction, or, personally expressed, pain-bringing *Ate*, in the long run breaks down the guilty (*διαλγῆς ἄτη διαφέρει τὸν αἷτιον*).

Characteristically enough, the fatalistic words appear when the chorus describes this and other inevitable events. The gods (*sic!*) have placed upon the kidnapped slaves the fate or necessity of belonging to two cities (*ἀνάγκη γιν ἀμφίπολιν*). But

The day of destiny (*τὸ μόριμον*) awaits for the free man as well
 As for the man enslaved beneath an alien hand.
 (103 f.)

Fate is also personal and thus also acts in accordance with Zeus' will and the righteous laws of *Dike*:

Almighty Destinies, by the will
 Of Zeus let these things
 Be done, in the turning of Justice.
 For the word of hatred spoken, let hate
 Be a word fulfilled. The spirit of Right
 Cries out aloud and extracts atonement
 Due.

(ἀλλ' ὃ μεγάλοι Μοῖραι, Διόθεν
 τῆδε τελευτᾶν,
 ἧ τὸ δίκαιον μεταβαίνει.
 ἀντι μὲν ἐχθρᾶς γλώσσης ἐχθρὰ

γλῶσσα τελείσθω· τοῦφειλόμενον
 πρᾶσσοῦσα Δίκη μέγ' ἄνται·
 (306 ff.)

Smitten by all calamity and sorrow Electra exclaims on the gravemound of her father Agamemnon: "Is not disaster (doom: ἄτα), or Ate, invincible?" (339) But not only men but also superhuman or non-human powers are subject to Fate. In *The Eumenides* the Furies sing that also their revenging function is spun for them by the everdetermining (διανταία) *Moirā* (334). They have it eternally from their hour of birth (349) and therefore represent the ancient laws (παλαιούς νόμους) which are now abolished by the young gods (808 f.).

We revert to some of the different total views that various scholars have derived from the same material. When E. Peterich in his work *Die Theologie der Hellenen* (Leipzig 1938) comes to speak of the Erinyes, he adds a special chapter called "Die Gnade" (pp. 227 ff.). It contains an analysis of *The Eumenides*, "the most magnificent theological poetry of the Hellenes". The drama deals with the struggle of the divine powers for the soul of the mother-murderer Orestes. The action presupposes a firm belief in a life in the hereafter and a justice that is dispensed beyond the grave (269 ff.), almost in the same way as the Christians look forward to a just judgment.

The revenging Erinyes are the guardians of eternal justice, and they are not satisfied with cultic purifications. Even if they appear as infernal spirits, comparable to the devils in Dante's Hell (300 ff.), they represent justice and not violence. They have their ancient office from *Moirā* herself (334) and they are proud of it (392 ff.). Benevolence also belongs to their nature, Aeschylus is not the first to make them Eumenides.

There is both juridical and religious history in *The Eumenides*. Apollo defends the broader rights of matrimony, not only those of blood as the Erinyes. He punishes the murder of the husband and at Zeus command sends Orestes to take revenge on Agamemnon from his own mother Clytaemestra. Apollo, therefore, is an accomplice, accused with her and the real culprit. This makes the understanding of the drama more difficult for us. In the last resort the problem is concerned with free will, and the Greeks of that time neither acknowledged nor denied free will. Orestes has no free will, he is an instrument. Clytaemestra on the other hand has killed Aga-

memnon on her own impulse; when she blames her husband's sacrificing Iphigenia and his intimacy with Cassandra, these are pretexts. Therefore she is hit by the punishment of the gods, but can this reach Orestes who has carried out the will of the gods themselves (cf. 426: ἀνάγκαις)?

Not even the new court, Areopagus, can acquit Orestes, he has forfeited his life also according to the new justice, since one more than half of the judges has voted for death. But then Athene throws her white voting stone into the urn (734). So Orestes is acquitted. Why does Athene do this? Not only because she herself has no mother and consequently does not care for the murder of a mother (736), but she acts by order of Zeus, whom Orestes also immediately thanks as *Soter* (760). Thus the circle from the beginning of *Agamemnon* is closed, where the chorus of the Argivian old men sings of χάρις βίαιος (βιαιῶς).

Aeschylus has not only written of history of law and cult in *The Eumenides*, but he has also made a theological drama about justice and grace. Neither human nor divine justice can stand without grace, and this thought is older than Aeschylus. But in him something of this ancient Greek doctrine of grace has been preserved, according to which neither the Erinyes nor Zeus are purely revenging and judging deities, just as little as the God of the Old Testament is such a god.

This total view is found also in Greene. At every point Aeschylus has transformed the traditional material and poured new wine into the old bottles, whether myths, scenic technique, or religious ideas are concerned. The family curse is not an implacable fate, but it is finally removed and justice is crowned with mercy. The purity of motive in the acting person makes this solution possible, which means that the role of human will is inculcated. There is no mechanical predestination. Suffering is not overcome through resignation but through compassion and forgiveness. It is characteristic that Greene in a footnote quotes the words of Jesus on the cross, "Father forgive them...", when he wants to illustrate what Aeschylus means. The individual does not live in isolation but is a part of a universal human and cosmic whole. The poet boldly tackles the eternal contrasts between fate and freedom, justice and mercy, individual and collective, suffering and happiness. Divine grace and persuasion solves the conflict in the case of Orestes.

The opposite interpretation emphasizes above all the tragedian's contra-

dictions. The old patent-remedy against this is to speak of the poet's development or to distinguish between genuine and spurious works. A modified position is taken by Reinhardt. According to him Aeschylus uses for the most part traditional material which he has not been able to amalgamate entirely with the new. The inherited curse stands beside divine grace, belief in the envy of the gods beside the idea of theodicy, belief in a supreme omniscience beside the revenging spirits. Two traits in the poet's thinking appear as especially contradictory; first, divine omnipotence and predestination, which nevertheless demand human cooperation; and secondly, Zeus' justice which punishes every injustice, although the deity works as a cause in man, with good or evil, guilt or innocence as consequences.

It may be tempting to modernize and trace these contrasts back to one, namely, necessity and freedom. But this antinomy which is necessary for ethical action is absent in Aeschylus both formally and concretely. He does not have the opposition between "must" and "should", but only between "must" and "want to", i.e. a submissive complying. The dissonance which is strengthened in the course of time appears especially if one compares the hymns to Zeus in *The Suppliants* and in *Agamemnon* (160 ff.).

Every Greek god demands a kind of human action that corresponds to the nature of the god. Zeus demands from man wisdom that is won by suffering. To this corresponds in the deity divine violence ($\beta\lambda\alpha$) and divine grace ($\chi\acute{\alpha}\rho\iota\varsigma$). Man suffers from Bia and learns from Charis. But Charis is not the same as the Christian word "grace" but a reciprocally beneficent interchange so that the term from the giver's point of view can mean graciousness, from that of the receiver gratitude. The opposite of Charis is therefore not Justice, so that grace would abrogate justice, but the relation between power and powerlessness, high and low, victory and submission, i.e. Bia.

With this we must conclude this research-historical review. Even if one may never disregard Aeschylus' historical background and his own particularity, the problems raised by the *Oresteia* are universally human and timeless. They may be expressed in different words in different times. But they are basic conditions of human existence. Therefore the dramatic works of Aeschylus continue to live and fill a place in this symposium on the problems of destiny.

“I Overcome Fate, Fate Harkens to Me”

By JAN BERGMAN

SOME OBSERVATIONS ON ISIS AS A GODDESS OF FATE

“I overcome Fate (*to heimarmenon*); Fate harkens to me”. In order to understand the tension in this proclamation of Isis, which forms the conclusion of the Isis aretalogy from Cyme,¹ we must make a closer acquaintance with the two dramatis personae. With what right could Isis make a claim like this? How was *to heimarmenon* understood and experienced in the Hellenistic environment to which the Cyme hymn belongs?

Let us consider the Egyptian goddess and her relation to Fate. The topic is vast, the time is brief. Therefore it is only possible to point out a few ‘fatalistic traits’ in Isis’ character. But first we have to ask another question: How did the Egyptians understand Fate in general? What concepts did they use in order to define Fate and its effects? What was the relation between the god(s) and Fate?

The answer to these questions can be made relatively brief by referring the reader to the recent work by S. Morenz and D. Müller, *Untersuchungen zur Rolle des Schicksals in der ägyptischen Religion*,² which deals precisely with these problems. A good introduction is given by H. Bonnet in his *Reallexikon der ägyptischen Religionsgeschichte* under the headings ‘Schicksal’ and ‘Schai’. G. Thausing’s *Der ägyptische Schicksalsbegriff*,³ which is treated

¹ For the Isis aretalogies, see above all P. Roussel, “Un nouvel hymne grec à Isis”, *REG* 42, 1929, pp. 137 ff., W. Peek, *Der Isishymnus von Andros und verwandte Texte*, Berlin 1930, R. Harder, “Karpokrates von Chalkis und die memphitische Isispropaganda”, *APAW*, 14, 1943, Berlin 1944, A.-J. Festugière, “A propos des arétalogies d’Isis”, *HThR* 42, 1949, pp. 209 ff., A. D. Nock, review of Harder, *Gnomon* 21, 1949, pp. 221 ff., D. Müller, “Ägypten und die griechischen Isis-Aretalogien”, *ASAW* 53: 1, Berlin 1961.

² *ASAW* 52: 1, Berlin 1960.

³ *MDAIK* 8, 1939, pp. 46 ff.

somewhat grudgingly by Morenz, should also be mentioned here, and C. J. Bleeker has dealt with this topic too.¹

The first time we meet with a fairly well defined concept of fate is in a text from the 18th dynasty. In the biography of Ahmose from Elkab (Urk. IV,5) it is said of a rebel, "His fate and his death draw near". The word that is here translated as 'fate', *š'.w*, is a verbal noun from the root *š'y*, to ordain. From a formal point of view it can be taken as a nomen agentis 'the ordainer', as a nomen actionis or abstractum, 'the ordainment', or as a passive perfect participle 'that which is ordained'. Bonnet is inclined to understand the word in the active sense,² while Morenz, against the background of the comprehensive material that he presents in his investigation, emphasizes the passive meaning of the concept.³ The oldest example of the verb *š'y* mentioned by Morenz is from the Teaching of Ptahhotep and consequently dates back to the Old Kingdom.⁴ In the well-known biography of Sinuhe the word occurs twice, characteristically enough in connection with *ntr*, '(the) god'.⁵ In the case of Sinuhe it is his unhappy flight from Egypt that is "the fate decreed by the gods". In the passage from Ahmose just mentioned the context is still more typical: it is death that is decreed. Morenz points out that the statements about *š'.w* are very often concerned with the regulation of man's length of life.⁶ The combination *š'.yt 'nh*, 'decree(ing) of life' is important to note. It is also illuminating that *š'.w* is sometimes followed by the determinative for 'death' and at other occasions by the sign for 'time'.

As already alluded to in the examples from Sinuhe, *š'.w* is often expressly connected with the god or gods. In view of the Egyptian idea of god it is natural that the primeval god—the creator—the sky-god should be the one who decrees. As Morenz remarks, the verb *š'y* even tends to take on the

¹ C. J. Bleeker, "Die Idee des Schicksals in der altägyptischen Religion", *The Sacred Bridge* (Suppl. to Numen VII), Leiden 1963, pp. 112 ff.

² *RÄRG* p. 611.

³ *Op. cit.* pp. 23 f.

⁴ *Ib.* p. 15.

⁵ Notice the vague expression *ntr.w nb* (B 156), approximately "any god", "a god whoever it may be". Notice also that the terminology for the interference of fate is not quite fixed; in B 43 the expression *š'yr ntr*, "God's plan" is used instead. (cf Morenz, *op. cit.* p. 16).

⁶ *Op. cit.* pp. 18 f.

meaning of 'to create'.¹ Horapollon's observation that according to the Egyptians "nothing exists without God" (I,13) illustrates well the sovereign position of the god in Egyptian thinking and belief. Just as the god (or goddess) appears as the 'lord of life', the 'lord of time (or times)' etc., he also bears the title *nb(.t) š'.w* 'the lord of fate', which Bonnet records with reference to Re, Amon, Ptah, Khnum, Thot, and Hathor as well as to Pharaoh.² A passage in a Leiden hymn to Amon (III,7) deserves mentioning here: "He lengthens the time of life, he shortens it, he grants an addition to fate to the one he loves." This *h'.w hr š'.yt*, 'addition to fate'—which also appears in Wen-Amon's (21st Dyn.) prayer to Amon for a 50 years' 'addition to his fate'³—leads our thoughts to Isis' proclamation to the transformed and converted Lucius (Apuleius, *Metam.* XI,6,6): *scies ultra statuta fato tuo spatia vitam quoque tibi prorogare mihi tantum licere*,⁴ "you shall know that I and I alone have the power to prolong your life beyond the bounds appointed as your fate". Thus Isis appears as the inheritor of Amon—the myth of Isis taking possession of (Amon-)Re's secret name reflects in its popular naive manner the development within the Egyptian hierarchy of gods. The claims of the two deities seem to be identical. Nevertheless there is no doubt—as we shall see—that the compact fatalism of Hellenism extends the sphere of influence of fate-ruling Isis as seen in Apuleius—and the Isis of the Cyme hymn.

It is no cause for surprise that Isis appears in Egyptian texts as one of the gods who control fate. Through her incorporation into the Heliopolitan ennead, her active part in the Osiris drama, and her important position in the royal ideology, Isis, who was probably originally a local goddess in the Lower Egyptian Iseion, acquired a more and more dominating role in the Egyptian pantheon.

Thus Isis appears as *nb(.t) š'.yt šhpr rnn(.t)*, "Mistress of fate, who creates destiny", and as *nb(.t) 'nh hnw.t š'.yt rnn(.t)* "Mistress of life, ruler of fate and destiny."⁵ In a hymn from Assuan Isis is referred to as *š'.yt rnn(.t)*

¹ *Ib.* p. 17.

² *Op. cit.* p. 671.

⁴ Morenz, *op. cit.* p. 12.

⁴ *Mihi tantum* here seems to correspond to the ἐγώ of the Cyme hymn with the emphasis this word receives through the anaphora.

⁵ For the provenience of these two examples, see Müller, *op. cit.* p. 84, n. 8. As regards *rnn.t* which is so frequently used together with *š'.w* I agree with Morenz'

wḏ.t.n.s., “the One under whose command fate and destiny is”. And in the temple of Philae (Pylon 76,4–6) she is said to be “Mistress of the jubilees, with a long reign, who ‘lengthens the years’ for the one who obeys her and makes his office last for ever”.

The last example, which is in addition reminiscent of the quotation from Apuleius, shows the important role time plays in the statements concerning fate. Fate is not only intimately connected with time, it is often even identified with it. In other words, no distinction is made between time and its contents. Time is inevitably bound up with what occurs in it. He who has time in his hand also has fate at his command.¹

Against this general background I should like to emphasize one trait in the Isis figure, which in my opinion has determined Isis’ connection with fate. I mean the identification of Isis with the Sothis star (Sirius). This combination is well instanced as early as the Pyramid texts, where, for example, a passage concerning the birth of Horus (Pyr. 632) bears witness to the identification of Isis with Sothis (*Špd.t*) with a typical pun *špd-špd.t*. Neugebauer and Parker² even launch the hypothesis that the original term for Sothis was *Špd* and that the ordinary form *Špd.t* should be taken as a *nisbeh* adjective referring to Isis as “the one who is connected with Sothis”. They also emphasize the fact that Sothis–Sirius is the most original example of the use of stars for measuring time.³ For the Egyptians thought that the Sothis star through its heliacal rising not only announced but itself brought about the rise of the Nile and therewith the beginning of the natural year. Thus the Sothis star was intimately bound up with the destiny of Egypt in all its aspects.

Some temple texts refer to this. “Isis–Sothis who discharges the flood of the Nile in due season” is mentioned in Edfu; in Dendera she is “Sothis in the sky who at New Year brings the flood of the Nile”; and in Assuan Isis

interpretation, *op. cit.* pp. 20 ff., according to which it would imply something like ‘the development of events’, and I suggest ‘destiny’ as an approximate translation. In later texts the pair *š’.w-rmn.t* seems to correspond to *Agathos Daimōn—Agathē Tyche*, behind which often Osiris (Sarapis)—Isis may be suspected.

¹ For the motif of time—fate, see e.g. H. Ringgren, “Dieu, le temps et le destin dans les épopées persanes”, *Journal de Psychologie* 53, 1956 pp. 407 ff.

² *Egyptian Astronomical Texts I*: “The Early Decans”, London 1960, p. 25.

³ *Op. cit.* pp. 106 f.

is addressed: "Isis, you who pour out the Nile in order to flood the two lands, in this your name 'Sothis'."¹ The combination *Isis Sōthis* occurs also in Greek, e.g. PGM II,33, and perhaps also in the well known Isis litany.²

Coins and amulets from Hellenistic and Roman times as well as the tympanum of the Isis temple on the field of Mars in Rome, which depicts a dog with a star, bear witness to the importance of the combination of Isis with Sothis, the dog-star, and shows how this idea was alive in Hellenistic times. Thus it also says in the Cyme hymn: "It is I who rise in the dog-star", and it is to be noted that ἐπιτέλλεσθαι-ἐπιτολή is the terminus technicus for the heliacal rising of a star.

In this manner Isis-Sothis³ came to play a key part in the determination of the year's destiny. A quotation from Horapollon, I,3, shows this: "When the Egyptians want to render 'year' they draw Isis, i.e. a woman (in this way they also render 'goddess'). For according to them Isis is a star called in Egyptian Sothis, in Greek Astrokyon, which is thought to rule (or, to be queen, βασιλεύειν) over the other stars, rising sometimes big, sometimes small, sometimes with greater, sometimes with less brightness. Therefore it is also according to the rising of this star that we make interpretations concerning everything that is to happen during the year. It is therefore not without reason that they call the year Isis." Another passage from the same excellent collector of facts (Horap. I,13) offers a combination of god, star, and fate which may be of interest: "When they (the Egyptians) render a θεὸς ἐγκόσμιος⁴ or *heimarmene*, or the number five, they draw a star; (it denotes) a god because God's providence decrees the victory through which the movement of the stars and of all the cosmos is completed; and further, *heimarmene* because this too is composed according to the 'economy' of the

¹ These texts are reproduced by Müller, *op. cit.* p. 34, n. 11 and 12 and p. 35, n. 1, where also further evidence is collected.

² P. Oxy. 1380, 143, which by the editors, Grenfell and Hunt, is interpreted as 'Ιοῖ Σῶθι, while Manteuffel, *De opusculis graecis Aegypti e papyris ostracis lapidibusque collectis*, Warszawa 1930, p. 80 reads 'Ισιῶθι.

³ For further examples of this combination, see Belegstellen to *WB* IV, 111, 18.

⁴ This is not the place for a detailed study of this interesting concept of god. See, provisionally, Sbordone's commentary (*Hori Apollinis Hieroglyphica ...*, Napoli 1940) pp. 35 f., which, however, does not analyze the Hellenistic concept but only hunts for the Egyptian counterpart.

stars (ἀστρική οικονομία) ...”¹ These two quotations show that Isis–Sothis as the queen of heaven² rules the other stars and that *heimarmene* is directly bound up with the constellations of the stars, a fact that has resulted from the role of the Sothis star as the announcer and bringer of the new year.³

From the relation between Isis and the year there is some interesting material. Especially noteworthy is a text rendered in Brugsch *Thes.* 107, where (Hathor-) Isis is called *Rnp.t*, “the Year”, precisely in Memphis. In the Oxyrhynchus litany (l. 46) we find the name *Eseremphis* which van Groningen interprets as ‘Isis-the Year’,⁴ while ll. 154 f. connect her with “the 365 combined days”. In my opinion these and similar statements can be put in a meaningful context, if we visualize some kind of ceremony to

¹ This passage, typical of Horapollon in its style of loose associations, is worth some comments. It is well known that Isis often appears as *Pronoia theou* or *providentia dei*. (For the former, see e.g. R. Reitzenstein, *Zwei religionsgeschichtliche Fragen*, Strassburg 1901, index s.v., and below p. 44 n. 1; Apuleius’ use of *providentia* will be dealt with below.) The occurrence of the word *nikē* in this context should be especially noticed. The word has caused the translators some difficulty: Leemans emends it to *dinē*, and Trebatius in his Latin translation omits the word. I should like to suggest that the argument here is parallel to the statement about Isis’ victory over *heimarmenon* in the Cyme hymn: *pronoia theou* (possibly = Isis) ordains *nikē*, which governs the movements of the celestial bodies, with which *heimarmenē* is intimately connected. It is also worthy of notice that *prostassein* and *akouein* are correlated technical terms in astronomy-astrology (e.g. Ptolemaios, *Tetrabiblos*, I, 14).

² Of Isis (-Sothis) it is said in a text: “She gives her son (Pharaoh) the kingdom of Sothis in the sky” (Brugsch, *Thesaurus* p. 110). It is also at an invocation of *Regina coeli* (Apul. *Metam.* XI,2) that Isis appears to Lucius.

³ Sbordone, *op. cit.* p. 36, has found no hieroglyphic evidence for “fate” written with a star. Instead he refers to general speculations, e.g. in Chairemon (quoted by Eusebius, *Praep. ev.* III, 4,2). There, immediately after the passage quoted by Sbordone, in which the unbreakable fetters (*alytoi desmoi*) of fate are mentioned, the gods—and it is only Isis and Osiris that have been expressly mentioned in what precedes—are described as “the only ones who can free (man) from Fate” (*lytēras tēs Heimarmenēs monous*). Cf. with this the Cyme hymn v. 48: “I set free those who are in fetters” (*egō tous en desmois lyō*). Iamblichus, *De mysteriis* 8,7 deals at length with the topic *lyein tēn Heimarmenēn* (see extracts in Müller, *op. cit.* p. 79). O. Weinreich has devoted a special study to the motif of the gods as those who free from fetters etc., *Gebet und Wunder*, Stuttgart 1929, Zweite Abh: “Türöffnung ...” pp. 34 ff.

⁴ B. A. van Groningen, *De papyro Oxyrhynchita 1380*, Diss. Groningen 1921, p. 17. One might ask if this name or a corresponding expression also occurred in the fragmentary l. 4, where Memphis is referred to by the archaizing expression “Ptah’s house”, as is also the case in the text quoted by Brugsch.

determine the 'destiny' of the year to come performed at Memphis¹ during the intercalated days with Isis-Sothis as the leading figure (according to ancient tradition the fourth intercalated day was the day of Isis *par excellence*). This allusion may suffice for the moment; for a general orientation, recourse may be had to Prof. Säve-Söderbergh's paper "Några egyptiska nyårsföreställningar".²

We have now, against the background of the Egyptian view of god and fate, briefly introduced the Isis who proclaims "I overcome Fate". Let us now direct our attention to *heimarmene*. But first we should notice an important fact that seems to have been entirely overlooked hitherto. The Cyme hymn speaks of *to heimarmenon* in the neuter singular form instead of in the otherwise prevailing feminine form *hē heimarmenē*.³ It might seem remarkable that this latter form does not occur in our hymn, especially since the verbs used, *νικᾶν* (*νικᾶσθαι*) and *ἀκούειν*, belong to the personal sphere and might be expected to prefer the feminine form (cf. *μοῖρα*, *τύχη*, *ἀνάγκη* etc., which are easily personified and appear as Moira, Tyche, Ananke). Could it be that precisely the form *to heimarmenon* represents an Egyptian concept like *š'.w*? If this is so it would contradict the hypothesis that the two concluding lines of the Cyme aretology are a later addition (thus Roussel, Festugière, and, with some hesitation, Nock). Against the hypothesis I would also adduce the fact that earlier statements in the hymn may be said to anticipate and prefigure this final climax, which would necessitate the assumption of rather radical changes in the original tradition. I have in

¹ Cf. also Thausing, *op. cit.* p. 50 n. 1, concerning Memphis and especially the temple of Ptah as *mḥ'.t t'.wy*, "the balance of the two lands", and Brugsch, *Thesaurus* p. 102, which refers to the New Year's Day as "the great festival at which the whole world is brought into balance, when the birth of Isis takes place."

² *Religion och Bibel* 9, 1950, pp. 1 ff.

³ Impersonal verbal expressions derived from this root are known to be common, e.g. in Homer (*εἰμαρται*, *εἰμαρτο*), and the plural form of the participle, (*τὰ εἰμαρμένα*, occurs a few times. Outside the Cyme hymn, however, I have been able to find *τὸ εἰμαρμένον* only in Theodoretus VI, 14 (H. von Arnim, *Stoicorum veterum fragmenta* II, Leipzig 1903, 265, 29 f.: "And Chrysippus the Stoic said that that which is bound by *anankē* (*τὸ κατηναγκασμένον*) in no way differed from that which is bound by *heimarmenē* (*τὸ εἰμαρμένον*)." Here it is obvious that the form *τὸ εἰμαρμένον* finds its explanation in the other part of the comparison, which could only be expressed in this form (not in the feminine form).

view lines 46–47: “Whatever I please, this too shall come to an end. For me everything gives way (ἐπέικει).” To this might be added the next line: “I set free those in bonds”.¹

On the other hand it is incontestable that *to heimarmenon* in the Hellenistic environment immediately suggests *hē heimarmenē*. The predominant role of the latter in this epoch is borne out by many contemporary witnesses, whose testimonies have been collected by modern scholars. Here we may content ourselves with a reference to W. Gundel, who in various contexts has dealt with the concept of *heimarmenē* and its development.² An excellent introduction is provided by D. Amand in the introductory chapter of his work *Fatalisme et liberté dans l'antiquité grecque*.³ *Heimarmenē*, which had been of some importance in Greek philosophy ever since Heraclitus, gained its sovereign power over Hellenistic man especially through two factors: Stoicism and astrology. From different points of departure and on different levels the ‘Chaldæans’ and the Stoics built up the hegemony of *heimarmenē*. It is with this in mind that Cumont could say: “En certains cas le stoïcisme fut une philosophie sémitique.”⁴ Posidonius of Apamea, who is probably the most typical example of the merger of these two lines of thought in one person, is characterized as *magnus astrologus idemque philosophus, fatalium siderum assertor*.⁵ According to its opponent Plutarch, Stoicism professes “*heimarmenē* which is invincible, and not to be overpowered and victorious over everything.”⁶

Hermetic literature often deals with *heimarmenē*, though not unequivocally.

¹ The verb ἐπέικω is not instanced earlier. Is there perhaps an Egyptian concept at the basis of this new-coined (?) word? Müller, *op. cit.* pp. 71 f., refers to the Egyptian word *hmy*, “to retire, retreat”, which is often used in connection with gods and kings. The simple word εἶκω is perhaps found in an Epidaurian hymn: σοὶ δὲ καὶ (=καὶ) Μοιράων σθένος εἶκει ... (IG IV, 1², quoted by Harder, *op. cit.* p. 27 n. 4), which would offer an excellent parallel to our passage. For v. 48, see above n. 24.

² The article “Heimarmene” (*RE* 14, 1912, 2622 ff.) and *Beiträge zur Entwicklungsgeschichte der Begriffe Ananke und Heimarmene*, Giessen 1914.

³ Diss. Louvain 1945.

⁴ F. Cumont, ‘Fatalisme astral et religions antiques’, *RHLLR* 3, 1912, p. 519, quoted by Amand, *op. cit.* p. 12.

⁵ Augustine, *De civ. Dei* V,5 (cf. also V,2).

⁶ *De Stoic. repugn.* 46, 1055 d. Cf. a little later (47, 1056 b), where *heimarmenē* is said to be “the causal law which cannot be overcome, prevented or averted” (ἀπείκω ἀνίκητος καὶ ἀκόλυτος καὶ ἀτρεπτος).

In Stobaeus (I,82,5) we read: "The stars serve *heimarmenē*. For no one can escape *heimarmenē* or protect himself against its harshness. For the tools of *heimarmenē* are the stars."¹

In an astrological work (Catal. cod. astrol. VI,41,11) we read: No one is free, we are all slaves of *heimarmenē*". Cumont's work *L'Égypte des astrologues*² paints in detail a pathetic picture of the cruel conditions of this slavery. *Heimarmenē* was felt as an inescapable *anankē* dependent on the stars which even from man's birth had fixed his destiny.

We have to visualize this basic attitude of Hellenistic man towards his situation in order to understand what a 'gospel' Isis proclaims: "I overcome Fate. Fate harkens to me." Earlier she has proclaimed herself the one who rises in the dog-star. It is worthy of notice that ἐπιτέλλω which was translated by 'rise' is not in the passive form which is the usual one in this sense, but in the active, where the translation 'to enjoin, command' is the normal one. Is this done on purpose to emphasize the commanding authority of Isis-Sothis? An Isis hymn from Cyrene³ says expressly: "And the stars do not go their own course if they have not received my command (ἐντολή)." And the Isis creatrix of the Cyme hymn proclaims (v. 13 f.): "I showed the paths of the stars. I ordered the course of the sun and the moon."⁴

A quotation from Valentinian gnosticism⁵ shows how concretely such statements were understood. After a description of the stars being in conflict with each other because of *heimarmenē* come glad tidings: "Therefore a new alien star rose to destroy the old constellation . . . to transfer those who believe in Christ from *heimarmenē* to His providence." A passage in the Isis litany (P. Oxy. 1380, 151 f.) refers to those who have faith in Isis: "Thou art seen by those who invoke thee faithfully". It has already been pointed out that

¹ Notice however that in this case *heimarmenē* in its turn serves *pronoia* and *anankē*. For *heimarmenē* in the Hermetic writings, see J. Kroll, *Die Lehren des Hermes Trismegistos*, Münster 1914, pp. 212 ff., and W. Bousset's important review of this work in *Göttingische Gelehrte Anzeigen* 1914, pp. 697 ff.

² Bruxelles 1937.

³ Text in Peek, *op. cit.* p. 129, as supplied by Oliverio.

⁴ The Cyme hymn itself offers several instances to prove that there is no opposition between the aorist of creation and the present of providence. From the Egyptian point of view this is a matter of course.

⁵ Clemens of Alexandria, *Excerpta ex Theodoto* 74.

Isis often appears as *Pronoia-Providentia*.¹ In the Isis book of Apuleius this is the leitmotif. Isis says (XI, 5, 4): *Iam tibi providentia mea inlucescit dies salutaris*, "The day of salvation already begins to dawn for you through my providence." Later (10,4) there is a reference to *deae summatis auxiliaris providentia*, "the helping providence of the highest goddess." And this is how Lucius himself views his imminent transformation: ... *deae maximae providentia adluctantem mihi saevissime Fortunam superarem*, "Through the providence of the greatest goddess I overcame Fortune, who attacked me so fiercely." Here *providentia Isidis* stands contra Fortune in the same way as Isis stands contra *to heimarmenon* in the Cyme hymn. The Isis priest's solemn address to Lucius (XI, 15) presents this in still sharper relief. Referring to the tempests of fate that he has been exposed to he says: "However it was, the blindness of Fortune (*Fortunae caecitas*), while torturing you with the worst of perils, has with a malice which proved shortsighted (*improvida*) brought you to this pious happiness. Let her go now and rage with her worst frenzy and seek some other object for her cruelty; for hostile chance has no power against those whose lives have been claimed for service (*servitium*) by the majesty of our goddess. What profit did spiteful Fortune (*nefaria Fortuna*) derive from robbers or wild beasts or slavery or the hardest of journeys, bringing you back to where you started, or the daily fear of death? Now you have been taken under the protection of Fortune, yes, and a Fortune that sees (*Fortunae videntis*), that by the splendour of her radiance gives light even to the other gods."²

Here we notice the sharp contrast between *Fortuna caeca*³–*nefaria* and *Fortuna videntis*–*salutaris*. But at the same time we note that the service, or slavery of both is denoted by the same word, *servitium*. This is emphasized by the concluding words of the priest's speech where, after referring to

¹ In P. Oxy. 1380,43 Isis is *pronoia*. Plutarch, De Iside 3 and 67 also connects *pronoia* with Isis. The Stoics often struggled with the problem of uniting *pronoia* and *heimarmenē*. See, e.g., von Arnim, *op. cit.* p. 264, 19, where *heimarmenē* is defined as "the principle of the world economy of Providence" (λόγος τῶν ἐν τῷ κόσμῳ προνοίᾳ διοικουμένων), and p. 280,15: "What happens according to Fate, also happens according to Providence" (τὰ καθ' εἰμαρμένην γινόμενα καὶ κατὰ πρόνοιαν γίνονται).

² Transl. according to A. D. Nock, *Conversion*, Oxford 1933, pp. 140 f.

³ Blind Fate is a common *topos*, e.g. Stob. Ecl. I, VII, frg. 3 (Menander?): "Fate is something blind and mean". See also s.v. τυφλός and *caecus* in the lists of epithets in the supplement of Roscher's *Ausführliches Lexikon* ...

ministerii iugum voluntarium, he says: *Nam cum coeperis deae servire, tunc magis senties fructum tuae libertatis*, "For when you have begun to serve the goddess, then you will the more perceive the fruit of the liberty which is yours." The resigned statement "All are the slaves of Fate" has already been quoted.

Vettius Valens, the astrological popularizer, uses another metaphor: men are the soldiers (στρατιῶται) of *heimarmenē* (V, 7) and they are asked to "fight nobly on the side of the times (i.e., of fate)" (VII, 2), thus adopting the ideal of Seneca and Marcus Aurelius—the Stoics are well known for their *amor fati*. It is characteristic that this military terminology is found also in Apuleius in the section just quoted. Here we find a reference to Lucius' *militia deae*: he joins the *cohors religiosa* of the goddess and swears his *sacramentum* (oath to the colours) when entering this *sancta militia*.¹

I overcome Fate—this was the fanfare of the Cyme hymn. As we have seen, proclamations of victory are not lacking in the Isis book of Apuleius either. *Fortunam superare* (XI, 12, 1) has already been quoted. Further down he says: *Et ecce pristinis aerumnis absolutus Isidis magnae providentia gaudens Lucius de sua Fortuna triumphat*, "Lo, Lucius freed from his old woes by the providence of great Isis triumphs joyously over his own fortune" (XI, 15, 4). These words are placed in the mouth of the irreligious, who have to see and admit their mistake. This suggests that the poet has had in mind some kind of Ἴσις νικᾷ acclamation of which there are several instances.²

The tremendous significance of Isis' proclamation that she overcomes Fate is easily realized if it is remembered how often it is Fate that is described as victorious, unconquered, or invincible. Thus an inscription³ speaks of

¹ For this terminology, see F. Cumont, *Les religions orientales ...* 4th ed., Paris 1929, p. 207 n. 7. It is interesting to compare with this the magician's declaration in Pap. Paris 10,5 ff., quoted by van Groningen, *op. cit.* pp. 77 f.: "I am the one who has struggled with the gods together with you, I, your soldier, have been defeated by the gods".

² O. Weinreich, *Neue Urkunden zur Sarapisreligion*, Tübingen 1919, Beilage IV, pp. 33 ff. and 19 ff., and E. Peterson, *EIS OEOΣ*, Göttingen 1926, pp. 154 ff., 314, have collected such formulae. They are above all connected with Sarapis and Isis, but were later adopted by the Christians, Weinreich, *op. cit.* Beilage V, pp. 35 ff.

³ IPE I², 52. Cf. Heliodorus, Aith. X, 16 τῆς πάντα νικομένης Φύσεως, "Nature that overcomes everything", where *Physis* is more or less identical with *Heimarmenē*.

πάντα νεικομένης (medial form) Είμαρμένης. The Stoics revered, as was mentioned, Invincible Fate. There are many similar statements concerning Tyche, e.g. a fragment from Chairemon (Stob. Ecl. I, VI, 15): "Tyche overcomes and changes everything, and nobody is victorious without Tyche's will". Against this background victorious Isis stands out with increased power. In Delos there is an inscription dedicated to Isis Nike,¹ and together with Sarapis and Anubis she has there the epithet νικηφόρος.² The cry νικήσομεν, "we shall win" plays an important part in a lawsuit concerning the site of a temple for the Egyptian gods of the island.³ In a Leiden papyrus we read about Sarapis "who, with Isis, gives you victory (and) power over all the world".⁴ In Latin inscriptions we often meet with *Isis victrix* (CIL VI, 352; IX, 3144, 5179; XI, 695) as well as *Isis invicta* (CIL VI, 353); *Isis triumphalis* also occurs.⁵ It is even possible that the opening line of Isis' self-introduction in the Cyme hymn should be related to statements about Fate. In an anonymous fragment (frg. adesp. 506) it says: "Fate (τύχη) is the mistress (τύραννος) of all the gods". Isis says: "I am Isis, the mistress (τύραννος) of every land." Admittedly, τύραννος has here the complement 'every land' (i.e. the whole earth), but the Cyrene aretology begins with a

For the combination of Isis and Physis, which sound much more similar through itacism, reference should be had to Athenagoras Athenaios, Suppl. 22,5 f.: "Isis, who they say is the nature (*physis*) of the world, from whom all beings have come into existence and through whom all beings exist". Hippolytus, Refut. V, 22 f., refers to Isis as *Physis heptastolos*, 'seven-robed Nature', which is given a cosmic interpretation. One may also compare with this the Isis epithet "prototype of everything" in late Egyptian texts and *rerum naturae parens* in Apuleius, Metam. XI,5. It is against this background that the alchemistic *physis* formula should be viewed (below p. 49 n. 1).

¹ A. Rusch, *De Sarapide et Iside in Graecia cultis*, Diss. Berlin 1906, p. 44; P. Roussel, "Les cultes égyptiens à Délos", *Annales de l'Est*, 29^e et 30^e années, 1915 et 1916, Nancy, No. 121, p. 149.

² Roussel, *op. cit.* p. 86 (No. 4). Cf. also No. 5. 5 "Ερωτος νικηφόρου, where Eros = Harpokrates. It should be noticed that the Ptolemæans also wore that epithet.

³ Roussel, *op. cit.* p. 72 (No. 1). Cf. Weinreich, *op. cit.* p. 20. Does this *nikēsomen* reflect a cultic cry?

⁴ UPZ I, 20,63 ff. (p. 200), cf. p. 31. It is a matter of course that also actual political conditions have played their part here. For the historical situation, see W. Otto, "Zur Geschichte der Zeit des 6. Ptolemäers", *ABAW NF* 11, 1934, p. 95.

⁵ The evidence has been collected by Drexler, *Wochenschrift für klassische Philologie* 1886, col. 1432-34. Cf. also the same writer in Roscher, *Ausführliches Lexikon* II, 1, 521.

cosmic statement: "I Isis, sole mistress of the world" ('Εγὼ τύραννος Εἴσις αἰῶνος μόνη).¹

Thus we see how Isis overcomes Fate—but at the same time adopts the role of Fate. Instead of invincible Fate we find *Isis invicta*. In Lucius' case, *servitium* under atrocious Fate is exchanged for *servitium* under the providence of Isis. The soldier of Fate has entered the *cohors religiosa* of Isis. To us this might seem contradictory. Still it is characteristic of the world of fatalism, or rather, of all religion. The power of Fate, the omnipotent, which gives and takes arbitrarily, is always experienced in an indirect way through the fate of the individual. The individual lot is easily personified which leads to the many different shapes of Tyche-Fortuna. We have no right to analyze logically who decreed what destiny. According to the laws of religion we are in this case always taken back to Isis the Highest, the goddess of Fate, who overcomes Fate, the Egyptian Isis who is *nb.t š'.w* but at the same time also Fate itself. We have to remember that even in Egypt the gods and Pharaoh seem not only to have appeared as the masters of Fate but also identified themselves with Fate, a feature that has been somewhat neglected in Morenz' book.² In the Amarna period we find that both Aton and Pharaoh, his earthly image, are *š'.yt dd 'nh*, 'lifegiving Fate'. In a hymn Amon-Re, possibly in conscious opposition to the Amarna heresy, receives the epithet *p' š'.y(t) rnm.t*, 'fate and destiny'.³ In a late hymn to Isis from Assuan the goddess has *š'.yt* and *rnm.t* under her command, which does not prevent her from

¹ It is possible that a cosmic-astral interpretation of *tyrannoi* should be taken into consideration in v. 25 of the Cyme hymn: "I have broken down the governments of tyrants". To my mind the Greek hatred for the tyrants has been allowed to play an exaggerated role in the interpretation.

² Morenz, *op. cit.* p. 24, n. 3. mentions some examples of this development of Egyptian fatalism which, according to him, is late.

³ Translated by A. Erman, *Die Literatur der Ägypter*, Leipzig 1923, p. 382. Thus this occurs side by side with the more common expression with *nh*, e.g. concerning Ramses II at Abydos (Morenz, *op. cit.* p. 21): *nb š'.yt šhpr rnm.t*, "the lord of Fate, who creates destiny ('development')". — Moreover, there are a number of Egyptian parallels, in which one and the same concept appears both as an objective genitive and as an independent subject. Of special interest is the fact that Isis is both *nb.t rnp.t*, "Mistress of the year" (i.e. the one who brings and determines the new year, etc.) and *rnp.t*, the year itself, when she is born on New Year's Day (cf. Brugsch, *Thesaurus* p. 102). She is also both *nb.t 'nh* and *'nh*, i.e. the Mistress of Life and Life itself.

being immediately afterwards identified with *Rmn.t*, i.e. Thermouthis. In this respect the Isis hymns from Medinet Madi¹ are very instructive; here Hermouthis (=Thermouthis) and Agathe Tyche and Isis are entirely on the same level (I, 1-2; II, 1-2, etc.), and we are entitled to recognize here the old combination Isis-š'.yt-rnn.t. Consequently, we need not have recourse to the Hellenistic cult of (*Agathē*) *Tychē* in order to understand this combination, even if this cult may have furthered and spread the idea. When Antoninus Pius' Egyptian titles include the name Š'.w n B'k.t, 'the Fate of Egypt',² this might express a domestic tradition, even if the idea of the Agathos Daimon may have contributed to it. Late speculation about Š'.w as a primeval god,³ e.g. the following phrase in the large magical papyrus from Paris $\psi\omicron\iota\ \varphi\upsilon\omicron\upsilon\theta\iota\ \nu\iota\nu\theta\eta\rho$ (=p' Š'.w p' ntr n ntr.w), "Fate, the god of the gods", which at first sight might seem to contradict Egyptian views, can only be explained against that aspect of Egyptian development that has been dealt with here, according to which Fate and the god of Fate are not kept strictly apart.

Also corresponding to this are the combinations Isis Tyche (even written Ἰσιτύχη!) or Isis Fortuna,⁴ which are quite common in the Hellenistic and Roman world. It is Isis Fortuna that Lucius in Apuleius becomes acquainted with and who in a real sense becomes his Destiny, his Fortune.

"I overcome Fate. Fate harkens to me." This was the gospel of Isis. But how did the individual react to this? This paper will conclude with a sketch of some of the different lines along which Hellenistic man sought deliverance from Fate through Isis.

1. It is not surprising that magic was frequently resorted to. From of old Isis wore the epithet wr.t ḥk'.w, 'great in magic spells', and consequently she plays a very significant role in the magical papyri.

2. Magic might be characterized as a special kind of gnosis. Astrology and alchemy border on this, and the statement: "One nature delights in another,

¹ Most easily accessible in SEG VIII, 548-551.

² Morenz, *op. cit.* p. 26.

³ *Ib.* pp. 26 f.

⁴ Several instances of this are given by G. Vandebek, "De interpretatione graeca van het Isisfiguur", *Studia Hellenistica* 4, Louvain 1946, pp. 54 ff.

one nature overcomes another, one nature rules another”¹ has an important bearing on the latter. This sentence which is said to have the same provenience as our Cyme hymn, points to certain possible lines of connection between the Isis tradition and alchemy (Isis-φύσις and the νικᾷ formula).

As for gnosis in the more traditional sense, we may refer to Hermetic literature, e.g. Corp. Herm. XII,9: “*Nous* rules everything, both Fate (*heimarmenē*) and law”, where *nous* stands for the cosmic principle and the individual’s share of it. Zosimus² tells us that both Hermes and Zoroaster have maintained that “the race of the philosophers was superior to Fate (*heimarmenē*)”. Since Isis in the Cyme hymn declares that she was educated by Hermes himself, and since she and Osiris in the *Korē Kosmou*³ are entrusted with special revelations, it is natural that a certain amount of gnosis was easily connected with Isis’ name, which Plutarch already wanted to relate etymologically to εἰδησις, knowledge (de Iside 2).

3. Others placed the stress on conduct. An instance is provided by the following quotation from Lactantius (Div. inst. 2, 15,6): “For neither an evil demon, nor Fate (*heimarmenē*) has any power over a pious man. For God delivers the pious from all evil.” The many ethical precepts of the Cyme hymn, mostly anchored in the myth of the goddess, called the initiates to fellowship with the θεῶν εὐεργέτης through imitation.

4. The most important way, which also included many of the elements already mentioned, was offered by the mystery cults. Initiation created a fellowship between the god and the initiate in life and death. The well known word in Firmicus Maternus (De errore prof. rel. 22,1) bears eloquent witness to this: “Be confident, O you initiates. Since the god has been saved, there is salvation also for us from our toil”. In the Cyme hymn Isis declares: “I

¹ For a discussion of this important doctrine the reader is referred to A.-J. Festugière, *La révélation d’Hermès Trismégiste* I, Paris 1944, pp. 231 ff. Notice also that the three parts, which do not occur in a fixed order, often also appear independently. See also Bidez-Cumont, *Les Mages Hellenisés* II, Paris 1938, pp. 313–315, 318–320, where the tradition is ascribed to Ptah’s temple at Memphis, p. 314, n. 2. For the age of the tradition, see vol. I p. 204 n. 1.

² Quoted by R. Reitzenstein, *Poimandres*, Leipzig 1904, p. 103.

³ For *Korē Kosmou* the reader is referred to the introduction in the Budé edition (*Hermès Trismégiste* III, Paris 1954, pp. CXXVIII ff.) and to the monograph of A.-J. Festugière, “L’arétalogie isiaque de la Koré kosmou”, *Mélanges Picard*, Paris 1949, pp. 376 ff.

showed initiations unto men" (v. 22). Thus she points precisely to the mysteries, to which initiations (*μυστήριος*) formed the gate of entrance. *Μυστήριον* often became synonymous with *sacramentum*. A sacrament could overcome Fate as is shown by Exc. ex Theodoto 78,1: "Thus until baptism, they say, fate is true, but after this the astrologers do not speak the truth." The idea of regeneration or a new birth under the favourable horoscope of the saviour god, which seems to have been concretely depicted in the sanctuaries, is basic for most mystery cults, and the initiate consequently celebrated the day of his initiation as his real birthday. The garment that he put on was a symbol of the new life he entered through his initiation. There is evidence that the garment of the Isis initiate was to accompany him to the grave. It is obvious that we have here the same kind of symbolism that was the basis of the Egyptian mummification through which the deceased was identified with Osiris. The initiate shared the destiny of his god. And from the very first mummification referred to by the myth and represented in the rite, it was Isis who held this destiny in her hand.¹

So we depart from Isis, who remains an Egyptian goddess² also in the world of Hellenistic syncretism and is, as such, Mistress of Fate, even Fate itself, even though the disturbed, dualistic atmosphere of the time came especially to emphasize the victory over misfortune that her dominion of Fate seemed above all to imply.

Abbreviations

<i>ABAW</i>	Abhandlungen der Bayerischen Akademie der Wissenschaften zu München.
<i>APAW</i>	Abhandlungen der Preussischen Akademie der Wissenschaften zu Berlin.
<i>ASAW</i>	Abhandlungen der Sächsischen Akademie der Wissenschaften zu Leipzig.
<i>CIL</i>	Corpus Inscriptionum Latinarum
<i>HThR</i>	Harvard Theological Review.
<i>IG</i>	Inscriptiones Graecae.

¹ Cf. the following statement in the *Korē Kosmou* aretology: "They (i.e. Isis and Osiris) taught how to shroud those who have ceased to live" (*Hermès Trismégiste* IV, 21, 19 f.).

² "Im Kern blieb Isis Ägypterin" is the conclusion of S. Morenz' lecture on "Ägyptische Nationalreligion und sogenannte Isismission", *ZDMG* NF 36 (= 111), 1961, pp. 432 ff.

- IPE** Inscriptiones orae septentrionalis Ponti Euxini.
L.-Sc. Liddell-Scott, A Greek-English Lexicon.
MDAIK Mitteilungen des Deutschen Archäologischen Instituts in Kairo.
PGM Papyri Graecae Magicae.
P.Oxy. Oxyrhynchus Papyri ed. B. P. Grenfell & A. S. Hunt.
RÄRG Bonnet, Reallexikon der ägyptischen Religionsgeschichte, Berlin 1952.
REG Revue des Études Grecques.
RHLR Revue d'Histoire et de Littérature Religieuses.
SEG Supplementum Epigraphicum Graecum.
UPZ Wilcken, Urkunden der Ptolemäerzeit I (Berlin 1922).
Urk. Urkunden des ägyptischen Altertums begr. von G. Steindorff.
WB Erman-Grapow, Wörterbuch der ägyptischen Sprache², Berlin 1957.
ZDMG Zeitschrift der Deutschen Morgenländischen Gesellschaft.

Islamic Fatalism

By HELMER RINGGREN

It has become a commonplace that Islam is a fatalistic religion which teaches that everything is determined in advance and that man is unable to do anything about it. But it is not as well known what this 'fatalistic' attitude really means, what place it occupies in the totality of Islamic religion, and how it originated and has developed in history. I shall try here to sketch briefly, first, the historical background, then the teaching of the Koran, and finally, the development of the typical Islamic fatalism.

Since we are dealing here with belief in fate in the general sense, i.e. the interpretation of what happens to man, we shall leave aside an otherwise very important aspect of the problem, namely the purely religious doctrine of predestination implying determination for belief and unbelief, or for Paradise and Hell.¹ It is admittedly hard to maintain a sharp distinction in this respect, but I think it is a useful limitation of our topic to concentrate on fate in the proper sense of the word.

The fatalism of Islam has to be viewed against the background of the ideas of pre-Islamic Arabia.² Unfortunately, there is no other evidence from this epoch that a few poems on a very restricted range of topics which have been able to survive Islamic censure. The conventional and stereotyped character of these poems makes it difficult to decide to what extent they reflect commonly accepted views or the ideas of a certain group. In any case, they present a picture of the pagan Arab which is extremely idealized and formed after a rigid pattern.

There is no formulated doctrine of fate in pre-Islamic poetry, but it is

¹ See e.g. W. M. Watt, *Free will and predestination according to Islam*, London 1948.

² The reader is referred, once and for all, to my book *Studies in Arabian fatalism*, Uppsala 1955; for the pre-Islamic ideas, see Chs. 1 and 2.

perfectly clear, even from a relatively superficial inquiry, that it reflects a fatalistic outlook. It may be a consequence of the purely secular character of this poetry that Fate stands out much more clearly than theism, of which we catch only a few rare glimpses.

The poets mention Fate mainly in three different contexts, in each case following certain patterns of language and style: (1) in dirges lamenting the death of a relative or friend: he has succumbed to Fate; (2) in the opening lines of the classical *qaṣīdah*, the so-called *nasīb*, in which the poet presents himself as standing at the abandoned encampment and contemplating the changes of time and the transience of everything; and finally (3) in the *fahr*, i.e. the passages in which the poet praises his and his tribesmen's excellent qualities: these include also the ability to endure the vicissitudes of fortune.

If we look at the verbal expression of fatalism, we also find three groups, which, however, do not correspond to the groups of motifs just mentioned. First there are some verbs expressing predetermination in general, and it is characteristic that as a rule they are used in the passive form: the poet does not want or is not able to state who has determined or assigned the lot of destiny. E.g. "When the fate of a man is determined, neither children nor property avail."¹ "My death is destined for a fixed time."² "Be patient; only what is just and reasonable was determined."³ Of a man who was killed by panthers in his sleep a poet says: "They were destined for him in the hour of his destiny, and they seized him."⁴ "Who seeks flight before her (war's) fear, his Doom (lit.: the predestined hour) stands and bars the road."⁵ In these cases it is usually death that is the inescapable destiny, the hour of which is determined in advance. Two of the verbs of this group, *qaddara* and *qadā*, are comparatively rare and seem to belong properly to the religious language.

The second group of 'fatalistic' words are connected with the verb *manā*, 'to count, assign, allot'. The verb itself is used a few times in the passive form, but there are also instances of the active form, the subject being either Allah or a participle, 'the Allotter'. But the most common word of this group is the noun *manīyah*, plur. *manāyā*, which would mean literally 'portion, lot' but in reality is almost exclusively used with reference to the common lot of all

¹ *Op. cit.* p. 6 f.

² *Ib.* p. 7. ³ *Ib.* p. 7. ⁴ *Ib.* p. 8.

⁵ *Ib.* p. 9; transl. Lyall.

human beings, that is, death. What is especially emphasized is its inescapability.

The days of a man are numbered, and through them all
the snares of death (*manāyā*) lurk by the warrior as he travels perilous ways.
His doom (*manīyah*) shall spring upon him at its appointed time,
and his way is towards that meeting though he makes no tryst therefore.
And he who dies not to-day, yet surely his fate it is
to-morrow to be ensnared in the nooses of Death's doom (*manīyah*).¹

In addition the plural form is used in the phrase *ṣarf al-manāyā*, "the vicissitudes of fortune". It is also probable that the word *manūn* is derived from the same root, but it often occurs as a synonym of 'time', especially in contexts referring to destruction and death. "*Manūn* consumes (or, wears out) us, but we do not consume it."² The expression *raib al-manūn*, the "embarrassment" of *manūn*, is often used of unexpected calamities which have to be borne with patience.

The third group of 'fatalistic' words comprises some words for 'time'.³ Time changes everything. Nothing resists time. Time brings death, time deprives us of our friends. It breaks down even the strongest. The contents of time are always shifting. The changes of time is a favourite motif, which covers all that human life contains of improvident and inescapable events.

The attitude toward destiny is characterized by two factors: it is impossible to avoid or escape destiny, and what it brings must be borne with unswerving patience (endurance, *ṣabr*).⁴

The relation between fatalism and theism is especially hard to judge.⁵ There are a few verses that relate fate to an Allotter or expressly to Allah—who, as is well known, was not unknown in pre-Islamic Arabia. But some of them may be the result of later revision: variant forms of one and the same verse have sometimes *dahr*, Time, sometimes Allah, God. The subject matter of the poems is such as to make religious motifs utterly rare, which makes the evidence one-sided. However, it seems clear that the poets endea-

¹ *Ib.* p. 22; transl. Lyall.

² *Ib.* p. 27.

³ *Ib.* pp. 30 ff.

⁴ See my paper on *ṣabr* in *Islamic Culture* 26, 1952, pp. 75 ff.

⁵ See my discussion in *Studies* pp. 46 ff.

vour to reckon without Allah. But it is impossible to decide if this is characteristic of the Arab view of life in general—probably it is not.

With Muhammad and the Koran we enter an entirely new world.¹ Everything is dominated by the omnipotent God and his will. It is characteristic that most of the fatalistic verbs are entirely missing in the Koran. Two terms that do occur are used in contexts that indicate their absolute repudiation. For instance, 45: 23, 25 says:

They say, "There is only our life in this world, we die and we live, and nothing destroys us but time". But they have no knowledge Say, "God quickens you, then he kills you, then he will gather you unto the resurrection day".²

The meaning is entirely clear. It is the secular, irreligious interpretation of destiny that prevails in poetry and that regards Time as a manifestation of destructive Fate that is repudiated in order to make room for a purely religious interpretation of human destiny: it is God, Allah, who give life and death and makes man responsible for the way he lives.

In another Koranic passage (52:30 f.) the Prophet's opponents say of him, "A poet, we wait for him the afflictions of Fate".³ In other words, Muhammad is taken to be one of those poets who use to sing of the vicissitudes of fate and it is suggested that these will hit him, too. The answer rejects this idea: "Wait ye then, for I, too, am of those who wait". Muhammad does not fear the issue; he is convinced of his divine mission and sure of God's protection.

These two passages show Muhammad's repudiation of secular fatalism as professed by the poets. What he wants to substitute for this belief may be illustrated by two quotations.

53:44-49. That it is he who makes laugh and weep, and that it is he who kills and makes alive, and that it is he who has created pairs, male and female, from a clot when it is emitted, and that for him is the next production, and that he enriches and gives possession.⁴

Here Muhammad makes it clear that good and evil fortune, success and adversity, life and death, in other words man's destiny from beginning to end, is God's matter.

¹ See Ch. 3 of my *Studies*.

² *Ib.* p. 86. ³ *Ib.* p. 86. ⁴ *Ib.* p. 116.

3:25. Thou givest the kingdom to whomsoever thou pleasest, and strippest the kingdom from whomsoever thou pleasest, thou honourest whom thou pleasest, and thou abasest whom thou pleasest; in thy hand is good. Verily thou art mighty over all.¹

If these passages give the impression of the same arbitrariness as is found in fatalism, this is counterbalanced by the fact that the context speaks of the Creator's providence and omnipotence. The point is rather omnipotence than arbitrariness.

Thus man's destiny is in God's hands, and there is no place for an impersonal Fate. It is impossible to deal here in detail with the somewhat contradictory statements concerning predestination for belief or unbelief—as a matter of fact the Koran both teaches strict predestination and appeals to man's free choice—but this should probably not be classified as fatalism but rather as religious determinism, where the point is God's omnipotence, not predestination itself.

As for the terminology, it should be noticed that the two verbs *qaddara* and *qadā*, which were rare in poetry and seem to have had a religious colouring even before Muhammad, are fairly common in the Koran as an expression of God's predetermination, e.g.:

39:43. God calls in the souls at the time of their death, and those which have not died, in their sleep; those upon whom he has decreed (*qadā*) death, he retains, the others he sends back until a stated term ...²

In other words: When man sleeps it means that God has temporarily taken his soul away; to the one whom he has not decreed for death he sends the soul back each time and leaves it to him until the appointed time; if, on the other hand, he has destined a soul for death he keeps it and that man does not wake up. This is a good example of the idea of the allotted time and the predestined hour of death. But it is God who allots and predestines.

56:60. "We have decreed death for you, and we are not to be evaded."

This passage is explained by Baiḍāwī thus: "We distributed (death) to you and fixed the death of everyone to an appointed time."³ In 25:2, where God is said to have created everything and "decreed it determinately" (*qaddarahu taqdīran*) Baiḍāwī comments, "He disposed and shaped it according to

¹ *Ib.* p. 116.

² *Ib.* p. 94.

³ *Ib.* p. 101.

what he wanted it to be regarding properties and works, such as the shape of man in entellect, understanding, speculation, economy, invention of different arts, the perseveration in various deeds, etc. Or: He decreed it to remain till a fixed term.”¹

A new idea is that of the book in which destiny is written, e.g. 3: 139, “It is not for any soul to die, except by God’s permission according to a fixed writing (*kitāb*, book)” or 9: 51, “Say: There will nothing befall us but what God has written down for us.”²

God’s omnipotence is emphasized over and over again, e.g. 6: 17, “If God touch you with distress, there is no remover of it but he, and if he touch you with good—he has power over everything.”

In a way, then, the determinism of the Koran is more rigid and consistent than the fatalism of the poets, but the determining power is a God who is also merciful and compassionate and who has a goal for his rule of the world. Even if man has to leave the question of the meaning of fate to God’s omnipotence, he is still a personal God who is also righteous.

It is hardly to be expected that Muhammad’s preaching should change the Arabs’ whole attitude towards destiny all at once. But the difference is clearly visible if we turn to the earliest Islamic poetry, even in spite of the overwhelming influence of traditional form and style. This is true, for instance, of Muhammad’s own ‘court poet’, Ḥassān ibn Thābit, of Ka‘b ibn Mālik, of a number of poems quoted in the traditional biography of the Prophet, and of the poetry of the Kharijites. We have to limit ourselves to a few essential observations.

The traditional terms ‘Time’ and *manīyah* are used, but *manīyah* never means anything but ‘death’, and it appears from time to time that death is determined or “written” by God. Time has retained more of its old meaning, but it can also be used in religious contexts. One poet says, for instance, that some Jewish rabbis were put to shame for their faithlessness according to the vicissitudes of time because they did not believe in the Lord;³ in other words, Time-Fate is a manifestation of divine retribution. One tradition even has the Prophet identify God and Time: “God said, ‘Man insults me in blaming Time; I am Time; in my hands is the Command, and I cause the

¹ *Ib.* p. 100.

² *Ib.* p. 94.

³ *Ib.* p. 130.

alternation of day and night.”¹ Consequently, when the Islamic poets ascribe the vicissitudes of fortune to Time, this is only a concession to traditional usage; in reality they refer to that which is sent by God.

The old ‘fatalistic’ verbs are still used, sometimes in the passive form but often in contexts where it is clear nevertheless that the reference is to God’s decree. But in most cases the verb is now in the active form: it is God who has determined or decreed, and “a matter which God has ordained cannot be warded off” and “all that God has ordained comes upon man” and “an affair that God has preordained is firm.”²

Later poetry returns to some extent to the traditional pattern, but sometimes it also breaks new ground. However, poetry can hardly be regarded as representative of a majority of the people. We have to turn therefore to other sources in order to follow the development of fatalism.

The tradition, or *hadith*, literature originated in the first centuries of Islam in order to give the Prophet’s authority to decisions in judicial and doctrinal questions that had arisen in various circumstances. Three of the six canonic collections of traditions have a special chapter on *qadar*, i.e., predestination. The development goes mainly in two directions: on one hand there is a tendency to making the idea of predestination more concrete, on the other hand the religious conviction of God’s omnipotence is changed into a rigid fatalistic dogma.

Here we find the idea that God first created the Pen, which wrote God’s decrees in a book. There is also the idea that an angel, while the embryo is still in the womb, writes down (or determines) four things: the child’s sustenance (*rizq*), its works, its hour of death, and whether it is to be miserable or happy.³ According to other traditions man’s destiny is written on his forehead.⁴

A number of traditions want to show that God’s decree is inevitably fulfilled. Each man receives what has been decreed for him. “To God belongs what he takes away, and to God belongs what he grants; everyone has a term; be you patient and consider.”⁵ “O God, there is no one to refuse that which thou bestowest, and no one to grant that which thou refusest, nor does striving avail anyone against thee.”⁶ “When God has decreed that as ervant

¹ *Ib.* p. 126.

² *Ib.* p. 131.

³ *Ib.* pp. 117 f.

⁴ *Ib.* p. 120.

⁵ *Ib.* p. 121.

⁶ *Ib.* p. 122.

shall die in a country, he also gives him an errand there".¹ An exception is the tradition that says, "Nothing wards off the Decree but prayer, and nothing lengthens life but piety."² Several traditions illustrate the rule, "What reaches you could not possibly have missed you, and what misses you could not possibly have reached you."³ God's decree is infallibly fulfilled and no human effort can ward it off or change it.

In the theological discussions of predestination, in which the Mu'tazilites maintained man's free will, there are often discussions that touch upon the question of destiny, i.e. the events of human life. It would carry us too far to go into details. We shall only cast a glance at the final stage, the theology that was accepted as orthodox, namely that of al-Ash'arī. In the question of predestination he took a compromising position: God creates the acts of a man, but the man 'acquires' them and makes them his own and becomes responsible for them. al-Ash'arī raised no objection to fatalistic ideas that had become traditional. He repeats the formula, "Whatever misses you could not possibly have reached you, etc.", and has something suggestive of the writing on the Preserved Tablet. He maintains that nothing happens without God's will and that man's appointed time and sustenance are determined by him. But in spite of these fatalistic traits "the outlook of al-Ash'arī is very much a God-centred one ... God is all in all; everything is in his hand; and since He is the Merciful and Compassionate, the proper attitude towards Him is patience (*ṣabr*) in the face of His judgments and loyal obedience to His commands".⁴

The mystics present a more practical solution of the problem of Destiny. They find it self-evident that God is the only active power in the universe. "There is no God but God and nobody can do what he does. Nobody can harm or profit, give or withhold, make ill or cure, exalt or abase, create and support, kill and give life, keep in rest or move, but he alone."⁵

The consequence of this must be a strict monistic determinism. "God is the creator of all the acts of his servants, even as he is the creator of their essences, all that they do, be it good or evil, is in accordance with God's decree, predestination, desire and will." But in the mystic this feeling of

¹ *Ib.* p. 123. ² *Ib.* p. 123. ³ *Ib.* p. 116.

⁴ Watt, *Free will and predestination* (see note 1), pp. 146 f.

⁵ Ringgren, *Studies* pp. 194 f.

absolute dependence does not create indifference and paralysing apathy. Dhū-n-Nūn said, "I am grace from thy grace, predestination from thy predestination. I run in thy grace, I wander freely in thy predestination. I increase according to thy foreknowledge and fail to decrease according to thy firm decision. From the place where thou hast put me, nobody will be able to push me away but thou thyself. I have no ability to avoid sin but that thy love awakens me." To him the idea of predestination is not paralysing but liberating.¹

Also the mystic speaks of patience in face of that which God sends as a virtue. But his patience is coupled with trust in and love for the God who sends everything. Therefore there is a higher stage than patience, namely *riḍā*, satisfaction with God's will, acquiescence. It is not only acceptance of God's will but a positive and active assent to it.²

It is an irony of fate that precisely this deeply religious interpretation of destiny has obviously contributed much to the development of the fatalistic attitude in Islam. There are some good instances of this popular Muslim attitude in the tales of the *Thousand and One Nights*.³ Here it is neither theologians nor mystics who are speaking but ordinary people. But precisely here it appears how deeply rooted this typically Islamic "fatalism" has become in the people's consciousness. There is nowhere any contradiction between Fate and God, but everywhere we find the conviction that everything is predestined by God and that nothing can prevent or change God's decree.

In the story of Ḥasan of Baṣrah we are told that Ḥasan and his wife travelled night and day through the desert, "and God decreed them safety (*salām*) and they arrived safely at Baṣrah".⁴ Similarly in the story of the humpback we read: "God decreed me safety until I entered this your city (Cairo)".⁵ Thus it is God who grants that the traveller arrives safe and sound, but it is done through his "decree".

In the story of the porter and the ladies of Baghdad three mendicants tell

¹ *Ib.* p. 195.

² *Ib.* pp. 196 f.

³ Some instances are given in my *Studies*, pp. 201 ff. Cf. also L. Leo, *Riflessi religiosi dell' Islam in Mille e Una Notte*, Cairo 1955, pp. 73 f.

⁴ *The Thousand and One Nights*, transl. by E. W. Lane, new ed. by A. S. Poole, London 1889, III p. 390.

⁵ *Ib.* I p. 299.

their stories relating what fate has done to them. The third one begins his story, "As for my companions, the course of fate and destiny (*qadar* and *qadā'*) brought upon them events against which they could not guard", adding that in his own case he had himself provoked fate (*qadā'*).¹ A little later, however, he tells how "his foot slipped, as God had decreed", and he fell upon a young man and killed him.² This is an event that he could possibly have avoided. Earlier in the same tale the first mendicant tells his story: "I aimed at the bird, but the bullet missed it and struck the eye of the vizier . . . in accordance with the appointment of fate and destiny, as the poet has said:

We trod the steps appointed (lit.: written) for us, and the man whose steps are appointed must tread them.

He whose death is decreed to take place in one land will not die in any land but that."³

Thus death is predetermined by God, and nothing can change his decree. But it is also obvious that the decree concerns all that happens to man, and it is man's duty to resign himself to the decree and accept it with patience. There are also several references to the idea of man's carrying his destiny tied around his neck so that it is useless to try to evade it.

There is a good summary of the attitude of Islamic fatalism in the following words in the story of Khalifah the fisherman: "I seek refuge with God the great, beside which there is no deity, the everlasting. I turn unto him, for there is no strength nor power but in God, the high, the great. What God wills comes to pass, and what he wills not does not come to pass. Subsistence is to be bestowed by God, and when God bestows upon a servant, no one prevents him, and when he prevents a servant, no one bestows upon him."⁴ Here the religious aspect of belief in the great and good God is combined with the fatalistic aspect of God's unalterable decree.

Finally, an interesting observation can be made in the *Shāhnāmah* of Ferdousi, the national epic of the Persians. Here we find a great number of instances where 'Destiny' plays the role of retributive power rewarding virtue and punishing evil. In this case we might, of course, think of an "order" or a

¹ *Ib.* I p. 160.

² *Ib.* I p. 167.

³ *Ib.* I p. 136.

⁴ *Ib.* III p. 485.

kind of justice inherent in the nature of the world, but in the context it seems clear that Destiny is here simply a manifestation of God's justice.¹

Historically speaking, Islamic 'fatalism' is the result of a combination of pre-Islamic fatalism and Muhammad's belief in God's omnipotence. From another point of view it is an interpretation of destiny that expresses man's feeling of total dependence, not on an impersonal power or universal order, but on an omnipotent God.

¹ See Ringgren, *Fatalism in Persian epics*, Uppsala 1952, pp. 17 f., 61 ff.

Scandinavian Belief in Fate

A COMPARISON BETWEEN PRE-CHRISTIAN AND
POST-CHRISTIAN TIMES

By ÅKE V. STRÖM

In point of principle, Christianity does not give room for any belief in fate.¹ Astrology, horoscopes, divination, etc., are strictly rejected.² The early Christians found in the Scriptures prohibitions against soothsayers (Lev. 19, 31). They read there ironic statements like this: "Let now the astrologers, the stargazers, the monthly prognosticators, stand up, and save thee from these things that shall come upon thee. Behold, they shall be as stubble; the fire shall burn them" (Is. 47, 13 f.), and they added themselves words like these: "We know that all things work together for good to them that love God" (Rom. 8, 28) or "It is God which worketh in you both to will and to do of his good pleasure" (Phil. 2, 13).³

Christianity entered a world, where people behaved like the Roman lady of about 100 A.D.:

¹ "It is wrong to introduce features of fate into the Christian image of God" (G. Borgenstierna, *Människan och ödet*, Stockholm 1949, p. 13). Or: "It is obvious that fate in any form cannot be accepted from a Christian point of view, whatever it may be called. The free God and free man cannot stand any interference from a third party, least of all from any power of fate" (p. 100).

² See Otto Riedinger, *Die Heilige Schrift im Kampf der griechischen Kirche gegen die Astrologie*, Innsbruck 1956, and H. C. Freiesleben, *Trügen die Sterne? Werden und Wesen der Astrologie*, Stuttgart 1963, pp. 53-61.

³ Hj. Sundén tries to coordinate belief in God and in fate: "Both of them seem to imply that the whole somehow controls the life of all the parts" (*Gud—ödet—slumpen*, Stockholm 1947, p. 221). He seems to reach this result by interpreting the parables of Jesus as describing "a fixed order, the inexorable consequences of unmerciful, irresponsible, and unforgiving behaviour" already in this life (p. 228). Cf. the same author, "Om ödestro och gudstro", *Sjuttiotredje psalmen*, Stockholm 1956, pp. 129-142.

If she wants to
walk to the nearest milestone she asks the stargazer's booklet
for a suitable time, and when her eyelids are itching
casts at once horoscope and chooses her unguent thereafter.¹

But the Christian emperor Constantius II forbade astrology about 350 A.D.,² and in Dante we find those who had tried to reveal fate placed in Hell with their faces on their backs. The prophet says:

Come 'l viso mi scese in lor più basso,
mirabilmente apparve esser travolto
ciascun tra 'l mento e 'l principio del casso;
ché da le reni era tornato il volto,
ed in dietro venir li convenia,
perchè 'l veder dinanzi era lor tolto.³

In this procession backwards are marching prognosticators from Teiresias:

perchè volle veder troppo davante,
di retro guarda e fa retroso calle,⁴

to Michael Scotus (d. 1250), the physician, astrologer, and wizard of emperor Friedrich II of Hohenstaufen.⁵ Martin Luther called astrology a "subtle jugglery" and said about it: "*Astrologia non est ars, quia nulla habet principia et demonstrationes, sed omnia ex eventu et casibus iudicat.*"⁶ His explanation of the First commandment: "Wir sollen Gott über alle Dinge fürchten, lieben und vertrauen", excludes the existence of any power of fate.⁷

Astrology and belief in fate, however, forced their way into Christendom, especially through the Arabs, who had translated the works of Ptolemy

¹ Juvenal, Satire VI, 576-79.

² See Jacob Burckhardt, *Die Zeit Konstantins des Grossen*, Neuaufgabe, Bern 1950, p. 158.

³ Inferno, Canto XX, 10-15 (Dante Alighieri, *Tutte le opere*, a cura di F. Chiappelli. Edizione del centenario, Milano 1965, p. 68).

⁴ Stanzas 38 f. (p. 69).

⁵ Stanzas 115-117 ("che...de le magiche frode seppe il gioco", p. 71).

⁶ *Luthers Werke*, WA, *Tischreden* III, Weimar 1914, Nr. 2834b.

⁷ Concerning the problem of religion and belief in fate see esp. Joachim Konrad, *Schicksal und Gott*, Gütersloh 1947, esp. pp. 195-204. Note the remark: Fate "erhebt von sich aus keinerlei Ansprüche, kultisch verehrt und angebetet zu werden, in ihrer Weisheit gepriesen, in ihrer Nützlichkeit gelobt" (p. 197).

(85-160 A.D.),¹ the leading Greek astronomer and astrologer, interpreted and used, e.g., by the above-mentioned Michael Scotus.² The North-Italian prince Ezzelino da Romano (d. 1259) used several astrologers, amongst them the Sarazene Paul of Bagdad.³ After that belief in fate never disappeared in Christian countries, nor did it in Scandinavia in Christian times. Especially in folklore we can find it at any period: "People believed in an implacable fate. All folklore is filled up with this belief in destiny. What is to happen will happen. Nobody can escape his fate. The future lies in the hands of fate, and the time to come takes its form according to inscrutable laws."⁴

The pre-Christian period in Scandinavia, dominated by pagan Norse religion, and the secularized epoch of the 20th century, however, show more distinctive and more widespread beliefs in fate than does the Christian period. The present paper will make a comparison between these forms of belief.

I. PRE-CHRISTIAN BELIEF IN FATE

A. *Modern research*

Recent study of the old Teutonic belief in fate does not start until 1920 and then, peculiarly enough, in the realm of Anglo-Saxon research. As a matter of fact the Swede Viktor Rydberg and the Dane Vilhelm Grønbech had discussed several points connected with the topic earlier,⁵ but Rydberg's investigations were partly silenced, partly ignored,⁶ and Grøn-

¹ Ἡ μεγάλη σύνταξις, better known as Arabic *Almagest*, and Τετραβίβλος, edited by Franz Boll and E. Boer, 1940. See about this Freiesleben, *op. cit.* pp. 46-50.

² Wilhelm Gundel, *Stern Glaube, Sternreligion und Sternorakel*, Aus der Geschichte der Astrologie, Heidelberg 1959, p. 51, and Paul Bauer, *Horoskop und Talisman*. Die Mächte des heutigen Aberglaubens, Stuttgart 1963, p. 209.

³ For the astrology and belief in fate in the Renaissance see Jacob Burckhardt, *Die Kultur der Renaissance in Italien*, Atlas-Verlag, Köln, no date, pp. 367-77, and Freiesleben, *op. cit.* pp. 71-86.

⁴ C. H. Tillhagen, *Folklig spådomskonst* Stockholm 1961, p. 30.

⁵ V. Rydberg, *Undersökningar i Germanisk mytologi*, 1-2, 1886, 1889, *passim* (see topical index), V. Grønbech, *Vor Folkeæt i Oldtiden*, 1-4, 1909-12.

⁶ For this, see Å. V. Ström, "Das indogermanische Erbe in der Völuspá", *Numen* 1966 (in the press).

bech's books were not translated into English and German until the thirties.¹ The modern literature concerning the subject in question was in fact inaugurated by a Breslau dissertation by Alfred Wolf on the words for fate in Anglo-Saxon poetry, and the treatise by Richard Jente on mythological expressions in Old English.² There attention is already drawn to three important groups of words: *wyrd*, *zescēap*—*zescēaft*, and *orlæg*, which appear in the Old Icelandic *urð*, *skop*, and *orlog*, all of them with the meaning of fate.³

In 1926 Fr. Kauffmann carried out a corresponding investigation in the East Teutonic area, which tried to show, that the expressions *giscapu*, *giscrafti*, and *urlag* were taken from the language of law, the first two meaning 'judicial decision', the third 'primal law' (Urgesetz).⁴

During the 1930's there appeared—with or without connection with the special belief in fate of the Hitler period⁵—on the average one work a year on this subject, all of them, except two, in German: M. von Kienle in 1933, A. G. von Hamel (in English), W. Baetke, and H. Naumann in 1934, M. Ninck in 1935, G. Gunnarsson in 1936, H. Schneider, H. de Boor, and E. Therman (in Swedish) in 1938, and W. Gehl in 1939.⁶

¹ V. Grönbech, *The culture of the Teutons*, 1-3, Copenhagen 1931, *Kultur und Religion der Germanen*, I-II, Hamburg 1937-39. V. Rydberg, *Teutonic mythology*, London 1889, does not seem to have become well known.

² A. Wolf, *Die Bezeichnungen für Schicksal in der angelsächsischen Dichtersprache*, Breslau 1919, R. Jente, *Die mythologischen Ausdrücke im altenglischen Wortschatz* (= Anglistische Forschungen, 56), Heidelberg 1921. Cf. already W. Jaehde, *Religion, Schicksalsglaube... und Rätsel in den englisch-schottischen Volksbaladen*, Halle 1905, and Alois Brandl, "Zur Vorgeschichte der Weird Sisters im 'Macbeth'," *Texte und Forschungen zur englischen Kulturgeschichte, Festgabe für F. Liebermann*, Halle 1921, pp. 252-270.

³ See especially Wolf, *op. cit.* pp. 48, 59 f., 88, 127, and Brandl, *op. cit.* pp. 252-55.

⁴ F. Kauffmann, "Über den Schicksalsglauben der Germanen", *Zeitschrift für deutsche Philologie* 50, 1926, pp. 361-408. Objection by W. Gehl, *Der germanische Schicksalsglaube*, Berlin 1939, who instead proposes the translation 'highest decision' (Höchste Bestimmung), p. 21.

⁵ For this question see Hj. Sundén, *Gud, ödet, slumpen*, pp. 36-44, and P. Bauer, *Horoskop und Talisman*, Stuttgart 1963, pp. 241-243.

⁶ M. von Kienle, "Der Schicksalsbegriff im Altdeutschen", *Wörter und Sachen* 15, 1933, p. 81 ff., A. G. van Hamel, *The conception of fate in early Teutonic and Celtic religion* (= *Saga book of the Viking Society* 9), 1934, H. Naumann, *Germanischer Schicksalsglaube*, Jena 1934, G. Gunnarsson, *Nordischer Schicksalsgedanke*, München 1936, H. Schneider, "Glauben", and H. de Boor, "Dichtung", both in *Germanische*

After that time there is, as far as I know, a complete silence until 1955¹, when there were two treatises in German by Mittner and Neumann.² Finally, we have to note a paper by Strömbäck in 1959.³ Let us examine some of the contents of this literature about the pre-Christian Norse belief in fate.

Walter Baetke deals especially with the following two problems: fate—ethics and belief in fate—faith in gods.⁴ He emphasizes the fact, that there is an inner connection between fate and the moral behaviour of the hero, which gives the poetry its tragic standard.⁵ The hero has to act entirely in accordance with the decision of his fate, he has to stand in conformity with the determined model, and “that is why just the factor *we* are thinking of in moral decision is missing, namely the choice”.⁶ On the contrary: it is fate that is to blame! Expressions like that of the Lay of the Hun-battle 29, “the Norn created bad luck” (*illr er dómr nórna*), or the famous passage in the Lay of Hildebrand, “misfortune is happening” (*wéwurt skihit*)⁷ show that “fate is not accepted in a fatalistic way, but accused!”⁸

Further, Baetke opposes the traditional interpretation, that fate is superior to the gods. They are *regin*, ‘the ruling ones’,⁹ *hopt*, ‘fetters’, or *Altertumskunde*, ed. by H. Schneider, München 1938 (new ed. 1951, pp. 222–305, 306–430), E. Therman, *Eddan och dess ödestragik*, Stockholm 1938. For Baetke, Ninck, and Gehl see p. 67 n. 4, p. 68 n. 4 and p. 69 n. 1.

¹ An exception is the small paper by B. J. Timmer, “Wyrd in Anglo-Saxon prose and poetry”, *Neophilologus* 26, 1944, pp. 24–33 and 213–228.

² L. Mittner, *Wurd* (*Bibliotheca Germanica* 6), Bern 1955, Ed. Neumann, *Das Schicksal in der Edda*, I (*Beiträge zur deutschen Philologie* 7), Giessen 1955.

³ D. Strömbäck, “Till Ynglingatal 10 och nordisk ödestro”, *Septentrionalia et Orientalia studia Bernharðo Karlgren ... dedicata*, Kungl. Vitterhets Historie och Antikvitets Akademiens Handlingar, 91, Stockholm 1959, pp. 386–92.

⁴ W. Baetke, *Art und Glaube der Germanen*, Hamburg 1934.

⁵ *Op. cit.* p. 67.

⁶ Baetke, *op. cit.* p. 68.

⁷ Cf. *Hamdismál* 28 and 30.

⁸ Baetke, *op. cit.* pp. 68 f.

⁹ This word already appears on a stone from the 8th century at Noleby: **rūnō fāhi raginaku[n]dō**, ‘I painted god-inspired runes’ (*Sveriges Runinskrifter*, Bd. 5, “Västergötlands runinskrifter”, Hft 3, Uppsala 1958, pp. 92–100: Nr. 63, Fyrunga sn, Noleby). Cf. *Hdv.* 80:

*er þú at rúnum spyrr
hinum reginkunnum*

and comments on this by Wolfgang Krause, *Runeninschriften im älteren Futhark*, Halle 1937, p. 519.

bönd, 'bonds'. To this group Baetke also counts "das sehr merkwürdige *mjotuðr*", a masculine word used only in the neuter sense of 'fate'.¹ The result is that, according to Norse opinion, "fatalism and theism coincide"². If one of them is later in origin, it is belief in fate, which represents "paganism deprived of its real religious content and grown bloodless and cold". Óðinn as a god of fate is in any case a late poetical conception.³

Similar problems are discussed in greater detail by Martin Ninck in his large book on Óðinn and belief in fate.⁴ In his interpretation of the notion *örlog* (cf. Swedish *örlog*, 'war'), adapted for the Hitler period, he declares, that "Krieg... ist *urlag* und damit zugleich 'Urgesetz' und 'Schicksal'"⁵.

Ninck's book deals more with Óðinn than with fate. The latter, he maintains, is always experienced as suffering, and he speaks of "den pathischen Zug im heldischen Erleben".⁶ Óðinn, too, has this 'pathic' trait. "Ganz im Sinne germanischer Heldenethik, die die Ehre nur sucht, indem sie dem Spruche der Nornen gläubig sich beugt, lag die Verpflichtung auf ihm, den Lauf des Schicksals zu erfahren und nach ihm zu handeln."⁷

To the same period belong the books of the Bonn scholar Hans Naumann and the Finlander Erik Therman, both with particular stress on the guilt of fate. The individual as well as the whole world are guilty, owing to Destiny's determination: "Man's fulfilling his inescapable duty towards life and towards fate produces a burden of guilt, and precisely the performance of his duty constitutes the guilt that causes his destruction."⁸ The same is true of the universe: "Upon life lies guilt from the very beginning. Such a stern religion breeds with absolute necessity the idea of the guilt of the world and 'consequently the belief in its destruction' in the hardening conflict of powers."⁹

¹ Baetke, *op. cit.* pp. 70 f.

² *Op. cit.* p. 71.

³ *Op. cit.* p. 78.

⁴ M. Ninck, *Wodan und germanischer Schicksalsglaube*, Jena 1935.

⁵ Ninck, *op. cit.* p. 130.

⁶ *Ib.* p. 198 with note 2. Similarly de Boor in: Schneider (ed.), *Germanischer Altertumskunde*, München 1938, 2. ed. 1951, p. 402. Opposition by Neuman, *op. cit.* p. 39, note 63.

⁷ Ninck, *op. cit.*, p. 297.

⁸ Therman, *Eddan och dess ödestragik*, p. 54.

⁹ Therman, *op. cit.* p. 56.

The most comprehensive work on fate in the North is Walther Gehl, *Der germanische Schicksalsglaube*, Berlin 1939. In an earlier book Gehl described honour as a "Hineinwachsen ins Überpersönliche".¹ Now he follows the same "impersonal" line with regard to fate, in calling it "eine ungreifbare, unpersönliche Macht, die als Mass und Ordnung hinter den Dingen der Sinnenwelt steht".² Though he treats "impersonal fate", "personified fate", and "personal fate" in different chapters,³ and though he maintains that "the Teutonic belief in fate was a perpetual struggle against the fatalistic and impersonal idea of fate,"⁴ he repeats the old opinion—against Baetke—that the Teutonic gods are subject to fate,⁵ and makes the following statement: "Schicksalsglaube ist eher 'Weltanschauung' als 'Religion'—ja er steht zu Religion im engeren Sinne überall in mehr oder weniger deutlicher Spannung."⁶ Has, then, the Norse man no free will? The problem is discussed by Gehl at some length.⁷ He states that the sources for the most part deal with fate as a power, over against which any resistance is meaningless, for instance: *vinnat skjoldungar skopum*, 'princes cannot resist fate' (*Helg. Hund.* II, 29).⁸ The examples of free will are rare and late,⁹ and in these cases it may be said: "Aus dem Willensentschluss redet das Schicksal."¹⁰

The latest monograph on the Norse problem of fate is the first part of a work by Eduard Neumann, more philosophical than strictly historical.¹¹ He divides the notions of fate into two groups: 1. the conception of "Schick-

¹ W. Gehl, *Ruhm und Ehre bei den Nordgermanen*, Leipzig-Berlin 1937, p. 139.

² Gehl, *Schicksalsglaube*, p. 39.

³ "Das unpersönliche Schicksal und der magische Schicksalsbegriff" (pp. 39–58), "Das personifizierte Schicksal" (p. 80–120), and "Das 'persönliche' Schicksal" (pp. 199–223).

⁴ *Op. cit.* p. 59.

⁵ *Op. cit.* p. 107.

⁶ *Op. cit.* p. 80. Cf. R. L. Derolez: Fate and gods are quite different things. "Vieles von dem, was ... als 'Schicksal' gilt, ist auf das Fehlen einer festgefügteten, über der Menschenwelt thronenden Göttergemeinschaft zurückzuführen" (*Götter und Mythen der Germanen*, Einsiedeln 1963, p. 215).

⁷ Chapter VII: "Das Problem der Willensfreiheit", pp. 182–198.

⁸ *Op. cit.* p. 183.

⁹ *Op. cit.* p. 185.

¹⁰ *Op. cit.* p. 205.

¹¹ Ed. Neumann, *Das Schicksal in der Edda*, I. "Der Schicksalsbegriff in der Edda" (*Beiträge zur deutschen Philologie* 7), Giessen 1955.

sals-Notwendigkeit”, with the terms *urð—verða*, *bønd* and *høpt*, and the sentence: what happens, has to happen, “Was wird, muss werden”.¹ Fate is what comes to pass. 2. the conception of a “Schicksals-Macht” expressed in the words *skuld—skulu*, *skop—skapa*, *leggja*, *meta* (Sigrdr. 20), and implying that a kind of superwill wants it to be in this way.² Fate is a ruling power. According to Neumann the first type belongs to a primitive people and corresponds to the gods called *vanir*, while the second type is connected with a more civilized and politically organized people and matches the *æsir*-gods.³ The second form is increasingly penetrating the Norse mind, thus giving fate in the Eddic poetry its “asic” stamp.⁴

More recently there have been only small articles and parts of books dealing with the conception of destiny, except for one larger treatise by *Ladislaus Mittner*.⁵ Starting from the ‘kennings’ of Norse poetic style, in which he finds a consistent pessimism,⁶ the author proceeds to a philological analysis of the words for fate, esp. *Wurd*, from the Indoeuropean root **uert*, Latin *vertere*, denoting a circular movement. Without mentioning the Indian *samsāra* he states, that the Teutonic conception of fate is pessimistic, most clearly expressed in *wēwurt skihit*.⁷

In a paper on Ynglingatal 10 and the Norse belief in fate,⁸ Dag Strömbäck gives a careful exegesis of the stanza in question, resulting in a new translation.⁹ He explains, that “according to Norse belief in fate each man had

¹ *Op. cit.* p. 24.

² “Der Über-Wille will, dass es so sein soll’ (*op. cit.* p. 52). On the Anglo-Saxon word *metod* see Brandl, *op. cit.* p. 254 and some reflections by Sundén, *Gud — ödet — slumpen*, pp. 55 f., 61 f.

³ *Op. cit.* pp. 54, 56 f. Cf. already Grønbech: “In the old country destiny was bound up with the luck of the clan... In the life of the viking fate asserted itself as a deity with a will of its own” (*The culture of the Teutons II*, 1931, pp. 305 f.).

⁴ Neumann, p. 197.

⁵ L. Mittner, *Wurd* (*Bibliotheca Germanica* 6), Bern 1955.

⁶ *Op. cit.* p. 63.

⁷ *Op. cit.* pp. 96, 104.

⁸ D. Strömbäck, “Till Ynglingatal 10 och nordisk ödestro”, *Septentrionalia et Orientalia Studia Bernharðo Karlgren... dedicata* (see note 23). Stockholm 1959, p. 386–92.

⁹ “I call it a miracle, / if Skjalf’s deed / seemed to Agne’s army / to be according to fate”, i.e. “Skjalf’s deed [of hanging her husband] is certainly not according to fate” (*op. cit.* p. 392).

a certain space of life, a certain measured time to live. It seems as if sometimes not only the length of life but also the place of death were determined in advance."¹

B. *Some important passages in the texts*

It is, of course, quite impossible in this paper to give a comprehensive picture of the Norse belief in destiny, or even to deal with a limited but sufficient number of texts. Our task is to make a comparison between old and modern conceptions in this area of religion or superstition. A few representative passages may be singled out in order to indicate the background of the parallels to be drawn. I marshal them in four groups according to their meaning.

1. *What is to happen happens*

We find this sentence already in Beowulf:

zæð ā wyrd swā hlo scel.

Wyrd goes always as she must.

(Beow. 455)²

We find also both *metod* and *wyrd*:

*swā unc wyrd zeteoð,
metod manna zehwæs.*

as fate us ordains,
which creates man's destiny.

(Beow. 2526 f.)³

These two expressions and *zescēap* have their correspondence in Heliand:

*wurdegiscapu,
metod gimarcod endi maht godes.*

So was his fate
measured by the creator and God's power.

(Heliand 127 f.)⁴

In scaldic literature we find the sentence used by Kormákr: "fighters do not conquer destiny" (*skopum vinnat*),⁵ and: "Angry destinies reign with their

¹ *Op. cit.* p. 391.

² Wolf, *op. cit.* pp. 34-37. Cf. Beowulf 1233: *wyrd = geosceaft*, 'creation', 'destiny', and 3030: *wyrda ne worda* 'fates and events', for which see Brandl, "Zur Vorgesichte der Weird Sisters", p. 253. Mittner, *op. cit.* p. 99, translates the last passage: "geweissagtes Missgeschick".

³ Wolf, *op. cit.* p. 4.

⁴ Text and commentary in H. Ljungberg, *Tor*, Uppsala 1947, pp. 84-86.

⁵ St. 30. Text in Kock, *Den norsk-isländska skaldediktningen*, I, 1946, p. 46. Gehl accepts the unnecessary conjecture of F. Jónsson: *mдат* instead of *þviat* (p. 183).

own will" (*valda sköp sínu* | ... *reið at ráði*).¹ Nearly the same expression is found in the Edda: in *Helg. Hund.* II, 29, *Gríp.* 53, *Oddr.* 16, line 8: "if fate did not destroy" (*nema mjötuðr spilti*), *Fjölsv.* 47, and especially the following:

*Sköpum viðr manngi,
ok skuluð þó hér kommir!*

Nobody resists fate.

You should at all events come here!²

(*Atlam.* 48)

It is explicitly said that fate dominates over chance:

*Ræðr auðna³ lífi en æigi hvar maðr er
kominn.*

Fate rules life, and not [the position]
where one is [= chance].

(*Orkn. saga* 11)⁴

*Góðs höfum tírar fengit
þótt skylim nú eða ígær deyja —
kveld lífir maðr ekki
eptir þvíð norna.⁵*

We gained good honour,
even if we should die now or to-morrow,
a man does not live to the evening
after the norns have spoken.

(*Hamð.* 30)

This type often occurs in the sagas, e.g. in the story of *Njál*:

Ch. 6: *þat verðr hværr at vinna, sem ætlat er.*

Everyone shall do the work that is set before him.

Ch. 13: *Ekki mun mega við gera; þat mun verða fram at koma, sem ætlat er.*

I am not able to prevent it; that will come about, which is set before us.

Ch. 128: *Ef annars verðr auðit, þá mun þat verða fram at koma, ok mun ekki mega við gera.*

If something else be ordained by fate, it will come about, and I am not able to prevent it.

Ch. 149: *Allt mun þat fram ganga um aldr manna, sem ætlat er.⁶*

Everything must come to pass with man's life-time, which is set before us.

¹ St. 40. Text in Kock, *op. cit.* p. 47.

² See Neuman, *op. cit.* pp. 43, 46, and Gehl, *op. cit.* p. 183.

³ The word *auðna* in 21 cases means 'fate', in 12 'luck' (Gehl, *op. cit.* p. 69).

⁴ *Orkneyinga saga*, ed. S. Nordal (SUGNL 40), København 1913-16, p. 20. A. B. Taylor translates: "not his own comings and goings" (*Orkneyinga saga*. A new translation, Edinburgh 1938, p. 148.)

⁵ The text of the manuscript (Cod. Reg.) is metrically too long, and F. Jónsson proposes to shorten it (*De gamle Eddadigte*, København 1932, pp. 342 and 359). The meaning will be the same.

⁶ *Brennu-Njáls saga*, ed. E. Ól. Sveinsson, Reykjavík 1954, pp. 20, 42, 327, and 427.

2. Each man has his own fate

There is at least one passage in *Beowulf*:

Wyrð oft nered unfæzne eorl, Wyrð often saves un doomed man,
(*Beow.* 573)¹

that is to say, a man who from the beginning is made to have success. *Vǫluspá* describes to us, how this personal destiny is given to men. The creator gods, *Óðinn* and *Hœnir*, found the first men, *Askr* and *Embla*, *ørlogslausa*, 'without a destiny' (st. 17). But the three Norns (whose names, *Urðr*, *Verðandi*, and *Skuld*, are all connected with fate,) came, and

þær lög lögðu, they created law,
þær líf kuru they chose life[-models]
alda þǫrmum and told destinies
*ørlog seggja.*² to the children of men.
(*Vsp.* 20)

The result appears in another Eddic lay:

Öll eru mein of metin. All harm is measured.
(*Sgdr.* 20)

Destiny is thought of as so personal, that one person can be the fate of another:

Urðr ǫðlinga The fate or princes
hefir þú æ verit, have you always been,
rekr þik alda hver[r] each wave of a bad destiny
illrar skepnu. is driving you.
(*Guðr.-kv.* I, 24)

The fate, 'luck', of one person can compete with that of another, as is especially shown by a story in the *Flateyjarbók*. A merchant called *Hrói* was an *úgiptumaðr*, 'unlucky man', and was unsuccessful in business. The Danish king *Sveinn Fork-beard* entered into partnership with him, and the following conversation developed:

¹ Wolf, *op. cit.* p. 4.

² Cf. *Snorra Edda* 14, where *Allfǫðr* creates rulers at *doema... ørlog manna*, and 15, where the Norns have the duty to *koma til hvers manns er borinn er, at skapa aldr* and to *ráða ørlogum manna*. They create these destinies *geysi-újafnt*, 'specially for each person'. The scald *Hallfrøðr* speaks of *forhaldin sköp norna*, 'the time-honoured doom of the Norns' (*Visur*, st. 10, Kock, *op. cit.* p. 86).

*Hrói: Vænti ek, at þá megí meira
gipta yður ok hamingja en úgæfa mín.*

Hrói: I expect that your good luck
and fortune will be stronger than my
ill-luck.

*Konungur: þar skal á hætta, hvárt
meira megí, konunglig gípt eða úgæfa
hans.*

The king: There shall be ventured
upon whether [my] royal luck or his
ill-luck is the stronger.

(*Styrbj. þátrr Sviakappa*, in *Ólafs saga helga*, ch. 62)¹

3. *One had better not know his fate, except through divination*

The main passage is the following:

*Orlog sín
viti engi fyrir:
þeim er sorgalausastr sefi.*

His fate ahead
one ought not to know:
for him sleep is most carefree.

(*Háv.* 56: 4–6)²

Such a carefree situation, through lacking knowledge of one's destiny, is pictured in the following scene in *Beowulf*:

...there was a choice banquet,
and the men drank wine. They knew not Weird,
the Fate that was grim, as it had befallen
many an earl...

...one of the beer-servants,
eager and fated (*fūs ond fæge*), went to his bed.

(*Beow.* 1232–35, 1240 f.)³

There are, however, two ways of finding out one's coming destiny without any risk: the special Norse divination, called *seiðr*, and the sacrifice, with the name of *blót*. A famous female soothsayer had used a woman, named *Guðriðr*, as her assistant at the *seið*, and she thanked *Guðrið* warmly, adding:

þín forlog eru mér nu öll glöggsæ.

Now I see your future destinies quite
clearly.

(*Eriks saga rauða*, ch. 3)⁴

There seems to be no danger in this sort of looking into the future, and *Guðriðr* is as successful as the *seiðr* promised.

¹ *Flateyjarbók*, ed. S. Nordal, *Annað bindi*, Akraness 1945, p. 150.

² For this see Gehl, *op. cit.* p. 161.

³ Translation by Ernest J. B. Kirtlan, *The Story of Beowulf*, London [1914]. On the quoted passage see Mittner, *op. cit.* p. 102.

⁴ Quoted from Dag Strömbäck, *Sejd*, Lund 1935, pp. 51 and 54.

The other method is the *blót*.¹ It is told about the first settler on Iceland:

þenna vetr fekk Ingólfr at blóti miklu, This winter Ingolf made a big sac-
ok leitaði sér heilla² um forlög sín. rifice and sought augury for his fate.
(*Landnámabók, Sturlubók, ch. 7*)

About another settler there is the following comment:

þorsteinn Rauðnefr... blótaði forsinn... Thorstein Rednib sacrificed to the
hann var ok framsýnn mjök. waterfall... he was also very fore-seeing.
(*Landn. Sturl. ch. 355*)

A special sacrificial instrument, the *hlautteinn*, which had some connection with the old Indoeuropean bundles *barsman*, *barhis*, *strena*, and εἰρεσιώνη, has also served as a divining rod.³ The expression *fella blótspánn*, 'cast divining rods', shows the method, by which the Norsemen investigated their destinies at *blót*-time. We find it in a least one Scaldic poem:

<i>Flótta gekk til fréttar</i>	The felling Niord [= the victor]
<i>fellí-Njörðr á velli.</i>	went to ordeal in the field.
<i>Draugr gat dolga Sögu</i>	The spirit of Saga's enemies [= the warrior]
<i>dagrðð Heðins váða...</i>	received augury of Hedin's peril [= success in battle]...
<i>Týr vildi sá týna</i>	The Tyr of the <i>hlauttein</i> [= the sacrificer]
<i>teinhlautar fjör Gauta.⁴</i>	was to destroy the lives of the Gauts.

C. Some philological remarks

The Norse word *mjotuðr*, Anglo-Saxon *meotod*, is mostly translated 'that which is measured', 'that which is allotted'.⁵ Professor Dumézil, however,

¹ See Åke V. Ström, "The king-god and his connection with sacrifice in old Norse religion", *La regalità sacra, Suppl. to Numen* IV, Leiden 1959, esp. pp. 713-15.

² About the neutral *heill*, meaning 'omen', 'augury', see Baetke, *Das Heilige im Germanischen*, Tübingen 1942, p. 61.

³ See Ström, *op. cit.* pp. 705-07, and the same author, "Die Hauptriten des wikingerzeitlichen Nordischen Opfers", *Festschr. Baetke*, Leipzig 1966, p. 72.

⁴ *Einars Skálaglams Vellekla*, st. 30, Kock, *op. cit.* p. 69.

⁵ So F. Jónsson, *Lexicum Poeticum*, København 1913-16, p. 408, F. Ström, *Nordisk hedendom*, Göteborg 1961, p. 141. Cf. Grønbech, *The culture*, p. 326: *Mjotuðr* is a ritual expression for luck... bound up with the sacrifice", and Sundén, *op. cit.* p. 55.

in an article on a rather different subject,¹ writes the following note apropos the Latin word *modus*, Oscian *med-diss*: "Cf. les valeurs de la racine en irlandais (*midiur*, 'je juge', *com-midethar*, 'il gouverne'); en vieux-scandinave (*mjǫtuðr*, 'juge, chef'), en grec (μέδων, Λαο-μέδων)."² Consequently, we ought to take the male gender of *mjǫtuðr* seriously and translate: 'the measurer', i.e. 'the dispenser of fate'; thus there is nothing 'merkwürdig' about the word at all.³

A similar figure is *Narfi* (*Nǫrfi*, *Nǫrr*),⁴ the father of Night (*nótt*). Rydberg derives the name from *njǫrva*, 'to bind with narrow bonds', and translates 'he who binds narrowly'; he proceeds to show that *Narfi* is the same as *Mímr* (*Mímir*) in *Vsp.* 28 and 46, *Sigrdr.* 14.⁵ Detter has pointed out that *Mímr* is not to be derived from Latin *memor*, Greek *μυμνήσκειν*, but ought to be connected with Anglo-Saxon *māmrian*, 'to brood', Dutch *mijmeren*, 'to dream', and Norwegian *meima*, 'to measure', from the old root **mer*.⁶ Consequently, we can combine *Mímr* with *meotod-mjǫtuðr*. The word *mímameiðr* (*Fjolsv.* 20) is not 'Mímir's tree', which would suppose a third form of the name, *Mími*, but 'the tree of measurement'.⁷

Gehl, with some hesitation, accepts Detter's identification of *Mímr* with *mjǫtuðr* and with *Mitothyne* in Saxo,⁸ the last name being a latinized form of the same word as *mjǫtuðr*.⁹ If *Mímr* is also the god of fate or a god of fate,

¹ G. Dumézil, "Ordre, phantasie, changement dans les pensées archaïques de l'Inde et de Rome", *Revue des études latines* 32, 1954 (Paris 1955), p. 139-162.

² Dumézil, *op. cit.* p. 151, note 4.

³ Cf. the quotation from Baetke, above p. 68.—The new translation in Geir T. Zoëga, *A concise dictionary of Old Icelandic*, Oxford 1952, s.v., Åke V. Ström, in: Ringgren-Ström, *Religionerna i historia och nutid*, 3rd ed., Stockholm 1964, p. 379, and, before Dumézil, in Ljungberg, *op. cit.* p. 85.

⁴ *Snorra Edda Gylf.* 10, *Vafþr.* 25.

⁵ Rydberg, *op. cit.* 1, pp. 459-63.

⁶ Ferd. Detter, "Zur Ynglingasaga", *Beiträge zur Geschichte der deutschen Sprache und Literatur* XVIII, 1894, pp. 72-105.—The Norse word *meta*, too, has in various Indo-European languages the meaning of 'measure' as well as of 'meditate' (de Vries, *Altnordisches Etymologisches Wörterbuch*, Leiden 1956, p. 385).

⁷ Detter, *op. cit.* p. 75, note 1.

⁸ *Saxonis Gesta Danorum*, ed. J. Olrik-H. Raeder, Hauniae 1931, I: 7: 2 (p. 25).

⁹ "Mimir könnte eine Nebenform für die vermutlich alte Schicksalsgöttheit *Metod* sein, eine Annahme, die durch Saxos Bericht über Mitothyne wesentlich gestützt wird" (Gehl, *Der germanische Schicksalsglaube* p. 113, n. 253, cf. p. 22, n. 17). For Mitothyne = *mjǫtuðr* see ib. p. 106.—Dumézil, in connection with his conception of the Mitothyne episode in Saxo as a duplicate of the story of the fight be-

we need not affirm the existence of two wells under the root of Yggdrasill, the well of *Urðr* (*Urðarbrunnr*, *Vsp.* 19, *Háv.* 111) being then the same as the well of *Mímir* (*Mímisbrunnr*, *Vsp.* 28).¹

The combination of *Mímir* and *mjǫtuðr* is supported by the following passages, in one of which *Yggdrasill* (in *Vsp.* 2 called *mjǫtviðr!*) is connected with *mjǫtuðr* (and *Mímir!*),² and in the other *Mímameiðr* is also combined with *mjǫtuðr*:

*Leika Míms synir,
en mjǫtuðr kyndis...
mæliŕ Óðinn
við Míms höfuð;
skelfr Yggdrasils
askr standandi.*

The sons of Mímr play,
and fate is kindled...
Óðinn talks
to Mímr's head;
the ask Yggdrasill
trembles, as it stands.

(*Vsp.* 46 f.).

*Mímameiðr hann heitir,
en þat manngi veit
af hverjum rótum renn...
sá er hann með mönnum mjǫtuðr.*

His name is Mímameiðr,
and nobody knows
from what root it rises...
he is such a dispenser of fate for men.

(*Fjolsv.* 20, 22).

Leaving the Norse conception of fate we only want to add that the old Scandinavians did not make any strong distinction between theism and fatalism, nor between the personal and the impersonal in the concept of fate.³ Norse culture, being impersonalistic in its nature, lacked our clear-cut notion of personality,⁴ and consequently no sharp distinction, like

tween the *æsir* and the *vanir* (Le saga de Hadingus, Paris 1953, pp. 100-113), offers a rather different interpretation: Mithothyn = Mithothyn (the first edition of Saxo, Paris 1514, and the second, Basel 1534, by Dumézil called "l'édition princeps", have: Mithoty) = *mjǫð-Óðinn*, 'the Óðinn of mead' or 'the mead of Óðinn' (ib. p. 111, n. 3).

¹ "Es berührt eigenartig, dass unter dem Weltbaum zwei Brunnen liegen sollen, in deren einem die Nornen wohnen, während der andere die Gabe der Wahrsagung verleiht. Man möchte annehmen, dass es sich hier ursprünglich um einen Brunnen gehandelt hat" (Gehl, *op. cit.* p. 113).

² Cf. *Yggdrasill* in connection with *urðr* and *orlog* in *Vsp.* 19 f.

³ Cf. the oscillation between personal and impersonal in the case of ἄτη, τύχη, etc. See above C. M. Edsman, pp. 24 f.

⁴ For this see Åke V. Ström, *Vetekornet*, Studier över individ och kollektiv, Uppsala 1944, pp. 37-45 (English summary p. 432).

our's, was made between personal powers and impersonal fate.¹ So *mjó-tuðr* is sometimes a person (*Oddr.-gr.* 16, *Sig.sk.* 71), sometimes a tree (*Fjolsv.* 22), a sword (*Snorra Edda Skaldsk.* 1: 8) or an impersonal power (*Vsp.* 46). In a similar way the old word *urðr*, fem. or (seldom) masc., oscillates between person (Weird sister) and power,² but it can also be used of a real, living person: *Urðr ǫðlinga hefir þú æ verit* (above p. 73).

II. POST-CHRISTIAN BELIEF IN FATE

A. *The situation.*

In comparison with the folkloristic concept of fate in Christian times the secularized man of the 20th century shows more and richer forms of fatalistic belief. Oswald Spengler represents in his doctrine of culture, as set forth in his work *Der Untergang des Abendlandes* (1919), an entirely pagan idea of destiny.³ Theophil Spoerri gives the following description of the new way of thinking in our century: "Die Vorsehung wird zum Schicksal, die klare Offenbarung zum zweideutigen Orakel, das gläubige Gebet zur magischen Beschwörung."⁴ *Kismet*,⁵ an international vogue-word, served in the thirties as an expression for the belief in fate.⁶ Trends in modern psychology have appeared to give scientific sanction to certain ideas of fate: "What we call fate is the totality of those psychological mechanisms, against which we feel ourselves powerless."⁷ In popular thought, inheri-

¹ Cf. H. Schneider: "Was ist aber 'Schicksal' anderes als der Begriff eines formlosen 'Mächtigen', das sich unseren Berechnungen und Einflüssen entzieht; sei es ein noch oder ein wieder Formloses? Im einen Fall ist das Göttliche noch nicht menschlich gefasst, im anderen hat es enttäuscht, wird deshalb aus der Menschengestalt wieder entlassen und kehrt zur alten Rätselhaftigkeit zurück" ("Glauben", *Germanische Altertumskunde*, p. 257).

² See Mittner, *Wurd*, p. 87 f. with note 173.

³ See Theophil Spoerri, *Die Götter des Abendlandes*, 3rd ed. 1932, p. 132.

⁴ *Op. cit.* p. 15.

⁵ The Turkish form of Arabic *qismah*, "the share or portion, attributed by God to man" (H. Ringgren, *Studies in Arabian fatalism* (= *Uppsala Universitets Årsskrift* 1955: 2), pp. 106 and 156. Cf. Konrad, *op. cit.* p. 198.

⁶ Spoerri, *op. cit.* p. 39 f.

⁷ Poul Bjerre, *Korset och livsbägaren*, Den efterkristna människans tro och krav, Stockholm 1927, p. 100. For a commentary see Åke V. Ström, *Vetekornet*, pp. 71-76. The quoted passage, as well as the subtitle, disappeared in the 2nd edition of Bjerre's book, Stockholm 1940.

tance and environment determine the destiny of man,¹ and nearly all the leading psychologists have a behaviouristic background (Tolman, Hull, Skinner, Murray, Cattell, Lewin etc.; exception: Allport).² In a recent pamphlet the present situation is described thus: "Man läßt die Arme schlaff am Leibe herunterfallen und beugt sich schweren Herzens, aber stumm wie ein Tier, unter das Joch, das dieses grauenvolle Schicksal durch Vererbung und Umwelt, durch Charakterveranlagung und Lebensmitgift einem aufgebürdet hat."³ Astrology is as much in vogue as in the Renaissance.⁴

The revival of the fatalism is intimately bound up with modern superstition and its consequences.⁵ Our world is shrinking, distances have grown shorter, and foreign cultures have come nearer. Accordingly, purely pagan belief in stars and fate is able to infect Europe, now as during the Renaissance. The great solar eclipse on the 5th of February 1962, caused by the conjunction of the sun, the moon and the earth, Jupiter, Saturn, Venus, Mars, and Mercury in the constellation of Capricorn,⁶ created alarm in nearly the whole world. The Prime minister of Burma U Nu sacrificed personally during a whole week, Indian astrologists predicted the destruction of the world,⁷ and Lorcher Astrologischer Kalender in Germany announced, that "diese totale Verfinsternung ganz gewaltige Katastrophen, Umwälzungen, Kriege oder aber auch Veränderungen der Erdoberfläche verursachen wird".⁸

A woman expert, Evangeline Adams, holds the opinion, that nations, too, have their horoscopes, and that the United States of America, as being born on the 4th of July 1776 at 3: 03 a.m., has a horoscope, which shows the

¹ "Ingen videnskapsmann vilde vel våge å sette formelen så nakent op: arv + miljø = skjebne. Men allikevel er dette faktisk den formelen som mange mennesker tenker efter nu for tiden." (E. Berggrav, *Legeme og sjel*, Oslo 1933, p. 68.)

² See Calvin S. Hall-Gardner Lindzey, *Theories of personality*, New York 1957, pp. 157-419, K. B. Madsen, *Moderne psykologiske teorier*, 2 ed., Copenhagen 1965, pp. 17-117, esp. p. 103.

³ Hans Dannenbaum, *Schicksal oder Schuld*, Velbert (Rheinl.) o. J. [1964], p. 4.

⁴ Gundel, *op. cit.* pp. 148-164, Freiesleben, *op. cit.* pp. 89-105.

⁵ Paul Bauer, *Horoskop und Talisman*, pp. 11-22, Kurt E. Koch, *Der Aberglaube*, Öhringen o. J. [1965].

⁶ The astronomer Freiesleben has Aquarius instead of Capricorn (*op. cit.* p. 100).

⁷ Svenska Dagbladet 1 febr. 1962.

⁸ Bauer, *op. cit.* p. 250.

country's great cultural importance etc.¹ According to Patrice Bousset there is one astrologist to 120 Parisians, but only one doctor to 514, and one clergyman to 5000. The French people pay ten times as much to fortune-tellers as the state does to scientific research.²

How do matters stand in Sweden? In 1930 no Swedish magazine published horoscopes, in 1940 and 1950 four of them³ contained articles on the stars, and in 1963 there were horoscopes in 13 magazines, besides daily newspapers.⁴ Books on astrology and soothsaying are more and more often translated into Swedish.⁵

B. *Two Swedish investigations*

In the spring of 1963 a small investigation concerning chance, fate, and horoscopes was carried out in Stockholm.⁶ The material consists of 250 oral interviews with people selected by chance. Unaware of this research, the present writer in the spring of 1964 made a somewhat larger investigation of the same subject in a suburb of Stockholm (Handen). A questionnaire with 16 questions was answered by 440 young people, i.e. all the pupils of 14-16 years of age in Handen's public school. They wrote anonymously and did not know the author of the questions and the receiver of the answers, but only the scientific purpose of the inquiry, which was conducted during school-hours by a student of professor Husén's. Here is a translation of the questionnaire developed by myself and my wife, who also worked up the answers statistically.* The number of answers are inserted.

¹ Dagens Nyheter, ed. B, 31 Dec. 1964.

² Expressen 20 Dec. 1964.

³ Hemmets Veckotidning, Vårt Hem, Veckorevyn and Allas Veckotidning.

⁴ Berndt Gustafsson, *Religionssociologi*, Stockholm 1965, p. 44, *Gud i storstad*. Undersökningar utförda vid Religionssociologiska Institutet i Stockholm, Stockholm 1963, p. 144 f. Cf. about similar investigations in Germany Freiesleben, *op. cit.* pp. 103-105, and in USA Svenska Dagbladet 25 April 1966.

⁵ E.g. Eleanor Kirk, *Planeternas inflytande på människans liv*, Stockholm 1926, *Nostradamus profetior*. Världens öden 1555-2797 ... tolkade av Åke Ohlmarks, 1960, and *Konsten att spå i kort*. Sefharians klassiska handbok i översättning av Åke Ohlmarks, Stockholm 1960.

⁶ *Gud i storstad*, 1963, p. 138-146.

* I here want to express my gratitude to the Provost, fil.lic. Olle Flodby, and to my wife, fil. kand. Siv Ström.

Questions concerning modern belief in fate.

Section I: "Que sera, sera, Whatever will be, will be."

1. Do you think, that on the whole what happens is settled in advance?					
yes	no	do not know	no answer		
55 (12.5 percent)	314 (71 percent)	69 (16 percent)	2 (0.5 percent)		
2. How, above all, is that which happens settled?					
by fate	by fate and chance	by chance	by God	no answer	
131 (30) ¹	6 (1)	246 (56)	46 (10.5)	11 (2.5)	
3. Which influence has inheritance and environment of a person on what happens to him?					
total	great	only little	no answer		
26 (6)	272 (62)	136 (31)	6 (1)		
4. Is it possible for a person to influence that which is to happen to him?					
yes	no	a bit	no answer		
174 (39)	112 (25)	152 (35)	2 (1)		
5. Can you increase your luck by					
a) living better and more up-rightly?					
yes	no	a bit	no answer		
204 (46)	141 (32)	88 (20)	7 (2)		
b) making special arrangements?					
yes					
have a mascot					
pray	something else	no	do not know	no answer	
116 (26)	98 (22)	11 (2.5)	290 (48)	6 (1.5)	0 (0)
c) avoid certain things, for example use the number 13, walking under a ladder, breaking a mirror?					
yes	possibly	no	do not know)	no answer	
25 (6)	13 (3)	389 (88)	1 (-)	12 (3)	

Section II: "It is written in the stars."²

6. Do you read the newspapers' horoscopes and predictions, based on the position of the stars, your birthdate etc.?				
often	sometimes	never	no answer	
146 (33)	256 (58)	37 (9)	1 (-)	
7. Do you believe in a connection between such things (stars, date of birth, etc.) and the progress of a person?				
yes	no	do not know	no answer	
35 (8)	304 (69)	99 (22.5)	2 (0.5)	
8. Do you believe in other methods to find out one's destiny?				
yes	no	possibly	no answer	
48 (11)	344 (78)	35 (8)	13 (3)	

¹ The figures in parentheses mean percentages.

² The Swedish translation of the song hit "C'est écrit dans le ciel" is more 'astrological' than the French original text and runs: "Det har stjärnorna sagt".

9. Do you know someone, who, in earnest, has had his fortune told?			
yourself	someone whom you know	nobody	no answer
8 (2)	92 (21)	336 (76)	4 (1)

Section III: "*Pride will have a fall.*"

10. Do you think that bragging involves bad luck?								
yes	no	sometimes	no answer					
72 (16)	132 (30)	232 (53)	4 (1)					
11. Do you think that bad luck more easily hits a person who talks about his luck (e.g. a person gets ill who says: I have not been ill for 10 years)?								
yes	no	sometimes	no answer					
25 (6)	322 (73)	90 (20)	3 (1)					
12. Have some people good luck, others bad luck?								
yes	no	do not know	no answer					
279 (63.5)	63 (14)	95 (22)	3 (0.5)					
13. What is the cause of this difference?								
their character	character and chance	chance	inborn luck					
58 (13)	4 (1)	234 (53)	73 (16.5)					
14. Each section above is headed by a quotation. Are they true?								
all of them	none	only quotation number			do not know and obscure answers	no answer		
75 (17)	123 (28)	I	II	III	I + II	I + III ¹	92 (21)	24 (5)
		55 (12.5)	9 (2)	38 (9)	2 (0.5)	22 (5)		

Accordingly voting quotation

I (Que sera...) true: 154 (35)

II (It is written...) true 86 (19.5)

III (Pride will...) true 135 (30.5)

The most interesting figures are probably the following:

56 percent believe in chance, 30 percent in fate as determiner of destiny (question 2),

35 percent believe that what is to happen happens (question 14, cf. question 1),

26 percent believe in mascots (question 5 b),

33 percent read horoscopes frequently, 58 percent sometimes, together 91 percent (question 6),

16 percent or possibly 69 percent believe in the danger of *hubris* (question 10), 6 or 26 percent believe in *nemesis* (question 11),

¹ Answers II + III are not represented.

19.5 percent hold the song hit "It is written in the stars" to be true (question 14).

Only 11, or possibly 19, percent believe in soothsaying and auguries (question 8), but no less than 63.5 percent think, that some people are born to luck, others to bad luck (question 12).

It is interesting to compare these results with those of the Stockholm investigation of 1963.

The figures about chance and fate are not quite comparable. In Stockholm people were asked about the origin of *accidents*,¹ in Handen about the background of *all that happens* (question 2), but perhaps young people in the latter case think primarily of accidents.

Here are the figures in percent:

		chance	fate	negligence	God	do not know
Stockholm 1963	men	38	21	43	—	14 ²
	women	31	37	21	—	25
	together	30	25	28	—	17
Handen 1964	boys	64	21	—		
	girls	48	38.5	—		
	together	56.5	30.5	—	10.5	2.5

In both cases the main result is the same: male individuals believe more in chance, females in fate. The percentage of believers in fate is only insignificantly higher in Handen than in Stockholm, but concerning chance it is nearly twice as high—certainly depending upon the lower age.

People in Stockholm were asked about the determination of the hour and the manner of death,³ which can be compared with our question 1 about predestination:

	yes	no	do not know
Stockholm 1963	36	45	19
Handen 1964	12.5	71	16.5

¹ *Gud i storstad*, p. 139.

² The totals of these figures are more than 100 percent, because the investigator has used the unusual method of counting two answers by one person as two! Cf. our treatment of the answers to our questions 13 and 14 above.

³ *Op. cit.* p. 140.

In both places the negative answers predominate, but the lower age in the Handen material gives more negative answers.

Are some people luckier than others (question 12, Handen), respectively, are born with more good luck (Stockholm¹)?

		yes	no	do not know
Stockholm 1963	18-29 years	27	62	11
	60 and above	56	37	7
	total	40	48	12
Handen 1964	14-16 years	63.5	14	22.5

Here we find a great difference. More young people in the suburb believe in inborn luck than do even people of 60 or more years of age in town.

Every third person in Stockholm and every second under 30 years of age confesses having a mascot.² There are many more people who believe that mascots give better luck (question 5 b) than those who believe in luck through avoidance (question 5 c). The comparison runs as follows:

		yes	no	do not know
Stockholm 1963	over 60 years	4	92	4
	30-60 years	6	84	10
	18-29 years	12	73	15
Handen 1964	14-16 years	26	48	1.5

The percentages of those using horoscopes in Stockholm³ and Handen (question 6) are as follows:

		often	sometimes	never
Stockholm 1963	men	6	34	60
	women	12	46	39
Handen 1964	boys	7	77	15
	girls	58	39	2

The females and the younger persons read much more horoscopes than males and older persons. The believers in them are grouped this way:

	yes	no	do not know
Stockholm 1963	9	74	17
Handen 1964	8	69	23

¹ *Op. cit.* p. 141.

² *Op. cit.* p. 143 f.

³ *Op. cit.* p. 145.

III. COMPARISON BETWEEN PRE-CHRISTIAN AND POST-CHRISTIAN BELIEF IN FATE

To characterize the difference between the two forms of fatalism before and after Christianity, we will make use of the phenomenological pattern, drawn up by C. J. Bleeker¹ and applied by Helmer Ringgren in his introductory lecture.² According to this pattern there are five methods of grasping and interpreting what happens. I Scandinavia these apply as follows.

A. *Types of fatalism*

1. *The wheel of Fortuna is turning arbitrarily*

This type is not met with in pre-Christian times, because fate is bound up, measured, and ruled, as the words tell us (*bønd, metod, regin*). Fate has a coherent plan.

On the other hand this type is predominant in modern time: belief in chance prevails over belief in fate, and inheritance and environment are considered to have great, though not exclusive, significance (question 3).

2. *Fate has something to do with birth*

This type has two subdivisions: a) Some (female) personages of fate (good or bad) stand at the cradle of the child with gifts, b) The constellation of stars in the moment of a child's birth is significant for its future life.

Type 2a is current in pre-Christian religion. The Norns create the destinies of each man. But *time* has no great importance in Norse religion,³ and there is no astrology to be found. Possibly there is a small astrological embryo in an Eddic lay, according to which in the birth-night of the child the Norns come and twist its thread of fate⁴:

¹ C. J. Bleeker, *The sacred bridge*, Leiden 1963, pp. 114-116.

² Helmer Ringgren, "The problem of fatalism", above, pp. 13-15.

³ I cannot agree with Folke Ström in connecting *urðr* with time (*Nordisk heden-dom*, Göteborg 1961, pp. 143 f.).

⁴ *Helg. Hund.* I, 2 f.—In spite of his own opinion, that the Teutonic goddesses of fate were originally not spinners but weavers, Mittner writes: "Von derselben Wurzel [**uert*, see above, p. 70] stammt auch mhd. *wirtel* 'Spinnwirtel'; das schien den Schluss zu berechtigen, die Wurd sei eine den Parzen ähnliche Schicksalsspinnerin gewesen" (*Wurd*, p. 90).

<i>ok und mána sal</i>	Under the hall of the moon
<i>miðjan festu.</i>	they fixed the middle /of it/.
<i>þær austr ok vestr</i>	In east and west
<i>enda fálu.</i>	they hid the ends.

(*Helg. Hund.* I, 3 f.).

This cosmic scene is, as far as I know, the only trace of astrology in the Norse texts.¹

Among modern youth we find at least great interest in and sensitiveness for "what is written in the stars", that is, type 2b. No instances of type 2a are found.

3. *There is an inscrutable world-order (ṛta in India, tao in China)*

The order in the world is reliable and causes optimism. This type is difficult to discover in the North. Surely there is a definite plan, which is carried into effect without human effort, but there is no principle like *ṛta*, *ἰδέμης* etc. and no optimism. In modern fatalism the type is completely lacking.

4. *Man is doomed to an inescapable destiny*

The knowledge of this causes a pessimistic view of life. On the whole, I think Professor Bleeker is right in finding this type in Greek tragedy and in Norse heroic literature.² All expressions in part I:B:1 of the present paper point in this direction.

However, a slight reservation may not be out of place. Man's achievement plays a certain rôle, in spite of all. We meet a sort of *semipelagianism*, similar to the one found in Greece.³ In the *Vatnsdøla saga*, for instance, it is admittedly said as a general rule: "It is not possible to 'break upon'

¹ The most interesting *urðar-máni*, 'weird-moon', in *Eyrbyggja saga* ch. 52, is seen on the wall, not in the sky. — In the 14th century the first instances of astrology appear in the North through continental influences (See Anne Holtsmark, "Horo-skop", *Kulturhistoriskt lexikon för nordisk medeltid*, VI, Malmö 1961, col. 674 f.). We find quite the contrary amongst the Celts: the Druids *multa de sideribus atque eorum motu . . . disputant* (Cæsar, *De bello Gallico* VI: 14: 6).

² Bleeker, *op. cit.*, pp. 115 f.

³ Edsman, above, p. 33 f.

(fight against) fate" (*brjótask við forlogumum*, ch. 9).¹ But in an unguarded moment it is said that Ingimundr went to Iceland "more as a result of fate than of [his own] desire" (*meirr af forlogum... en fýsi*, ch. 11),² and in ch. 29 (perhaps the best example): Gróa finds it difficult to stand against the luck of the sons of Ingimundr, but she causes a landslide to come upon them with the words: "Be it, as it was prepared [by fate]" (*Fari nú hvat sem búit er*).³

Modern faith, too, is an exponent of type 4. A third of the investigated youth consider the song "Que sera sera" to be true. But the determination is now placed in inheritance and environment. A mechanistic, biological view of life is behind this new fatalism.

5. *The omnipotent God determines man's destiny*

This type, of course, is not to be found in the two bodies of material before us.

B. *Types of man's action*

As to the question of man's attitude towards destiny, we have to discuss briefly Professor Maass' pattern⁴ and its application to the Norse material.

The first type, called the *primitive* interpretation, "sums up", according to Ringgren, "too much under one heading".⁵ That is really so; we must e.g. distinguish between two ways of escaping fate: by sacrifices and by man's own will. Norse men held the position, that they could alter their destinies by *blót* (p. 75), and they gave some room for human will and desire in the realm of shaping the fate (p. 86).—The position of modern fatalism is shown by the answers to question 4: it is possible to influence one's destiny a good deal (p. 81).

The *heroic* view is, in Ringgren's opinion, "more or less identical with Bleeker, No. 4",⁶ which we have discussed at some length. It is an inter-

¹ *Vatnsdælasaga*, ed. Finnur Jónsson, København 1934, p. 27, l. 9. Cf. ch. 13 (p. 33, l. 11 f.). See H. Neuberger, *Der Aberglauben in den Islendinga Sögur*. Thesis Jena, Riga 1926, p. 10, and Åke V. Ström, *Vetekornet*, p. 45.

² *Vatnsdælasaga*, p. 31, l. 22 f.

³ *Ib.* p. 83, l. 3.

⁴ Above, pp. 16 f.

⁵ Above, p. 17.

⁶ Above, p. 17.

esting feature, that no stubborn Promethean attitude is expressive of the Norse mind.¹ The famous Swedish poet Tegnér's pastiche in "Fritiof's Saga" has no historical or psychological authenticity:

Hur glad, hur trotsig, hur förhoppningsfull!
Han sätter spetsen av sitt goda svärd
på Nornans bröst och säger: du skall vika.²

Every trace of belief in hubris or nemesis is lacking in the Norse sources.³ In the modern material it shines dimly through (16, resp. 6 percent). But 30,5 percent hold the opinion that pride will have a fall.

The last two types of professor Maass': destiny can be *denied* or fully *accepted*, are not found out in our material. There is no attitude like the Arabic *ṣabr* in pre- or post-Christian thought in Scandinavia.

Comparative religion finds an amazing multitude of remnants from pre-Christian religion, still alive in the Northern countries. The celebration of Christmas and Easter bears the impress of pagan customs and food⁴, most of the weekdays are named for the Norse gods, and a trace of the goddess *Vár* is left behind in the wedding ritual of the Church of Sweden.⁵ But the modern belief in fate is decidedly not a 'survival' of ancient religion but the spontaneous creation of a secularized culture.

¹ Baetke, *Art und Glaube*, p. 74.

² Esaias Tegnér, *Samlade skrifter*. Nationalupplaga, vol. 1, Stockholm 1923, pp. 152 f.

³ Gehl, *op. cit.*, p. 46.

⁴ See Åke V. Ström, "Germanerna", in: Ringgren-Ström, *Religionerna*, pp. 377f.

⁵ Helge Ljungberg, »Vårdtecken». En liturgisk-etymologisk undersökning till 1529 års handbok, *Kyrkohistorisk årsskrift* 36, 1936, pp. 281-298.

Proof Addition to pp. 66 f. More literature from the 1930's: W. Mohr, *Schicksalsglauben und Heldentum* (= *Die Welt der Germanen* 3), Leipzig 1935, H. Buttgerit, „Die Schicksalsauffassung der Germanen”, *Zeitschrift für deutsche Bildung* 15, 1939, pp. 197 ff., W. Wirth, *Der Schicksalsglaube in den Isländersagas* (= *Veröffentlichungen des Orientalischen Seminars der Universität Tübingen* 11, Veröffentlichungen des Arischen Seminars 1), Stuttgart 1940. — Literature after 1955: J. de Vries, "Gott, Mensch und Schicksal bei den Germanen", *Der neue Bund* 7, 1958, M. C. van den Toorn, „Über die Ethik in den Fornaldarsagas", *Acta Philologica Scandinavica* 26, 1964, pp. 19-66 (fate in pp. 55-57). F. P. Pickering, "Notes on fate and fortune", *Medieval German studies*. Presented to Frederick Norman, London 1965, pp. 1-15.

Fatalistic Traits in Finnish Proverbs

By MATTI KUUSI

1. In his main work Oskar Loorits characterizes Fenno-Ugrian *Weltanschauung* in the following way: "Sie hat durch die Seelenwanderung ohne eine präzisierte Reinkarnation, durch den Schamanismus ohne ein berufsmässiges Priestertum, durch den Manismus ohne eine Vergöttlichung der Ahnen und durch den Fatalismus ohne eine Vorherbestimmung von höherer Seite (d.h. durch den Determinismus ohne irgendeine Prädestination) ihre Originalfärbung in der Jahrtausende währenden Waldkultur herauskristallisiert."¹

The verb *luoda*, which in modern Finnish has the basic meaning 'to create' with a strong Christian colouring, was obviously used earlier to express fatalistic ideas. Its primary meaning appears, for instance, in a laconic proverb from Perniö (in south-western Finland): *Tam lua*, literally "The oak creates", which is given the following explanation: "It is the weather in January [*tammikuu*, month of oak] that in some way predetermines what the spring and the summer will be like."

Special attention should be given to the use of the perfect passive participle *luotu* (modern Finnish: 'created') which in Schroderus' *Lexicon Latino-Scondicum* (1637) is interpreted as: "Fatum, ödhe (i.e. destiny, fate), Gottes Schickung".

I quote some typical examples of proverbs in which the reference is to marital predestination:

Jokaatten täytytty luatus otta, Everyone has to take his *luotu*.

Ei luotu poika portist palaa, mut luomaton menee viel sänkystäkin, The boy who is *luotu* (for a girl) does not return from the gate, but the one who is not *luotu* for her returns even from the bed.

¹ O. Loorits, *Grundzüge des estnischen Volksglaubens*, Uppsala 1949-57, III p. 249.

Luotu löytyy loukosta, aijottu tulee vaikka pystöaijan takaa, or vaik yli yhdeksä virra, You find (that which is) *luotu* (even) in the nook, the premeditated even comes through the fence (or, across nine rivers).

Luatu luakses vettä, Luotu draws (attracts) to itself.

Mihes luadustas mene, How could you escape your *luotu*?

Luotuunsa, suotuunsa, ei kauan katseltuunsa eikä mielen tehtyynsä, You belong to the one who is *luotu* for you, granted to you, not to the one whom you have long been looking for and desiring.

Luoja sen luodun tuo, vaan toinen sen toivotun vie, God brings the *luotu*, another (man or woman) carries away what you wish for.

The last proverb, with a Christian Creator, *Luoja*, is an exception to the general usage of the passive without an agent. In Lappish the word *luondo* has a corresponding range of meanings, e.g. *Kalle mon ädtjob tab neitab jus le luondo*, "I shall certainly get that girl, if she is allotted to me".¹

Proverbs like the above have obviously been quoted in support of the old patriarchal marriage system. "Rarely does it happen that a girl or a young man oppose their parents' will, and that she elopes with a man or allows herself to be abducted. The girl subordinates herself and prepares herself in advance to say: *Ku kelle on luotu mänemöä*, "one is *luotu* to marry someone", or: *koha se nii ol sallittu*, "if it is ordained by Fate", or: *koha se on suotuhie, luotuhie eikä mieltiettohie*, "if you only end up with one who is granted, *luotu* (for me), and not with my beloved".²

The paratactic rhyme figure *suotu-luotu* occurs also in ancient poems of wooing as a cliché employed by the girl to refuse unwanted suitors. Larin Paraske, for example, who knew 32,000 verses in Kalevala metre, sang in her variant of "Suitor from the Sea" the following refusal formula:

*Ei oo suotu eikä luotu,
eik o eukko toivotantu
saunan maass ei maatessaase
olkiloill ei ollessaase
pehuloill levätessäse.*³

"It has not been granted, nor *luotu* (that I marry you), nor has my mother

¹ E. Lindahl-J. Öhring, *Lexicon Lapponicum* (1780) p. 222.

² Iris Kähäri, in: *Räisälän historia*, 2nd ed. Turku 1952, p. 573.

³ *Suomen kansan vanhat runot* V₃ 107.

wished (me for you) when she lay (in childbed) in the sauna on straw and chaff”.

In some cases the difference between *suotu*, ‘granted’ and *luotu* is emphasized. If the wife is older than her husband it may be said: *On suatu mutte o luatu*, “it has been granted but not *luotu*”. Likewise: *Vaikk moni ols sul suottu, muttei ne kaik ol su varitte luottu*, “Though many a one may have been granted to you, they are not all *luotu* for you.”

The reference to the wish of the mother in childbed should probably be taken as poetic licence and hardly as an attempt to explain man’s inborn destiny. Indeed, in ancient folk lyrics man’s destiny is often associated with his time of birth.

Passivum fatale occurs in some ten Finnish proverbs which use a formula with *luotu*. Here are some examples:

Luotu on köyhä kulkemahan, vaivainen vaeltamahan, The poor man is *luotu* to walk around, the miserable one to wander.

Mies on luotu miekka vyölle, nainen värttinä kätehen, A man has been *luotu* to carry a sword in his belt, a woman to have a distaff in her hand.

Lintu on luotu lentämähän, huolellinen laulamahan, The bird is *luotu* to fly, the sorrowful to sing.

Thus certain behaviour is characterized as a natural necessity that cannot be evaded. There are also *luodut päivät*, a predestined number of days (of life): *Näkeminen luodut päivät, jos nälän nähtäköön; tekeminen luodut lapset, jos tiellä tehtäköön*, “You have to see your *luotu* days, even if it be in hunger, you have to bear your *luotu* children, even if it be on the road.” The same fatalistic formula, based on the Finnish fourth infinitive, is found e.g. in the proverb: *Pitäminen päätynttä, jystäminen jäätynttä, saatua syliäminen*, “You have to keep that which has reached you, you have to gnaw that which has frozen, you have to embrace the one you have received.”

Luotu, *fatum*, is not only an expression of erotic fatalism. “He that’s born to be hang’d shall never be drowned” is in Finnish: *Joka hirtettäväks on luatu, ei se vetteen kuale*. When a man ventures on to unsafe ice, he says: *Ei hullummin käy kun luotu on*, “It will not go worse than what is *luotu* (for me)”. The opposite of *luotu* is *luomaton*, ‘uncreated’, ‘not predestined’. *Ei luomaton surma tapa*, “A mortal danger that is *luomaton* does not kill”, for “every man dies such a death as has been decreed for him on the

luoma-day’. The time and manner of death are predestined and cannot be altered.

2. Learned abstractions like fatalism, or destiny can only with difficulty be applied to the metaphorical thoughts of the Finnish proverbs. The word *kohtalo*, which corresponds to ‘destiny’ in the modern written language, is rare in ancient folklore and has primitive shades of meaning. In a dirge in *Kanteletar* (II 305) the singer says: When I die in the swampy woods the ravens get *kohtaloa* and the crows warm blood from my corpse. *Kohtalo* has here retained its old meaning of “piece of meat”, “the allotted share of the common booty”.¹

The only proverb that mentions *kohtalo* runs: *Osallaan mies elää, koira toisen kohtalolla*, “A man lives off his [own] share, a dog lives off another’s *kohtalo*”. Here the synonyms *osa* and *kohtalo* have a double sense: in the case of the dog the reference is to the piece of meat, but man’s *kohtalo* is ‘portion, lot, portio, sors’ as Kristfrid Ganander translates the word *kohtalo* in his dictionary as early as the 1780’s. The idea of this proverb is central in Finnish proverbial ideology: one should be content with one’s lot and not covet the lot of others. This proverb occurs for the first time in Lönnrot (1842), but its twenty variant forms come from all parts of the country and the Kalevala metre proves that it is of considerable antiquity.

The concepts *osa*, ‘lot, share’, *onni*, *lykky*, ‘fortune, luck’, appear in Finnish proverbs sharing similar features with the old poems. In folk songs too there are references to a concrete, personified *osa* or *onni* which accompanies man, can be divided, bought, exchanged, thrown away, which sleeps or is wakeful, and receives such parallel names as *haltija* (ruler, owner), *synty* (genius) and *jumala* (god). I quote some relevant proverbs.

Onni miehen tyyrmanni, Fortune is man’s pilot, or *Onni se miestä tyyrää*, It is fortune that steers man.

Osa orjana pitävi, lykky toisen lyötävänä, One’s lot makes him a slave, fortune causes him to be beaten by another, or *Onni orjana pitävi, onni orjan käskijänä*, It is fortune that makes one a slave, and the other the slave’s master.

Osastaan ja onnestaan ihminen ei pääse yli, ei ympäri, A man can neither skip over nor dodge around his lot and his fortune.

¹ Cf. V. Ruoppila, “‘Kohtalo’ ja ‘osa’”, *Virittäjä* 37/1933 pp. 361 ff.

Ei saa onnea ostamalla eikä lykkyy vaihtamalla, One does not get [good] fortune through purchase or exchange.

Ei ole osa ostettava eikä ikä jatkettava, One's lot cannot be bought, nor one's time extended.

Ei oo onnee, ei oo ossoo — kuka minunnii onnellain elänee, I have neither luck nor portion — who could it be that lives off my luck?

Mies makaa, onni valvoo, Man sleeps, fortune is awake.

Onnessa se on ihmisen elämä, It is on luck that human life depends.

Ei sua osua etsie, gu ei osa itsie etsinne, You should not seek your fortune if it does not itself seek you.

Uno Harva, V. J. Mansikka, Oskar Loorits, Martti Haavio, and Ivar Paulson have analyzed the concept of *osa* and *onni*, though without considering the proverbial tradition. They have produced Scandinavian and classical as well as Fenno-Ugrian and East Slavonic parallels. What I find especially interesting in this context is the fact that proverbs concerning lot and luck in the earlier material are common all over Finland, while in the 20th century they are found predominantly in the eastern parts of the country, to a great extent only in Karelia. Even in the East new chords are now struck, e.g. *Ei onni hyvänenkään syötä miestä syrjälleen, istuvalleen ei elätä*, 'Not even good luck feeds a man who only lies and sits.' This proverb was found in four parishes on the Karelian Isthmus and can be regarded as a protest against "Man sleeps, luck is awake".

We may choose as a typical example *Vaiivainen varahin nousi, kova onni kohta kanssa*, "The poor man got up early in the morning, hard luck immediately after." In the earliest material there are 11 variants equally distributed in eastern and western Finland. The most recent western variant is from 1885 and the most recent one from Eastern Finland is from 1936. We are confronted with a dying tradition: destruction begins in the west and spreads gradually to the east. Conditions are the same as in old Finnish poems, marriage rites etc.: the eastern periphery keeps a vanishing tradition the longest.

3. In his book *Die altgermanische Dichtung* Andreas Heusler compared Old Nordic proverbs with more recent ones. He characterized the difference in the following way: "Der Blick auf die Welt (scil. in the old proverbs) ist männlich und kühl, wehrhaft und misstrauisch. Humor ist selten und nicht

von der gutmütigen Art. Aus einem sehr grossen Bruchteil dieser Sätze vernehmen wir den herrenhaften, fatalistisch beschatteten Kriegersinn, der uns aus der Heldendichtung, auch aus den Bauern- und Fürstenfehden der Sagas bekannt ist. Die jüngere, uns geläufige Gnomenweisheit ruht mehr im friedlichen Kleinleben, sie hat oft einen gedrückten, entsagenden, oft einen gemütlich-schalkhaften Ton."¹

Heusler's view of the basic difference between old and new proverbs came to my mind eleven years ago when I made a little experiment with old and recent favourite Finnish proverbs. The material was the twenty proverbs that recur most frequently among the 11,000 variations of proverbs published or recorded before the fire of Turku in September 1827, and twenty others which recur most often in a similarly sized collection of proverbs from the 1930's. Among the differences that emerged from the 20 old and the 20 new favourite proverbs was a noticeable decrease of fatalistic ideas.

The old group included the following proverbs: *Tulee mies merentakainen, ei tule turpehen alainen*, The man who is beyond the sea returns, but not the one who lies under the turf. *Vuosi vanhan vanhentavi, kaksi lapsen kasvattavi*, A year makes the old man aged, two years make the child grow up. *Jumalall on onnen ohjat, Luojalla lykyn avaimet, ei katehen kainalossa, vihansuovan sormenpäissä*, God has the bridles of fortune in his hand, the Creator has the keys of luck, they are not in the arm-pit of the envious, nor on the enemy's fingertips. *Tikka kirjava metsässä, ihmisen ikä kirjavampi*, The woodpecker of the forest is motley, more motley is human life.

In the most common proverbs of the 1930's there are no counterparts to the sentences and maxims about life and death and the nature of human existence quoted above. The proverb that comes closest to the first group runs: "The sniveller becomes a man, but not the one who laughs unnecessarily." The long fatalistic perspective is lacking here, and this is still more obvious in the other recent favourite proverbs.

There are still no accepted methods of measuring and demonstrating trends of development from one generation of proverb users to another. But in my opinion investigations of frequency can give new information

¹ A. Heusler, *Die altgermanische Dichtung*, Darmstadt 1957, p. 68.

concerning the changes that are taking place in the minds and the attitudes of people. In Helsinki we have approximately two million Finnish proverbs, 1,425,000 in the Sanakirjasäätiö in the old university building and 500,000 in the Folklore Archives. The latter have been copied and arranged according to two title-words in a big card-index which is now almost ready. The large collection of the Sanakirjasäätiö is arranged according to parishes: it is easy to find all proverbs that have been recorded in e.g. Nurmijärvi, but the variant forms of certain proverbs are very difficult to find. Nevertheless, through sufficiently numerous and comprehensive sample tests it has been possible to ascertain that humorous sayings ridiculing blind, deaf, crippled or insane people are proportionally decreasing, or that the main stress of folk humour is moving from local to social and professional conditions.

Fatalism, the belief in fate, unfortunately does not belong to the phenomena that are easily defined or statistically measured. No doubt there are fatalistic and anti-fatalistic proverbs. The common European proverb: "Everyone is the architect, or smith, of his own fortune" is known all over the Finnish area: *Jokainen on oman onnensa seppä*. But in four parishes the anti-fatalistic proverb has been turned into its opposite: in Nilsjä, Sumiainen, Jämsä and Lieto it is said: *Kukaan ei ole oman onnensa seppä*, "Nobody is the smith of his own fortune". How could statistics be made in such cases? A hundred votes against four? As a matter of fact, it is very interesting that the proverb: "Everyone is the smith of his own fortune" does not occur in Finnish tradition until the 1880's; till then this ancient proverbial idea had obviously been repudiated. In the 1880's the threshold had become lower, but opposition showed itself here and there through the antithesis "Nobody is the smith of his own fortune". If we had thousands of variants of "the smith of fortune" from various decades and provinces, we might try to measure statistically the strength and the weakening of the opposition in time and space. But we do not have this. We can only collect more individual cases, without preconceived ideas, and see whether they fit into the pattern or not.

Probably there have always been both activists and fatalists in Finland—and no pure activists or fatalists. Even in the oldest collection of Finnish proverbs, from 1702, activist opposition asserts itself: *Niin luotu kuin tehdään*, "Such is fated as is done". In the 18th century H. G. Porthan records two sharply anti-religious proverbs: *Teko pellon jumala*, "Work is

the god of the field”, *Aura on arpoja parahin*, “The plough is the best diviner”.

In the more recent collections of proverbs it is easily seen that the fatalistic tradition is diminishing and man’s own will and enterprise are more and more unanimously emphasized as the most important causes of success. A sense of uncertainty, danger and powerlessness is — or was — close to disappearance. In the textbooks of the primary schools it is God who holds the bridles of fortune, but in the compositions for the matriculation most students believe that man is the architect of his own fortune. The study of proverbs can primarily record the changes that have taken place in people’s minds many years ago, but hardly the processes that are going on at present. The question of whether fatalism is undergoing a revival in the big cities of the atomic age has to be answered by other means.

Die osteuropäischen Volkssagen vom vorherbestimmten Schicksal

Von ROLF WILH. BREDNICH

Von allen Menschheitsfragen überhaupt sind wohl die um Geburt und Tod die ursprünglichsten. Geburt und Tod sind die großen elementaren Ereignisse im Leben des Menschen, sie sind die Pole, zwischen denen sein Dasein verläuft. Geburt und Tod sind gleichzeitig die Einfallstore des jenseitigen Seins für den primitiven Menschen, und es ist natürlich, daß die Vorstellungen und Bilder, die er für jenes andere Sein gefunden hat, um diese beiden Phänomene kreisen.

Dies gilt auch für den Glauben an ein vorherbestimmtes Schicksal. Nach volkstümlicher Vorstellung greifen die Schicksalsmächte schon bei der Geburt eines neuen Erdenbürgers in dessen Leben ein und bestimmen ihm sein Geschick und alles, was ihm im Leben begegnen wird, aber vor allem auch seinen Tod. So verbinden sie mit ihrem Spruch die beiden elementaren Ereignisse des Lebens miteinander. In der Geburt, am Beginn des Lebens, wird so schon der Tod sichtbar.

Der Gedanke liegt nahe, daß sich diese elementaren Vorstellungen vom vorherbestimmten Geschehen auch im Volksglauben und in den Volkserzählungen niedergeschlagen haben. Mehr oder weniger deutlich ausgeprägt finden wir fast in ganz Europa die Vorstellung von der Prädestination alles Geschehens, als dunkle Ahnung oder als vollkommen fest ausgebildeter Volksglaube mit bestimmten Schicksalsgestalten, die das menschliche Geschick in Händen halten und verwalten. Da sich der Volksglaube gewöhnlich sehr gut in den entsprechenden Volkserzählungen spiegelt, war es methodisch wohl gerechtfertigt, die europäischen Märchen, Sagen und Legenden als Grundlage zu nehmen und sich ausgehend von diesem volkskundlichen Material eine Übersicht über die Bedeutung des Schicksals zu ver-

schaffen. Hierbei muß betont werden, daß der gesamte Bereich der europäischen Volkserzählungen in die Untersuchung mit einbezogen wurde, also auch alle Gattungen. Es genügt nicht, vom Schicksalsglauben im Märchen oder in der Sage allein zu sprechen. Bei der Betrachtung der Rolle des Schicksals in der mündlichen europäischen Volkstradition ergibt sich die überraschende Feststellung, daß die Erzählungen vom vorherbestimmten Schicksal ein einheitlicher Komplex sind, der von der Erzählforschung in seiner Zusammengehörigkeit und Verwandtschaft bisher noch kaum erkannt worden ist.

Der Volksglaube vom vorherbestimmten Schicksal drängt bei den verschiedenen Völkern und zu verschiedenen Zeiten zur Personifikation. Der Ursprung dieser anthropomorph gedachten Schicksalsgestalten liegt in dem Glauben, daß das Leben des Menschen und alles ihn umgebende Geschehen unter dem Zwang von Mächten stehen, die ihm durch mündlichen Spruch bei seiner Geburt alles vorausbestimmt haben, was ihm im Leben widerfährt. Von diesem Glauben ist es nur ein Schritt bis zur Personifikation jener Schicksalsmacht. Gewöhnlich finden wir weibliche Gestalten in der Rolle der Schicksalskünder, weil es immer Frauen sind, die bei der Entbindung und beim Wochenbett der Mutter zur Seite stehen und von eh und je mit Weissagung, Zauber und dgl. in Verbindung gebracht wurden.

Der Volksglaube von den schicksalsverkündenden weiblichen Dämonengestalten, den „Schicksalsfrauen“, ist keine auf die indogermanischen Völker beschränkte Vorstellung. Schon die altägyptische Religion kannte in den sieben Hathoren ausgesprochene Schicksalsgöttinnen; in den uns überlieferten ägyptischen Märchen treten sie an die Wiege neugeborener Kinder und bestimmen ihnen das Schicksal voraus. Der Volksglaube von den schicksalsbestimmenden Gestalten ist heute noch in einigen europäischen Ländern lebendig. Vor allem sind es Länder im Osten Europas, und sie weisen in Bezug auf die Erzähltradition so große Gemeinsamkeiten auf, daß es sich empfiehlt, das Erzählgut und den dazugehörigen Volksglauben im Zusammenhang und als Einheit zu betrachten und sich nicht auf einzelne Länder zu beschränken. Dies bedeutet, daß man das gesamte Balkangebiet von Griechenland bis Rumänien und Jugoslawien, ferner die Tschechoslowakei sowie Litauen und Lettland in die Untersuchung mit einbeziehen muß. Einer solchen großräumigen vergleichenden Betrachtungsweise stehen

naturgemäß nicht wenige Schwierigkeiten entgegen. Sie sind zunächst rein sprachlicher Natur, aber es darf nicht vergessen werden, daß es auf dem Gebiet des Schicksalsglaubens für eine übernationale Betrachtung der Überlieferungen noch kaum Vorarbeiten oder Quellenpublikationen gibt.¹

Überall in Europa war der Glaube an die Schicksalsfrauen im ausgehenden 19. Jahrhundert noch lebendig. Zuerst wird man an die Griechen denken müssen, die ja schon im Altertum die Personifikation der Schicksalsmacht in weiblicher Gestalt kannten. Die Moira der nachhomerischen Zeit hat im Volksglauben jahrhundertlang weitergelebt und ist auch im 20. Jahrhundert noch hier und da ein Charakteristikum der neugriechischen Vorstellungen vom vorherbestimmten Schicksal geblieben. Wir stehen hier vor einem religionsgeschichtlich ziemlich einmaligen Beispiel von Kontinuität über viele Jahrhunderte. Kein Wunder, daß die ersten Forschungsreisenden, denen dieser Glaube im neuzeitlichen Griechenland begegnete (z. B. John Galt, Pouqueville, Wordsworth, Wachsmuth, James Th. Bent, L. Heuzey u. a.) ihren Ohren kaum trauen wollten. Denn für lange Jahrhunderte waren die Moiren im Dunkel der Geschichte untergetaucht, während derer sie indessen im Volksglauben und in der Volkserzählung eine bedeutende Rolle gespielt haben müssen.² Von den Griechen ist die Vorstellung nach dem Norden gekommen; hier haben die Albaner³ und die Rumänen⁴ unter dem Namen Miren, Fata und Ursitori die Schicksalsgestalten übernommen und mit dem einheimischen Volksglauben vermischt. Den südslawischen Völkern war — vermutlich seit urslawischer Zeit — die Vorstellung von einer weiblichen Geburtsgottheit (Roždanica) gemeinsam. Der Glaube von den schicksalsbestimmenden Frauengestalten verband sich mit dem von der Geburtsgöttin und bestimmt auch heute noch die volkstümlichen Vorstellungen der Bulgaren, Serben, Kroaten, Slowenen, Tschechen und Slowaken vom

¹ Meine Studien zu den europäischen Volksüberlieferungen vom vorherbestimmten Schicksal sind erschienen unter dem Titel „Volkserzählungen und Volksglaube von den Schicksalsfrauen“, Helsinki 1964 (*Folklore Fellows Communications* 193).

² Bernh. Schmidt, *Das Volksleben der Neugriechen und das hellenische Altertum*, Leipzig 1871, S. 213 ff. und Albert Thumb, „Zur neugriechischen Volkskunde I. Die Schicksalsgöttinnen im neugriechischen Volksglauben“, *Zeitschrift für Volkskunde* 2, 1892, S. 123–134.

³ Georg Stadtmüller, „Altheidnischer Volksglaube und Christianisierung in Albanien“, *Orientalia Christiana Periodica* 20, 1954, S. 211 ff.

⁴ S. Fl. Mariană, *Nascerea la Români. Studii etnograficë*, Bucureşti 1892, S. 1 ff.

Schicksal.¹ Bei den Polen und Russen ist der heidnische Schicksalsglaube weitgehend von der christlichen Idee der Vorsehung verdrängt worden. Bestimmte Schicksalsgestalten sind in Polen und Rußland gegenwärtig nicht mehr nachzuweisen. — Die Schicksalsfrauen sind bei den genannten Völkern göttergleiche unsterbliche Wesen, aber sie tragen in starkem Maße auch anthropomorphe Züge. Sie sind keineswegs frei von menschlichen Empfindungen, Leiden und Schwächen. Oft werden sie geschildert als leicht reizbare und empfindliche Wesen, die jede Nachlässigkeit und Vergeßlichkeit bestrafen. Krankheiten sind sie unterworfen, Schmerz und Wut empfinden sie genau wie Menschen. Aber sie sind auch mit etwas Aufmerksamkeit leicht zufriedenzustellen und zu einem günstigen Spruch zu bewegen. Die Güte der ihnen als Opfer vorgesetzten Speisen und Getränke entlockt ihnen gute Segenswünsche und Voraussagen für das Kind. In den erwähnten südosteuropäischen Ländern glaubt das Volk, daß sich bei der Geburt eines Menschen die Schicksalsfrauen einstellen und über alle wichtigen Ereignisse seines Lebens bestimmen. Sie sagen die Zahl seiner Lebensjahre voraus, den frühen Tod, insbesondere ein jähes, gewaltsames und unerwartetes Lebensende, seinen künftigen Beruf, Reichtum und Armut, und sie bestimmen den Ehepartner. Volkstümlicher Glaubensvorstellung entspricht es, daß man die Sprüche dieser Dämonengestalten für endgültig hält, an sie glaubt und sich nach ihnen richtet. Jeglicher Versuch, den einmal bestimmten Gang der Dinge zu ändern, wäre von vornherein vergebens und würde nur dazu führen daß das Vorherbestimmte umso unausweichlicher eintritt. Bei der Besprechung der volkstümlichen osteuropäischen Schicksalserzählungen werden wir zahlreiche Beispiele für diesen stark fatalistisch anmutenden Volksglauben kennenlernen.

Bevor wir zu diesen Volkserzählungen übergehen, ist noch ein kurzer Blick auf die übrigen europäischen Länder notwendig. Verwandte Vorstellungen von den Schicksalsfrauen finden wir auch bei den Letten und Litauern in Nordosteuropa. Bei ihnen hat die Göttin Laima die Schicksalsfunktion inne, und sie oder die aus dieser Vorstellung entwickelte Dreierheit der Laimen tauchen in Volkserzählungen und Volksliedern (Dainas) immer

¹ F. S. Krauß, „Sreća. Glück und Schicksal im Volksglauben der Südslawen“, *Mitteilungen der Anthropologischen Gesellschaft in Wien* 16, 1886, 102 ff.

wieder als die Verwalterinnen des menschlichen Schicksals auf. Ich übergehe die Diskussion um den Ursprung der baltischen Laima und verweise auf die einschlägigen Arbeiten von Haralds Biezais.¹ Bei den germanischen Völkern ist der Glaube an die schicksalsbestimmenden Frauengestalten (Nornen, Völven) heute so gut wie ausgestorben; Zeugnisse für ein Weiterleben dieses Vorstellungskreises sind — außer in Island — sämtlich historischer Art. Nur in der deutschen Sprachinsel Gottschee in Jugoslawien hat man in den letzten Jahrzehnten noch Überlieferungen von großer Altertümlichkeit aufgefunden, die darauf schließen lassen, daß dort die germanischen Schicksalsfrauen unter dem deutschen Namen Schöpferlein weitergelebt haben.² Allerdings waren dort in der slawischen Umwelt mit dem ausgeprägten Volksglauben von den Rojenice — Sojenice ideale Voraussetzungen für ein Weiterleben der aus dem Mutterland mitgebrachten Vorstellungen gegeben. Der romanischen Völkerfamilie gemeinsam ist der Volksglaube von den Feen; er wurzelt letzten Endes in römischen Vorstellungen, im Glauben an die Parzen und an die Fata. Aber der Feenglaube der Romanen ist heute so differenziert und hat so verschiedenartige Glaubenselemente in sich aufgesogen, daß man die Feen nicht mehr einfach mit den Schicksalsfrauen identifizieren kann. In Frankreich ist die Fee der Märchendämon schlechthin geworden, und die Schicksalsfunktion ist nur eine von vielen Funktionen, welche die Fee ausübt. Außerdem fehlt hier im Westen-rein geographisch betrachtet-der Zusammenhang mit den osteuropäischen Volkserzählungen, denen wir uns jetzt zuwenden wollen.

Im Sinne von C. W. von Sydow bilden die Erzählungen, die sich als Ergebnis meiner Untersuchungen zum volkstümlichen Schicksalsglauben herausgeschält haben, eine neue und nach systematischen Gesichtspunkten zusammengehörige Gruppe, die „Schicksalserzählungen“. Ich verstehe darunter die Volkserzählungen vom vorherbestimmten Schicksal, d. h. Märchen und Sagen, in denen einem Menschen ein bestimmtes Schicksal prophezeit wird, das unweigerlich eintreten muß. Diese Gruppe ist bisher als eigenständige Erzählüberlieferung von begrenzter geographischer Verbreitung kaum erkannt worden. In den älteren Märchentypenverzeichnissen von Antti

¹ Haralds Biezais, *Die Hauptgöttinnen der alten Letten*, Uppsala 1955.

² Richard Wolfram, „Die Schöpferlein“, *Jahrbuch für Volkskunde der Heimatvertriebenen* 1, Salzburg 1955, S. 77 ff.

Aarne und Stith Thompson sind diese Erzählungen noch sehr unbefriedigend berücksichtigt. Erst die zweite Revision des Verzeichnisses hat Abhilfe geschaffen.¹ Allerdings ist hier wiederum zu fragen, ob die Schicksalserzählungen überhaupt in einem Verzeichnis der Märchentypen richtig am Platze sind. Die meisten der hierhergehörigen Volkserzählungen sind keine Märchen; vielmehr handelt es sich um Sagen mit starkem Wirklichkeitsbezug und enger Bindung an den Volksglauben.

Die osteuropäischen Sagen vom vorherbestimmten Schicksal sind einander in Aufbau und Motivbestand sehr ähnlich. Meistens ist das Schicksalskind ein Knabe. Die Schicksalsgestalten erscheinen bei seiner Geburt an der Wiege und sagen dem neugeborenen Kind voraus, durch welchen Umstand es seinen Tod finden wird: Es sind in der Regel außergewöhnliche, bemerkenswerte Todesarten, Unglücksfälle und Katastrophen mannigfacher Art, die zum Gegenstand der Prophezeiung gemacht werden. Das normale Lebensende, der Tod durch Altersschwäche oder Krankheit, ist nur selten der Inhalt des Spruchs der Schicksalsfrauen. Der zweite gemeinsame Zug der Schicksalssagen ist das Motiv, daß die Eltern des Schicksalskindes den Spruch mit anhören oder durch einen anderen Zeugen der Schicksalsverkündung Kenntnis davon erlangen. Ihr ganzes Bemühen ist von dem Tag an auf die Vereitelung des Schicksalsspruches gerichtet. Sie behüten ihr Kind sorgsam, verstecken es in einem unterirdischen Keller oder sperren es in einen gläsernen Turm. Doch das Schicksal läßt sich nicht bezwingen. Am Ende muß der Mensch die Ohnmacht und die Zwecklosigkeit seiner Bemühungen erkennen. Ursprünglich werden wohl alle Schicksalssagen im tragischen Ausgang übereingestimmt haben. Erst in jüngerer Zeit ist bei dem einen oder anderen Sagentyp durch den Einfluß christlicher Gedankengänge ein glücklicher Schluß eingefügt worden, wobei Gott über die Schicksalsfrauen die Oberhand behält. Diese Verchristlichung der Schicksalserzählungen hat jedoch den ursprünglich heidnischen Gehalt nicht beseitigt, sondern lediglich überdeckt. Im Volke selbst ist in Osteuropa der Glaube an die Schicksalsfrauen und der christliche Glaube kein Gegensatz, ja verschiedentlich werden die Schicksalsfrauen sogar als Wesen betrachtet, die von Gott

¹ Stith Thompson, *The types of the folktale. Antti Aarne's Verzeichnis der Märchentypen translated and enlarged*. Second revision, Helsinki 1961 (*Folklore Fellows Communications* 184).

mit der Schicksalsbestimmung beauftragt worden sind und gegen deren Spruch deshalb Gott selbst und alle Heiligen machtlos sind.

Die folgende Erzählung soll dafür als Beispiel dienen und gleichzeitig einen Eindruck von einer osteuropäischen Schicksalserzählung vermitteln. Die Aufzeichnung stammt aus Bulgarien, die darin auftretenden Schicksalsfrauen heißen Urišnicen.

Als der Herr noch auf Erden wandelte, kam er gegen Abend in das Haus eines Schäfers, wo er über Nacht verblieb. Des Schäfers Frau hatte vor zwei Tagen einen Knaben geboren, und nun war dies die dritte Nacht. Die Urišnicen kamen zum Kinde und bestimmten ihm folgendes: „Durch einen Tropfen Wasser soll er sterben!“ Gott hörte die Worte der Urišnicen und sprach zu ihnen: „Nicht wahr, ihr könnt mir eine Seele nehmen?“ Und sie versetzten: „Nicht jetzt, sondern wenn er Hochzeit hält, damit ihn seine Mutter und seine Braut beweine!“ Und der Herr wurde Taufpate des Kindes, und als er von dannen ging, sprach er zu dem Schäfer: „Wenn ihr einst den Burschen verheiratet, so ladet auch mich, wenn ich lebe, zur Hochzeit, und geht ja nicht ohne mich, um die Braut abzuholen!“ Der Schäfer versetzte: „Aber Gevatter, woher sollen wir dich rufen lassen?“ Der Herr antwortete: „Einen Kuchen und eine Flasche Wein steckt in eine Tasche und stellt dieselbe auf einen Berg; wenn ich die Tasche sehe, dann komme ich gleich.“ Der Schäferssohn wuchs heran, und seine Eltern verlobten ihn, und als das Hochzeitsfest anfang, da luden sie auch den Gevatter ein, so wie er es ihnen aufgetragen hatte. Er kam und ging auch mit, die Braut abzuholen, die in einem jenseits des Flusses gelegenen Dorfe wohnte. Sie kamen hin, holten die Braut ab, und als sie zurückkehrten, da war der Fluß angeschwollen; der Herr aber setzte den Bräutigam hinter sich aufs hohe Roß und überschritt so mit ihm den Fluß. Als sie aus dem Wasser stiegen, spritzte ein Tropfen Wasser dem Burschen in den Mund, und er begann davon zu sterben. Alle fingen an zu weinen, besonders die Braut. Gott konnte des Burschen Seele von den Urišnicen nicht retten. Da griff er in seinen Busen und zog ein großes Buch hervor, in welchem die Lebensjahre aller auf Erden lebenden Menschen verzeichnet waren. Dem Burschen waren sechzig, der Braut hundert Jahre bestimmt. Da sagte der Herr, daß wenn die Braut die Hälfte ihrer Lebensjahre den Urišnicen geben wolle, dann würden diese dem Burschen die Seele zurückgeben. Die Braut opferte die Hälfte ihrer Lebensjahre, und der Bursche erhielt seine Seele zurück und blieb am Leben. Was die Urišnicen in der dritten Nacht nach der Geburt bestimmen und ins große Buch eintragen, das kann selbst der Herr nicht abändern.¹

Diese Erzählung beschreibt deutlich die Macht, die die Schicksalsfrauen in Händen halten. Selbst Gott muß sich ihnen beugen. Das Motiv vom

¹ Adolf Strauß, *Die Bulgaren. Ethnographische Studien*, Leipzig 1898, S. 178.

Geschenk der Lebensjahre und der treuen Ehefrau hat schon antike Wurzeln und geht auf den altgriechischen Stoff von Admet und Alkestis zurück.¹ Noch deutlicher wird dieser Zusammenhang der heutigen osteuropäischen Schicksalserzählungen mit der griechischen Antike bei einem anderen bekannten Stoff. Es handelt sich um die Sage von Meleagros, die bei mehreren altgriechischen Autoren in unterschiedlicher Gestalt überliefert wird. Uns interessiert hier die nachhomerische Ausprägung des Stoffes, die etwa folgenden Inhalt gehabt hat:

Einmal schlief Althaea, die Tochter des Thestis, mit Oineus und Mars. Sie zeugten ihren Sohn Meleagros. Bei seiner Geburt erschienen die drei Moiren Klotho, Lachesis und Atropos im Zimmer und spannen ihm sein Schicksal zu. Die erste Moira sagte ihm eine große Zukunft voraus, die zweite wünschte ihm Tapferkeit und Stärke, aber die dritte erblickte das Herdfeuer und rief: „Ich will, daß dieses Kind nicht länger lebt, wie dieses Holzsplit im Feuer brennt. In dem Augenblick, wenn es verlöscht, soll das Kind sterben.“ Seine Mutter Althaea, die das alles gehört hatte, sprang aus dem Bett, löschte das Holzsplit und verbarg es auf dem Boden einer Truhe. Der Junge wuchs heran und ging eines Tages mit dem Bruder seiner Mutter zur Jagd. Bei der Rückkehr stritten die Männer über die Verteilung der Jagdbeute, worauf der Junge im Jähzorn seinen Onkel erschlug. Als die Mutter vom Tod ihres Bruders vernahm, holte sie das halbverbrannte Holzsplit aus der Truhe und warf es ins Feuer. Als es verbrannt war, fiel ihr Sohn tot zur Erde.

Diese antik-griechische Erzählung muß in der volkstümlichen Überlieferung der südlichen Balkanhalbinsel tiefe Wurzeln geschlagen haben, denn verschiedenen Märchensammlern unseres Jahrhunderts war es möglich, die Meleager-Geschichte als lebenskräftige Volkserzählung unserer Tage aus dem Volksmund aufzuzeichnen. Sogar in Ätolien, der antiken Heimat Meleagers mit dem kalydonischen Eber, ist die Erzählung mehrfach aufgetaucht, ferner auf Zypern, in Makedonien, in der Türkei in der Gegend von Ankara, in Kroatien, bei den Tschuwaschen, den Letten und Litauern, schließlich auch noch in den Vogesen und in der spanischen Landschaft Katalnien.² Verschiedene Motive der alten Sage sind bis in die Gegenwart fest und unwandelbar geblieben. Dazu zählt vor allem das Motiv von der Schicksals-

¹ Georges A. Megas, „Die Sage von Alkestis“, *Archiv für Religionswissenschaft* 30, 1933 S. 1-33.

² Johannes Th. Kakridis, *Homeric researches*, Lund 1949 (Skrifter utgivna av Kungl. Humanistiska Vetenskapssamfundet i Lund 45). Nachträge bei Brednich, *FFC* 193, S. 17 ff.

vorhersage. Ohne diesen Zug ist die Sage kaum denkbar, in ihm haben wir das konstitutive Bauelement der Sage zu sehen. Die Erzählung lebt geradezu aus dem Spannungsbogen von Voraussage und Erfüllung. Es ist verständlich, daß sich der Stoff vorwiegend in solchen Ländern erhalten konnte, in denen die entsprechende Vorstellung von den Schicksalsfrauen noch lebendig ist. In allen anderen Gebieten, in welchen eine solche volksglaubensmäßige Fundierung der Sage nicht mehr vorhanden ist oder nie bestanden hat, wird der Stoff entweder verschwunden sein oder aber nie festen Fuß gefaßt haben. Aus dieser Tatsache wird auch einsichtig, warum die Volkserzählungen vom vorherbestimmten Schicksal in der Regel auf das osteuropäische Gebiet mit dem lebendigen Glauben von den Schicksalsfrauen beschränkt geblieben sind. — Der Schluß der Erzählung von Meleagers Tod hat im Verlaufe der Jahrhunderte manche Abwandlungen und Änderungen erfahren. Nur noch in zwei der zwanzig insgesamt bekannt gewordenen Varianten ist es die Mutter, die den Sohn durch Verbrennen des Scheites tötet. In anderen Fassungen sind es ein Nachbar, der Vater oder die Schwiegermutter des Helden oder der Held selbst, die mit Vorbedacht oder aus Nachlässigkeit und Unkenntnis das Holz verbrennen. In einer Gruppe von Varianten bringt die eigene Frau ihren Mann um, indem sie das Scheit ins Feuer wirft und ihn für seine an ihr begangene Untreue straft. In einer Aufzeichnung aus Žepču in Kroatien wird folgendes berichtet:

Bei einer Geburt wurde eine Frau einmal schwer krank. Ihr Mann war in der Wassermühle, und sie lag zu Hause halb in Ohnmacht und gebar einen Knaben. Spät nachts kehrte der Mann aus der Mühle zurück, kam vor sein Haus und hörte darin ein Flüstern. Zwischen den Balken spähte er ins Haus und erblickte neben dem Fenster drei Frauen wie Vilen in weißen Gewändern. Die eine sagte: „Was wollen wir bestimmen?“ Darauf die andere: „Er soll arm sein, aber er soll lange leben.“ Die beiden anderen antworteten: „Was soll er leben, wenn seine Mutter sowieso schnell sterben wird? Er soll auch sterben, sobald das Holzscheit im Feuer verbrennt“. In diesem Augenblick verschwanden sie. Es waren die drei Sojenice, die gekommen waren, das Schicksal des Kindes zu bestimmen. Der Mann ging ins Haus hinein, erblickte das Kind beim Feuer, rief die Frau, und da sie in Ohnmacht und Schmerzen dalag, wußte sie nichts. Er nahm das Scheit, löschte es, trug es in eine Truhe und verschloß sie. In dieser Nacht starb die Frau, und der Vater gab das Kind in die Nachbarschaft zu einer Frau, die das Kind ernähren sollte. Als das Kind etwas größer war, gab sie es dem Vater zurück. Dieser wachte über das Kind, aber als es erwachsen war, wurde es ein händelsüchtiger Trunkenbold. Als dem Vater die

Klagen der Nachbarn über den Sohn zuwider wurden und die Schande ihn betroffen machte, nahm er das Holzschiet aus der Truhe und legte es ins Feuer, um zu sehen, ob es dem Sohn schaden würde. In diesem Augenblick rief ihm jemand zu, daß seine Rinder ins Getreide gegangen seien. Er eilte hinaus, um sie zurückzutreiben. Der Sohn stieß mit dem Fuß das Holzschiet in die Flammen, und als der Vater zurückkam, fand er das Holzschiet verbrannt und den Sohn tot.¹

Der französische Zigeunererzähler Matéo Maximoff hat den Stoff der Meleagersage aus volkstümlicher Zigeunerüberlieferung aufgegriffen und zu einem Zigeunerroman verarbeitet, der einen bemerkenswerten Erfolg verzeichnen konnte und unter dem Titel „Die Ursitory“ in mehrere Sprachen übersetzt worden ist.²

Eine weitere antike Sage, die die Unabwendbarkeit des vorherbestimmten Schicksals zum Thema hat, ist die Überlieferung von König Ödipus, die in dem Drama von Sophokles ihr großes Denkmal gefunden hat und weltweite literarische Verbreitung erfuhr. In der Forschung wird heute allgemein angenommen, daß Sophokles in seinem „Ödipus auf Kolonos“ Teile alter Volkssagen verarbeitet und für die Bühne dichterisch gestaltet hat. Spuren der Ödipussage sind bis heute in der osteuropäischen Volksüberlieferung erhalten. Darüber hinaus aber war das christliche Mittelalter genau wie das Altertum sehr reich an volkstümlichen Legenden und Erzählungen, die das Inzestmotiv in seinen vielfältigen Ausprägungen behandeln. Ja, es gibt eine derartige Fülle von Legenden, Dichtungen, Bearbeitungen und Übersetzungen, daß man hier vor einer kaum entwirrbaren Fülle von Material steht. Bevor man eine volkstümliche Inzesterzählung in die Nachfolge des Ödipusstoffes einordnet, ist eine gewissenhafte Prüfung der möglichen Abhängigkeiten erforderlich. In der Vergangenheit hat man sehr großzügig und unbesehen alles für Ödipusvarianten angesehen, was auch nur entfernt mit „Inzest“ und „Sphinx“ zu tun hatte. Viele Belege scheiden bei näherem Zusehen als Ableger mittelalterlicher Legenden aus. Solche Legenden, die nach dem Vorbild des Ödipusstoffes gearbeitet sind und ihrerseits wiederum ins Volk zurückgewirkt haben, sind beispielsweise

¹ Tomo Dragičević, „Narodne praznovjerice“, *Glasnik Zemaljskog muzeja u Bosne i Hercegovini* 20, 1908, S. 451.

² Matéo Maximoff, *Les Ursitory*, Paris 1947; vgl. dazu Rolf Wilh. Brednich, „Les sources folkloriques du roman tsigane ‘Les Ursitory’ de Matéo Maximoff“ *Études tsiganes* 9, 1963, H. 1, S. 5-16.

die Legenden von Judas Ischariot, vom hl. Andreas, die Gregoriuslegende oder die Legende vom Elternmörder.¹ Nur vereinzelte Varianten bleiben übrig, bei denen ein ungebrochener Zusammenhang mit der Antike wahrscheinlich anzunehmen sein wird. Hierzu zählt z. B. eine von F. S. Krauß veröffentlichte Volkserzählung aus Montenegro, die folgenden Inhalt hat:

Eine Frau hört bei ihrer Niederkunft die Unterhaltung zweier Vilen über das Schicksal ihres neugeborenen Kindes: Es sei zu einer unglücklichen Stunde geboren, es werde der Gatte seiner eigenen Mutter werden. Nach der Geburt des Knaben nimmt die Frau ein Nadelchen zur Hand, fädelt einen Seidenfaden ein und zieht ihn dem Knäblein durch beide Fersen hindurch. Dann hängt sie ihn auf einem Tannenbaum auf. Ein Kaiser kommt auf der Jagd durch den Wald und findet das Kind. Er bringt es seiner Frau mit nach Hause; es wird am Hof großgezogen.

Als der Knabe von seiner Herkunft erfährt, zieht er von dannen und übernachtet in einer Herberge, bei seiner Mutter. Sie war noch jung und rüstig, der Jüngling gefiel ihr gut, und sie sagte zu ihm: „Hör mal, Bursche, wenn es dir paßt, so heiraten wir!“ Damit war er einverstanden, und sie heirateten am nächsten Morgen. Nach der Trauung begab sich der junge Mann auf die Jagd. Abends kehrte er in Schweiß gebadet nach Hause zurück und zog seine Schuhe aus. Die Frau starrte entsetzt auf seine nackten Füße und erinnerte sich dabei an das, was die Vilen einst bei ihrer Niederkunft verkündet hatten. Als der Sohn die grausige Wahrheit erfuhr, sprang er auf der Stelle auf, sattelte sein Roß und rief aus: „Beim Allah, Mutter, deine Augen werden mich nimmermehr wiedersehen!“ So zog er in die unbekannte Welt, sie erhielt aber nie mehr Kunde von ihm.¹

Bei dieser Variante dürfen wir wohl zu Recht von einem Zusammenhang mit dem antiken Stoff reden, zumal das Motiv von den durchschnittenen Füßen, das Ödipus seinen Namen gegeben hat, noch eine deutliche Sprache spricht.

Eine andere — bisher nicht typenmäßig erfaßte — osteuropäische Volkserzählung vom vorherbestimmten Schicksal ist die Sage vom prophezeiten Tod durch einen Wolf. In ihr spiegelt sich besonders deutlich jener Fatalismus, der im unwiderrufflichen Eintreffen des verhängten Schicksalsspruches zum Ausdruck kommt. Besonders bemerkenswert ist außerdem die Vielfalt der Möglichkeiten, die die Erzähler in den verschiedenen Ländern zur Aus-

¹ Zu letzterer vgl. Rolf Wilh. Brednich, „Die Legende vom Elternmörder in Volkserzählung und Volksballade“, *Jahrbuch für Volksliedforschung* 9, 1964, S. 116–143.

² Fr. S. Krauß, „Die Ödipussage in südslawischer Volksüberlieferung“, *Imago* 21, 1935, S. 358–360.

gestaltung dieser Sage gefunden haben. Ihre Grundform ist recht einfach: Die Schicksalsfrauen sagen einem neugeborenen Kind voraus, es werde durch einen Wolf sein Ende finden; eines Tages, als das Kind erwachsen ist, erscheint zur vorherbestimmten Zeit der Wolf und verschlingt den Jüngling. Dieser angenommenen Grundform entsprechen heute nur noch sehr wenige Sagenvarianten. Alle anderen sind durch sekundäre Komplizierungen und epische Erweiterungen in ihrem Motivbestand weiter aufgeschwellt worden. Wie bei anderen Sagen vom vorherbestimmten Schicksal gehen diese Erweiterungen größtenteils aus dem Motiv der versuchten Vereitelung des Schicksalsspruches hervor. Meist wird erzählt, die Eltern seien Zeugen des Schicksalsspruches geworden oder haben durch einen Zeugen von der Prophezeiung erfahren. Sie versuchen nun mit aller Macht, das Vorhergesagte zu verhindern und das Kind zu retten. Aber — wie schon vorher betont — gerade durch diese Versuche führen sie den Spruch selbst herbei oder helfen bei der Ausführung des Vorhergesagten mit.

Für die verschiedenen Ausgestaltungen der Sage folgen hier einige kurzgefaßte Beispiele.

Eine kroatische Erzählung aus der Gegend von Varaždin erzählt folgendes:

Ein Graf und seine Frau bekamen einen Sohn. Bei der Geburt erschienen die drei Sujenice, um ihm sein Schicksal zu bestimmen. Die erste sagte: „Er soll Offizier werden!“ Die zweite: „Er soll werden, was sein Vater ist!“ Aber die dritte sagte: „Ein Wolf soll ihn auffressen!“ Ein Bettler, der das alles gehört hatte, warnte die Eltern. Sie ließen ihren Sohn in der Schule erziehen. In den Ferien bat er einmal seinen Vater, mit der Kutsche in den Wald fahren zu dürfen. Im Wald wuchsen viele wohlriechende Rosen. Der Knabe bat den Kutscher, ihm eine Blume abzupflücken. Der Kutscher brachte ihm die Blume und schloß die Wagentüre. Als sie nach Hause kamen, eilten Vater und Mutter der Kutsche entgegen, um das Kind herauszuheben. Sie öffneten den Wagen, aber es sprang ein Wolf heraus. Das war also die im Wald gepflückte Rose! Und so war der Spruch der Sujenice in Erfüllung gegangen.¹

Während der Wolf hier in der Verwandlungsform der Rose erscheint, kommt er in einer serbischen Fassung aus einer Kerze:

Ein reicher Türke übernachtet auf der Reise bei starkem Regen in einem Haus, in dem den Eltern gerade ein Sohn geboren worden war. In der Nacht hörte er die Stimmen der drei Suđenice beraten. Die erste sagte: „Wenn das Kind groß wird, soll

¹ M. K. Valjavec, *Narodne pripovedke skupio u i oko Varaždinu*, Varaždina 1858, S. 90, Nr. 9.

es das Gut von diesem Türken erben.“ Darauf die zweite: „Das Kind soll, wenn es erwachsen ist, ertrinken.“ Die dritte Suđenica bestimmte: „Es soll an seinem Hochzeitstag vom Wolf gefressen werden.“ Da die drei sich nicht einigen konnten, riefen sie ihren Herren Uris herbei, der bestimmte, der Spruch der dritten Suđenica solle eintreffen. Der Türke, der dies alles mitgehört hatte, fühlte Mitleid mit dem Kinde, brachte es zur Taufe und suchte später eine Braut. Er baute eine Scheune, untersuchte sie gut, bevor er nach der Hochzeit das Paar hineinließ. Er befahl ihnen, die Kerze brennen zu lassen. Als die beiden Brautleute allein waren, floß aus der Kerze plötzlich eine Wachsträne, begann rasch zu wachsen, wurde zum Wolf, sprang auf den Bräutigam und fraß ihn auf. Darauf verwandelte sich das Untier wieder in die Träne der Kerze zurück.¹

Viele der in Südosteuropa verbreiteten Schicksalserzählungen sind auch bei den Litauern und Letten heimisch geworden. Dort sagen Laima oder die drei Laimen das Schicksal voraus. Auch die Sage vom prophezeiten Tod durch einen Wolf findet sich dort. In einer lettischen Fassung aus Siuxt aus der Sammlung von Lerchis-Puschkaitis wird folgendes erzählt:

Laima sagt einem neugeborenen Bauernsöhnlein voraus, daß es später einmal durch einen Wolf umkommen werde. Als der Junge erwachsen und Bauer geworden ist, fährt er in die Stadt, weil er meint, daß er dort vor Wölfen sicher sei. Unterwegs nimmt er eine Frau in seinem Wagen auf, die mit ihm in die Stadt fahren will. Sie verwandelt sich in eine Wölfin und zerreißt den Bauern.²

Auch hier haben wir wieder das unerbittliche Walten des vorherbestimmten Schicksals! Hier und da ist dieser tragische Gehalt der Schicksalserzählungen auch schwankhaft überdeckt, aber der heidnische Untergrund wird doch noch recht deutlich, wie aus der folgenden Variante, ebenfalls aus Lettland, zu entnehmen ist. Die Einleitung ist ins Schwankhafte gewendet und erzählt, wie es einem Mädchen namens Barbara gelingt, den Inhalt des Laimenspruches über ihr künftiges Schicksal zu erfahren.

In alten Zeiten pflegten Gott und Laima auf Erden zu wandeln, so daß ihnen Menschen begegnen konnten. Einmal wandte sich das Mädchen Barbara an Gott, um ihn um einen Mann zu bitten. Gott antwortete: „Ich kann dir, liebes Mädchen, nur Gesundheit geben, einen Mann kann dir nur Laima bescheren. Wenn du den Spruch hören willst, den Laima über dich gegeben hat, so folge mir.“ Barbara ging mit Gott

¹ Veselin Čajkanović, *Srpske narodne pripovetke*, Beograd 1927 (Srpski etnografski zbornik 41), S. 307 f., Nr. 87.

² A. Lerchis-Puschkaitis, *Latweeschu tautas pasakas*, Bd. 2, S. 84.

zu Laima und wartete im Vorraum, während Gott, der sich betrunken stellte, hineintaumelte. „Lieber Gott, Väterchen“, rief Laima, von ihrem Stuhl aufspringend, „wo hast du dich angetrunken?“ — „Auf Barbaras Hochzeit“, antwortete er. „Ich habe aber doch der Barbara keinen Mann bestimmt; ich habe ihr doch bestimmt, eine alte Jungfer zu werden und von den Wölfen aufgefressen zu werden.“ — „Da hörst du, Mädchen, was Laima dir bestimmt hat“, sagte Gott, indem er zu Barbara hinaustrat. „So wird es auch geschehen!“ Barbara bat ihren Bruder, sie nicht zur Weide zu schicken, da Wölfe sie dort fressen könnten. Der Bruder gewährte ihr die Bitte und behütete sie bis zu ihrem Tode in seinem Höfchen. Aber als sie gestorben und begraben war, scharren Wölfe sie aus dem Grabe und fraßen sie.¹

Die verschiedenen hier vorgeführten Varianten sind lediglich Abwandlungen eines und desselben Grundgerüsts. Die Gesamtverbreitung dieses Sagentyps weist weit über den europäischen Osten, das eigentliche Zentrum der Erzählung, hinaus. Ein Zusammenhang mit den entsprechenden in Asien verbreiteten Fassungen des Stoffes muß bestehen. Es kann im vorliegenden Fall nicht ohne weiteres entschieden werden, ob es sich hierbei um Sagenwanderung oder um gemeinsame Urverwandtschaft handelt. Jedenfalls sind die außereuropäischen Parallelen den soeben referierten Varianten derart ähnlich, daß polygenetische Entstehung auszuschließen ist. Der einzig greifbare Unterschied ist der, daß statt des Wolfes in Asien ein Tiger erscheint. Die Schicksalsfrauen sind durch andere entsprechende Gestalten mit der Funktion der Schicksalsvorhersage ersetzt. Es folgt der Inhalt einer zentralindischen Erzählung zum Vergleich mit den europäischen Fassungen:

Ein König hatte einen einzigen Sohn. Bei seiner Geburt waren weise Männer zugegen gewesen, welche die Zukunft des Kindes vorher verkündigt hatten: „Dieser ist nur für kurze Zeit gekommen, denn an seinem Hochzeitstage wird ihn ein Tiger holen.“ Darum ließen ihn seine Eltern nie in den Wald noch auf die Jagd gehen, und ließen ihn nie allein. Als er Hochzeit machen wollte, machten sie großartige Vorbereitungen. Dann erbauten sie eine Festung, worin er wohnen sollte. Mit großem Pomp ward seine Hochzeit gefeiert. Als er mit seiner Frau in der Sänfte saß, inmitten des Hochzeitzuges, sagte er zu ihr: „Die Wahrsager haben geweissagt, daß mich am Hochzeitstage der Tiger holen werde, und nun ist alles so glücklich verlaufen.“ Darauf sprach sie: „Möchtest du gerne mal einen sehen?“ Er sprach: „Zeige ihn mir, wenn du kannst.“ Sie hatten etwas Kuchenteig mitgebracht, der übrig geblieben war. Daraus machte sie in der Sänfte die Form eines Tigers und zeigte ihm das Gebilde. Dies ward im selben Augenblick lebendig, ward zum Tiger.

¹ P. Šmits, *Latviešu pasakas un teikas*, Bd. 14, Rīgā 1937, S. 197.

Der sprang auf den Knaben, packte ihn, sprang mit ihm aus der Sänfte, eilte mit ihm in den Wald und fraß ihn. So ward die Weissagung erfüllt.¹

In dieser indischen Erzählung kehren alle Elemente der europäischen Schicksalssagen wieder: Die Schicksalsverkündung, der erfolglose Versuch der Eltern, das Unheil aufzuhalten, die Erfüllung des Vorhergesagten, indem der Tiger aus seiner Verwandlungsform hervortritt und den Bräutigam tötet.

Zu den osteuropäischen Volkserzählungen von den Schicksalsfrauen ist auch eine Gruppe von Märchen zu rechnen, die man als Schicksalsmärchen oder Märchen vom vorherbestimmten Schicksal bezeichnen kann. Es handelt sich dabei hauptsächlich um die beiden Märchen „Der reiche Mann und sein Schwiegersohn“ (AT 930) und „Die vorherbestimmte Ehe“ (AT 930A). Beide sind in ganz Europa und darüber hinaus verbreitet und bekannt. Aber in Osteuropa hat sich eine bestimmte Sonderform dieser Erzählungen herausgebildet, die es uns erlaubt, sie an die Seite der Schicksalssagen zu stellen. Beide Märchen sind von Antti Aarne² bzw. Archer Taylor³ bereits monographisch untersucht worden. Bei beiden ist der orientalische Ursprung mit einiger Sicherheit erwiesen. Vermutlich von Indien aus haben die Märchen ihre Wanderschaft angetreten, mehrmals nach verschiedenen Richtungen und zu verschiedenen Zeiten. Auf diese Weise sind sie auch nach dem Südosten Europas gelangt, wahrscheinlich zunächst nach Griechenland. Dort ging jene Umwandlung vor sich, der wir unsere Aufmerksamkeit zuwenden wollen. Wir betrachten zuerst das Märchen vom Reichen Mann und seinem Schwiegersohn, auch bekannt unter Titeln wie Märchen vom Kaufmann Marko, vom Krämer Peter oder vom Glückskind mit dem Todesbrief etc. Es war bereits seiner Entstehung nach Schicksalsmärchen, d. h. es behandelt ein Thema von der Vorherbestimmung und der Erfüllung eines Schicksalsspruches. Einem armen Jungen wird prophezeit, daß er die Tochter eines reichen Mannes heiraten soll. Der reiche Mann hört dies und versucht die Heirat zu verhindern, erreicht aber nichts und stürzt sich am

¹ Ferdinand Hahn, *Blicke in die Geisteswelt der heidnischen Kols. Sammlung von Sagen, Märchen und Liedern der Oraon in Chota Nagpur*, Gütersloh 1906, S. 61 f., Nr. 32.

² Antti Aarne, „Der reiche Mann und sein Schwiegersohn“, Helsinki 1916 (*Folklore Fellows Communications* 23).

³ Archer Taylor, „The predestined wife“, *Fabula* 2, 1958, S. 45–82.

Ende selbst ins Unglück. In Indien ist die Geschichte seit dem 3. nachchristlichen Jahrhundert bekannt. Aber in den verschiedenen überlieferten Texten wird mit dem Begriff des Schicksals keine einheitliche Auffassung verbunden, etwa der Gedanke an eine Personifikation. Verschiedene Personen werden darin zum Sprecher des Schicksals gemacht, Brahmanen, Priester, der königliche Hofkaplan, ein Büßer oder auch eine unsichtbare Stimme usw. In Griechenland oder den anderen südosteuropäischen Ländern fand diese Erzählung nun einen Raum vor, in dem der Volksglaube vom vorherbestimmten Schicksal sich in entsprechenden Schicksalsgestalten kristallisiert hat. Die aus dem Orient zugewanderte Erzählung wurde in ihrem Einleitungsmotiv umgebildet und erhielt ihre für den ganzen südosteuropäischen Raum charakteristische Form. In die Funktion der Schicksalskünder traten wie in den heimischen Erzählungen die dem Volksglauben geläufigen Moiren ein und bewirkten, daß das zugewanderte Märchen nicht mehr als Fremdkörper empfunden wurde, sondern ganz den Eindruck einer bodenständigen Erzählung macht. Auf gleiche Weise wuchs das Märchen auch in das Erzählgut der benachbarten nördlicheren Länder hinein, wo es verwandte Vorstellungen vom Schicksal und die gleichen Gestalten des Volksglaubens vorfand. Die südosteuropäischen Varianten des Märchentyps AT 930 mit dem Motiv der Schicksalsbestimmung durch dämonische Gestalten sind untereinander eng verwandt und bilden einen einheitlichen Komplex, der sich deutlich aus dem übrigen Märchenmaterial dieses Typs abhebt.

Wir wählen eine für den südosteuropäischen Bereich typische Variante aus. Es handelt sich um eine Fassung aus Albanien; die Schicksalsfrauen heißen dort wie im Neugriechischen Miren.

Es lebte einmal ein sehr reicher Mann, der auf Reisen ging, um Schafe zu kaufen. Er kam unterwegs zu einem armen Haus, in dem er übernachten wollte, weil es Abend geworden war. Er klopfte an die Tür, trat ein und fand eine arme Frau, die vor drei Tagen einem Knaben das Leben geschenkt hatte. Die Frau nahm den Reisenden auf, bereitete ihm ein Lager und wünschte ihm eine gute Nacht. Als er aber das Bettzeug sah, scheute er sich davor und hielt es für ratsamer, nicht schlafen zu gehen, sondern setzte sich neben dem Herd nieder und blieb dort sitzen und schlummerte.— Gegen Mitternacht wachte er von einem Geräusch auf und sah drei hochgewachsene Frauen eintreten. Das waren die Miren, die am dritten Tage nach der Geburt des Knaben kamen, um ihm sein Schicksal zu bestimmen. Sie setzten sich auf den Fußboden rund um den Tisch, der schön gedeckt war. Alles Silbergeschirr des

Hauses stand darauf, und in der Mitte befand sich ein Trinkbecher auf einem Teller. Dieser Trinkbecher war mit Honig gefüllt, in dem drei Mandeln für die Miren schwammen. Auf dem Tisch lagen drei Messer, drei Gabeln und drei Mundtücher, ferner standen dort drei Teller mit Essen, und drei Schnitten Brot waren vorhanden. Alles war für die Miren bereitet, die erwartet wurden, um dem Knaben das Schicksal zu beschließen. Der Gast am Herd stellte sich schlafend, denn er wollte sehen und hören, was es da gebe. — Die Miren setzten sich, aßen und tranken, dann nahm die älteste und oberste von ihnen das Knäblein aus der Wiege, wickelte es aus den Windeln und schrieb mit dem Finger auf seine Stirn: „Die Zeit wird kommen und die Zeit wird vergehen. Der Mann am Herd, der als Gast hier weilt, wird dich zum Gatten seiner Tochter machen.“ Als der Fremde diesen Spruch hörte, war er davon wenig erbaut. Aber er gab keinen Laut von sich und tat weiter, als ob er schlief. Da erhob sich die zweite Mire, nahm das Kind und schrieb ihm auf die Stirn: „Der Mann am Herd wird Meuchelmörder gegen dich dinge.“ — Dann schrieb die dritte Mire: „Alles wird sich erfüllen, wie die Schwestern es schrieben. Aber die gedungenen Meuchelmörder werden nicht dich, sondern den Mann dort am Herd erschlagen.“ — Sie wickelte das Kind wieder in die Windeln, legte es in die Wiege zurück, dann sagten alle drei „Gute Nacht“ und verschwanden. — Der Gast an der Feuerstätte blieb wie versteinert sitzen, wußte nicht, was er tun sollte und sagte zu sich: „Dieser bettelarme Knabe soll mein Schwiegersohn werden? Nein, das wird nicht geschehen! Durch ihn soll ich sterben? Da schaffe ich lieber rechtzeitig Abhilfe! Morgen früh sage ich der Frau, sie möge mir das Kind geben, damit ich es an Kindes Statt annehme. Was ich dann mit ihm mache, weiß ich schon.“ — Am nächsten Morgen bat der Fremde vor seinem Aufbruch die Frau, sie möge ihm ihren Neugeborenen überlassen, denn er sei kinderlos und werde den Knaben lieben wie sein eigenes Kind, sie aber sei arm und habe viele Sprößlinge zu nähren. Er bot ihr ferner eine stattliche Geldsumme an, so daß die Mutter auf den Vorschlag einging. Dann machte er sich mit dem Neugeborenen auf den Weg, der ins Gebirge führte, denn auf der Alm wollte er Schafe kaufen. Unterwegs kam er zu einem Felsen, in dem eine Höhle war, in die er das Kind hineinwarf, in der Hoffnung, dort werde sein Weinen von niemandem gehört. Hierauf stieg er weiter zur Bergwiese empor, kaufte die Schafe und machte sich auf den Heimweg, froh, die Erfüllung der Mirensprüche vereitelt zu haben. Schlafend lag das Kind in der Höhle. Bevor es erwachte, ging die oberste der drei Miren auf die Alm, holte von dort die Ziege, welche am meisten Milch gab, führte sie in die Höhle, wickelte das Knäblein aus den Windeln und legte seinen Mund an den Euter des Tieres. Und der Kleine trank; das geschah nun so an jedem Morgen und Abend. Jeden Abend brachte die Mire die Ziege auf die Alm zurück.¹

¹ *Laographia* 1, Athen 1909, S. 93–100, nach der Übersetzung bei Maximilian Lambertz, *Zwischen Drin und Vojusa. Märchen aus Albanien*, Leipzig und Wien 1922, S. 9–12.

Bis hierhin möge die wörtliche Erzählung genügen. Das Märchen geht dann in der bekannten Richtung weiter. Der Säugling wird von einem Hirten aufgefunden, aufgezogen und Ziegensäugling genannt. Nach 20 Jahren entdeckt der Reiche erneut den Jüngling, will ihn beseitigen und schickt ihn mit einem Brief zu seiner Frau. Doch hier greift die zweite Mire ein und bringt durch die Abänderung des Briefes die Hochzeit zwischen dem Ziegensäugling und der Tochter des Reichen zustande. Der Mann ruht nicht und will seinen Schwiegersohn ermorden. Doch die dritte und jüngste der Miren erscheint dem Ziegensäugling im Traum und verhindert den Mord. Die gedungenen Meuchelmörder bringen den Reichen selbst um, so daß der Spruch der drei Miren in Erfüllung gegangen ist.

Das zweite Schicksalsmärchen von der vorherbestimmten Ehe ist nach Inhalt, Herkunft und Verbreitung eine genaue Parallele zu der Erzählung vom reichen Mann und seinem Schwiegersohn. Sein Ursprung wird ebenfalls in Indien zu suchen sein, wo es seit dem 9. Jahrhundert aufscheint. In Osteuropa hat es im allgemeinen die folgende ökotypische Form angenommen: Ein Mann hört, wie die Schicksalsfrauen einem neugeborenen Mädchen bestimmen, es werde ihn, den Lauscher, später einmal heiraten. Der Mann will nicht mehr so lange auf seine Heirat warten und versucht, das Mädchen zu ermorden. Der Anschlag mißlingt. Das Mädchen wird gerettet und behält von der Verwundung eine Narbe zurück. Nach Jahren kommt der noch immer unverheiratete Mann an den gleichen Ort, verliebt sich in das herangewachsene Mädchen und heiratet es. Als er eines Tages die Narbe entdeckt und seine Frau ihre Geschichte erzählt, stellt er fest, daß die Prophezeiung doch in Erfüllung gegangen ist.

Kehren wir zum Abschluß noch einmal zu den osteuropäischen Sagen vom Schicksal zurück. Dieser ausgedehnte Komplex von innerlich verwandten und zusammengehörigen Sagen hat in ähnlicher Weise wie die Schicksalsmärchen auch andere Erzählungen in seinen Bann zu schlagen vermocht. Das Motiv der Schicksalsbestimmung hat sich aus den Sagen losgelöst und ist auf andere Erzählungen übergegangen, die ursprünglich nichts mit diesem ganzen Bereich gemein hatten. Dies trifft beispielsweise auf die Erzählung vom „König Midas mit den Eselsohren“ zu. In vereinzelt Varianten dieser schon in der Antike nachweisbaren Erzählung hat sich das Schicksalsmotiv in der Einleitung angesiedelt; eine griechische Fassung aus Zakynthos hat z. B. folgenden Inhalt:

Einem König war bei seiner Geburt von den Moiren vorausgesagt worden, er solle Bocksohren haben, und wenn sein Volk dies erführe, so müsse er alsbald sterben. Der König trug immer einen Schleier, damit niemand die Ohren sehen könne. Nur sein Barbier wußte um das Geheimnis, und als es der gar nicht mehr aushalten konnte, grub er ein Loch und teilte dem Erdboden das streng gehütete Geheimnis mit. Ein junger Bursche kam an der Stelle vorbei, schnitt ein Schilfrohr ab und machte daraus eine Flöte. Als er darauf blies, ertönte es: „Der König, der fünffach verschleierte, hat Bocksohren!“ Darauf mußte der König sterben.¹

Wenn wir uns abschließend den modernen Aspekten zuwenden, die die Erzählungen vom vorherbestimmten Schicksal zeigen, so ist zuvor festzustellen, daß der Volksglaube von den Schicksalsfrauen in Osteuropa heute im Abnehmen begriffen, ja daß er in einigen Ländern bereits nahezu zur historischen Erscheinung geworden ist. Erwartungsgemäß ist dieses Schwinden der Glaubensvorstellungen nicht ohne Einfluß auf die entsprechenden Volkserzählungen geblieben. Tatsächlich ist zu beobachten, daß die dämonischen Schicksalskünder allmählich auch aus den Erzählungen zu verschwinden beginnen. Wir können geradezu von einer Tendenz zur Entdämonisierung der Erzählungen sprechen. Die Schicksalsfrauen, die schon vorher ganz nach menschlichem Vorbild gedacht waren, werden vollends zu menschlichen Wesen: Zigeunerinnen, wahrsagende Frauen, die Hebamme oder sonstige menschliche Gestalten übernehmen ihre Funktion. Die zweite Entwicklungstendenz, die die Schicksalserzählungen besonders nachhaltig beeinflußt hat, ist die Verchristlichung. Populäre Heiligengestalten oder Gott selbst treten als Schicksalskünder in die Erzählungen ein und verdrängen die heidnischen Dämonen. Dieser volkstümlichen Verchristlichung steht eine wohl von der Geistlichkeit gelenkte gegenüber. Dabei wird der ganze Gehalt der Erzählungen in das Gegenteil verkehrt und gezeigt, daß sich die Schicksalssprüche der heidnischen Gestalten nicht erfüllen und das Wort Gottes eine den Schicksalsfrauen überlegene Macht ist. Durch diese entscheidende Umwandlung werden die Sagen an ihrer Wurzel getroffen, der Mensch atmet erleichtert auf und fürchtet nicht länger den unheimlichen Zwang, den die Schicksalsmächte auf ihn ausüben. Ein Zeugnis für diese Befreiung aus dem Glauben an Vorherbestimmung soll zum Abschluß noch

¹ Bernhard Schmidt, *Griechische Märchen, Sagen und Volkslieder*, Leipzig 1877, S. 70 f., Nr. 4.

vorgeführt werden. Es handelt sich bei dem Beispiel um eine Variante der Schicksalssage vom prophezeiten Tod durch einen Blitz. Diese Sage ist in ganz Osteuropa weit verbreitet und auch aus Schweden und Finnland belegt. Die folgende Variante ist bei den Slowenen in den Julischen Alpen (an der österreichisch-jugoslawischen Grenze) aufgezeichnet worden. Sie lautet:

Eine Hebamme wurde einmal nachts zur Hilfeleistung bei einer Entbindung gerufen. Als sie nach der Geburt des Kindes, eines Knaben, am Bett der Wöchnerin saß, bemerkte sie auf der Straße vor dem Fenster drei weiße, schön und hell gekleidete Frauen, die miteinander redeten. Sacht schlich sie näher, um das Gespräch zu belauschen. Die erste sagte: „Er wird ein Priester werden.“ — „Nein“, entgegnete die zweite, „im Kriege wird er seinen Tod finden.“ — „Schwestern, erreicht das Kind sein 18. Lebensjahr, dann wird es der Blitz erschlagen“, raunte die dritte der Rojenicen. Der Knabe erhielt in der Taufe den Namen Andrej. Beim Patenschmaus waren alle sehr heiter; nur die Hebamme blieb wortkarg. Als man sie fragte, warum sie so traurig sei, erzählte sie dem Vater des Kindes und den Gästen, was sie in jener Nacht erlauscht hatte. Nachdenklich verabschiedeten sich die Eingeladenen; es ist ja bekannt, daß die dritte Schicksalsgöttin die Bestimmende ist. Kurze Zeit darauf erkrankte Andrejs Vater. Er fühlte sich seinem Ende nah und vertraute das Geheimnis der Hebamme seiner Frau an, dann verschied er. Die Sorge für ihr Kind war fortan die einzige Lebensaufgabe der Witwe. — Als Andrej siebzehn Jahre alt wurde, verfiel die Mutter auf den Gedanken, für ihn ein so festes Haus bauen zu lassen, daß es selbst der Blitz nicht zu zerstören vermöchte. Auf breiten Fundamenten wurde ein mächtiges Gewölbe von Quadersteinen aufgeführt; darauf wurde ein ebenso starkes zweites gemauert; dann folgte ein drittes, viertes, bis schließlich im ganzen neun Gewölbe übereinander errichtet waren. Als der Sohn nach dem Zweck dieses Riesenbaues fragte, erklärte die Mutter, daß das Haus zu seinem Schutz gegen ein grausames Schicksal dienen sollte. Unweit davon ließ die Witwe zur Erinnerung an ihren toten Mann einen Denkstein und vor diesen einen Betstuhl setzen. Dort hielt sie allabendlich mit Andrej ihre Andacht. Am Vorabend des verhängnisvollen Tages sagte sie zu ihrem Sohn: „Morgen wirst du 18 Jahre alt. Was die dritte Rojenica prophezeit hat, mein Kind, dürft bald eintreffen. Es fällt mir schwer; aber um dein Leben zu retten, mußt du von nun an in dem festen Gewölbe weiterleben und darfst es nie verlassen. Ich werde immer bei dir sein, um dich zu trösten. Jetzt komm noch einmal zum Gedenkstein deines Vaters; laß uns dort zum letzten Male zusammen beten!“ — Als sie vor dem Kruzifix standen, sprach Andrej: „Mutter, sei nicht bange! Ich vertraue fest auf Gott. Unter seiner Bestimmung stehe ich. Sein Wille geschehe!“ Im Gebet versunken bemerken beide nicht, daß sich der Himmel plötzlich dicht umzog. Schwere schwarze Wolken ballten sich zusammen, grelle Blitze durchzuckten die Luft, Donnerrollen erschütterte die Erde; und mitten in fürchterlichem Unwetter

fuhr ein Feuerstrahl in das Haus mit den neun Gewölben und vernichtete es völlig. Nur Schutt und Asche blieben zurück. (Der Junge aber blieb unversehrt).¹

Wir sind am Ende dieses kleinen Rundganges durch die Sagen vom vorherbestimmten Schicksal angelangt. Meine Absicht war es, Sie in die faszinierende Welt dieser Sagen einzuführen und ich wäre froh, wenn die dargebotenen Beispiele dazu beitragen konnten, Ihnen einen Einblick in die sonst wenig bekannten volkstümlichen osteuropäischen Vorstellungen vom Schicksal zu vermitteln.

¹ Anton von Mailly, *Sagen aus Friaul und den Julischen Alpen*, Leipzig 1922, S. 19 ff., Nr. 20.

Instances of Belief in Fate in South India

By CARL GUSTAV DIEHL

Fate is blind, predetermined and inescapable. A search for such beliefs in South India may at first sight seem vain. There are many beliefs with one or two of the characteristics mentioned, but it is doubtful whether all three are ever to be found in a single doctrine or attitude.

Man's life is predetermined by Karma. The deeds of an earlier existence bear their fruits in the present life. That is why the poor man is poor and the rich is happy with his wealth and good fortune. One man is born a brahman and another spends his days as a pariah. The law of Karma has spread in the wake of Buddhism all over the Indian continent and far beyond, whereas its complement and presupposition Samsara for the most part appears as an intellectual conception with little foundation in popular belief. But Karma is not blind. On the contrary it is absolutely just, and for that very reason inescapable. This is, however, modified in so far as good deeds are both possible and profitable. The fatal consequences of the Karma of previous births end with this span of existence. Life hereafter will depend on the fruits of accumulated Karma here and now.

Man's life is subject to the influence of the stars. While Karma is retrospective the position of the planets at the time of birth forms a clue to the coming vicissitudes of life. Popular belief does not ask any questions about the power behind the movements of the stars. The thoughts of ordinary men halt with the predictions of the horoscope. They are led by them to feel anxiety or hope and, which is more important, to take precautions and counteraction. The horoscope is a kind of birth certificate. Its importance is never greater than at the time of marriage when there must be agreement, *poruttam*, between the horoscope of the bride and the bridegroom. To ensure this the yearly calendar, or more often an astrologer is consulted.

The course of a man's life is determined by the movements of the planets in the lunar mansions and so is every hour of the day. *Mukūrttam* in Tamil, from the Sanskrit *muhūrta*, has come to mean an auspicious hour and will be observed when any important transaction and above all the main wedding ceremony takes place. There is no explanation of why the planets are positioned just as they are on the important occasion. Blind forces are operating. But the consequences are not altogether inevitable. It would be wrong to say that the planets are merely warning signs. Their influence is real, otherwise they would not have ceremonies addressed to them nor be the objects of worship. On the other hand, because they have become gods they are approachable. Their attitude can be softened and their decisions altered. In every Śiva temple the nine planets, *navagrahas*, are found in a group where no one faces the other. Circumambulations are performed around them and offerings are brought to them. There are rituals for the mollification of Saturn and for bringing discordant elements of two horoscopes into harmony with one another. Talismans and amulets can counteract the influence of the planets, and thousands of advertisements similar to the following may appear in the papers: "Raj astrologer, Calcutta, has acquired unusual power through Yoga and Tantra whereby he can avert the evil influence of the planets." The common use of amulets and talismans implies a belief in a blind predetermination which can be controlled in a mechanical instrumental way.

These ideas exist all over India and find their expression in the languages of the South as well as of the North. Many Tamil sources equalize Karma and fate and destiny and quote as alternatives Sanskrit words like *adr̥ṣṭa*, the invisible or unforeseen, *apūrvā*, that which has no beginning, *prārabdha*, that which has commenced, *daiva*, that which belongs to the gods.

There are, however, some words in Tamil with no etymological connection with the Sanskrit language. They may add another dimension to the belief in fate. It is the purpose of this paper to examine the usages of such words as *ūḷ*, *vakai* and *kūr̥ru* with a view to indicating the concepts they stand for.

Ūḷ is found with various meanings in old Tamil literature in works like the *Kuraḷ*, *Puṛaṇāṇūru*, *Kalitokai*, *Pattupāṭṭu*, *Maṇimēkalai*.¹ It is usually

¹ See *Tamil Lexicon*, Madras, sub voce.

considered to be a synonym of Karma or the fruit of Karma. There is reason, however, to believe that these renderings are oversimplified adaptations to the concepts of the Sanskrit culture.

The root *ŪL* when used as a verb means 'grow old' and 'decay' and the Madras lexicon has as the first meaning of the noun 'that which is pristine, of long date'. In the second and third meanings it refers to Karma and its fruit. Transferred meanings are evident in the following definition: 'rule, i.e. long standing custom, maturity, time, end'. A derivative *ūli* is 'time of universal deluge, aeon, world' and then 'fate' and 'regular order'.

The Madurai Lexicon of 1956¹ has 'the end of the world' as the first meaning and then similar definitions to those in the Madras lexicon but also gives for both *ūl* and *ūli* the usual word for fate, *viti* (= Sanskrit *vidhi*).

There are many composite nouns which contain an explicit reference to Karma like *Ūl vinai*, which can be rendered as 'old deed'. Deeds of former existences are meant. *Ūl viti* is a mixture of Tamil and Sanskrit translated 'deed done by a soul in a former existence'.

The oldest reference made in the lexicon is to *Puranānūru* from about the beginning of the Christian era. In 29:22 the meaning is 'rule' or 'conduct' which contains the promise of wealth and good fortune:² "May your action (O, King) be in conformity with customary behaviour when coupled with qualities of friendliness" would be a translation of the stanza. It is important to notice that *ūl* is here something you can choose or follow, with the good fortune hinted at by the commentator as its promised fruit.

It is not possible to follow the early history of the word. Our concern is chiefly with its connotation of fate interpreted as the fruit of Karma. In this connection two texts are immediately relevant. First of all there is a chapter in the *Kural* with the heading *Ūl* (slokas 371-380). Then we find in a collection of 9000 proverbs made by John Lazarus (Madras 1894) five beginning with *ūli* (*op. cit.* 2088-2092).

The chapter in the *Kural* dealing with *ūl* begins with a definition by the commentator Parimēlaḷakar dating from the 12th century. His explanation is based on an older work of etymology, *Pirayōka Vivēkam*.³ "This work

¹ *Tamil Pēraḱarāti* published by the Madurai Tamil Sangam.

² *Puranānūru*, Madras 1947, p. 85, commentator.

³ Vativelu Cettiḱar's edition p. 418 note.

explains the agreement between Tamil grammar and Sanskrit grammar” says Singaravelu in his encyclopedia *Abhidhana Chintamani*. The information gives us reason to suspect an adjustment in meaning not without significance for the interpretation of *ūl*. *Ūl* is said to be the rule, *niyati*, which visits the consequences of deeds upon the doer and upon nobody else. The same commentator mentions some synonyms of which the first, *pāl*, means share, attributed portion, and the last, *viti* or fate, has a Sanskrit origin suggesting ‘produce, fix, give’. The relation to Greek expressions of a similar meaning like *moira* and *aisa* is obvious. As has already been stated the Tamil language has another word in the neuter gender of the same meaning, namely *kūrru*. This is translated ‘Yama, the king of death’¹, although it is derived from *kūru* meaning ‘portion, lot, share’. A more common word is *vakai* with the same meaning, which occurs in stanza 377 as verbal noun, verbal adjective and noun. The three uses of the same root are hidden in this rendering by Drew and Lazarus: “... as it has been determined by the Disposer”.² Literally it could be translated “... according to the portion apportioned by the apportioner”. As regards this last word, a grammatical usage recorded in *Tolkappiyam*, the classical work on Tamil grammar and the oldest extant literary work in Tamil, may be relevant. Some words can have a personal as well as a neuter ending, like *kālam* which both in this neuter form and with a masculine ending, *kālan*, is translated Yama as well as ‘time’. The ‘Disposer’ could in other words have a neuter form and stand for a power of fate having no other function than causing events to happen as they do, just like *kūrru*. Similar is *teyvam*, from the Sanskrit *deva*, which in its neuter form comes close to the Latin *numen* but without its numinous qualities. In the language of ordinary people *teyvam* is the unknown power behind happenings. There is as a matter of fact little difference between this and the common Christian expression *kaṭavuliṅ cittam*, ‘the will of God’, which is often taken as something inescapable to which one has to yield of necessity. *Kural* 619 illustrates the concept of *teyvam*: “Even if (an attempt) is doomed to failure through the divinity (*teyvam*) it will be its own reward since it is a genuine effort.” The commentator significantly enough equates *teyvam* with *pāl-vakai*, i.e. the two words for lot or portion used in a sense equal to Fate.

¹ *Tamil Lexicon*, s.v.

² *Tirukurāl*, Madras 1952, p. 77.

The author of the *Kural* knows no god but one may not assume his adherence to a rationalistic conception like Karma either. In addition he is opposed to a ruthless predeterminism.

The first stanza of the chapter on *ūl* in the *Kural* qualifies *ūl* as positive and negative, *ākūl* and *pōkūl*. Positive *ūl* makes man trustworthy whereas negative *ūl* makes him lazy and indolent. In the next stanza the negative *ūl*, here called *īlavu ūl*, is said to make him ignorant and stupid, even though he may have acquired all kinds of knowledge. *Ākūl* on the other hand wherever it occurs enlarges the knowledge even of an ignorant man. The third stanza states that a man may have studied however many learned books, his negative *ūl* will cause his natural foolishness to increase.

The fourth stanza makes another distinction however: "The nature of the world is twofold. There is the world of wealth and the world of knowledge." The commentator connects this distinction with *ūl* by saying that knowledge is not necessary as an aid to acquiring wealth.

In the English translation of the *Kural*, made by Drew and Lazarus,¹ *ūl* is rendered 'fate' which as has been shown already is in line with the interpretation of Tamil commentators. This is borne out by the fifth stanza where all three aspects of the concept of fate can be found. It says that in man's efforts to acquire wealth everything favourable becomes disadvantageous and everything disadvantageous becomes favourable—"through the power of *ūl*", adds the commentator. What happens is predestined, inescapable and blind, because there is no explanation. H. A. Popley's introduction of the word *karma* into his translation is quite arbitrary.² The efforts of men are of no use according to 376: "That which is not your portion (*pāl*—"the share apportioned by *teyvam*, i.e. *ūl* or fate", says the Tamil Lexicon s.v. quoting from *Tolkāppiyam Colatikaram* 58) will not remain although you guard it carefully, and what is yours—"through *ūl*", adds the commentator—will not leave you even if you pour it away." According to stanza 377 the very enjoyment of the good things in the world by those who have made their millions is determined by the Disposer. Even the way of renunciation is denied to the destitute who are victims of fate, says 378. The implication seems to be that poverty could lead to an ascetic life and thus be the cause of

¹ Madras 1949, reprint of an old edition.

² *The Sacred Kural*, Calcutta 1931, p. 52.

ultimate progress. But the inexorability of fate will prevent even such an escape. It is worth noticing that Parimēlaḷakar uses the plural *ūḷkal*.

To complain of one's misfortunes is pointless. A touch of the serene indifference of Buddhism is found in stanza 379, where a mild reproach is directed against those who gladly accept good fortune but resent an adverse fate. "Nothing is stronger than *ūḷ*. If you try to get around it, *ūḷ* will be in that very effort." Thus ends the chapter in the *Kural*. Vativelu Cettiyaṛ explains, "Whatever befalls the soul happens because of *ūḷ*".¹

There is clearly no reference to Karma in the text of the *Kural*. The commentators' explanations sometimes turn in that direction, but even they more often interpret the word in terms of fate. The *Kural* could be expected to contain views on Karma in view of its depending on Sanskrit words like Kauṭilya's *Arthaśāstra* and also Jain or Buddhist traditions.² *Ūḷ* is a wider concept of something old and inescapable. It will consume the world as *ūḷttī*, the fire, which in *Cīvaka Cintāmaṇi* 973 is the equivalent of *vaḍavā mukhāgni*, the fire of Aśvinī, the mare, the mother of the Aśvins, which will consume the world at the end of the aeon. For Karma the common word in Tamil is *viṇai* which is used in *Kural* 367 rather on the lines of Karma. "If a man thoroughly cuts off all desire, the deeds (*viṇai*) which confer immortality, will come to him in the path in which he seeks them."³

The meaning of the word *ūḷ* is not exhausted only by references to the *Kural*, nor is any attempt to do so intended here. It might, however, also be relevant to consult the list of proverbs. These proverbs contain the variant *ūḷi* along with *ūḷ*. The dictionaries offer slightly different renderings of the two forms but it is clear from the commentator on *Cīvaka Cintāmaṇi* 149 and 1138, for example, that *ūḷi* is a permissible variant of *ūḷ*.⁴

It says much for people's need for encouragement that out of the five proverbs beginning with *ūḷ* or *ūḷi* three speak of the possibility of modifying fate with good courage and strong efforts as in, for example, "Even if *ūḷi* is powerful, don't relax your efforts." One proverb, however, repeats in question form but with negative response expected what is already stated in the

¹ *Tirukural*, Madras 1919, p. 428.

² M. Winternitz, *Geschichte der indischen Literatur*, Leipzig 1920, III p. 580, and H. A. Popley, *The sacred Kural*, p. 22.

³ Drew and Lazarus' translation.

⁴ Caminataiyar's edition, Madras 1922, p. 342.

Kural: "Can there be anything stronger than fate?" J. Lazarus uses the word fate throughout for *ūl* and *ūli*.

One proverb is puzzling even to Tamil scholars. No. 2085 in the collection of Lazarus reads: *Ūlīkkāyccal atikam ānal cūṇiyakkāraṇ kolḷai*. M. Lazarus gives the following interpretation: "One's extremity another's opportunity." This is a very free rendering. Literally it means: "If *ūli* fever is high the sorcerer will have gain." On submitting the proverb to three Tamil scholars and Pandits, three different interpretations were received. It might be worth while giving them in extenso as a small contribution to Tamil research.

1. A Tamil pandit living in Madras writes: "When in the country contagious fever is raging, the sorcerer (*cūṇiyakkāraṇ*) alias the mantra reader (*mantravāti*) gets a good income. Common people fearing foot and mouth disease seek the help of mantra readers to remove it. That is the reason."

Two pandits from Madurai write:

2. "When at the destruction of the world disastrous conditions prevail, the deceitful sorcerer, bent on robbery, will make use of these conditions to cheat the people, make them confused and deceive them.

It is like this: When on board a ship, tossed by a heavy storm, people in the grip of fear run hither and thither leaving their belongings, some hypocrites will profit from their distressed state and steal many valuables. This is an application of the proverb."

3. "A *cūṇiyakkāraṇ* is a man who contrary to God (*vallaṇ*) brings things about with the help of certain powers (*caktikal*).

Kolḷai means gaining a great victory in bringing things about. *Ūlīkkāyccal* means the trouble that comes through not walking in the way which God (*vallaṇ*) has apportioned (*vaku*¹).

There was a king who was a cruel ruler. He did not care for the happiness of the people of his country but in his own interests accumulated much wealth, forgetting how he should have behaved, going astray from the good path and illtreating the people for his own good. Hunger and disease began to raise their heads and spread over the country. A neighbouring king seeing this state of affairs attacked that country with his small army, conquered it, and tormented the people still further, all according to this proverb."

¹ Compare *vakai* mentioned above as 'lot, portion, established manner'.

While all three agree in the application, there are obviously different opinions about the meaning of *ūlīkkāyccal* and *cūṇiyakkāraṇ*. When people are in straitened circumstances ruthless men take advantage of the situation. But the circumstances indicated by *ūli* and *kāyccal*, which usually means 'heating, excess of heat, fever', are very differently illustrated as 1) contagious disease, 2) the deluge, and 3) the unjust rule of a king. One pandit refers to *ūli* as deviation from approved conduct which may be a reference to Bhagavad Gita IV,7: "Whenever there is decline of Law, O Bharata, and an outbreak of lawlessness, I incarnate myself", but in other cases *ūli* is something more unaccountable and of cosmic proportions.

To get a complete understanding of what *ūl* stands for, an analysis of a number of composite nouns should also be made. Here only one more phenomenon may be mentioned. In the Tamil encyclopedia of Singaravelu, called *Abhidhana Chintamani*, there is a reference to *ūlvātimatam*. The word literally means the religion, *matam*, of *ūl*. *Vāti* is the same word as the common Sanskrit element found for instance in the Buddhistic *sarvāstivādin*, or advocate of the doctrine of real existence. "*Ūlvātimatam* teaches that Karma is a deity for the reason that Śiva always acts through or by means of Karma. *Ūl* is Śiva and *ūl* is Brahman.¹" The argument clearly aims at a rationalistic explanation of *ūl* adapting it to the idea of Karma. After what has been said above, this means either an intended adaptation by Singaravelu or a late development. Even so it is of significance that *ūl* is identified with the ultimate power. What it really means and what it has stood for in the experience of the Tamil people has only been shown in a few examples. It cannot be a mere coincidence that *ūl* is for the most part translated as 'fate' or 'destiny', and the same can be said of its implications in the limited material presented here. *Ūl* can safely be said to have suffered from an oversimplified arianization in the writings of commentators of a later date.

¹ *Abhidhana Chintamani*, s.v.

Observations on the Chinese Ideas of Fate

By GUNNAR SJÖHOLM

The pottery unearthed by Chinese archaeology, from the 2nd millennium B.C., belongs to three civilizations of a neolithic type. The red, black and grey ware of these civilizations characterizes the industrious people of the stone age tribes. Their utility was also decorated. Thus these people had an idea not only of the necessary and useful but also of the necessary but useless. But their signs are still too general to allow of an interpretation.

A bronze age civilization followed. The earliest forms of Chinese writing occur on thousands of tortoise shells found 65 years ago in the province of Honan. At that time inscriptions on bronze vessels from the first millennium B.C. were already known. But the new material was more difficult to interpret. The amount of material has grown since then: there are now about 100 000 inscribed shells and bones, some hundreds of whole tortoise shields with inscriptions as well as other archaeological material. One third of the signs has been deciphered. The inscriptions are mostly quite brief and contain oracle formulas.

The people of the Shang-Yin dynasty (1500–1028 B.C.) knew the useful and the beautiful. What did the oracle stand for? Did it represent something necessary? An oracular technique had been developed, “which consisted in touching shells or bones on one side with a little red-hot rod and interpreting according to certain patterns the cracks that arose on the other side as the answers of the ancestral spirits to the questions of the kings. After the consultation of the oracle the questions and often the answers were inscribed beside the cracks. Often also pure memoranda concerning weather, war expeditions etc. were inscribed.”¹

¹ Translated from B. Karlgren, *Religion i Kina, Antiken*, Stockholm 1964, p. 2; in this book there are also translations of selected oracles, pp. 19 ff.

The philologist has to resign himself to the laborious task of deciphering the signs and organizing a stock of oracular terms, from which he can derive a picture of the religion of ancient China. The systematic task is as difficult as the pictographic one. Probably the systematizer, like the diviner, has what is called in the description quoted "a certain pattern", a system of ideas according to which the difficult new terms, answers to questions asked under other similar but not identical circumstances, are interpreted. The cracks in the oracle shells are forced to fit into the "cracks" of the already extant pattern. Over the field of the terminological stock spread like iron filings on a paper are moved, for instance, the magnets of theism—fatalism, and certain patterns arise. Theism and fatalism are already defined in terms of a ruling power versus the course of the world, or of personal faith versus an impersonal attitude. The oracle texts provide answers in situations which are originally undecided. They express uncertainty, appeal, perplexity, risk. The very situation is capable of many interpretations. The one who asks is both active and passive in the situation. The brief answers contain the names of the Supreme Ruler (Shang Ti) or a collective designation of those who offer sacrifices to the ancestral spirits; in the latter case the oracles are not real answers but reports on ritual activity, and it may be asked whether there is really an oracular situation, unless the oracle implies the acceptance of the reported sacrifice. The ancestral sacrifices also seem to have some relation to Shang Ti, since the spirits are described as his "guests", i.e. dwelling near him. Natural spirits are also denoted as messengers of Shang Ti. In connection with the question of the relation between theism and fatalism it is interesting to note that in the oracle texts the principal verb used to designate divine action is 'to command', the terminus technicus par excellence of Chinese fatalism, *ming*. Other verbs are: send down, approve, give, make unhappy, etc. What is commanded, sent down, done? Favour, difficulties, approval, calamity, hindrance, rain, etc. As for sacrifices there is reference to suovetaurilia, game, liquor, human beings, etc.

From the next epoch of Chinese history, Chou (1027–256), besides the archaeological evidence and sacral inscriptions in bronze, there are texts of considerable length, the Documents, the Odes, the Stories of Tso, the Discourses of the States, of which the Odes are the most important as religious sources. In addition there are the Records of Rites and the philo-

sophical writings, the Analects of Confucius, Mencius, the taoists Chuang and Laotse, and Mo Ti. While religious reflection and fatalism in this epoch were modified by thinking about value concepts and explanation of nature, an innovation took place in oracular technique. In addition to divination through tortoise shells another method was introduced, namely oracles with the aid of stalks of the Achillea plant. As a means of reference an oracular book was used, the Book of Changes, based on series of oracular figures, each consisting of six lines, whole or broken. Through the variation of the number and the position of the broken lines 64 different figures emerged, each with its own symbolism. Now the divining priest, after having directed his question to the Spirits, took a bundle of Achillea stalks, cut them (as one would a pack of playing cards), and drew in different instalments whole and broken stalks until he got a pattern of six lines, and interpreted the answer with the aid of Yi King.”¹

It is important to consider the fact that these oracular methods to gain knowledge of Fate (*ming*), conceived in a rather theistic way, belong to the kind of Chinese thinking represented by the leading teachers of the Chou period.

A few quotations illustrating the ideas of the great philosophers on *ming*, destiny, follow below:

Confucius

The Master said, “At fifteen my mind was set on learning. At thirty my character had been formed. At forty I had no more perplexities. At fifty I knew the Mandate of Heaven (*T'ien-ming*). At sixty I was at ease with whatever I heard. At seventy I could follow my heart's desire without transgressing moral principles” (Analects 2:4).²

¹ Karlgren, *op. cit.* p. 43.

² Cf. Wing-tsit Chan, *A source book in Chinese philosophy*, Princeton 1963, pp. 22 ff.: “What *T'ien-ming* is depends upon one's own philosophy. In general, Confucianists before the T'ang dynasty (618-907) understood it to mean either the decree of God, which determines the course of one's life, or the rise and fall of the moral order, whereas Sung scholars, especially Chu Hsi, took it to mean “the operation of Nature which is endowed in things and makes things be as they are”. This latter interpretation prevailed. The concept of *T'ien-ming* which can mean Mandate of Heaven, decree of God, personal destiny, and course of order, is extremely important

When Confucius was in personal danger in K'uang, he said, "... If it had been the will of Heaven to destroy this culture it would not have been given to a mortal (like me). But if it is the will of Heaven that this culture shall not perish, what can the people of K'uang do to me?" (Analects 9:5).

Tzu-hsia said, "I have heard this saying, 'Life and death are the decree of Heaven (*ming*), wealth and honour depend on Heaven'" (Analects 12:5).

"The superior man stands in awe of three things:" the Mandate of Heaven, great men, and the words of the sages. "The inferior man is ignorant of the Mandate of Heaven and does not stand in awe of it..." (Analects 16:8).

"If a man in the morning hears the Way (Norm), if he dies in the evening, so be it, then. (Analects 4:8.)

Mencius

To contrive what man cannot contrive, that rests with Heaven. To bring to the throne he whom no man can bring, that rests with Heavens ordinances. (5A.6 = Dobson, *Mencius* 3.8, pp. 62 f.)

When Heaven is about to confer high office on a man, it first exercises his mind with suffering and flexes his muscles with toil. It inures his body to hunger and his person to poverty. It frustrates him in his undertakings so that his mind is stimulated, his nature toughened to endure, and he develops capacities he lacked. (From 6B.15 = Dobson 6.61, p. 160).

Ch'i went and attacked Yen. Had he asked me, "Who should attack Yen", I would have answered, "He who is appointed by Heaven to do so". (From 2B.8 = Dobson 1.18, p. 24).

A prince finds his inheritance and passes it on to his successor so that it may continue. His immediate success rests with Heaven. (From 1B. 14 = Dobson 1.31, p. 35).

Mencius said: Whether my way is to prosper or be impeded is not within the power of man to determine. It was decreed by Heaven that I should not

in the history of Chinese thought. In religion it generally means fate or personal order of God, but in philosophy it is practically always understood as moral destiny, natural endowment, or moral order."—Cf. also the commentary on this passage in Fung Yu-Lan, *The spirit of Chinese philosophy*, London 1947 (2nd impr. 1962), pp. 19 ff. For Confucius' idea of fate, see also H. Creel, *Confucius, the man and the myth*, London 1951, pp. 130 ff.

see the Lord of Lu; it could not be that girl of the Tsang family who prevented me. (From 1B.16 = Dobson 1.35, p. 40).

Mencius said: It is the man who has stretched his mind to the full who fully understands man's true nature. And understanding his true nature, he understands Heaven. To guard one's mind and to nourish one's true nature is to serve Heaven. Do not be in two minds about premature death or a ripe old age. Cultivate your mind and await [destiny].¹ In this way you will attain to your allotted span. (7A.1 = Dobson 6.24, p. 143).²

Mencius said: Everything is destiny (*ming*). We should accept obediently our rightful lot. Therefore, he who understands Heaven's ordinances does not walk below high walls, but when he dies in the full discharge of his principles he has fulfilled the lot that Heaven has ordained for him. He who dies, however, in a felon's chains cannot be said to have fulfilled the lot that Heaven ordained for him. (7A.2 = Dobson 6.26, p. 144).

The Doctrine of the Mean

What Heaven (*T'ien*) imparts to man is called human nature. To follow our nature is called the Way (*Tao*). Cultivating the Way is called education ... (§ 1, beginning).³

¹ Wing-tsit Chan, *op. cit.* p. 78 supplies "wait for [destiny, *ming*, fate, Heaven's decree or mandate] to take its own course." For the idea of "waiting for destiny", see Fung Yu-Lan, *op. cit.* p. 35: "According to this doctrine man should exert his utmost in moral endeavor and leave whatever is beyond our control to fate."

² Wing-tsit Chan, *op. cit.* p. 78 f.: "In ancient China there were five theories about destiny or the Mandate of Heaven. The first was fatalism: the Mandate of Heaven is fixed and unchangeable. The second was moral determinism: Heaven always encourages virtue and punishes evil; therefore, man can determine his reward and punishment through moral deeds. The third was antifatalism, advocated by the Moist school. The fourth was naturalistic fatalism, which means that destiny is not controlled by Heaven in the sense of an anthropomorphic God but by Nature and works automatically. Lastly, there was the Confucian theory of 'waiting for destiny'" (see above n. 4). For Mencius, see also W. A. C. H. Dobson, *Mencius*, Toronto 1963, pp. 140 f.: "It is the *hsing* [nature] and *hsin* [guarding the mind] that determine what we are. It is our *ming*, 'fate', that governs our fortunes and determines our lease on life. *Ming* was originally a patent to a fief-holder, given by the Son of Heaven, as heaven's deputy, to a feudatory. In extended usage it is our 'lot in life'—the fate ordained by Heaven. While a man can 'guard his mind' and determined his conduct, he cannot determine his fate, which is in Heaven's hands."

³ Wing-tsit Chan, *op. cit.* p. 98.

The superior man does what is proper to his position and does not want to go beyond this ... He does not complain against Heaven above or blame men below. Thus it is that the superior man lives peacefully and at ease and waits for his destiny (*ming*), while the inferior man takes to dangerous courses and hopes for good luck. (§ 14).¹

Mo Ti

Who should be taken as example? I say, Nothing is better than to take Heaven as example. The working of Heaven is allcomprising and impartial. Its gifts are plentiful and it does not ascribe any goodness to itself. Its light is eternal and does never decrease. Therefore the holy kings took Heaven as their example, and in so doing they followed Heaven in everything. (From Ch. 4).

I have never heard of Heaven seeking blessing and good fortune from the Son of Heaven. So I know that it is Heaven that decides what is right for the Son of Heaven. (Ch. 26; Watson, *Mo Tzu* p. 80).

Moreover I say that he who kills one innocent person will inevitably suffer one misfortune. Who is it that kills the innocent person? It is a man. And who is it that sends down the misfortune? It is Heaven. If Heaven did not love the people of the world, then why would it send down misfortune simply because one man kills another? Thus I know that Heaven loves the people of the world. (Ch. 26, Watson p. 82).²

The advocates of fatalism say, "If fate decrees that the state will be wealthy, it will be wealthy; if it decrees that it will be poor, it will be poor.... If it decrees that a man will have a long life, he will have a long life; if it decrees that he will die young, he will die young. Though a man tries to combat fate, what can he do?"

To accept the theories of the fatalists would be to overthrow the righteousness in the world ... (Ch. 35, Watson p. 117, 119).³

In Taoistic mysticism the consciousness of fate is made relative in self-

¹ *Ibid.* p. 101.

² See also Fung Yu Lan, *A history of Chinese philosophy*, 2nd ed. Princeton 1952, I p. 97 and parallel tr. in Y. P. Mei, "The works of Motse", *Probsthain Oriental Series XIX*, 1929.

³ Cf. also H. H. Rowley, *The Chinese philosopher Mo Ti (BYRL 31, 1948-49)*, p. 35.

consciousness. The attitude is characterized by independence in the psychological sense. At the same time the concept of fate prevails in the thinking as never before in a strict and disciplined terminology. Thinking can be said to be reduced to one idea, *Tao-te. Ming*, fate, is qualified by the prevailing intellectual climate:

“All things, however they flourish, return to their root. This return to their root is called quiescence (*ching*), which is called submission to Fate (*ming*). Submission to Fate is called the Invariable. To know this Invariable is called enlightenment.” (*Tao-te-king*, ch. 16)¹

Finally, attention should be drawn to the fact that Chinese proverbs often refer to Fate. Here are some examples from C. Plopper, *Chinese religion seen through the proverb*, Shanghai 1937, Ch. 11:

Nr. 1926. The abacus in the Ch'en Huang's temple is not within human calculation, i.e. Man's life is fated.

Nr. 1946. The swallow living in the hall does not know the great building is about to be burned.

Nr. 2006. Great wealth is from Heaven, little wealth is from diligence.

Nr. 2082. Heaven's fortunes move in a circle.

Nr. 2125. The man is good but his fate is not.

Nr. 2129. Chang killed pigs, yet he became an immortal; Li who studied the liturgy, was killed by a tiger.

Nr. 2139. Silently awaiting Heaven's decrees.

¹ Cf. Fung Yu Lan, *op. cit.* I, p. 181.

Die Schicksalsseele

SEELE UND SCHICKSAL
MIT BESONDERER BERÜCKSICHTIGUNG DER FINNISCH-
UGRISCHEN VOLKSRELIGIONEN

Von IVAR PAULSON (†)

Das Schicksal ist gewöhnlich als eine dem Menschen fremde, an ihn von aussen herantretende und ihn überfallende Macht aufgefasst worden, d. h. als Inbegriff alles dessen, was ihn ohne sein eigenes Mitwirken trifft und mit sich reisst: z. B. in den volklichen Vorstellungen über die vorausbestimmte Lebensdauer, das Glück und Unglück, die wechselnden Geschicke während der Lebensdauer. Dabei ist es, besonders in den sog. Hochreligionen bzw. Schriftreligionen oft zu einer Auseinandersetzung zwischen Schicksalsglauben und Gottesglauben gekommen, wobei der erstere mitunter als Glaube an das Walten einer mehr oder weniger unpersönlichen oder auch nur ganz vage personifizierten Macht auftritt, deren Zwang das Weltgeschehen und Menschenleben unterworfen sind. In dieser Fassung unterscheidet sich der Schicksalsglaube vom Gottesglauben, der in allem die Auswirkung eines persönlichen höheren Wesens oder auch vieler solcher Wesen sieht. Die Frage, wie sich Schicksalsglaube und Gottesglaube zueinander verhalten, ob das Schicksal der Gottheit unter- oder übergeordnet ist, ob beide einander nebengeordnet sind, oder ob die Gottheit das Schicksal in sich aufnimmt, all dies soll hier nicht behandelt werden. Die Religionsgeschichte bietet für alle diese Typen Beispiele genug, auch für ihre Mischung innerhalb derselben Religion.

Meine Aufgabe soll hier eine mehr bescheidene und begrenzte sein. Ich hoffe nämlich auf Grund einiger ausgewählten Beispiele aus einer Reihe nordeurasischer, besonders finnisch-ugrischer Volksreligionen, den Nachweis führen zu können, dass es im Glauben dieser Völker neben der oben

kurz angedeuteten Auffassung vom Schicksal als einer dem Menschen fremden, an ihn von aussen herantretenden Macht, welches Glaubensgebiet hier nicht näher dargestellt werden kann, noch eine andere gegeben hat, die das menschliche Geschick und Lebenslos eng mit der Person oder Persönlichkeit bzw. dem Charakter des Menschen selbst, nämlich der Seele als Träger und Inbegriff der Persönlichkeit, verbunden hat. Als Schlüsselwort dieser volklichen Auffassung habe ich den Begriff Schicksalsseele gewählt, um damit die enge Verbundenheit des Schicksalsglaubens mit der Seelenvorstellung hervorzuheben.

Zur Verdeutlichung des Zusammenhanges zwischen Schicksal und Seele muss ich zuerst kurz auf die Forschungsergebnisse zurückgreifen, die im Bereich des volklichen Seelenglaubens, d. h. in der Erforschung der Seelenvorstellungen bei Naturvölkern sowie in einer Reihe von Volksreligionen erzielt worden sind, wobei ich mich besonders auf die Arbeiten aus dem Kreise der Stockholmer Religionsforscher (Ernst Arberman, Åke Hultkrantz, Ivar Paulson) berufe.¹

Die Seelenvorstellungen der nordeurasischen Völker sind von mir a. a. O. früher näher untersucht worden. Die Aufmerksamkeit war dabei vor allem auf die Vorstellungen von der Seele oder den Seelen des lebenden Menschen gerichtet. Die eingehende Bestandsaufnahme und Analyse des Materials hat in diesem Grossraum generell zum gleichen Ergebnis geführt, wie es früher für verschiedene andere Gebiete und Kulturen der Erde (Arberman), für Afrika (Ankermann)² und für Nord-Amerika (Hultkrantz) festgestellt worden ist: die Seelenauffassung hat sich als eine durchgehend dualistische oder dualistisch-pluralistische erwiesen, die von grundlegend verschiedenen Seelenelementen gebildet wird, d. h. der sog. Freiseele einerseits und den

¹ E. Arberman, „Untersuchungen zur primitiven Seelenvorstellung mit besonderer Rücksicht auf Indien“ I-II, *Le Monde Oriental* 20-21, Uppsala 1926-1927; Å. Hultkrantz, *Conceptions of the Soul among North American Indians. A Study in Religious Ethnology*. (The Ethnographical Museum of Sweden, Stockholm (Statens Etnografiska Museum), Monograph Series, Publication No. 1), Stockholm 1953; I. Paulson, *Die primitiven Seelenvorstellungen der nordeurasischen Völker. Eine religionsethnographische und religionsphänomenologische Untersuchung* (The Ethnographical Museum of Sweden, Stockholm (Statens Etnografiska Museum), Monograph Series, Publication No. 5), Stockholm 1958.

² B. Ankermann, „Totenkult und Seelenglaube bei afrikanischen Völkern“, *Zeitschrift für Ethnologie* 50, Berlin 1918. Vgl. nunmehr auch H. Fischer, *Studien über Seelenvorstellungen in Ozeanien*, München 1965.

sog. Körperseelen andererseits, wie ich sie nach der Terminologie meiner Vorgänger auf dem Forschungsgebiet des Seelenglaubens (z. B. schon Holmberg-Harva,¹ besonders aber Arbman und Hultkrantz) benannt habe.

Mit Freiseele ist das freie, ausserkörperliche Erscheinungsbild des Individuums gemeint, sein zweites Ich (alter ego), das sich bereits zu Lebzeiten gelegentlich und zeitweilig vom Körper trennen und ein selbständiges Dasein führen kann. In der Literatur ist sie auch Bildseele oder Schattenseele benannt worden, da ihre Erscheinungsform oft dem Abbild oder Schatten gleicht. Sie manifestiert sich nur als eine ausserkörperliche Seele in passiven, inaktiven Zuständen des Eigentümers, z. B. im Traum als sog. Traumseele, in Extase und Trance (z. B. beim Schamanen) als sog. Tranceseele, und im sog. Seelenverlust — öfters im Zusammenhang mit verschiedenen Krankheiten — als sog. verlorene Seele. Die Freiseele hat die Grundlage für die Vorstellung von der Schicksalsseele gebildet. Die letztere ist, wie wir noch an Hand einer Reihe von Beispielen sehen werden, nichts anderes als eine in gewissen schicksalsschweren Situationen in Erscheinung tretende Freiseele, die sich als ein Wesen mit eigener Macht und Mündigkeit in Gestalt der ausserkörperlichen Erscheinungsform des Menschen ihm selbst oder anderen Menschen zeigt. Dabei bildet der Doppelgänger oder die sog. Doppelgängerseele eine interessante Zwischenform. Sie ist eine in ominösen Situationen in Erscheinung tretende Freiseele, jedoch nicht von der Dauer und lebenslänglichen Bedeutung der Schicksalsseele. Unten werden diese beiden Formen der Freiseele, Doppelgänger und Schicksalsseele je für sich näher betrachtet.

Die Körperseelen sind von keinem grösseren Belang für unser Thema. Als Träger und Inbegriffe der verschiedenen physischen und psychischen Lebensfunktionen können sie nur in einem mehr bedingten und indirekten Sinne "Seelen" genannt werden, da sie ja eigentlich in der primitiven Pneumatologie Vorstellungen von Lebenskraft oder Lebenskräften zum Ausdruck bringen und — wenigstens ursprünglich — wahrscheinlich nicht als gestalt-hafte seelische Wesen aufgefasst worden sind. Wenn die Körperseelen, d. h. die während des Lebens in der Regel an den Körper gebundenen Lebenspotenzen, nicht in dem für uns geläufigen Sinne als „Seelen“ bezeichnet

¹ U. Holmberg, *Gudstrons uppkomst, med särskild hänsyn till de finsk-ugriska folkens religiösa föreställningar*. Uppsala 1917, p. 25.

werden können, die die Persönlichkeit des Menschen auszudrücken und zusammenzufassen vermögen, so steht die Freiseele als eine lebendige, visuelle und gestalthafte Anschauung vom Menschen in dessen ausserkörperlicher Erscheinungsform da, die als ein durchaus personenhaftes Wesen die Persönlichkeit des Eigentümers mit allen ihren Eigenschaften, darunter auch der Macht des Individuums trägt und in dieser Stellung leicht als ein dem Menschen gegenüber selbständiges, sein Schicksal bestimmendes Wesen, d. h. als Schicksalsseele, aufgefasst werden kann.

Von den für unser Thema bedeutsamen Gestaltungen der Freiseele wäre zuerst die sog. Doppelgängerseele oder der Doppelgänger zu erwähnen. Die Manifestation des Doppelgängers ist oft als ein ominöses Vorzeichen für das Schicksal desjenigen Menschen gedeutet worden, den er repräsentiert. Zum genetischen Zusammenhang zwischen den Vorstellungen von der Freiseele und der Doppelgängerseele hat Arbman die folgende Charakterisierung gegeben: „Eine andere Form der externen Seele [d. h. Freiseele] ist die neben und unabhängig von dem Menschen und seinen gewöhnlichen Seelen existierende und als sein treues Ebenbild aufgefasste ‚Doppelgängerseele‘. Auch diese ‚Seele‘ ist oft mit dem Menschen durch ein Verhältnis sympathischer Reziprozität verbunden ...“¹ „Die Sonderung zwischen Psyche [d. h. Freiseele] und Individuum hat nur hier zu einer weiteren Objektivierung der erstgenannten geführt. In der bei mehreren Völkern vorkommenden Doppelgängerseele, die als eine geistige Dublette des Individuums eigene Existenz neben und unabhängig von diesem, obgleich in engem Kontakt mit ihm stehend, besitzt ..., hat die berührte Entwicklung [d. h. von der Freiseele zu weiteren Seelenformen] ihre Spitze erreicht. Ich sehe also in dieser Seelenform keine selbständige und unabhängige Erscheinung, sondern nur einen Ableger der Psychevorstellung [d. h. Freiseelenvorstellung].“² — Zu Arbman's Ausführung wäre hier nur zu bemerken, dass mit Entwicklung im Bereich der Seelenvorstellungen stets nur eine ideologisch-genetische Ableitung der einen Vorstellung von einer anderen gemeint sein kann, und dass ferner die „Spitze“ in diesem Sinne vielmehr in der Vorstellung von der Schicksalsseele als im Doppelgänger anzunehmen wäre.

Die Doppelgängerseele ist tatsächlich als eine Variante der Freiseele zu

¹ Arbman, *op. cit.* I, p. 132, Anm. 1.

² Arbman, *op. cit.* I, p. 139, Anm. 1.

betrachten, wie es aus vielen Beispielen erhellt werden kann. Der Doppelgänger erscheint, wie ja auch die Freiseele, oft als ein Ebenbild des Menschen, als sein schattenhaftes oder „luftiges“ ausserkörperliches Abbild, wie es in den Angaben öfters heisst. Mit der Freiseele teilt der Doppelgänger auch die grosse Verwandlungsfähigkeit, d. h. die Fähigkeit, verschiedene Gestalten anzunehmen: bald als Mensch (gewöhnlich in der Gestalt des Eigentümers), bald als Tier oder Vogel zu erscheinen. Zum Unterschied von der Freiseele tritt der Doppelgänger aber stets zugleich mit dem wachen und aktiven Individuum, jedoch an einem anderen Orte auf als da, wo der Mensch sich selbst befindet. Nach zahlreichen Mitteilungen geschieht dies kurz vor dem Tode des Betreffenden, weshalb das Inerscheintreten der Doppelgängerseele oft als ein Todesvorzeichen gedeutet worden ist. Man sieht einen Menschen kurz vor seinem Tode, oder in seinem Todesaugenblick, an einem anderen Orte, als wo er sich tatsächlich körperlich befindet. Seine Freiseele hat sich von ihm getrennt und ist auf dem Weg ins Jenseits, wie es die volkliche Pneumatologie öfters erklärt. Aber auch in anderen schicksalsschweren Lebenslagen und Situationen, z. B. bei Krankheitsfällen mit Seelenverlust, kann die Seele als Doppelgänger erscheinen, womit sie zumeist die Unabwendbarkeit des Todes für den Betreffenden vorkündigt, zu dem sie gehört.

Der Doppelgänger oder die Doppelgängerseele ist somit eine ausserkörperliche Erscheinungsform des Individuums, mit dessen Existenz sie eng verbunden ist, von dem sie sich aber aus verschiedenem Anlass und Grund (Krankheit, Tod) getrennt und entfernt hat und sich simultan mit der ganz wo anders befindlichen Person anderen Leuten zeigt, womit ein verhängnisvolles Geschick für den Betreffenden bekräftigt oder herbeigeführt wird. Das Schicksal des Menschen hat sich in dieser Gestalt gewissermassen konkretisiert und verselbständigt, steht aber durch die erwähnte Reziprozität (Arbman) mit der Person noch in sehr enger Verbindung. In diesem Sinne wäre schon der Doppelgänger eine, obwohl temporäre Schicksalsseele zu nennen. Wir wollen aber lieber den Begriff „Schicksalsseele“ für diejenige Seelenform behalten, die das Schicksal des Menschen durch das ganze Leben trägt.

Wie bei der Freiseele, so bilden auch bei der Doppelgängerseele subjektive Erlebnisse einerseits und kulturgebundene religiöse Tradition andererseits

die Voraussetzung. Von den ersteren kommen verschiedene visuelle und auditive Halluzinationen und Illusionen in Betracht, d. h. psychische Zustände, die mit leichter Trance in Verbindung gebracht werden können. Der traditionelle Seelenglaube, d. h. kulturgebundene Seelenvorstellungen einer Volksreligion, findet bereits darin einen Ausdruck, dass die Freiseele oft „Doppelgänger“ genannt worden ist. Zur eigentlichen Doppelgängerseele wird die Freiseele jedoch nur in einer bestimmten Situation, wenn sie als ein gegenüber der Person frei und selbständig gedachtes Wesen mit eigener Existenz und zugleich mit dem wachen und aktiven Individuum — aber an einem anderen Orte als dieses — in Erscheinung tritt.

Eine scharfe Grenze zwischen den beiden artgleichen Vorstellungen — Freiseele und Doppelgänger — kann natürlich nicht immer gezogen werden. In ihrer Struktur sind sie ja einander so verblüffend ähnlich bzw. miteinander identisch, da sie beide doch auf die gleiche ausserkörperliche Erscheinungsform des Menschen zurückgehen. Dabei haben sie jedoch ihre eigenen und gerade für sie charakteristischen Funktionen, die aus den besonderen Situationen herauswachsen, in denen sie auftreten. Auf Grund seines nordamerikanischen Materials hat Hultkrantz bemerkt, dass es nicht immer leicht ist zu entscheiden, ob die Doppelgängerseele bei einem gewissen Volk, in seiner Volksreligion und deren Glaubensvorstellungen, mit der Freiseele als unmittelbar und direkt identisch aufgefasst worden ist, d. h. als eine besondere Situationsform der letzteren, oder ob es sich um zwei konzeptionell verschiedene, tatsächlich aber genetisch-ideologisch voneinander abhängige, herleitbare Seelenvorstellungen handelt. Darum ist es auch nicht leicht, die Verbreitung und Tragweite der Doppelgängervorstellung genau festzustellen.¹ Genau dieselbe Schwierigkeit begegnet uns in Nordeurasien, von wo wir nun einige Beispiele herausgreifen wollen.

Die Freiseele kann in Gestalt eines selbständigen „Begleitergeistes“ auftreten, der in gewissen ominösen Situationen als Doppelgänger des Menschen erscheint. So berichtet z. B. Itkonen: „Die Rentierlappen von Inari nehmen an, jeder Mensch habe einen ihn begleitenden Geist (*fārrosâš*, von dem Wort *fārru* „Reise, Reisebegleitung“) . . . Der *f*. kann zuweilen ein Vorzeichen oder Doppelgänger (*ov'dâsâš* K. [Koltalappen] *ovdkas*) werden; er kann ihn vor

¹ Hultkrantz, *op. cit.*, p. 356.

Unglück schützen, aber auch dem Verderben entgegenführen. Wenn man in einer Ödkote allein ist, kann es geschehen, dass man jemanden vor die Kote fahren hört, aber niemand kommt. Erst nach langer Zeit tritt ein Mensch ein. Der Doppelgänger war sein *fārrosäš*, und man meint, das Gehörte sage dem Ankömmling Schlimmes voraus. Mitunter sieht man auch, dass der *f.* seinem Besitzer ähnlich ist, unter anderem nach dessen Tode; der *f.* bleibt auf der Erde und ist unsterblich. Er kann auch auf das Kind seines Besitzers übergehen. Der *f.* oder *o.* ist der Herr des Menschen und als solcher aufrichtig, er gerade hält das Gewissen (*óame-tov'du*) rege. An erster Stelle steht der *f.*, an zweiter das Gewissen, erst an dritter steht der Mensch selber. Das Gewissen wohnt dem Menschen inne und ist ihm in allem voraus, der *f.* lebt überhaupt nicht im Menschen. Mittels des *f.* kann man zu einem Schlafenden oder Verstorbenen reden, zu ersterem am besten dann, wenn er sehr ermüdet in festem Schlafe liegt. Jemand, der sich geheime Kenntnis, z. B. über einen Renntierdiebstahl zu verschaffen sucht, schleicht sich an den Schlafenden heran und fragt flüsternd. Dann antwortet der *f.* des Schlafenden.“¹

Diese komplexe Vorstellung vom „Reisebegleiter-Geist“ der Rentierlappen von Inari weist in ihrer Struktur und ihren Funktionen sehr verschiedene phänomenologische Züge auf, die teils an die Freiseele, unter anderem als Traumseele, (der *f.* sieht seinem Besitzer ähnlich und antwortet im Schlafe), teils auf die spezifische Situationsform des Doppelgängers, bzw. der Freiseele als Doppelgängerseele erinnern, teils aber auch darauf hinweisen, dass wir es mit einer bereits verselbständigten Schutz- oder Schicksalsseele bzw. einem Schutzgeist des Menschen zu tun haben, der „überhaupt nicht im Menschen lebt“, diesen vor Unglück schützen, ihn aber auch dem Verderben entgegenführen und auf das Kind seines Besitzers übergehen kann. Der *f.* oder *o.* wird ja ferner auch als Herr des Menschen bezeichnet, was darauf beruhen kann, dass man ihm eine grössere Macht zugeschrieben hat als sie der Mensch selbst besitzt. Letzteres ist aber ein besonderes Charakteristikum der sog. Schutz- oder Schicksalsseele bzw. auch des Schutzgeistes. Die Verankerung in der Seelenvorstellung kommt dabei

¹ T. I. Itkonen, „Heidnische Religion und späterer Aberglaube bei den finnischen Lappen“, *Mémoires de la Société Finno-ougrienne* 87, Helsinki 1946, p. 162.

jedoch wiederum darin zum Vorschein, dass der *f.* als eine überlebende Seele bzw. als Totengeist des Menschen aufgefasst worden ist.¹

An diesem Beispiel, das wir gerade darum als Auftakt für unsere kurze und flüchtige Illustrationsreihe ausgewählt haben, kann die Problematik ersehen werden, die einer näheren phänomenologischen Analyse bei der Herausschälung der verschiedenen Vorstellungselemente in der volklich oft so komplexen Anschauung von der Freiseele als Doppelgänger, als Schutz- oder Schicksalsseele und überlebende Seele bzw. Totengeist begegnet. Dabei muss immer noch zugleich in Erwägung gezogen werden, dass es sich auch um einen selbständigen, soz. von aussen erworbenen Schutzgeist handeln kann, der gar nicht auf die Seelenvorstellung zurückgeht. Beim *fārrosás̄* oder *ov'dásás̄ (ovdkas)* der Lappen kann diese letzte Grundlage jedoch an Hand verschiedener struktureller und funktioneller Merkmale mit vollem Recht in Erwägung gezogen werden. Anders verhält es sich z. B. mit den Begleitergeistern oder „Gefährten“ (*kaD'Dze*) der Koltalappen, die zumeist als tiergestaltige Schutzwesen den einzelnen Sippen, Familien und deren verschiedenen Mitgliedern sowie besonders den Zauberern (Schamanen, als *nóaid-k.*) angehören und eine eigene Kategorie von selbständigen Schutzgeistern bilden.²

Itkonen weist darauf hin, dass *fārrosás̄* der Renntierlappen von Inari vielleicht dasselbe sein kann wie ihre Vorstellung vom personifizierten Glück des Menschen, *óassi* (finn. *osa*), „Teil, Anteil, Los, Glück“ und bringt dazu als Illustration eine koltalappische Sage: „Einst waren Männer aus Suonikylä beim Holzhacken im Walde. Einem armen Manne träumte im Schlaf, dass die anderen schon zum Holzfällen gegangen wären. Er eilte zu ihnen, kannte aber keinen von ihnen. Er fragte sie, wer sie seien. Sie antworteten, sie seien das Glück der und der Männer. Er kannte die betreffenden Männer, da sie seine Arbeitsgefährten waren. Dann fragte er: „Wo ist denn mein Glück?“ „Dort schläft es.“ Der Mann nahm einen Stock, begann den Schlafenden zu verprügeln und sagte: „Ach du schläfst, und die anderen arbeiten.“ Der Schlafende richtete sich auf und bat: „Schlag mich nicht, ich werde arbei-

¹ Vgl. I. Paulson, „Seelenvorstellungen und Totenglaube bei nordeurasischen Völkern“, *Ethnos* 1960: 1-2. (Autorisierter Wiederabdruck in C. A. Schmitz [hrsg.], *Religions-Ethnologie*, Frankfurt a. M. 1964, pp. 238-264.)

² U. Harva, „Skoltlapparnas 'följeslagare““, *Festskrift til Rektor J. Qvigstad*, Tromsø 1928; Itkonen, *op. cit.*, pp. 163 f.

ten“. Danach begann das Glück jenes Mannes „zu leben“, und er wurde reich.“¹

Der Unterschied zwischen dem „Begleitergeist“ (*färrosås*) und dem personifizierten Glück (*oassi*) ist jedoch schon aus ihrer Gestaltstruktur zu ersehen: der erstere gleicht im Aussehen dem Menschen, was auf seine genetisch-ideologische Verankerung in der Freiseelenvorstellung hinweist, das letztere ist aber von einem ganz anderen Aussehen als die betreffenden Männer, zu denen es gehört, weshalb man es vielmehr für einen selbständigen Schutzgeist halten könnte.

Der nahe Zusammenhang zwischen dem Schutzgeistglauben und der Anschauung vom personifizierten Schicksal bzw. Glück des Menschen geht auch aus dem finnischen Volksglauben hervor, wo das letztere mit verschiedenen Synonymen benannt worden ist, die auch den Schutzgeist des Menschen bezeichnen, so z. B.: *onni* („Glück“), *lykky* (schwed. *lycka*, „Glück“), *säästi*, *tsäästi* (russ. *tšästje*, „Glück“), *osa* („Teil, Anteil, Los, Glück, Rolle“), *luonto* („Natur, Charakter“), wobei alle diese Bezeichnungen im Volksglauben und in der Volksdichtung auch für „Schicksal“ und „Schutzgeist“ gebraucht worden sind.² Die Verankerung des Schicksalsglaubens liegt aber hier nicht direkt im Seelenglauben vor, sondern vielmehr im Schutzgeistglauben, der jedoch seinerseits verschiedene Berührungspunkte zu den Seelenvorstellungen aufweist.

A. Vilkkuna hat in seiner Untersuchung über die sog. Ausrüstung des Menschen für seinen Lebensweg im finnischen Volksglauben eine Reihe wichtiger Werte zusammengefasst, die im Zusammenhang mit der Gefahrenperiode des Kleinkindes und bei deren Abschluss klar zum Ausdruck kamen: 1. Name, 2. Schutzgeist, 3. äussere Gestalt, 4. Charakter, 5. Schicksal, 6. Glück. „Sie bilden eine geschlossene Gesamtheit, die man als Grundlage der Individualität des Menschen bezeichnen kann. Die erwähnte Komponente schützt den Menschen und bestimmt den Verlauf seines Lebens“, fasst er zusammen.³ Den Zusammenhang zum Seelenglauben hat er

¹ Itkonen, *op. cit.*, p. 163.

² K. Krohn, „Suomalaisten runojen uskonto“, *Suomensuvun uskonnot* I, Helsinki & Porvoo 1914, pp. 164 ff.; M. Haavio, *Suomalaisen muinaisrunouden maailma*, Helsinki 1935, p. 239; U. Harva, *Suomalaisten muinaisusko*, Porvoo & Helsinki 1948, pp. 255 ff.

³ A. Vilkkuna, „Die Ausrüstung des Menschen für seinen Lebensweg“, *Folklore Fellows Communications*, 179, Helsinki 1959, p. 133.

nicht untersucht, es liegt aber nahe anzunehmen, dass Fäden von jedem dieser Werte in der postulierten Komponente hinüber zu der Seelenvorstellung laufen können. Wir wollen hier nur kurz das Verhältnis zwischen Schutzgeist- und Seelenvorstellung betrachten, wobei wir besonders auf ihre Verbindung zum Schicksalsglauben achten.

Die Finnen (und Karelrier) haben für die Seele bzw. Freiseele des Menschen verschiedene Bezeichnungen angewendet, von denen *haamu* (*haamo*, *hahmo*, *haahmo*, *hahmu*, *haahmu*) an erster Stelle steht.¹ Sie bezeichnet eine Art „Schattenseele“ oder äussere Gestalt des Menschen, die bereits bei Lebzeiten gelegentlich den Körper verlassen und wieder zum Menschen zurückkehren kann, was zuweilen, aber nicht unbedingt, eine Erkrankung des Betreffenden verursachte. Mitunter wurde mit dem gleichen Wort auch der Doppelgänger benannt. „Sein *haamu* kam früher als er selbst“, sagte man, wenn ein Mensch vorher dort erblickt wurde, wo er erst später eintraf.² Ein schattenhafter Doppelgänger des Menschen hiess im Finnischen auch *aave* — und man hielt die mit diesem Wort bezeichnete Erscheinung für ein Todesvorzeichen für den Betreffenden, dessen *aave* an einem Ort gesehen wurde, wo er sich gar nicht selbst befand.³ Aber auch *varjo* („Schatten“), *kuva* („Bild“) u. a. die Freiseele bezeichnenden Namen wurden für den Doppelgänger gebraucht.⁴ In der Situationsform des letzteren hat die Seele das Schicksal des Menschen besiegelt.

Dabei wurde im finnisch-karelischen Volksglauben auch der Schutzgeist des Menschen (*haltia*, *haltija*) öfters als Doppelgänger aufgefasst.⁵ Dieser konnte mitunter als *varjo-haltia* („Schatten-h.“) in der Gestalt des Menschen zu dem er gehörte, an einem Ort gesehen werden, wo der Betreffende sich selbst gar nicht aufhielt. Jeder Mensch soll in einem gewissen Alter einen solchen Schutzgeist erhalten, der ihn überall begleitet, seine Vorhaben und Unternehmen begünstigt, zuweilen aber auch hindert, ihn in allem berät

¹ Harva, *Suomalaisten muinaisusko*, pp. 243 ff. Vgl. auch U. Harva, „Ihminen ja hänen hahmonsaa“, *Suomi* 5: 10 (1930).

² Harva, *op. cit.*, p. 244.

³ Harva, *op. cit.*, pp. 245 f.

⁴ Harva, *op. cit.*, pp. 249 f.

⁵ Krohn, *op. cit.*, *loc. cit.*; Harva, *op. cit.*, pp. 251 ff. Vgl. A. Vilkkuna, „Über den finnischen *haltija* ‘Geist, Schutzgeist’,“ *The Supernatural Owners of Nature*. (Acta Universitatis Stockholmiensis, Stockholm Studies in Comparative Religion 1) Stockholm, Göteborg & Uppsala 1961, pp. 158 ff.

und ihm im Traume kommende Dinge vorhersagt. Ein Schutzgeist ist, wie der Mensch, den er beschützt, gross oder klein, stark oder schwach. Nach seiner Gestaltstruktur sowie nach seiner Funktion als Berater im Traume gleicht der Schutzgeist der Freiseele, die ja nichts anderes ist als die ausserkörperliche Erscheinungsform des Menschen und deren wichtigste Situationsform gerade diejenige der Traumseele ist.¹ Harva hat den nahen Zusammenhang zwischen Schutzgeist- und Seelenvorstellung im finnischen Volksglauben hervorgehoben.² Beide — Schutzgeist und Freiseele als sog. Schutz- oder Schicksalsseele — haben ja die gleichen Funktionen gegenüber dem Menschen, zu dem sie gehören. Sie können auch von gleicher Gestaltstruktur sein, d. h. sich in Gestalt der ausserkörperlichen Erscheinungsform des Menschen manifestieren.

Während der Doppelgänger nur in einer bestimmten Situation, gewöhnlich erst kurz vor dem Tode, das Schicksal des Menschen bestimmt und anderen Leuten ankündigt, lenkt der Schutzgeist sowie die Schutz- oder Schicksalsseele das ganze Leben lang die Geschicke des Betreffenden. Die Verquickung zwischen Seele und Schutzgeist im Volksglauben geht so weit, dass beide sowohl als temporäre Doppelgänger wie als permanente Schutzwesen wirken können. Was die wissenschaftliche Theoriebildung mit ihrer phänomenologischen Terminologie auseinanderhalten kann, fliesst im lebendigen Volksglauben oft zusammen. Auch dies weist auf die genetisch-ideologische Verbindung zwischen den Vorstellungsbereichen „Seele“ und „Schutzgeist“ hin, wobei beide mit der volklichen Auffassung vom Schicksal des Menschen in Zusammenhang gebracht worden sind. Der finnisch-karelische Volksglaube bietet dafür sehr anschauliche Beispiele in reichlichem Masse.

Auch bei den Esten hat sich die kurz vor dem Tode vom Körper des Menschen sich trennende Seele (Freiseele) als Doppelgänger gezeigt und damit die Sterbestunde des Betreffenden verkündigt. In Nord-Estland trug die Erscheinung den Namen *mardus*. Kurz vor dem Tode, so hiess es, soll die Seele (*hing*, *vaim*) sich bereits auf immer vom Körper trennen und als *mardus* erscheinen. In ganz Estland galt es als ein Todesomen, wenn man

¹ Paulson, *Die primitiven Seelenvorstellungen der nordeurasischen Völker*, pp. 290 ff., 311 ff.

² Harva, *Suomalaisten muinaisusko*, p. 255.

den Menschen in seiner ausserkörperlichen Erscheinungsform (als Doppelgängerseele) dort sah, wo dieser sich gar nicht leiblich aufhielt. „Es war nicht er, sondern bloss sein *mardus*“, sagte man in solchen Fällen in Nord-Estland und hielt es für ein ominöses Vorzeichen für den Betreffenden. Die Seele tritt auch hier in der Gestalt des Menschen als sein Doppelgänger auf und besiegelt dadurch sein endgültiges Schicksal.¹

Eine typische Schutz- oder Schicksalsseele ist *ort* der Syrjänen. Ich habe früher den Nachweis geführt, dass die Syrjänen mit *ort* ursprünglich die Freiseele bezeichnet haben, die aber im Laufe der Zeit und besonders wohl seit der Christianisierung vor dem christlichen Seelenbegriff gewichen ist. Der letztere bezeichnet eine einheitliche, monistische Seele, in der Züge von der Freiseele sowie der Körperseele ineinandergeflossen sind und die mit einem Wort bezeichnet wird (*lol, lov*), das früher im Syrjänischen wohl nur die Lebensseele, d. h. die belebende Körperseele als Atem („Atemseele“) bezeichnet hat.²

Eine der ältesten Nachrichten über den *ort* der Syrjänen stammt vom russischen Forscher Popov aus der Mitte des vorigen Jahrhunderts.³ Nach seiner Mitteilung hätten die Syrjänen geglaubt, dass jeder Mensch seinen eigenen, besonderen *ort* habe, der in der Luft [d. h. ausserhalb des Menschen] wohnt. Kaum kommt das Kind zur Welt, gesellt sich ihm sein *ort* bei. *Ort* nimmt manchmal körperliche Gestalt an, d. h. erscheint in der Gestalt des Betreffenden seinen Freunden und Verwandten. Dann ist der Tod des Menschen, der in dieser Gestalt erblickt wird, nahe bevorstehend. *Ort* erscheint besonders in der Nacht und hat ein blaues Flämmchen (*ort-bi*, „Seelen-Feuer“) bei sich, oder zeigt sich auch nur in Gestalt dieser Flamme. Durch sein Benehmen, sein Tun und Treiben, zeigt *ort* an, wessen Tod gerade bevorsteht: z. B. soll sein Erscheinen den nahen Tod des Hauswirtes anzeigen, wenn man ein Hacken hört; soll ein Kind sterben, so tollt dessen

¹ O. Loorits, *Grundzüge des estnischen Volksglaubens* I (Skripter utgivna av Kungl. Gustav Adolfs Akademien för folklivsforskning 18: 1), Lund 1949, pp. 252 ff.

² Paulson, *Die primitiven Seelenvorstellungen der nordeurasischen Völker*, pp. 75 ff. Vgl. auch U. Holmberg, „Permalaiisten uskonto“, *Suomensuun uskonnot* 4, Porvoo 1914, pp. 16 f.

³ N. Popov, „Zyrjane i zyrjanskij kraj“, *Izvestija Obščestva Ljubitelej Estestvoznaniija, Antropologii i Etnografii pri Moskovskom Universitete* 13: 2, Moskva 1874, pp. 57 ff.

ort herum wie dieses. Ausser dem Vorhersagen des Todes besteht die Pflicht des Doppelgängers darin, nach dem Tode des Menschen alle Stellen aufzusuchen, wo der Verstorbene bei seinen Lebzeiten gewesen ist. *Ort* ist hier als die überlebende Seele oder der Totengeist wohl mit dem Toten bzw. seiner postmortalen Existenzform identifiziert worden. Die Verbindung des Doppelgängers zur Seelenvorstellung ist hier ganz offenbar.

Am ausführlichsten hat der syrjänische Forscher Nalimov dieses Glaubensbereich seines Volkes geschildert.¹ Nach seiner Beschreibung davon hat jeder Mensch seinen Doppelgänger oder sein Schutzwesen, *ort*, das sich unsichtbar in der Nähe seines Schutzbefohlenen aufhält. Die Gestalt (bzw. den „Körper“) des *ort* sieht man nur selten. Ein Jüngling hat erzählt, er habe einmal seinen *ort* gesehen, der ihm bis aufs Haar ähnlich gesehen habe. Eine Frau wieder hatte den *ort* ihres Grossvaters gesehen. *Ort* macht dieselbe Arbeit, wie sein Schutzbefohlene, spielt dieselben Spiele wie dieser und übt andere Tätigkeiten aus, wie der Mensch, zu dem er gehört. Er tut dies so offen, dass alle Umstehenden und der Betreffende selbst ihn hören, manche sehen ihn auch. *Ort* sagt den Tod des Betreffenden voraus. Zuweilen erfolgt dies in der Manifestationsform des Seelenvogels. Der Vogel fliegt mit Ungestüm ins Zimmer, schlägt dabei mit dem Kopf an die Wand und stirbt, wonach der Mensch, dessen Seelenvogel so umkam, bald sterben wird. Die Syrjänen prüfen solch einen Vogel aufmerksam. Nach seinen äusseren Merkmalen urteilen sie, wer sterben müsse: ein Mensch oder ein Tier (denn auch diese haben ihren Doppelgänger, der in der Gestalt des Seelenvogels erscheinen kann) und namentlich wer von ihnen.²

Auch Žakov hat den Doppelgänger der Syrjänen geschildert. Überall, wohin der Mensch geht, folgt ihm sein „Schatten“ oder Doppelgänger, *ort*, der gerade so aussieht, wie der Mensch selbst, ebensolche Kleider trägt, wie dieser. Stirbt der Mensch, so lebt der *ort* weiter und zeigt sich in Gestalt des Verstorbenen.³

Ort der Syrjänen erscheint in den Berichten als ein vom Menschen

¹ V. Nalimov, „Zagrobniy mir po verovanijam zyrjan,“ *Etnografičeskoe Obozrenie* 72-73, Moskva 1907.

² Nalimov, *op. cit.*, p. 13.

³ K. Žakov, „Jazyčeskoe mirosozerčanie zyrjan,“ *Naučnoe Obozrenie* 8: 3. St. Peterburg 1901, p. 17.

während des Lebens völlig getrenntes, mit eigenem Willen und Wollen sowie mit eigener, höherer Macht ausgerüstetes übernatürliches Wesen, das nur noch in seiner Erscheinungsform in Gestalt des Menschen, durch seinen Namen, der mit den (Frei) Seelenbenennungen der nächsten Sprachverwandten (*urt* der Wotjaken und *ört* der Tscheremissen),¹ sowie durch seine post-mortale Existenz seine Verankerung in der Seelenvorstellung aufweist. Man kann die Erscheinung am besten als Schutz- oder Schicksalsseele bezeichnen. Diese tritt dem Menschen gegenüber sehr selbständig auf. Sie begleitet ihn wohl überall während seiner ganzen Lebensdauer und nimmt an allen seinen Vorhaben teil, erscheint ihm auch zuweilen im Traume als mahnendes Vorzeichen, womit sie sein Schicksal lenkt und leitet. Kurz vor dem Tode erscheint sie aber anderen Leuten als Doppelgänger von anthropomorpher oder theriomorpher Gestalt (Seelenvogel), oder auch als Seelenfeuer. *Ort* ist durchaus ein selbständiges, mit eigenem Willen und Wollen ausgerüstetes und mit eigener übernatürlicher Macht begabtes Schutzwesen, das das Schicksal des Menschen bestimmt. Indem *ort* aber seine Verankerung in der Seelenvorstellung noch in vielem (besonders in der Gestaltstruktur) bewahrt hat, wächst auch das Geschick des Menschen soz. aus seinem eigenem Seelengrunde hervor.

Diese Beispiele von den finnisch-ugrischen Völkern (Lappen, Finnen und Karelier, Esten, Syrjänen) mögen hier genügen, um im Rahmen des vorliegenden kurzen Vortrags die Verbindung zwischen Seelenvorstellung, Schutzgeist- und Schicksalsglaube zu illustrieren. Die Verbreitung der sog. Schutz- oder Schicksalsseele in Nordeurasien habe ich früher näher verfolgt, worauf hier hingewiesen sei.² Sie ist keine einheitliche und allgemeine. Oft fällt es schwer, eine genaue Grenze zwischen der Schicksalsseele und dem Doppelgänger zu ziehen. In mehreren Fällen kann man auch im Zweifel bleiben, ob es sich um eine Schicksalsseele oder um einen selbständigen Schutzgeist handelt. Je freier und selbständiger sich eine Seele (bzw. Freiseele) ausserhalb des Menschen bewegt, desto mehr neigt sie dazu, sich

¹ H. Paasonen, „Über die ursprünglichen seelenvorstellungen bei den finnisch-ugrischen völkern und die benennungen der seele in ihren sprachen,“ *Journal de la Société Finno-ougrienne* 26, Helsinki 1909 (Sonderabdruck), pp. 17 ff.

² Paulson, *Die primitiven Seelenvorstellungen der nordeurasischen Völker*, pp. 310 ff. Sie kommt in Nordasien (Sibirien) z. B. bei den Wogulen und Ostjaken, den Samojuden (Juraken) und Tungusen vor.

als ein anderen übernatürlichen Wesen (Geistern) ähnliches Wesen zu äussern, was zur Verquickung zwischen Seelenvorstellung und Schutzgeisterglaube beigetragen hat. Obwohl eine Schutz- oder Schicksalsseele auch fernerhin in einer nahen Verbindung zum Menschen bleibt, den sie durch sein Leben begleitet und dadurch sein Lebenslos bestimmt, wird der Zusammenhang doch lockerer und die Seele selbst zu einem recht eingewilligen Machtwesen, wie es auch die Geister sind, denen gegenüber der Mensch eine religiöse Scheu und Ehrfurcht fühlt und in Kulthandlungen zum Ausdruck bringt. Ihren Ursprung in der Seelenvorstellung verrät ein solches Wesen, die Schutz- oder Schicksalsseele, jedoch auch weiterhin, indem sie mit ihrem Schützling in einer Schicksalsverbundenheit bleibt und in der Regel auch die äussere Gestalt des betreffenden Menschen trägt.

Den Begriff „Schicksalsseele“ habe ich auf Grund meines nordeurasischen Materials geprägt. Arbman hat in seiner Untersuchung zum primitiven Seelenbegriff darauf aufmerksam gemacht, dass die Psycheseele [d. h. Freiseele] mitunter selbständig als eine Art Schutzgeist des Menschen auftreten kann.¹ Hultkrantz, der auf Grund seines nordamerikanischen Materials aus dem Gebiet des indianischen Seelenglaubens den Begriff „Schutzseele“ (guardian soul), alternativ mit „Kraft- oder Machtseele“ (power soul), in die religionswissenschaftliche Terminologie einführte, hat nach seinen Beispielen festgestellt, dass die Freiseele in zwei verschiedenen Situationsformen sich als Schutzseele manifestieren kann: als Traumseele und als Doppelgängerseele.² Diese beiden Situationsformen kommen auch in Nordeurasien vor und kamen in den oben wiedergegebenen Beispielen zum Vorschein. Jedoch ist die Doppelgängervorstellung in unserem Gebiet durch zahlreichere Angaben belegt als die Situationsform der Freiseele als eine im Traume erscheinende Schutz- oder Schicksalsseele. Weit aus häufiger scheint in Nordeurasien die Schicksalsseele auf eine Freiseele als Doppelgänger zurückzugehen.³ Dabei erinnert sie stark an die von aussen auf das Geschick des Menschen einwirkenden Geisterwesen, die Schutzgeister. Hultkrantz hat die Frage gestellt, inwieweit man bei der Schutzseele mit dem Vorbild der Schutz-

¹ Arbman, „Untersuchungen zur primitiven Seelenvorstellung“ ... I, pp. 139 f. Anm. 1.

² Hultkrantz, *Conceptions of the Soul among North American Indians*, pp. 374 ff.

³ Paulson, *op. cit.*, pp. 304 ff. und 310 ff.

geistidee rechnen kann.¹ Auch im nordeurasischen Material erscheinen beide — Schutzgeist und Schutz- oder Schicksalsseele — oft zusammen im gleichen funktionellen Situationszusammenhang.

Alternativ mit dem Begriff „Schutzseele“ habe ich für mein nordeurasisches Material „Schicksalsseele“ vorgeschlagen. Die Funktionen eines solchen emanzipierten Seelenwesens beschränken sich in meinen Angaben gewöhnlich nicht nur auf das Schützen ihres Besitzers. Es bestimmt vielmehr das ganze Schicksal des Menschen sein Leben lang, und zwar entweder zum Guten oder zum Bösen, je nach der Situation, die vielfach wechselt, wie das Lebenslos selbst. Dieser ominöse Charakter tritt in mehreren Berichten scharf hervor. Der Unterschied vom Doppelgänger, der ja auch das Schicksal des Menschen durch sein Erscheinen verhängnisvoll bestimmt und verkündet, liegt darin, dass die Schicksalsseele erstens sowohl Böses wie Gutes bestimmen kann, der Doppelgänger aber in der Regel nur den schlimmen Tod, und zweitens, dass sie es durch das ganze Leben tut, während der Doppelgänger ja zumeist erst kurz vor dem Tode in Erscheinung tritt. Man kann daher sagen, dass die Schicksalsseele zum Unterschied von der mehr passiven Doppelgängerseele ein recht aktives Seelenwesen ist, das durch sein Wirken das Schicksal des Menschen ausschlaggebend bestimmt. Rein phänomenologisch liegt ihm die Freiseelenvorstellung zugrunde, aus der sich genetisch-ideologisch gesehen sowohl die Vorstellung vom Doppelgänger als auch diejenige der Schutz- oder Schicksalsseele entwickelt haben, wobei an keine historisch-evolutionistische Entwicklung gedacht ist. In der volklichen Anschauung vom Menschen und seinem Schicksal bilden die verschiedenen phänomenologischen Elemente, wie z. B. Seele, Name, Schutzgeist, personifiziertes Glück und Schicksal oft einen recht diffusen Komplex, in dem die einzelnen Vorstellungen nicht immer auseinandergehalten werden. Indem das Schicksal durch diese Komponente gewissermassen an den Menschen selbst, an seinen Charakter und seine äussere Gestalt (die Freiseele als ausserkörperliche Erscheinungsform des Menschen!) gebunden wird, erscheint es im Volksglauben nicht nur als eine dem Menschen gegenüber fremde, an ihn von aussen herantretende und ihn überfallende Macht, sondern — neben der gerade geschilderten Anschauung — zugleich

¹ Hultkrantz, *op. cit.*, pp. 376 ff.

auch als eine aus dem Wesen des Menschen selbst hervorgewachsene Grösse. Anders betrachtet könnte man auch sagen, dass das Volk in seiner geistigen Überlieferung hier Stellung dazu genommen hat, inwieweit endogene Faktoren neben den exogenen das Schicksal des Menschen bestimmen.

Fate in the Religion of the Lepchas

FROM THE THIRD DANISH EXPEDITION TO
CENTRAL ASIA 1947-54

By HALFDAN SIIGER

The question of Fate in the religion of an indigenous culture faces us with many difficulties. This is probably first and foremost due to the fact that Fate, after all, is a problem belonging to the higher religions, and one in which certain theological and ethical notions play a prominent part. Fate in this special sense of the word presupposes a certain world order or plan which may be envisaged as a moral unity, intelligible to man. In any religion presupposing such a world order the question of Fate is apt to arise in the minds of the believers, as, for example, in Islam and Christianity.

Nevertheless, the question of Fate may also present itself to the more thoughtful members of some indigenous religions, although we must certainly in this case give a wider meaning to the word. When studying indigenous religions, we have to confine ourselves to the search for particular approaches to that constellation of problems which forms the prerequisite for the notion of Fate in the higher religions. That is to say, we must not expect any coherent, integrated system of thought.

In order to understand the problem of Fate among the Lepchas¹ we must concentrate on their central religious experiences, on that which constitutes their world as a whole and which gives it its cosmic core, the very mainspring of its existence.

¹ The Lepchas are mountainous agriculturalists who live in the State of Sikkim in the Himalayas and in some adjacent Indian districts. Cf. the present author's report: "Ethnological Field-Research in Chitral, Sikkim, and Assam", *Det kongelige Danske Videnskabernes Selskab*, vol. 36. No. 2, pp. 35-47, Copenhagen 1956. Cf. also Geoffrey Gorier, *Himalayan Village*, London 1938; John Morris, *Living with Lepchas*, London 1938.

To the Lepchas the world consists first of all of an innumerable number of living beings, i.e. benignant or maleficent supernatural beings, men, and animals. All these living beings live and act constantly on each other and frequently against each other. In other words, the world consists of an enormous number of life-functions, not only in the terrestrial sphere, but also in the supernatural sphere, for the supernatural sphere is just as much a part of the world of the Lepcha as is the terrestrial sphere. Among all these functions man has not only his own tiny daily activities, which he tries to adjust to the functions of Nature herself, but also a great number of more important activities, which he attempts to conduct according to the will of the beings of the supernatural sphere. For a foreigner it is often difficult to discover where the tiny activities end and the more important activities begin. To the mind of the Lepchas the problem of mankind is to bring his major activities in harmony with the supernatural order, and therefore his activities have both a terrestrial *raison d'être* and a supernatural *raison d'être*.

Similar conditions may, of course, also be observed among many other indigenous peoples. When the behaviour of indigenous man sometimes confuses the foreigner, it is often due to the fact that he does not take the above twofold aspect of activity into consideration. Except for very ordinary activities, indigenous man seldom does anything of importance without this double reference, i.e. without simultaneously having regard to the rules of the terrestrial sphere and to the rules of the supernatural sphere. The reason for this rests on the fact that indigenous man in his heart of hearts experiences the world as created by some of the supernatural beings to whom it therefore ultimately belongs. Man is only a tiny part of this created world, the society is a greater part, and mankind as such is the greatest part, but none of them stand outside the whole formed by the terrestrial and the supernatural spheres together. The Lepchas attempt to harmonise their major activities with the will of the supernatural beings by means of great 'ceremonial performances', which therefore must be said to constitute the very centre of their religious life. These ceremonial performances are extensive and complicated, just as the entire world is manifold and complicated, as it presents itself to him.

Let us give some examples. To the Lepchas the supernatural world is

divided into two groups, the *rŭm*, or the mainly benevolent supernatural beings, and the *mung*, or the malignant supernatural beings. Any evil occurrence is in the first instance ascribed to the malignant activities of the *mung*, but it may, under certain conditions, also be due to temporary ill-will on the part of some or other *rŭm*. If it is obvious that the evil occurrence is caused by a human being, this person is considered to be governed by some *mung*, or he may, which is much worse, be a *mung* in human disguise. At all events, any evil occurrence is experienced as the result of the evil will-power of some or other malignant supernatural being. Consequently, we cannot apply our technical term "Fate" to such occurrences, and Fate as an abstract concept cannot be used, when we speak of the Lepchas. To them there is no evil Fate per se. But daily life has numerous manifestations of evil will-power which have their origin in some or other supernatural being, and everyone has to be constantly on guard against these. That is, of course, particularly so for those who are specially exposed to the activity of evil will-power, such as pregnant women, a man going out hunting etc., but even a man who is going to build a house must take his precautions. Such people are therefore constantly looking for tiny hints in the life of Nature which may give them a warning that misfortune is in store for them. The ominous hint may be the appearance of a strangely coloured butterfly or bird, the call of an animal, the meeting of a person behaving unusually, etc. That is to say, any natural occurrence may, under certain circumstances, be taken as omens of future evil, they are portentous signals of something which will occur unless steps are taken to prevent it. In other words, the approach of an evil occurrence may be discovered by means of such small signals, and may then, perhaps, be avoided provided that the person concerned is able to interpret the ominous signal. Thus Fate in this connection becomes the sense of something potentially evil, which is approaching, but which may be avoided provided that the person is able to interpret the signals and to take the necessary precautions. But only the person who has received the right instruction from the elders of his people will know how rightly to interpret these signals. We might, perhaps, say that the ominous signal is the shadow of a foreboding fateful occurrence. But we should hesitate to use our term Fate in this connection, as fate which may be avoided is not an inescapable fate, resting on inevitable causal relations or on a divine decree.

Horoscopes, probably of Tibetan origin, play an important role in the life of the Lepchas. A person's horoscope discloses the dependence of his life on the supernatural world, and the right interpretation of its diagram is a potential key to the knowledge of his fate.

It is the duty of the maker and reader of horoscopes to draw up the diagrams and to expound them. The Lepchas use both birth, marriage, and death horoscopes. In daily life horoscopes are much used when marriages are planned. If the horoscopes of the prospective spouses do not correspond favourably, there will be no marriage. If the horoscopes correspond favourably, the elder members of the families will give their consent to the marriage, sometimes even urging or forcing the young couple to marry without their having any mutual inclination to do so.

It is no wonder that horoscopes play an important role in the planning of marriages, because a marriage unites not only two persons, but also two families in the most intimate social way. But also from the religious point of view marriage constitutes a significant tie, because a marriage unites two persons' fates in such a way that the outcome may be either auspicious, or ominous, or mixed. At the contraction of a marriage two persons' fates are united in such a way that a marriage entails a conjunction of two fates which may determine not only the health and the length of the lives of each partner, but also the health and length of life of their children. As practically all Lepchas are married, the fate of the entire Lepcha society depends to no small extent on the fates of all the married couples.

However, the reader of horoscopes will also tell people what they should do in order to modify, change, or even avert an approaching evil fate. This is generally done by means of ceremonial performances, and thus there is still hope for the endangered. A person is not the complete and passive victim of his fate. Generally speaking, a person cannot escape the major outcome of his fate, but many minor consequences can be altered or modified. The latter depends on his willingness to learn from the diagram what he must do, or to put it in other words, he must learn how to cooperate with his fate in order to attain a tolerable compromise. A person's fate, as disclosed by the diagram, reveals the will of the mighty supernatural powers, but this will is not in every respect beyond the influence of human beings. The man who learns from the diagram of his horoscope, adjusts his life according to its

forecasts, and honestly observes the necessary precautions may modify his fate for the better. In other words, a man has to cooperate with his own fate in order to improve his life, and if he does not, he will come to experience an evil fate.

Among the Lepchas there are certain persons, called *mün*, who possess extraordinary abilities to communicate with the beings of the supernatural world. The female *mün* are especially strong, and are called in when difficult situations arise, e.g. in cases of disease, when all other means have proved ineffective. These women are also called for when a dead person's soul is going to be sent forth into the next world.

If a person is haunted by one or several *mung*, i.e. devils or demons, then as a last resort a female *mün* may be called in. When she arrives, she puts on her special dress, and begins a ceremonial performance, during which she requests her auxiliary supernatural beings to appear, and to assist her in fighting the evil supernatural beings haunting the man. Thus one group of supernatural beings fight another group, and the outcome of this fight will decide the fate of the person. Now it may happen that the miserable state of the haunted person is due to the fact that some or other wicked person, e.g. another female *mün*, on her own initiative has set the evil supernatural beings upon him. In that case, the assisting *mün* will try to mobilise all her auxiliary supernatural beings and request them to fight the malignant supernatural beings sent by the hostile *mün*. Consequently, a great battle between the two groups of supernatural beings may ensue, and the outcome of this battle depends on which of the two groups is the stronger.

This example shows that a man's fate may depend on the outcome of a battle in the supernatural world, but this outcome is also dependent on which of the two female *mün* has the stronger group of supernatural beings at her disposal. No wonder that the female *mün* with the best supernatural connections are much sought after.

With the Lepchas a belief in the reincarnation of the departed souls may be found, but I should, however, hesitate to state that it is common. It may have been introduced, or at least stressed, by the creed of the Tibetan lamas. I learnt of some few cases of reincarnation in the villages I investigated, and one villager informed me that the soul of a departed person may be found reincarnated in a newborn child, sometimes in an animal, and, but rarely,

even in a *mung*. The last-mentioned had happened to the soul of a woman who had had a very bad reputation. As the evidences of a general belief in reincarnation are so rare I prefer to exclude this problem from the present discussion of Fate.

Finally, we shall investigate the great religious ceremonies, as these seem to throw an interesting light on the present problem. Apart from many minor ceremonies performed on behalf of the individual, there are during the year some major ceremonial performances which concern the whole village or even the whole society, and which are therefore performed regularly on its behalf. These performances are similar to those which we find with innumerable other indigenous peoples throughout the world. To the anthropologist there is nothing particularly new in them, but a careful examination of them may contribute to the understanding of Fate among the Lepchas.

On these occasions the mainly benevolent supernatural beings, the *rüm*, are approached and requested to grant the people certain favours, e.g. fertility to human beings, to cattle, or to the fields, protection against the evil supernatural beings, and the like. The mere fact that such performances take place indicates that there is a certain connection between human beings and supernatural beings, and that the latter can be influenced by the former. If it were not so, the performances would have no purpose at all. When we use the word performance it should not be taken in any mechanical sense of the word. Nothing in the world functions mechanically according to the mind of the Lepchas. But when we say that the Lepchas observe such performances meticulously, we must be careful to state what we mean. Their religious performances have reference not only to the supernatural beings, but also to their own souls. Therefore they utter their prayers during the performances. The souls of the Lepchas appeal to the souls of the supernatural beings. It is, so to speak, soul that speaks to soul; and in their prayers they put their very souls into the performances. The religious performances should thus be viewed as preparing the way for the wishes of their souls which find an outlet through their prayers. Usually the Lepchas do not utter a prayer except at a ceremonial performance and thus we should regard the ceremonial performance as being intended to set their souls free and orient them towards the souls of the supernatural beings. But this is to say that the ceremonial performance has a twofold purpose and direction; one concerns

the souls of the supernatural beings and on concerns the souls of men. In fact, the very purpose of the ceremonial performance is to establish a cooperation between these two groups of souls. In other words, the ceremonial performance has two aspects, a supernatural one and a human one. By means of the ceremonial performance the souls of men are drawn into that auspicious minor cosmological activity which is the ceremonial performance. We call it a cosmological activity, because it is an activity which includes not only man, his body and his soul, but also the supernatural beings, and because it aims at achieving a result which cannot be obtained without the help of the supernatural beings, i.e. it involves the cosmos of indigenous man.

It is a well known fact that the direct purpose of the ceremonial performances of indigenous peoples is to secure greater 'life-power' in the widest sense of the word, and to avert anything which might diminish this life-power. But this means that there must be a possibility of influencing the souls of the supernatural beings or, in other words, of expanding or intensifying the good happenings which occur to human beings, and of changing or modifying the bad ones. The attitude, underlying the human approach, has as a necessary prerequisite the concept that the supernatural beings have certain events in store for human beings, and the ceremonial performances presuppose that human beings are or may be able to influence supernatural beings so that the coming events may be more auspicious or less inauspicious. If we are at all justified in attributing such a semi-philosophical notion as the above to the ceremonial performances of the Lepchas, we may conclude that future events represent not merely an exertion of an arbitrary will-power on the part of the supernatural beings, but are, on the contrary, events of a mixed origin, emerging from that particular state of mind which supernatural beings are in when they have accepted the request of human beings. But that is to say that human beings may to a certain degree influence the character of the events that are in store for them, or, to use another term, they may cooperate with their fate.

These considerations show that we may speak of a notion of Fate among the Lepchas provided that we employ that term in a specially modified form. To the Lepchas, Fate is not a totality of future events apprehended as an inevitable necessity controlling all happenings. It is rather a multitude of events emerging from the beings of the supernatural world, and these

events appear as the realisation of a supernatural will-power which has incorporated the wishes of human beings. Fate is therefore not to be considered as a long series of inevitable events, but rather as a multitude of events which mankind cannot escape, but which, in their supernatural origin, are constantly being created or re-created according to the influence of human beings on the supernatural beings. In short, to the Lepchas, Fate is not an inevitable necessity, but a supernatural possibility, and this trait of possibility in the character of Fate depends on the willingness on the part of the supernatural beings to remain favourable towards the ceremonial approaches of the human beings.

Thus we may conclude by saying that Fate, according to the religion of the Lepchas, is the multitude of future events which supernatural beings have in store for human beings, and that the character of these events is constantly being created or re-created according to the favourable or unfavourable response of the supernatural beings to the ceremonial approaches of the human beings. Consequently, man is not absolutely without any influence on his own Fate, for its character depends on two factors, and although man constitutes always the inferior factor, he is not left in a state without any hope at all.

Divinity and Destiny in the Religion of Ruanda-Urundi

By OLOF PETTERSSON

Ruanda and Urundi belong to the Ruanda cluster of the interlactustrine Bantu in the regions surrounded by a great ring of lakes—Tanganyika, Kivu, Edward Albert, Kioga and Victoria. Pygmoid hunters and gatherers still survive among some tribes of the Ruanda cluster, and in both Ruanda and Urundi, people of “Hamitic” (Nilotic) origin live side by side with the original tribes. Most of the societies today reveal a sharp stratification into endogamous castes with a ruling aristocracy of herders called Tutsi, a subject agricultural peasantry called Hutu, and often also a depressed caste of Pygmy hunters, called Twa.¹

Animal husbandry approaches agriculture in economic importance, except Tutsi and Hima who subsist almost exclusively on the products of their herds. Descent, inheritance, and succession conform to the patrilineal mode. Exogamy applies to all members of one’s own patrisib. Marriage is not allowed within the clan, and intermarriage between certain clans is also tabu. In Runda the local community tends to assume the form of a patriclan but other tribes seem to lack clan division. There are no compact villages. The family is the unit of the community. “In fact there is no word for village or town in either language, the nearest equivalent being a word meaning a collection of *rugos*. The *rugo* is the fence surrounding the homestead ... Only members of the same family live in the *rugo*, with their servants.”²

¹ C. P. Murdock, *Africa. Its Peoples and Their Culture History*, New York 1959, pp. 347 ff.

² R. Guillebaud, “The Doctrine of God in Ruanda-Urundi” (In: *African Ideas of God*, ed. E. W. Smith, London 1950) p. 180. Regarding the religious conditions among the tribes, see further A. Arnoux, “Le Culte de la Société Secrète des Imandwa au Ruanda” *Anthropos* VII, 1912, pp. 273 ff., 529 ff., 840 ff., and *Anthropos* VIII, 1913, pp. 110 ff., 754 ff.; P. Schumacher, “Die Ehe in Ruanda”, *Anthropos* V, 1910, pp. 870 ff., *Anthropos* VII, 1912, pp. 5 ff.

Even if the beliefs in Ruanda and in Urundi differ in detail, the general religious system is the same among the both peoples. The influences—good or evil—on the life of mankind, on the social orders etc. come from what I should like to determine as the ultrahuman or superhuman¹ part of the world. This ultrahuman part of the world may be divided in the following way:²

1. Certain more or less material powers are believed to be inherent in some special objects. Many things, species of plants, animals, etc. have in them certain powers.³ These powers are transmitted and used for practical purposes by the magicians, doctors, diviners (*bafumu*), and rain-doctors (*bavurati*.)

2. The *bihume*, half material, half spiritual beings who can be seen under special circumstances. They are as a rule evil beings who are thought to live in haunted places and the only way of escaping the *bihume* is to avoid such places.

3. The *mizimu*, the spirits of the dead. The *mizimu* are divided into two classes, the *mizimu*, the spirits of common people, the *muzimu*, the spirits of important chiefs.

4. The national spirit *Ryangombe*, a personal spirit or national ancestor or hero, to whom a real cult consisting in offerings and prayers is directed.

5. The creator-god *Immāna*.⁴

¹ Cf. G. Lienhardt, *Divinity and Experience*, Oxford 1961, p. 28, where the terms "human" and "ultrahuman" are found. I wish to avoid the term "supernatural world" because the African peoples and—as I believe—also other primitive peoples do not reckon with what we call natural and supernatural. The relation between man and the gods or spirits has nothing "supernatural", in the western sense of the word, for the primitive man. The gods and the spirits are parts of the world in which man lives. The gods and the spirits have human qualities but in a higher potens than man has. The 'powers', spirits and gods are "regarded as higher in the scale of being than men and operate beyond the categories of space and time which limit human actions. They emerge in the interpretation of events: those which are of men and those which are of powers (spirits, gods)". (Lienhardt). In many Bantu languages there are no terms for what we call "natural", "supernatural", "empirical" and "transcendental". See J. D. Krige, "An Address Inaugurating the chair of Social Anthropology, delivered in Durban on the sixteenth of August 1947", *Theoria, A Journal of Studies*, Pietermaritzburg 1948, p. 108, where the author with regard to the Lovedu magical practices states that no dividing line exists between what we call natural and supernatural.

² B. Zuure, "Immāna, le Dieu des Barundi", *Anthropos* XXI, 1926, p. 735.

³ Cf. O. Pettersson, "Magic and Medicine in South African Bantu Psychiatry", *Centaurus* 9, 1963, København 1964, p. 298.

⁴ I cannot decide whether or not the original name of the creator might have been Nya-Murunga, 'creator', as Alexis Kagame has tried to demonstrate in *La philosophie bantu-rwandaise de l'être*, Bruxelles 1956.

The above-mentioned five 'elements' of the religion are of course, not distinguished. They form rather an entirety and the people do not in their *normal* daily life decide if an event comes from the *mizimu*, *muzimu*, from *Ryangombe* or *Immāna* or from the magicians. The different events which take place in the life of man or in the life of the tribe they ascribe as a rule to the ultrahuman world as an entirety, even if they sometimes attribute events to the ancestors, to *Ryangombe* or to another spiritual being. In their worship people may approach a special god with special requests even if there is no clear dividing-line between the deities. In one situation man may address *Ryangombe*, in another the *muzimu* or *mizimu*, in a third situation they may turn to the *bafumu* or *bavurati* in order to get help and assistance or in order to divert illness or other misfortunes. Then they say that 'god', *without specification*, has given his help or has refused to help: "He has saved you from destruction", "He has saved you at last", "He still causes you to stand up", "They have seen you", "I am alive because of him", "I depend on him", "He has taken his hands off him".¹

In the present survey of the god *Immāna* and his relation to the destiny of man, we may first try to get a picture of the god as the people see him. In describing *Immāna* it is necessary to distinguish between the following:

1. *Immāna* in the myths.
2. *Immāna* in the proverbs, sayings and songs.
3. *Immāna* in the worship.
4. *Immāna*'s rôle in the daily life of man.

In the myths *Immāna* is described as creator. He takes the rôle of the creator of the first man and the first woman: "Immāna créa un jeune homme et une femme. Ils construisirent une petite hutte dans la brousse. Ils eurent deux enfants. Ceux-ci étaient mauvais. Les premiers étaient des Batutsi, les seconds des Bahutu. Ensuite Immāna créa la vache, la chèvre, le mouton. Les Bahutu viennent, ils voient la vache. Ils ont peur. Ils s'enfuient. Les Batutsi viennent, se signent de craie blanche, conduisent la vache. Les Bahutu prennent la chèvre et le mouton."² From the lines quoted it appears that *Immāna* is not only the creator but also the organizer of the social order in the tribe. He sanctioned during the mythic period the social order that

¹ In some of the sentences quoted "he" may be identical with *Immāna*.

² Zuure, *op. cit.*, p. 753.

still prevails in tribal life. The mythic period thus determines the future.¹ It is worth noticing that the myth does not deal with Immāna as the creator of the world. The quoted myth deals only with the creation of man as do all African creation myths.² From a general point of view the Africans have very little interest in the origin of the world. The earth existed when the creation took place, and the Africans see to be satisfied with this. Further information is offered by Baumann who has given a clear exposition of the creation ideas in African religions.³ He has analysed some 2500 myths and legends and based upon them a study of African cosmology. He has proved beyond dispute that there are no *original* African myths dealing with the *creation of the world*. Ideas insisting on a world creation are of non-African origin. When the creator appears in the history of creation, earth and heaven already existed.⁴

Another myth tells how Death came to mankind. At one time Death did not live amongst people, and whenever he appeared Immāna gave chase to him. On one occasion he was being hunted down, and ran into a narrow place where he collided with a woman coming in the opposite direction. He immediately besought her to hide him saying, "Hide me, and I will hide you and yours". The woman opened her mouth, and Death jumped inside and she swallowed him. Immāna came up and said: "What has happened to Death? Did you see which way he took?" The woman denied having seen Death. Then Immāna who knew supernaturally what had happened, said: "Seeing you have hidden Death, Death will destroy both you and yours." From that moment Death spread in the land.⁵ This myth refers to Urundi. The Ruanda have the same myth in another version, according to which it is a king—not Immāna himself—who was hunting Death.⁶ Immāna did not create Death. Death existed in the mythic period, but he had no power to injure man until the woman took him under her protection.

¹ Cf. M. Eliade, *Die Religionen und das Heilige*, Salzburg 1954, p. 446, P. Schebesta, *Ursprung der Religion*, Berlin 1960, pp. 43 ff.

² Cf. O. Pettersson, *Chiefs and Gods*, Lund 1953, pp. 172 ff.

³ H. Baumann, *Schöpfung und Urzeit des Menschen im Mythos der afrikanischen Völker*, Berlin 1936, pp. 185 ff.

⁴ *Ib.*, p. 163: "Die Erde ist meist schon vorhanden, wenn die Schöpfung einsetzt und der Eingeborene begnügt sich mit dieser Tatsache."

⁵ The myth is quoted after Guillebaud, *op. cit.* pp. 193 ff.

⁶ See Zuure, *Op. cit.*, pp. 754 f.

Immāna's words to the woman—that man would die—applied for all time to men's fate.

There are myths which will show how Immāna in the mythic period intervened in human affairs and punished men who did not follow his divine order. One myth runs as follows: A beautiful girl wished to marry nobody but a prince. Her mother forbade her to work on the fields so that she would not spoil her hands. Immāna revealed himself to the girl and ordered her to work on the fields together with her mother. The mother, however, said to the girl that she should not obey the god but go home and do nothing that could spoil her beauty. The god punished the girl and her mother in the following way. He made the girl meet a poor man belonging to the *mutwa* people whom the Rundi regarded as pariahs. The girl and her mother, however, believed that the poor *mutwa*-man was a prince and the girl married him.¹

In other myths, the events of which take place during the mythic times, men are informed about Immāna's demands on men concerning their ethical behaviour.² A myth dealing with the problem of why Immāna no longer lives among men expresses the idea of Immāna's sovereignty. Briefly, the myth runs as follows. At first Immāna lived among men, and he went about among them and talked with them, creating children, until one day he created a crippled child. The parents were very angry and one of them took a knife and began to watch for an opportunity of killing Immāna. The god knew all about it, and said, "If they are going to behave like that I will depart to my own place, and not show myself any more. Then I can create as I please, and if they are not satisfied, they can just grumble!"

Thus, the myths give the god the following characteristics. In the mythic period Immāna organized the world: he created man and animals etc., he gave death free scope and punished transgressions of the divine will. It seems to be clear that the myths dealing with Immāna and the rôle played by him in the mythic period have the character of being a philosophical-rational explanation of the world, of human conditions and ethics. This theoretical

¹ *Ib.*, p. 757.

² For examples see E. Johanssen, "The Idea of God in the Myths and Proverbs of Some East African Bantu Tribes", *International Review of Mission* XX, 1931, pp. 541 ff.

philosophy also performs, however, a practical purpose, viz. to strengthen tribal beliefs and ethics.¹

In the proverbs Immāna is often mentioned in words that may allude to the idea that the god is believed to be behind the destiny of men and the order of the world. When a person has escaped a great danger or has been saved from a sure death, they say, "*Wagize Immāna*" (You have Immāna), "you have seen Immāna" or "Immāna saved you". On recovery from a serious illness they say, "He (Immāna) still causes you to stand up". When a person dies, Immāna is said to let go of him, "Immāna has let him go" or "Immāna has taken his hand off him". Among the other proverbs and sayings the following examples may be mentioned. To a person who is in distress they can say, "The enemy prepares you a grave, but Immāna prepares you a way of escape". A proverb running as follows may show the idea that Immāna is the sustainer of the order of the world: "The tree set up by Immāna cannot be blown down by the wind."²

Immāna is supreme: he gives and takes, unfettered by the wishes and desires of men. This thought is expressed in the following way: "What Immāna has let go of no one can bring back", "Immāna gives to you; you cannot trade with him: if you do, he will drive a hard bargain. No one can take from him to whom Immāna has given," "Immāna knows about the things of tomorrow".³ The quotations have a fatalistic character: luck and misfortune alternate, and man has only to accommodate himself to the course of events.

The ethical rules and man's behavior are reflected in the proverbs as well as in the myths. Immāna wishes man to work and do his duties in the world; the god does not like complacency and he punishes envy etc. "You pray for blessing to Immāna when sitting by the hearth, and he anoints you with ashes", i.e. 'do not expect him to help you if you do not do any work', "Rather than praise yourself you should be praised by Immāna". "You cry for the luck of another, and Immāna sends you scabies" (i.e. envy makes a person more and more miserable).

¹ Cf. B. Malinowski, *Magic, Science and Religion and other Essays*, New York 1954, p. 101: "It (the myth) expresses, enhances and codifies belief; it safeguards and enforces morality ..."

² Guillebaud, "The Doctrine of God", pp. 189 ff. 195.

³ *Ib.*, pp. 196 f.

In song there is very little about Immāna. Rosemary Guillebaud has recorded a Rundi lullaby:¹

Hush, child of my mother
 Hush, hush, O my mother!
 Immāna who gave you to me,
 If only I could meet him
 I would fall on my knees and pray to him,
 I would pray for little babies,
 For little babies on my back.
 You came when the moon was shining
 Yoy came when another was rising.
 Hush, field that we share,
 That we share with Immāna!
 Immāna who gave you to me
 May he also bring you up for me ...

When a person is extremely sad, especially after bereavement, or when a woman has been driven away by her husband, they may express their laments in the following words:

As for me, Immāna has eaten me
 As for me, he has not dealt with me as with others ...
 Sorrow is not to hang the head mourning,
 Sorrow is not to go weeping ...

A person in Ruanda may bewail his lot in such words as these:

I do not know what Immāna is punishing me for: if I could meet with him I would kill him. Immāna, why are you punishing me? Why have you not made me like other people? ...²

To sum up we can state that the name Immāna is often mentioned in proverbs and sayings and sometimes in songs. Here he seems to take the rôle of determiner of man's destiny; in the sayings, the exceptional occurrences in life are attributed to Immāna. A knowledge of the natural, ordinary course of events, learned by experience, if not conscious then unconscious, and self-evident, is essential to the life of every man. Without such knowledge his existence would be simply impossible. The Africans know that summer

¹ *Ib.*, p. 197.

² *Ib.*, pp. 198 f. Cf. Schumacher, *op. cit.* p. 899 with an extract from a marriage song where Immāna is mentioned.

follows upon winter, that the sun rises and sets on regular times. The different phases of the moon are well known and used as time-measurer, etc. They know that, what they sow or plant will wax and bear fruit, that it will rain sometimes, in certain countries at certain seasons, that some season is the rutting time of the animals and that they will bear their young at a certain season. They know that when they hit an animal with an arrow it will be killed or at least wounded. Nothing will—according to their interpretation of the world—happen by chance. There is always a cause behind the events, and they are not satisfied with a “natural cause”. They see an arrow kill a man, and they know that the arrow caused his death, but they ask further: ‘Which person, spirit, god, magician caused the arrow to hit the person who was killed by it?’¹ The unchangeability of the laws of nature is quite as self-evident to Africans as to westerners, even if the primitives do not explicitly give expression to it. However, they arrange their lives according to the regularity of the order of things.

Divergences, however, take place in the normal world-order, in nature as well as in man’s life. The natural sequence of events can be broken. An expected event may not occur and an unexpected one may happen. If rain does not fall at the regular times, famine will occur and men and animals will die, and if a woman gives birth to her child prematurely, the child will die, etc. When the Africans wish to explain a remarkable, exceptional event—a sudden death, an unforeseen illness, a miscarriage, etc.—they attribute the events to *the ultrahuman world*, i.e. to sorcery, to malicious spirits, to ancestors or to gods. It seems as if the ancestors, Ryangombe, and other superhuman beings and ‘forces’ flow together in Immāna. The myths also contain some expressions indicating vague ideas of special evil beings that have no relation to the ancestral spirits. They are said to await a chance to do harm and their only aim is to spoil what Immāna has done. In Urundi this spirit is called *Rwuba* and he is characterized as the adversary of Immāna. In Ruanda they do not speak of *Rwuba* but of *Immana Ruremankwachi* and *Immana Ruremba*. The mentioned beings have no known form, and they are not worshipped. They seem to be wholly theoretical abstractions used in the aetiological myths to elucidate the problem of theodicy. These beings

¹ Cf. E. Ehnmark, *Anthropomorphism and Miracle*, Uppsala 1939, p. 199. Cf. also L. Lévy-Bruhl, *Les fonctions mentales dans les sociétés inférieures*, Paris 1910, pp. 75 f.

hold their position in the myths as causers of evil, dangerous and ugly things that happen in the world and disturb the world-order. They have disrupted—and still disrupt—Immāna's creation, but do not have any practical religious function.¹ In order to see if our hypothesis that Immāna stands for the ultrahuman world is plausible, we must analyse Immāna's rôle in every-day religious worship. We must know whether there is any conformity between the rôle ascribed to Immāna in the every day sayings and the rôle played by him in practical worship. Immāna does not intervene in human life as a punisher of crimes against the tribal order. Those who guard the social and ethical laws of the tribe are the national or private ancestors—not the supreme being.

There is no worship directed to Immāna, even if they say that they offer their cult to the 'god'. The 'god' is, however, not identical with Immāna. The 'god' is Ryangombe or another ancestral deity. In their worship there are no clear dividing-lines between the different deities,² even if the worshippers say that they turn to a special deity.

When the people are in real trouble, when the world-order is disturbed, they can pray to Immāna. The following prayer may illustrate this:

O Immāna of Urundi (Ruanda), if only you would help me! O Immana of piety, Immāna of my father's home ... if only you would help me! O Immāna of the country of the Hutu and the Tutwi, if only you would give help to me just this once! O Immāna, if only you would give me a rugo and children! I prostrate myself before you, Immāna of Urundi (Ruanda), I cry to you: give me offspring, give me as you give to others. Immāna, what shall I do, where shall I go? I am in distress, where is there room for me? ...

The quoted form of prayer, said by a barren woman to Immāna in order to get a child, is the only form of direct prayer that has been recorded as far as I know. Sayings in the form of a wish are, however, not uncommon, "Oh, that Immāna would spare my children to me"³ etc. No offerings are

¹ Guillebaud, *op. cit.*, pp. 183 f.

² Zuure, *op. cit.*, p. 738: "La confusion est grande. Très souvent ils se trompent d'adresse. Ils disent Immāna, mais ils pensent à Kiranga (=Ryangombe) ou à une autre chose." See further Arnoux, "Le culte", *Anthropos* VII p. 275 note 1: "Le culte envers le créateur Immāna n'existe pas au Ruanda, ou du moins, n'y est pas organisé."

³ Johanssen, *op. cit.*, p. 346.

made to him, but only to the national or private ancestral spirits. The prayer may promise offerings to Immāna if he helps, but no offerings are made.¹

There is a very interesting custom, called *Amazi y'Immana*: A little water is kept in the house all night. No married woman who has expectations of childbearing would ever go to bed without seeing that there was water in the house. Immāna is thought to create during the night. His creation does not take place at the moment of conception only; it continues night after night. If the god found no water he would mis-create. What is the water for? According to some explanations, Immāna wants to drink when he comes in the night. Others say that he wants to wash after he has created.² The most credible explanation, however, seems to be that the idea behind this custom has its parallel in the custom of the potters. Just as the potter uses water when he forms the clay for pots and jars, Immāna has to use water when he forms (creates) a child.

Man's future life—his destiny—is connected with the act of creation. The god would mis-create, if he did not find any water. In the light of this belief the words quoted above,³ "Why have you not made me like other people?" have a meaning. Man protests against his destiny, but "the tree set up by Immāna cannot be blown down by the wind." The thought that man's future is connected with his creation does not, however, end in fatalism. A proverb runs, "Immāna has a starting-point for everything he does", i.e. he helps those who help themselves, or "You pray to Immāna for blessing when sitting by the hearth, and he anoints you with ashes".⁴

From the survey given above we may conclude that, according to the myths and proverbs and in worship, Immāna seems to be the determining power over man's life. He represents the world-order, i.e. the laws that he fixed in the mythical period at the creation. Men's destinies differ without any obvious cause. This fact is attributed to Immāna, to his creation in the mythical period and to his contribution to the creation of man in recent times. "Immāna gives to you. You cannot trade with him: if you do, he will

¹ B. Zuure, "Poésies chez les Barundi", *Afrika* 5, 1932, p. 346: "Je te ferai dormir avec beaucoup de bière. Je tuerai pour toi une vache stérile. Je te sacrifierai un grand pot de bière."

² Guillebaud, *op. cit.*, p. 191.

³ Above, p. 6.

⁴ Guillebaud, *op. cit.*, p. 196.

drive a hard bargain." The problems of right and justice and the meaning of life have their origin in difficult situations. A person in great distress asks about the meaning of life and rightness and justice of the events. If people are in trouble, they ask such questions. But if all goes well, they do not think about them. It is the harsh conditions of life that present the problems dealing with the causes of events. However, it is worth noticing that not all events are attributed to Immāna. Some misfortunes may be caused by Ryangombe and the ancestral spirits. Immāna has no jurisdiction over Ryangombe or over the *mizimu* and *muzimu* or over the other spirits. Illness, childlessness—a serious misfortune in Africa—may be due to the dissatisfaction of the ancestors of the living. Such a misfortune can be diverted by ceremonies where the spirits are conciliated. If the misfortune does not disappear in spite of the fact that prescribed rites are performed, the cause is attributed to Immāna and man has nothing to do but to submit to his will—often with grumbling and complaints, expressed in sentences or—sometimes—in prayers.

From the survey it is also clear that Immāna has an abstract-theoretical aetiological character, expressed in myths and proverbs. This character may also be illustrated by other ideas among the people. In the realm of oracle and ordeal the word Immāna is used. The animal whose viscera are inspected by the diviner to pronounce judgement is called Immāna. The diviner examines the liver and addresses it in the following way: "O Immāna, be bright or dark." Even the bones of the animals used are holy and are Immāna, and the branches of the *Ficus religiosa* planted over the buried viscera of an animal which has been used for an oracle are also called Immāna. It seems evident that Immāna designates something mystic or holy.¹ Father Zuure gives an interesting example that illustrates—so it seems—that a person who performs an exceptional thing can be addressed as Immāna. Zuure's example may be quoted verbatim:

¹ Zuure, *op. cit.*, p. 736: Immāna "garde quelque chose de mysterieux, de sacré, de respectueux ..."—Cf. Arnoux, "Le culte" *Anthropos* VII, p. 284: "Immāna est fréquemment usité pour désigner des êtres autres que le Créateur: des amulettes, la taureau du troupeau etc." See also p. 284, where it is stated that Immāna is identified with different gods. When the word Immāna appears in the plural, it means 'luck'. See Guillebaud, *op. cit.*, p. 188.

“Qu'est ce qu'Immāna?” — “C'est toi”, me répondit un matin un vieux païen, “c'est toi Immāna. Hier soir j'ai prié keranga (= Ryangombe) de me donner du tabac. Il ne m'en a pas donné. J'ai demandé aux *mizimu* (esprits); rien. J'ai demandé à mes enfants; rien encore. Et toi ce matin, je te demande, tu me donnes: tu es Immāna. Peusses-tu rester longtemps dans ce pays.”¹

The people have very vague ideas of Immāna. When father Zuure asked the Rundi about Immāna, as a rule they answered that they did not know anything about him. “Ask the old people”, they said, “they may perhaps know something”. People use the name of the god in their sayings and proverbs but they do not know anything about him. This fact is not surprising in the light of what has been said above: Immāna has no practical function. His area is that of the theoretical—abstract—not to say theological—explanations and of exceptional events in man's life.

As we said above, Immāna has no jurisdiction over the other superhuman beings, and therefore it may be inconsistent to name him “supreme being”. A supreme being may be a god who has a selfevident supremacy over all gods and spirits of the pantheon.² Among the Ruanda and Urundi they believe, for example, that Ryangombe can prevent Immāna from helping people.³ Ryangombe, who is malevolent in the main, can disturb the order of human life and there is a highly organized cult connected with his worship. He can, however, also sometimes be regarded as “a sort of minister of Immāna, carrying out Immāna's commissions”.⁴

Man wishes to interpret and understand life and its events. The external events that befall man—which are adverse to the normal order of life—may be described as man's destiny.⁵ Destiny implies always an order that is accepted as the normal one, but destiny derives its character from its fickleness.

¹ Zuure, *op. cit.*, p. 738.

² For this problem that cannot be discussed in this short paper, see R. Pettazzoni, *The All-Knowing God.*, London 1956, pp. 1 ff., 11 ff. et passim.

³ See for Ryangombe, B. Zuure, “Croyances et pratiques religieuses des Barundi”, *Bibliographie Ethnographique du Congo Belge XXII*, Bruxelles 1929.

⁴ Guillebaud, *op. cit.*, p. 182.

⁵ Cf. H. Ringgren, “Schicksal”, *Die Religion in Geschichte und Gegenwart*, vol. 5, Tübingen 1961, sp. 1404 f: Destiny is the “allgemeine Erfahrung dass das, was den Menschen trifft, nicht von ihm, sondern von etwas ausser ihm Seiendem abhängig ist ...”

In the interpretation of destiny, theistic and fatalistic conceptions can intermingle.¹ In the religious ideas of the Bantu of Urundi and Ruanda, however, the events that have a farreaching influence on man's life, that is events that form his destiny, are thought to have their causes in the superhuman world. According to their religion it is impossible to speak of a fate, meaning an impersonal force or order that absolutely predetermines all events, or a 'fatalism', that is, the attitude of mind which accepts whatever happens as having been bound or decreed to happen.

The people of Urundi and Ruanda have a theistic—to use the word in a wide meaning—interpretation of the events. What happens to man always has its cause in the superhuman world, and Immāna may often stand for this world. Man connects his condition with the will of the superhuman beings, who have power over him. The Africans do not often concern themselves with fatalistic thoughts. It is quite natural that the living ideas of a creator who, in the mythical period, instituted the order of the world and the customs of the tribe—which are expressed by the myths—may lead to a theistic interpretation of what happens to man. Even if Immāna is a mythical aetiological god, his existence proves the belief in an order of life and nature.

Professor Widengren says of Immāna that "he is a pronounced god of destiny, at the same time good and evil and wholly capricious".² This conclusion may be correct, even if it is too general. We may compare this utterance with a remark, expressed by one of the best authorities on the religions of the Bantu in Ruanda-Urundi, Rosemary Guillebaud, who states: "Immāna comes perfectly naturally into the talk of the people, always reverently, though *without any display of fear, for Immāna is good, no one is afraid of him* (italics mine) I have never heard anyone speak of him flippantly except people who consider he has given them a raw deal—old people, for instance, whose children have all died young—or those who, worse still, have had no children."³ Professor Widengren has laid stress upon an idea—that he seems to regard as general in the religions—according to which the

¹ H. Ringgren, *Studies in Arabian Fatalism*, Uppsala 1955, p. 199.

² G. Widengren, *Hochgottglaube im alten Iran*, Uppsala 1938, p. 47: "Er (Immāna) ist also ein ausgesprochener Schicksalsgott, zugleich gut und böse, und vollkommen unberechenbar."

³ Guillebaud, *op. cit.*, p. 199.

supreme being may be the primary determiner of destiny.¹ Even if he does not mention Pratt's wellknown definition of religion, this shows a striking resemblance with his characterization of the supreme beings.² From Widengren's interpretation the conclusions follows that every form of impersonal conception of destiny may be secondary. It is, however, outside the scope of this short paper to discuss the rightness of this hypothesis.

¹ Widengren, *op. cit.*, pp. 46, 70 ff. *et passim*.

² J. B. Pratt, *The Religious Consciousness*, New York 1937, p. 26.

The Transformations of the Concept of Fate in Literature

By MOGENS BRØNDSTED

The word 'literature' in the title should not be taken only in its strict sense of *written* literature; we are concerned here with a wider field, including the pre-literary, oral forms of literature, which are not only fictional, like the folk tale but which also, like myth and legend, represent reality in symbolical form. The idea of fate in such literary forms may seem to be on the level of other great ideas in the history of literature, such as love, nature or society; nevertheless, it holds a special position, firstly because it is probably the most comprehensive and fundamental of these *Urprobleme* (to use the term of Rudolf Unger, who has considered "Literaturgeschichte als Problemgeschichte"),¹ and secondly because in a rather unique manner it is woven into the structure of literature and colours the traditional genres of which literature is continuously built up.

In the course of time the literary idea of fate has been subject to a series of transformations which may also be of some interest from the point of view of comparative religion. We shall sketch them in rough outline. The primary point of departure is man's dualistic experience of coming up against an exterior power stronger than himself, which thwarts his actions and intentions. This is supposedly the basic element in all primitive religion: the observation of an external power which decisively controls human life. The first phase, then, is *religious*, whether this power is conceived to be a plurality of spirits or deities or—most primitive of all, according to a recent trend in comparative religion—as a single 'high god'. The insecurity of the ancient tribal society can be seen in its tendency to discover an arbitrary spiritual will behind all events. But with the growing insight of urban civilization into

¹ *Aufsätze zur Prinzipienlehre der Literaturgeschichte*, Berlin, 1929 p. 155.

the regularity of nature the idea of a general law arises, which can best be seen in the regular movements of the stars; it is along such lines that the idea of a fixed destiny, perhaps even superior to the gods may have developed. Such an idea already presupposes a certain amount of reflection. When urban society is differentiated to include also a priestly class which dogmatizes the concepts, the result is the *theological* phase. In those religions where the fixed course of nature plays a predominant part, the task is above all to determine the line of demarcation between this and the gods freedom of action; this is a major point in the Babylonian cosmology, but Indian *rita* and Greek *heimarmene* also presuppose, each in its way, an unalterable universal order, more or less moral in its basic character, with or without the cooperation of the gods. In the supranaturalistic monotheistic religions the task is to determine the relation to human freedom of action; here everything is subjected to Yahweh's despotic will or Allah's *kismet*, and man should use his allotted ethical freedom to carry out this will. Further speculation can boldly free itself from the anthropomorphic idea of god, reaching thus the *philosophical* phase. The concept of god is merged into an all-comprehensive idea (nature, pantheism), which is superior to man but at the same time contains him; the old dualism, that is to say, is abolished. The feeling of being part of a great universal whole may be combined with the intellectual need to find one all-pervading principle of existence; the different shades of the deterministic ideology are extended to the human psyche and form the transition to the last phase, the *psychological*. Destiny is now found in man's own breast. The earliest expression of this idea is probably Heraclitus' aphorism that a man's *ethos* (character) is his *daimon*. The consistent application of this implies that the development from a transcendent to an immanent idea of fate (i.e., as something inherent in man) has been completed. But the transcendental perspective is not entirely given up unless one is prepared to abandon the whole concept of destiny. In literature, as elsewhere, it is true that previous stages live on as currents under and beside the philosophical and scientific achievements of the time. In his attitude toward the great problems of life, homo sapiens, and especially the subspecies poeta, is rarely a strictly logical being. On the contrary, it must be said that in the mirror of literature fate is conceived of in a series of *dialectical categories*, i.e. contradictions that can be resolved upon reflection but which for the

emotional experience remain as poles between which the concept vacillates. These categories refer to either the character of the concept or to its extent.

A. Categories of character.

1. Personal—impersonal (blind). Is there a personified power or a mystical universal force?

2. Moral quality: is it good or evil or indifferent? Is it conceived of as righteous or unrighteous? In other words, is a causal relationship between the volitional act and external fate discovered or found lacking? (cf. the Greek ideas of *hybris* and *nemesis*).

3. Transcendence—immanence (see above). Is it located outside of and above man or in man—in the latter case man's character is the determinant. This category comes to the fore especially in the case of the great fatal passions which are felt as alien to the personality and can be ascribed to 'demoniac' influence.

B. Categories of extent.

1. Individual—universal. Originally the horizon was limited to the tribe itself; for neighbouring tribes other conditions may prevail. Later the tension between individual and collective destiny is added, or the concept receives an aristocratic definition (e.g. *nemesis* as the consequence of the social level or of the very nature of heroic personality—cf. the poetic theory of 'the tragic height of fall'). A literary work will preferably make the interpretation applicable to the main character, who is the aesthetic centre but who may possess a symbolical value as illustrating a universal condition.

2. Final—causal. Transcendence was originally final (aiming at specific goals, although not necessarily with a conscious intention). Within the given framework, or outside the given limits, human will is free. On the other hand, immanence is causal, i.e. excludes freedom of will.

3. Accidental—necessary. Chance is unforeseeable and capricious (though it is not the result of personal caprice but unintentional and blind); it is often peripheral and minor—but little strokes often fell great oaks. Through such effects it acquires 'fatal' character, since the experience of fate is always connected with central and decisive events. The accidance of fate takes its most extreme form in narratives like the Batak myth of the soul's choice of a leaf

from the tree of fate in preexistence¹, or in the Serbian tale of the distribution of the gifts of destiny according to dates of birth.² But just as chance, in philosophical analysis, may fall into various categories, so also, in more immediate experience, it may be considered an aspect of a higher system of necessity. This can be conceived of as equally blind and abstract, indeed as hypostatized inevitability (while the accidental might be avoidable); or it may be understood teleologically, as a conscious super-will, as distinct from divine providence, is inaccessible to prayer or moral efforts. In any case the final result is the same: the fact of predestination.

A condensed account like this sounds speculative, while literature demands concreteness and vividness. Let me quote some typical examples to illustrate this great complex of ideas.

First, predestination can be visualized by the creative imagination through *auguries*. Poetic augury is something quite different from the auguries of superstition, which can be counteracted or nullified by magic. Literary auguries have the aesthetic effect of concentrating the expectation on a point in the future and thereby increasing the suspense, tightening the structure so to speak. Through the augury the direction of destiny, and thereby of the action, is given or hinted at in advance. In view of this the human will may either surrender in resignation—this is the fatalistic or quietistic attitude; or it may—which is more dramatic and artistically attractive—try to offer resistance. A well known travelling motif from heroic legends is the story of a father and a son who, without knowing one another, engage in battle with the result that one kills the other (cf. the Persian Rustam, the Teutonic Hildebrand, etc.). It is this kind of catastrophic chance that actualizes the problem of fate. To underline the inevitability an augury is added: it is predicted that Oedipus will kill his father (and marry his mother). His father Laios tries to evade the threat by not begetting children and later, after he has forgotten himself in intoxication, by exposing the son and piercing his feet (whence the name Oidi-pous), but the boy is found by shepherds and grows up. These are two examples of an element of action

¹ According to this East Indian idea everything is determined before birth. Cf. G. Warneck in *Allgemeine Missionszeitschrift* 1904 p. 4.

² See reference in J. Bolte—J. Polívka, *Anmerkungen zu den Kinder- und Hausmärchen der Brüder Grimm* I, Leipzig 1913 p. 292.

that is typical of fate literature and may be called 'futile evasion'. Of these the latter works ironically to further the prediction. Oedipus now does not know his real parents; when he himself learns about the prophecy, he flees from his supposed parents, and on his way he meets his unknown father and the catastrophe happens. But because the legend is bound up with a local hero, the great solver of riddles whose memory was cherished at Colonus, the apparently meaningless element of predetermination acquires significance through the functional combination of greatness, fall and rehabilitation. This is typical of the structure of the *heroic legend*. In Nordic literature we often meet with a third kind of attitude, without resignation or resistance: this is the heroic acceptance implying that the hero fulfils his destiny and mocks at the prophecies of evil (like Gunnar in the *Edda*). This attitude is predominant in the heroic poems, where it is a question of being prepared for one's destiny.

All this differs from another ancient genre, the *tale*, a fireside and day-dreamer genre, in which the anonymous hero is often carried to glory by his lucky star or gratuitously endowed with gifts in the cradle by the fairies (*fata, fée*); after adversity and affliction a reward awaits him at the end. The most wide-spread 'fate-tale'—called in Scandinavia "Rige Per Møller (kræmmer)"—is akin to the Oedipus legend. The rich man hears a prophecy that a certain poor boy will inherit his riches; he has him exposed but he is saved by a shepherd (the first futile evasion). Then he sends the young man with a letter asking the receiver to kill its deliverer—but his daughter or somebody else changes the wording to provide for the daughter's marriage with the deliverer (second futile evasion). In some variants¹ the rich man makes additional attempts to kill the unwanted son-in-law, but only to his own destruction. The prophecy is here favourable to the main character, and the one who fights the prophecy has become the villain of the action.

A further difference is found in the *legend*, where moral Providence rules, to the benefit of religious edification. In the Middle Ages the Oedipus motif was applied to Judas, whose disaster brought him to repent and become a disciple of Christ.

The Oedipus story is best known through Sophocles' treatment of it,

¹ J. Schick, *Das Glückskind mit dem Todesbrief*, Leipzig 1932; A. Aarne in *Folklore Fellows Communications* XXIII, 1916.

and here we pass from the simple forms of folklore to the use of the same motifs in written literature. In the *tragedy* "Oedipus Rex" the prophecy is set in the past and the action of the play consists in its fulfilment—an unwitting fulfilment in which we recognize the ironical structure, but the decisive point is that the main character *himself chooses* to fulfil the prophecy. The oracle's pronouncement that starts the action is, closely considered, a conditional prophecy: if the plague is to be stopped, the murderer of Laios has to be found—in other words, the hero is given a free choice between two necessities both of which will lead to disaster. This dilemma is the tragic situation proper. The choice that involves great responsibility is from the beginning the kernel of this kind of art, for it was the official festival play of the newly established Athenian democracy. We find it already in the oldest play that has come down to us, the "Suppliants" of Aeschylus, in which King Pelasgus is asked for asylum by the fleeing Danaids: on one side there is the respect for Zeus as the protector of hospitality, on the other hand the regard for the security of the state. He has a choice between violating the cult and thrusting his country into war. Pelasgus is the first tragic figure in world literature.

The *epic* genre, as it has developed since classical antiquity, differs from this. Both Achilles and Ulysses face a disjunctive prophecy: Achilles is foretold either an early death and eternal fame or a long life without fame; Ulysses is told that he is to fell the suitors either through ruse or in open battle. However, we hear nothing of a real choice. With some simplification one might say that the tragic hero chooses his lot without knowing it, while the epic hero knows his lot without choosing it. The decisions that determine the action are taken by the gods: by the quarrelling lower gods, by the supreme god, or, above even him, by Fate. This tradition in classical literature goes back to Homer's divine apparatus formed out of the multitude of deities and demons of popular belief and arranged by a rationalistic artist who was only bound by one thing: the fixed action of the narrative. This constitutes the determination proper. It may be objected that tragedy, too, is built on stories that are fixed and known in advance, but among other differences, there is a different time dimension. In drama we see, in the sacred 'now' of the festival, the action take shape through human decisions; it is created before our eyes, just as the ancient ritual myths were re-created every year.

In the enormously extended epic, revolving time itself becomes a determinant of Fate; it brings hither what must happen in the fulness of time in spite of all digressions and embellishments born out of the rhapsodist's imagination. Epic literature does not so much want to show the events as to explain them, to justify the given actions as inspired by gods and demons, to discuss causes and motives. It is an extended oral art, while drama is a concentrated visual art. — A special Nordic form of epic is the Icelandic family saga, which tries to explain historical events psychologically, through the greater or lesser 'luck' (*gæfa/gipta*) of the characters; here there occurs a corresponding psychological type of presage, namely the presentiment (*hugr*) of the wise (most clearly in the Nial saga). Destiny is here on the verge of immanence but retains a mysterious element.

Finally a few words should be said about *comedy*, which is farthest removed from the sacral origin but in which we can trace two determining elements.¹ Both point back to the ancient *komoi*, the pageants in Attica after the wine harvest, in which people walked about roaring songs (*kom-oidia*), which contained obscenities and ridiculed those standing or living around. The disrespectful lust for mocking at people is seen in the comic action as a teasing of Fate, which works not least of all through surprising chances and accidents (while chance was entirely banished from tragedy). Consequently we find almost no auguries in comedy. Obscenity, an offshoot of the fertility cult, culminated in the burlesque sacred marriage (*hieros gamos*) —and the fact that the comic action should and must end in the union of the lovers sounds like an echo of this. Dionysus wields his protecting power over them.

Thus the ancient literary genres enter into different combinations with the ideas of fate and each thereby shows its metaphysical aspects.² It is my hope that through this we can reach not only a deeper understanding of the forms of literature but also a more precise definition of fate and the way it is experienced.

¹ I follow especially F.M. Cornford, *The origin of Attic comedy*, Cambridge, 1934 (who, however, is not reliable in all details) und G. Murray, *Aristophanes* Oxford, 1933.

² For further elaboration and documentation reference may be made to my work *Digtning og skæbne*, København 1958.

C. Linnæus' Ideas Concerning Retribution and Fate

By K. ROB. V. WIKMAN

SUMMARY¹

From the day in 1844 when the loose sheets from the hand of C. Linnæus which bear the title *Nemesis divina*, were found and entrusted to the care of Uppsala University Library, they have never ceased to arouse wonder and interest. The little volume, now bound, with its 203 octavo leaves, retains even today a good deal of its attraction as a reliquary for the most secret thoughts of the great scientist.

It is known that Linnæus wrote these leaves over a long period of time and kept them strictly secret. Dedicating the leaves to his son, Linnæus Junior, he wrote: "Some of these stories are perhaps told incorrectly; [if so] listen, say nothing, do not violate anybody's name and honour." This counsel has been followed piously until our days. There is no complete edition of the manuscript, only a selection, good in itself, published with a commentary by Elias and Thore Magnus Fries. Of this selection, which bears the title 'Carl von Linnés anteckningar öfver *Nemesis Divina*', the first edition was published in connection with the doctoral investiture at Uppsala in 1848, and a second enlarged and revised edition in 1878. This is still the only edition of scientific value and will therefore be used here.

Only in special cases do dates in *Nemesis divina* enable us to establish a chronological connection. But we may assume that Linnæus' ideas have changed somewhat in the course of time and that the differences between his youth and his maturity can be traced. Linnæus early evinces signs of old age.

¹ The paper will be published in full in a separate volume *Lachesis and Nemesis*.

The exterior framework of *Nemesis divina* seems to derive from the 1760's, when Linnæus was already an old man.

Linnæus' *Nemesis divina* has been interpreted in different ways. Crucial to me is its central problem: the ideas of fate and retribution, but these are, in turn, dependent on Linnæus' conception of God and nature and not least on his opinions concerning the unity and coherence of the natural and ethical order of the world.

From whatever sources Linnæus may have derived his religious ideas and whatever changes they may have undergone, his religious attitude in face of the works of nature remained unshaken. But Linnæus' religion, as we find it fragmentarily in these literary sources, was entirely undogmatic, untheological and, from a Christian point of view, even heterodox. Partly, this was in accord with his belief in the necessary immanent coherence in the processes of nature and the concomitant idea of the righteous divine order of the world. Crime and punishment appear to Linnæus to stand in a necessary connection, which is manifested in the divine decree of fate. This is *in nuce* his doctrine of nemesis which never postulates either punishment or recompense in a future life.

The concept of fate is deeply embedded in Linnæus' thinking. We find it already in the notes for *Diaeta Naturalis*, made in the 1730's. In *Nemesis* he says that fate is God's judgment, against which there is no appeal. Linnæus asks how free will (*liberum arbitrium*) should be harmonized with inescapable fate, and he illustrates it by saying that any man can hang himself, drown himself, cut his throat; he may freely choose not to do it. But if, for some reason, he is sentenced to death by the highest judge his death follows inevitably. Thus, man is free to commit a crime or to decline, but once it is committed, he cannot escape his punishment. Linnæus' argument is interesting because of the idea that divine retribution works *ex post facto*, just as human retribution does. The problem of free will is seemingly abolished, but instead the contradiction becomes even more obvious, since this argument leads to pure occasionalism.

We need not travel far to find the principle of retribution taken to a logical extreme in Linnæus' time. How ruthlessly this was done in politics is shown by the bloody drama after the defeat in the war of 1741-1742 and after the abortive attempt at a coup d'état in 1756. These events are clearly reflected

in Linnæus' *Nemesis* notes. Linnæus' idea of nemesis is obviously related to his cultural background. But this does not mean that it originated in popular beliefs. It would be more plausible to say that the Old Testament tradition, which Linnæus frequently refers to, has influenced his thinking. But most probably Linnæus' idea of nemesis has an independent origin. When he combines fate and retribution, this is the expression of an empirical determinism, which places crime and punishment in an inner relation to each other. There are allusions to the nemesis idea as early as the latter part of *Diaeta naturalis*. Man sins against God through ingratitude toward Him and through indifference (*securitas*) to the punishment that threatens him in this life. One injures one's neighbour through malice (*malitiositate*) and embezzlement (*suppressione*). The peasantry and tenants are impoverished so that "many become poor, which is not heeded, even if half the people starve to death".

Linnæus works inductively, trying to show the judgments of divine retribution. He collects cases, and he looks for a "system". This system is *lex talionis*. Linnæus' *Nemesis divina* is not a collection of *exempla* for biblical truths. The notes claim to be "empirical experience". Unfortunately Linnæus himself could not verify them.

We find that Linnæus in his thinking on retribution rarely applies the *talio* principle in a strict sense. Retribution works *ex operato* and in a new situation it operates according to the magical principles of similarity or contact. In various cases crime and punishment reflect each other in similar situations, but no real equilibrium is produced between them. The application of *ius talionis* has a predominantly numinous, only apparently a juridical character.

The crimes and vices that are censured by Linnæus include pride, arrogance, greed, ambition (*ävlan*), envy, malevolence, and ingratitude, which are illustrated by numerous quotations from the Bible and classical antiquity. In *Nemesis* also wealth and poverty, joy and friendship may be both good and evil. In the ethics of retribution the punishment of evil always preponderates over the remuneration of the good. Retributive indignation against the criminal is common to justice and religion. From the point of view of religion it is sin that punishes the sinner, and crime avenges itself. When crime is regarded as sin, the calamities of mankind are often understood as divine

punishment. Crime and punishment are thus related through a sympathetic connection which according to the general principle of likeness and contact makes retribution stand out as a necessary force which is released in given situations. Retribution is understood as a revenging destiny which comes into effect according to religious-magical or juridical-moral principles, which can cooperate with or counteract each other in the historical process of evolution. Sin and crime are often identified as guilt and conceived as the material cause of punishment.

The *nemesis* of Linnæus is at the same time *talio* and *numen*, *dike* and *tyche*. There can reasonably be no real equivalence between these concepts. Retribution often becomes a juridical fiction, *Nemesis* only a fictitious *Dike*. The restrictive rules of *talio* merge into numinous fatalism. The sympathetic relationship between crime and punishment is regarded as a symbolizing likeness and this too on the final count becomes fictitious. Neither human nor divine justice can function without norms, and therefore the borderline between *ius naturae* and *ius divinum* must be highly arbitrary. In this way the *nemesis* of Linnæus will require not only social but also religious sanction.

Fatalism in Systematic Aspect and Fatalism in its Functional Context

By GUSTAV HENNINGSEN

“My mind’s made up, don’t confuse me with facts.” I don’t remember who originally said so, but it was with such a feeling that I sat down to sketch out this contribution. I had better confess that to me Fatalism and its problems are subjects not one day older than the present symposium. I have come here like a traveller arriving in a new and exciting country. I can be blamed, therefore, for not contenting myself with listening to what others with years of experience in these studies have to say. But I ask my audience to bear in mind that I am in the same privileged situation as that of the traveller finding himself in a position that enables him to look at matters with a freshness altogether different from the views taken by those who have been living in the country for a long period.

Fatalism thought out in its ultimate consequences, I think, must be the view that a man’s life in the minutest detail has been fixed in a pre-ordained course. This would mean that whatever I do it will be but the bends and curves of my unalterable track. In this perspective, apparent alternatives to Fate have been entirely eliminated. If I pray to my God and have my wish, this religious act can, on close reflection, be viewed only as a link in a pre-destined plan. If I impose my will by magic, I can afterwards wonder whether this was a link in the pre-ordained plan that by this act I was to change my course. Indeed it may be part of my destiny that the opportunity should be given me of imagining myself the architect of my own fortune. By this intellectual experiment I only want to show how Fate, when equated with a man’s life, can be raised to an infinite number of powers—as illustrated in the well-known story of the philosopher who began to wonder whether he were awake or dreaming himself awake.

If it is going to be useful for us in the analysis of religion to concern ourselves with Fatalism, the concept must be so defined as to make it possible to set up alternatives. I would suggest, therefore, that we consider Fatalism phenomenologically as a category of interpretations of reality having the common feature of explaining the course of a man's life as dependent on determinators inaccessible to outside influence. As soon as Fate is said to be alterable we have therefore no longer to do with pure Fatalism. Inaccessibility to outside influence as a criterion has an advantage over the often heard criterion of impersonality. It does not rule out the possibility of Divinities of Fate. Typical fatalistic religion can be placed in this category in so far as the religious behaviour is not aimed at altering the divine will, only at making Fate endurable. We can call this *first category* of interpretations the *fatalistic* category.

Another category of interpretations of reality is constituted by those *religious* ideas which will explain human life as dependent on determinators accessible to outside influence.

A *third category* comprises the *magic* concepts which have the feature in common that they set up man as determinant of his own destiny and those of other persons. That I have an influence on the lives of others means conversely that other people have an influence on mine; and therefore patterns of ideas connected with witches, sorcerers and witchdoctors form an important sector of this category.

Finally, a *fourth category* is formed by those interpretations of reality that can be called the positivistic or "*rational*" interpretations. This category excludes the three first categories in that the concept of determination in the transcendent meaning implied in the foregoing is denied. In the positivistic category we operate on one hand with empirical regularity, and on the other hand with chance, or, in the terms of common sense philosophy, man is here in his experience of reality oscillating between the two poles of knowledge, experience and uncertainty.

Theoretically, the 'transcendent' categories 1-3 exclude one another. Category 1, that of Fatalism, and 2, the religious category, both exclude the third category, the magical interpretations, in that they both operate with forces that are independent of man. Categories 1 and 2 exclude each other, still speaking theoretically, in that the forces cannot at the same time be accessible and inaccessible to outside influence.

So much for systematics. Turning to the religio-historical and folkloristic material put before the participants in this symposium two things will strike us. For one thing, there are very few of the fatalistic complexes of which we have heard that can be referred to Fatalism as delimited by me. But this is only an illustration of the fact that a good many of the features which we are inclined to ascribe to Fatalism typologically, when handled firmly, must be considered as conglomerations of fatalistic and religious, magical, and 'rational' elements.

Secondly, examples have been put before us proving that the fact of living in an environment characterized by typical Fatalism does not exclude complexes of ideas of the three other categories from playing an important role side by side with them, in spite of all (theoretical) contradictions. In this connection I can contribute an example of how fatalistic, religious, magical, and rational ideas can thrive in apparently perfect harmony within one and the same person.

One of my informants in Denmark has an idea about the 'Book of Life' where everything is written down and determined. At the same time he is a diligent church-goer. But in addition he goes every year to a 'wise' woman in order to rid himself of a magic spell; he has also on one occasion buried seven sorts of wood and earth from a churchyard in the concrete under his stable door, in order to prevent a neighbour from intruding to bewitch his animals. In other matters my informant acts quite rationally in his daily work, and is, for instance, not afraid of beginning a new thing on a Monday.

The co-existence of so contradictory interpretations of reality is incomprehensible when the material is viewed in a static aspect. But if we see it in action and apply a functional approach, the problems will solve themselves. For one thing we shall see that the contradictory systems are often applied to quite different fields, and for another, it becomes evident that man's response to the vicissitudes of life is more often one of action than of reflection. The last sentence is a free quotation from E. E. Evans-Pritchard, *Witchcraft, Oracles and Magic among the Azande* (Oxford 1937), in which he aims some critical remarks, on grounds of principle, at those anthropologists who try to over-systematize the beliefs of the primitive African. "The Zande", he says, "actualize these beliefs rather than intellectualize them, and their tenets are expressed in socially controlled behaviour rather than in doctrines."

(p. 82 sq.). In my experience these words are valid far beyond Africa. They apply, so to say, to all persons who have not had some form of intellectual training.

I think it would be fertile for the study of Fatalism to devote itself to analyses of situations with a view to ascertaining in which situations Fatalism is *used*. It would be very interesting then to examine whether the typical situations of Fatalism are not such as exclude the application of religious, magical, or rational behaviour. I should think that by this procedure pure Fatalism would prove in the majority of cases to be applied retrospectively. It is true of much of the material that has been put before this symposium in the form of examples fetched from the higher religions and popular beliefs, from drama, legends, and proverbs. All things considered when man is in situations where all attempts to find a solution (through prayer, magic, or rational cunning) have failed, he has only one thing left: to resign himself and put up with his destiny.

SCRIPTA INSTITUTI DONNERIANI ABOENSIS

1. Studies in Shamanism, edited by Carl-Martin Edsman. 1967.
2. Fatalistic Beliefs in Religion, Folklore, and Literature, edited by Helmer Ringgren. 1967.

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