FINNISH DEFENCE STUDIES

FLANK OR FRONT

An Assessment of Military-Political Developments in the High North

Tauno Nieminen

DOCUMENTATION

War College Helsinki 1991

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Published by

WAR COLLEGE
P.O. Box 266
SF - 00171 Helsinki
FINLAND

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

War College Helsinki 1991

ISBN 951-25-0538-X
ISSN 0788-5571

Valtion painatuskeskus
Pasilan VALTIMO
Helsinki 1991

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1 INTRODUCTION

Through the centuries control over the seas has played a prominent role in the strategic thinking of great powers. The seas have offered an easy route for the projection of military power to distant areas. And now, with the development of submarines, they have acquired a further military dimension in the form of submerged weaponry that is not easily detected even with the most modern technology. Thus today, the nuclear missile submarines are thought to be the least vulnerable leg of the strategic Triad and hence the best assurance of second-strike retaliatory capability.

It is difficult to survey the naval power of the superpowers regionally because of the world-wide mobility of vessels. The autonomy of navies and the traditional freedom of the high seas have apparently seen to it that naval forces are exempted from consideration in arms control negotiations. Thus only five multilateral agreements touch on nuclear weapons at sea, among them the 1971 Seabed Treaty which prohibits the emplacing of nuclear weapons on the seabed and the ocean floor. The negotiations on reduction of conventional forces in Europe, which started in Vienna in March 1989, do not include naval or specifically nuclear forces.

The northern seas were drawn into the maritime arms race in the 1960s when the Soviet Union began an intensive development of her naval power and of the Northern Fleet bases in the Kola Peninsula. NATO's immediate response was to develop a surveillance and intelligence network aimed at detecting the enemy forces and, if necessary, aiding land and air forces attempting to block the Soviet forces from entering the North Atlantic.

Pursuant to the SALT I agreement in 1972, the superpowers stepped up the deployment of their nuclear arsenal in

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submarines. At the same time the Soviet Navy evolved to a blue-water navy and the Soviet Northern Fleet to the largest of the country's four fleets. The US response was to develop a new maritime strategy emphasizing the forward deployment of naval forces, and to start planning for a 600-ship navy. The number of sea-based nuclear weapons has increased constantly. Today some 15,000 nuclear weapons, between 25 % and 35 % of the world's total, are possessed by the navies of the nuclear powers.[1] In the wake of the INF Treaty this percentage is likely to grow, as sea-launched cruise missiles can target sites previously covered by the banned intermediate-range missiles.

Comprehensive disclosure of the new US maritime strategy in 1986 reopened discussion on the strategic significance of the Arctic regions and the northernmost part of the European continent. Similarly, improved weapons technologies, which resulted in increased operational mobility of ground forces, a longer range for tactical aircraft, new designs for strategic and tactical submarines and the development of long-range cruise missiles and other precision guided munitions, have changed the military-political relevance of the High North.

The Arctic has assumed a new importance in the strategic thinking of the superpowers, not only because of geopolitical developments and advances in technology but because of the course naval doctrines have taken in both the United States and the Soviet Union. These put considerable emphasis on engagements in the Barents and Norwegian seas and even under the permanent ice of the Arctic Ocean.

The shortest trajectory for strategic air assets between the Soviet Union and the United States crosses over the Arctic. Neither strategic thinking nor new weapons technologies have changed this reality during the last two decades. The significance of the Arctic airspace will persist, especially if both powers continue to develop the penetration ability of their strategic bomber forces.

This article looks at contemporary military-political developments in the High North: the Soviet military build-up and the US maritime strategy developed to counter that threat. It then surveys the implications of the new situation for the security of Canada and the five Nordic countries and the security policies evolved in response.

2 THE GEOPOLITICAL ENVIRONMENT OF THE HIGH NORTH

The High North in this article refers to northern Europe and the Norwegian and Barents seas. Necessarily the analysis also includes the Arctic Ocean and the adjacent littorals.

The Gulf Stream keeps the waters west of Svalbard open all year, and the Barents Sea south of Bear Island free of pack ice almost to the eastern end of the Kola Peninsula. The "passage" between the demilitarized Svalbard archipelago and the northern shoreline of Norway is about 750 kilometers.

Western Alaska and eastern Siberia are only 90 kilometres apart at the Bering Strait, which is essentially enclosed by American and Soviet territories. The depth of the strait is about 40 metres.

The northern circumpolar seas on the Eurasian side, i.e., the Barents, Kara, Laptev and East Siberian seas, are shallow seas above the continental shelf. On the North American side the continent descends rather abruptly into the deep basins. The Norwegian Sea is deep, in central parts more than 2000 metres. From Greenland, an underwater ridge extends via Iceland and the Faroe Islands to Scotland.

The Arctic Ocean is likewise very deep, with basins between 3000 and 5000 metres. The thickness of the floating raft of ice ranges from a few inches to nearly 200 feet. The continual tearing, grinding and compression of the raft creates areas of newly formed ice, thin enough to allow submarines to break surface for the purpose of communicating or firing missiles.[2]

Most of the region has an arctic climate and much of the terrain is rugged, inhospitable, and sparsely populated with few lines of communication. In World War II in the summer of 1941, two German Mountain SS-divisions attacked from Norway towards Murmansk and were able to advance only 24 kilometres in two and a half months.



Figure 1 The High North as part of the Arctic.

The weather conditions in autumn and winter severely restrict the use of tactical air assets. The long daylight hours in summer, on the other hand, allow the air force a decisive role in land warfare on treeless terrain.

The Svalbard archipelago is under Norwegian sovereignty, but mining, oil and gas exploration and other industrial activities are governed by the 40 signatory nations of the 1920 Svalbard Treaty. Norway and the Soviet Union are the only states to have established a major permanent commercial presence on Spitsbergen, Svalbard's main island. Greenland, part of the Kingdom of Denmark, owes its strategic importance to its location on the shortest route between North America and the Soviet Union.

The various installations in Greenland, Iceland, the Faroes and Norway permit NATO to carry out extensive and continuous surveillance of the Norwegian and Barents Seas. In time of military conflict this geopolitical setting would make the thrust of the Soviet Northern Fleet into the Atlantic difficult. The introduction of satellite surveillance and the airborne warning and control system (AWACS) both in NATO and in the Warsaw Pact, contributes to a better intelligence picture for both alliances.

Scarce mineral resources have been discovered in the northern waters and on the continental shelves, and as the technology to exploit them emerges, so does the potential for conflict. Likewise fish stocks are eagerly sought after. In response, the coastal states have established economic zones of 200 nautical miles, which are regulated by rules of international law as implemented by the national laws of the states. Conflicts over resources are by nature, of course, likely to involve allies as much as militarily opposed nations.[3]

The waters of the North Atlantic are important fishing grounds especially for Norway, the Soviet Union and Iceland. Oil exploration has begun in the Norwegian and Barents Seas, and although the size of oil and gas reserves in the area is not yet known, significant gas discoveries have already been made. These resources add to the strategic significance of the area. The issue of dividing the continental shelf in the Barents Sea between Norway and the Soviet Union remains unsettled.

The economic importance of the Arctic to the United States, Canada and the Soviet Union is also increasing. The Prudhoe

Bay and Beaufort Sea oil fields and the Trans-Alaska Pipeline System, the Urengoi natural gas field and the Siberian gas pipeline, for example, will have an important role in the future energy equation.

3 THE SOVIET KOLA PENINSULA AND ITS STRATEGIC SIGNIFICANCE

The bases of the Soviet Northern Fleet lie at the edge of the Arctic and Atlantic Oceans. The harbours of Murmansk are ice-free all year round and allow direct access to the North Atlantic.

According to Michael MccGwire, the two main maritime missions of the Soviet Navy are to contribute to the Soviet long-range nuclear strike capability and to counter the Western sea-based nuclear strike systems. The Soviet SSBN force of nuclear powered ballistic missile submarines has three overlapping roles: intercontinental strike, continental strike, and national strategic reserve.[4]

The deployment of the SS-N-8 in 1972 made the polar regions increasingly important to the Soviet nuclear strike capability. Advances in submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) technology allowed the Soviet Union to pull back her SSBNs from forward deployment to the Arctic Sea areas, over which the Soviet conventional forces had far better control.

Meanwhile during the 1970s the US Navy was developing new classes of submarines specifically designed to operate against Soviet SSBNs; and more antisubmarine systems mounted in surface ships, submarines, and aircraft became available at the same time. The Soviet response was to develop anti-submarine defences in the Northern Fleet area and in the Sea of Okhotsk, which would turn them into ocean "bastions" where SSBNs could be deployed in safety. Because anti-submarine warfare (ASW) units are highly vulnerable to superior forces, it was also necessary to establish command of both these areas. The outer defence zone assumed new importance as well: in the Norwegian Sea the Soviets had earlier been primarily concerned with denying command of the sea to the West. Now they became concerned with securing command for themselves as a means of strengthening the outer defences of the SSBN bastions.[5]

Observed manoeuvre patterns, shipbuilding programmes and internal Soviet debates have led Western analysts to conclude that the Northern Fleet now has three major wartime objectives in the High North:

* interdiction of the Atlantic sea-lines of communication between the US and Western Europe,
* protection of the Soviet SSBN force (the sea-based "nuclear reserve" or second strike capability), and
* defence of the northern approaches to the Soviet Union, including the support of land campaigns.

There are differences in opinion as to which of the first two objectives, the more offensive or the more defensive strategy, is the priority of the Soviet Navy. Some see them as complementary: by moving into the North Atlantic the Northern Fleet would attempt to tie down Western naval forces and thus prevent them from attacking the Soviet SSBNs. There seems to be widespread agreement that the principal mission of the Northern Fleet's other assets, its tactical submarines and surface forces, is to protect the SSBNs.[6]

By the end of the 1970s the Soviets had apparently decided to downgrade the relative importance of the Arctic Ocean as an area for the deployment of SSBNs and to give priority to the Sea of Okhotsk, which would be secured by improving the military and physical defences of the Kurile Islands and reinforcing the Pacific Fleet.[7] Similarly, it seems that, since the mid-eighties, the emphasis in the Soviet effort to acquire a sea-based strategic reserve has been shifting from the SSBNs to their defence, within this defence from submarines to surface combatants, and as a whole from the Northern Fleet to the Pacific Fleet.[8] The Northern Fleet nevertheless has the newest submarines – 6 Typhoon and 6 Delta IV SSBNs – and neither of these is present in the Pacific Fleet. The Northern Fleet continues, then, as the most important component of the sea-based strategic reserve, while the Pacific Fleet is a complementary 'leg' of the retaliatory capability.

The Soviet SSBN forces are now believed to number 61 vessels of which almost two thirds are deployed in the Northern Fleet.

Table 1

Deployment of Soviet Ballistic Missile Nuclear Submarines (SSBNs) and Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missiles (SLBMs)[9*]

SSBN	No. of SSBN Northern Fleet (NF)	Pacific Fleet (PF)	SLBMs	Re-entry vehicles/ SLBM	Launcher total June 1990 NF	PF
Typhoon	6	-	20 SS-n-20	6 à 0.1 MT	120	-
Delta IV	6	-	16 SS-N-23	10 à 0.1 MT	96	-
Delta III	5	9	16 SS-N-18	1-5 à 0.02-0.45 MT	80	144
Delta II	4	-	16 SS-N-8	1-2 à 0.8 MT	64	-
Delta I	9	9	12 SS-N-8	1-2 à 0.8 MT	108	108
Yankee II	1	-	12 SS-N-17	1 à 0.5 MT	12	-
Yankee I	6	6	16 SS-N-6	1-2 à 1-0.5 MT	96	96
Total	37	24			576	348
% of total	61 %	39 %			62 %	38 %

* (The figures are based on The Military Balance 1990-1991. Other sources give slightly different figures.)

Operational strength of the Soviet non-strategic (tactical) subsurface fleet is believed to include 46 nuclear-powered guided missile submarines (SSGN), of which 27 (59%) are in the Northern Fleet; 68 nuclear-powered submarines (SSN), of which 42 (62%) are in the Northern Fleet; and 128 other tactical submarines (SSG and SS), of which 37 (29%) are in the Northern Fleet.[10]

The SS-N-21 sea-launched cruise missile (SLCM) is capable of being launched from Akula, Sierra, Victor III and converted Yankee Notch-class attack submarines, and it is believed to be operational in all but the Victor III.[11] The experimental Mike-class with SS-N-21 was lost in the Norwegian Sea on 7 April 1989. When deployed aboard an SSN, the SS-N-21 is fired from a 53 - cm torpedo tube. When carrying a single nuclear warhead, the missile is estimated to have a range of 3000 km. A further SLCM, the SS-NX-24, is under evaluation aboard a converted Yankee-class SSBN.[12]

Major surface combatants in the Northern Fleet number 60 vessels, including two carriers (40% of a total of 5), 16 cruisers (37% of 43), 8 destroyers (26% of 31) and 34 frigates (24% of 141).[13]

In support of the Northern Fleet there are approximately 400 aircraft based in 20 airfields in the Kola Peninsula. Included are the modern missile-carrying TU-26s (Backfire). Like the TU-16s (Badger), if they are refuelled the TU-26s have a range extending from the Kola to areas south of the Greenland-Iceland-United Kingdom (GIUK) gap. The naval air force units of the Northern Fleet with stand-off missiles constitute a potent threat against NATO naval forces.

The Kola Peninsula is also an important early-warning and defence area against air attacks. The air defence forces of the Archangelsk Air Defence Sector include some 350 all-weather fighters, of which 100 are stationed on the Kola Peninsula. No strategic bombers or fighter-bombers are permanently deployed in the Kola area.

The two motorized rifle divisions and the naval infantry brigade on the Kola Peninsula appear to be basically defensive considering the size of the area and the importance of the naval bases to the Soviet Union. The Northern Fleet also has Spetsnaz units assigned to it.

The Soviet Union's main objective today seems to be for the

forces in Kola to secure a Soviet second-strike capability. Logically, their use on a large scale for other purposes would be self-defeating.

Thus a paradox has been created: the strategic importance of the Kola base resources might serve to deter their use on the tactical level. The Soviet Union would hesitate to put vital strategic interests at risk for the attainment of limited local gains. However, it cannot be excluded that the Soviet Union has made calculations for gaining a foothold in Norway as a means of providing even greater security for Soviet arms based in Murmansk.[14]

4 THE ISSUE OF US MARITIME STRATEGY

The gist of a new maritime strategy[15] was adopted by the US Navy between 1981 and 1986. As a global strategy it has several purposes, but only its implications for the Nordic regions will be dealt with here.

The mission of the US maritime strategy seems first to maintain deterrence and crisis control and secondly to function as an efficient war fighting strategy if the deterrence fails. Functionally a war is foreseen as unfolding in three phases. In the first phase, Deterrence or the Transition to War, forward deployment of anti-submarine warfare (ASW) forces (particularly attack submarines) will force the Soviet submarines to retreat into defensive bastions. Power would be projected into the Norwegian Sea by moving aircraft carrier battle groups to protect Norway and to prevent the Soviet Northern Fleet from moving south of its home waters in the Barents Sea. The decision to move the Marine Amphibious Brigade (MAB, renamed Marine Expeditionary Brigade) to Norway might be taken early during a major international crisis.

Should deterrence fail, a second phase, Seizing the Initiative, would be implemented. Carrier battle groups would move into the upper reaches of the Norwegian Sea and launch air strikes and cruise missile strikes against the Soviet naval and air forces and their ports and airfields on the Kola Peninsula. The ASW forces would wage an aggressive campaign against all Soviet submarines, including SSBNs. An essential aspect of this phase is to establish a logistic structure to support sustained forward operations. The greatest threat to the US fleet during this phase would be the missile-carrying aircraft of Soviet Naval Aviation. These would be destroyed as far from the carrier battle groups as possible, and also their bases.

The final phase, Carrying the Fight to the Enemy, would begin once sea control had been established. The aggressive campaign against Soviet submarines, and attacks on the bases and support structure of the Soviet Navy would continue. Marine amphibious forces would be used directly against targets ashore. The overall objective would be to restore peace on terms

favourable to the US and her allies.

The strategy is seen by its advocates as a maritime component of national strategy that can contribute to deterrence, promote allied solidarity, ensure unimpeded reinforcement of Europe, divert Soviet resources and attention from the Central Front, and provide unique war termination leverage.[16]

One of the focal and most debated aspects of US maritime strategy is the intention to alter the strategic balance by hunting out and destroying the Soviet SSBNs. It is not entirely clear, however, that the balance of forces would work to NATO's advantage.

The Soviets have 37 SSBNs and 106 attack and cruise missile submarines in the Northern Fleet.[17] The US Navy now maintains 48 of its 91 tactical submarines in the Atlantic.[18] Moreover, the American submarines based in Bangor, Washington, and the Soviet submarines based in Petropavlovsk, Kamchatka, are fully capable of passing back and forth to the Arctic waters except during winter months when the shallowness of water beneath the ice could make it hazardous. In wartime, it would be relatively easy to close the Bering Strait to all users by minefields.

The technical feasibility of conducting hunt and kill operations against submerged submarines has not been widely discussed in public sources. The experiences of the Swedes and Norwegians in their home waters indicate that the task is not an easy one. In crisis, moreover, the Soviets would encourage many of the SSBNs to hide under the polar ice cap,[19] which would effectively rule out the superior Western air and surface ASW assets.[20] In the Arctic, within the limits posed by extremely quiet submarines, and without other than acoustical techniques for areal searches, strategic antisubmarine warfare becomes extremely difficult.[21]

The Soviet Union would hardly take calmly to the destruction of her second-strike capability and would presumably launch a retaliatory attack. The Soviet Strategic Air Force is modest and the increasing accuracy of the US inter-continental ballistic missiles (MX) and submarine-launched ballistic missiles (D-5) increases their counter-force capability. In sophisticated estimates of the effects of massive retaliatory attacks, the calculations are done in terms of equivalent megatons (EMT). Calculations suggest[22] that a retaliatory force able to

deliver 200 EMT would be minimally sufficient for destroying one-half of US industrial capacity and 150 EMT would destroy about one-fourth of the US population (assured destruction capability). Beyond 400 EMT, nuclear attack would produce little additional damage. Thus, for the Soviets to preserve a capability of 400 EMT would require the survival of a minimum of 10 of their

Delta III-type SSBNs.[23] There is, of course, no way to predetermine the number of SSBNs the Soviets could afford to lose. Now, if the fear of losing first-strike nuclear weapons might attract the use of nuclear weapons, it is even more reasonable to think that a counter-force attack against the Soviets' strategic retaliatory nuclear forces – although conducted with conventional weapons – might lead to their use.

Given the widespread nuclearization of both navies, one cannot simply remove the nuclear equation from strategy and hope that any war will remain conventional. On the contrary, the new US strategy could increase the probability that a superpower naval war, or any war that involves US and Soviet naval forces, will lead to the use of nuclear weapons before escalating to a truly global – and nuclear – war.[24] The majority of the superpowers' surface combatants carry nuclear weapons. And the armament of the Soviet Naval Air is largely based on nuclear weapons. The scarcely populated areas of Northern Europe, Canada, Greenland and the Arctic are particularly attractive for the demonstrative use of a nuclear weapon. It is well known that the electromagnetic pulse (EMP) generated by even a single high-altitude explosion is capable of disrupting all command, control, communications and intelligence assets in the area.

According to declared strategy, the US would consider early maritime pre-positioning of forces to the far north in time of potential conflict. Operating aircraft carriers in the Norwegian Sea to defend Norway or to threaten Soviet military installations on the Kola Peninsula is nevertheless viewed by critics as risking escalation.[25] In any case, from the east coast of the United States it takes at least a week of sailing to reach the Norwegian Sea.

The US Second Fleet Headquarters in Norfolk, Virginia covers the Atlantic both north and south. It has 7 aircraft carriers (CV/CVN), 2 battleships (BB), 21 SAM cruisers (CG/CGN), 32

destroyers (DDG and DD), and 54 frigates (FFG and FF), compared with 2 carriers, 16 cruisers, 8 destroyers and 34 frigates of the Soviet Northern Fleet. The Second Fleet typically deploys 6–7 Carrier Battle Groups, 1-2 Battleship Surface Attack Groups, 1 Amphibious Group and 4 Underway Replenishment Groups.[26] The balance of forces is even more advantageous to the West when the national NATO and Warsaw Pact navies in the Atlantic are included in the calculation.

Forcing a roll-back of advancing Soviet naval forces would not be an easy mission. The Soviets would have a large number of bombers, cruise missiles and other strike systems – even ICBMs – which could be used against the carriers. The land-based C3I networks that support the allied fleets would be especially vulnerable. The Soviets would also employ fighter aircraft, surface-to-air missiles and anti-aircraft artillery to defend the Kola bases. Forcing a roll-back would require the destruction of Soviet submarines and Soviet naval air capability in the area before the carrier groups moved in.

On one carrier there are generally 90 aircraft and about 34 of them are designated attack aircraft. Thus the number of aircraft that US carriers could muster for an air offensive is limited and they would have to be augmented with significant numbers of land-based fighters and bombers.[27]

The new long-range cruise missiles would no doubt play an important role in the kind of warfare that is envisaged. An increasing number of ships are now armed with launchers for SLCM, either nuclear or conventional land-attack missiles or conventional anti-surface ship warfare (ASUW) cruise missiles. Launchers for the nuclear-tipped Tomahawk cruise missile (TLAM-N, range 2500 km) are now installed in 53 submarines and 35 surface combatants. The Soviet counterpart SS-N-21 (range 3000 km) is now installed in 21 submarines and the older models with 100-550 km ranges in 58 submarines and 80 surface combatants.[28] During fiscal years 1980-89, 2021 Tomahawk cruise missiles (of the 3994 planned) of four types were produced; 385 were the TLAM-N version, 179 for surface ships and the rest for submarines.[29] In addition, 172 US B-52 and 95 B-1B and 75 Soviet TU-95 and 15 TU-160 long-range bombers have been equipped with long-range cruise missiles.[30] New stealth-technology versions of cruise missiles are under development.

To be realistic, one would expect the US maritime strategy to have measurable consequences even in peacetime. To become credible, strategies have to be rehearsed and steps taken in peacetime to make them operational for crisis and war. Increased presence and exercises of the US Navy in the northern waters as well as more frequent port calls would be expected. At the same time the importance of NATO assets in Iceland, Denmark and Norway would increase. Perhaps because such activities could alter threat perceptions in the Soviet Union,[31] peacetime exercises have in fact been few and, so far, neither the Second Fleet nor NATO's Standing Naval Forces in the Atlantic (STANAVFORLANT) have permanent conventional units in the Arctic.

The new maritime strategy is the doctrine of the US Navy only. In correct perspective, it needs to be seen as a reaction to the relative decline of the Navy in the 1970s and as a stratagem in the competition for defence spending. It justifies the so-called 600-ship navy with 15 carrier battle groups, 4 battleship battle groups, 100 attack submarines, marine amphibious forces, etc., and the need for different types of cruise missiles. The 600-ship target has not yet been reached, but has become closely linked with the ability to sustain the strategy. President Reagan's 1990-91 biennial Department of Defense budget target was intended to support 574 deployable battle force ships in 1990.[32]

The strategy has also played an important role in reorienting naval officers to the verities of naval power after the war in Vietnam. It is an answer to the extension of Soviet sea power, creates uncertainties in Soviet calculations and thus possibly heightens the threshold of war.

The US maritime strategy connects Northern Europe directly with developments in Continental Europe and emphasizes the importance of the northern seas, although the timing and order of relative importance of world-wide operations would be reweighed in an actual crisis. The accumulation of US and Soviet naval strength has increased the likelihood of horizontal escalation into the High North.

5 CANADIAN AND NORDIC PERCEPTIONS OF SECURITY

Finland, Sweden and Norway, each in their own way, provide a zone between the superpowers, which has served to assure each superpower that its vital interests would be respected.[33]

Finland has taken into account the security interests of the Soviet Union while firmly safeguarding her own. The foundation of relations between Finland and the Soviet Union is the Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance (FMCA) signed in 1948, which acknowledges "Finland's desire to remain outside the conflicting interests of the Great Powers". Finnish foreign policy is an active and peace-oriented policy of neutrality.

Ever since 1814, Sweden has pursued a policy of being unaligned in peacetime and staying neutral in time of war. Swedish neutrality is a unilaterally declared policy.

Norway and Denmark belong to NATO but have declared certain limitations on their memberships. These pertain to nuclear weapons policies, the stationing of foreign troops and border activities and are intended to dissuade the superpowers from increasing their involvement in the region.

Iceland lacks a military defence of her own. In accordance with the 1951 defence treaty between Iceland and the United States, a US contingent is permanently stationed in Iceland. Its main tasks are connected with the NATO surveillance and intelligence-gathering system in the North Atlantic. Iceland has placed a restriction on her membership in NATO to the effect that nuclear weapons should not be stationed in the country.

Canadian defence policy is based on a strategy of collective security within the framework of NATO, with particular attention paid to developments in American military strategy and defence policy. Canada, like Iceland and Norway, has an additional bilateral security relationship with the United States.

Norway

Norway has been affected most by the naval activities in the High North. The activities are mainly linked to the rivalry

between the two superpowers and thus do not imply a threat aimed primarily at Norway.

The expansion of the Soviet Northern Fleet caused great anxiety in Norway in the early 1970s. The Norwegians envisaged a gradual change in the "Nordic balance" and attempted to draw attention to NATO's northern, "forgotten" flank.

Johan Holst has suggested that the Soviet Union's primary interest in northern waters is likely to be the protection of SSBN launching zones and transit routes. Other probable concerns are to prevent the Norwegian Sea being used for carrier-based air strikes against the USSR, and the destruction of US ASW barriers in the GIUK gap and off northern Norway.[34]

Norwegian assessments seem to regard the interdiction of the Atlantic sea-lines as the major objective of the Northern Fleet, rather than the protection of the SSBN force. The argument that Norway could then "fall behind the Soviet lines" is much used in the Norwegian debate.[35]

The Soviet peace-time ground forces in the Kola area hardly pose a threat to northern Norway. Paradoxically, the importance of the Kola Peninsula to the Soviet posture in a global war provides a certain protection to Norway against the threat of a limited attack for limited objectives, since such an attack could easily jeopardize the Soviets' vital interests in avoiding escalation.[36] As long as Norway restricts her national forces to defence, and makes that defence credible, an invasion of Norway is of questionable strategic usefulness to Moscow.[37] Nevertheless, part of a broader East/West confrontation in Europe, most western military planners believe that Soviet contingency planning includes the neutralization of installations in northern Norway, to prevent the West from gaining command of the Norwegian Sea.[38]

The US military interests in northern Norway grew in the early 1980s with the new maritime strategy. In 1981 a bilateral agreement was signed with Norway on the pre-positioning of contingency stocks for an amphibious brigade of US Marines. The Western "Teamwork 84" exercise was conducted with the objective of operating carrier battle groups in the Norwegian Sea combined with amphibious landing operations in Northern Norway.

During 1986 a debate emerged regarding the desirability of

requesting the United States to deploy US naval units on a more permanent basis off the Norwegian coast. The issue of how to counter the military and political impact of the Soviet Union's new naval capabilities and forward defence strategy is likely to remain and to become linked to broader political questions.[39]

In the view of some Norwegian observers an emphasis on forward naval operations combined with an extensive deployment of dual-capable, ship-based cruise missiles could lead to an intensive naval competition in the Northeast Atlantic, with ominous repercussions for the surrounding littoral states. A build-up of sea-launched cruise missiles harbours the danger of inadvertent escalation and lowers the nuclear threshold.[40]

The defence of Norway's territory depends upon maximum use of her own resources and making credible preparations for the swift, safe arrival and deployment of external reinforcements in an emergency. The credibility of allied reinforcements is sustained by the pre-stocking programme, to provide for their early arrival by air, and the regular programme of reinforcement and field service exercises involving NATO and Norwegian forces.[41] It is estimated that if the ACE (Allied Command Europe) Mobile Force were deployed to Norway it could arrive in six days. Moving by air, the 4th US Marine Expeditionary Brigade (MEB) could reach Trondelag, where material is pre-stocked for it, within eight days. The UK – Netherlands Commando Brigade could arrive by sea within ten days.[42] Stored in northern Norway are equipment, fuel and ammunition for the ACE Mobile Force, oversnow vehicles for the UK Third Commando Brigade, and equipment for two brigades earmarked for transfer from southern to northern Norway.[43]

Until 1987 the Canadian Air-Sea Transportable Brigade Group (CAST BG) was the only external force specifically earmarked for the reinforcement of Norway. In that year, however, Canada judged it impractical to continue this earmarking as the timely arrival of this force had always been questionable. Canada's decision has caused some dismay in Norway. The so-called Europeanization of defence and security policy is a question that has been widely discussed. Even the British assistance in the defence of northern Norway would tend to look more like a British national interest than an allied interest.[44] Likewise, the presence of US Marines in Norway would

be linked to the US maritime strategy.

CAST is to be replaced with a multinational force comprising a Canadian infantry battalion, a US field artillery battalion and a field artillery battalion from West Germany. The new force is expected to be about 2500 strong, about half the size of the Canadian Brigade.[45]

The developments in the High North appear to enhance the strategic value of Norwegian territory. For geographical reasons, Norway sees the Soviet Northern Fleet not only as a global factor but as a subregional threat. "What is defensive to Moscow is offensive to Oslo." However, while the Norwegians attach special concern to the growth of Soviet naval power, they do not predict any changes in Soviet policy towards Scandinavia.

The Norwegians are concerned by the arms race in the waters adjacent to Norway. If the defence of Norway depends primarily upon the US security guarantee, it could be drawn into a conflict that has nothing to do with the defence of Norway.

The Norwegians have developed a dual response to the US maritime strategy. On the one hand they are attempting to tie the United States more specifically to an early defence of Norwegian territory and want it to demonstrate its ability to bring adequate naval forces into the Norwegian Sea. On the other hand, they are anxious to discourage any strike against Soviet forces on the Kola Peninsula as this is seen as a dangerous, war-escalating move. One might say that Norwegian security policy stresses the management of peacetime relations rather than wartime scenarios.

As Holst puts it, in Norwegian policy the "fear of abandonment competes with the fear of being drawn into extraneous competitions. The protector should be within reach, but be at arm's length."[46] While it is clear that the presence of allies should exist in the NATO context rather than in a bilateral relationship with the US, it is just as clear that Western Europe cannot replace the United States as the principal guarantor of Norwegian security.[47]

The US and Norway necessarily have different perspectives on defence. The Norwegian concept of "deterrence and reassurance" is not always compatible with current US strategic thinking where the primary emphasis is on "deterrence". US arrangements that may contribute to deterrence, may not

necessarily contribute to the defence of Norway should deterrence fail. And they may have the undesirable effect of linking the Norwegian Sea to conflict spots elsewhere.[48] It is important to see Norway's strategic position in the Atlantic relation and the defence of Norway in its European context.[49]

Canada

In June 1987 Canada released its first Defence White Paper since 1971. Looking ahead for the next 15 years,[50] Canada saw the Arctic Ocean as an area of growing strategic importance and as an important passage between the Pacific and Atlantic Oceans. Increasing use of the region by submarines, the Paper noted, raises both sovereignty and security concerns for Canada.

There is a growing feeling in Canada that for both superpowers the naval importance of the Arctic in increasing, and that serious defence issues are arising which might require a major shift in Canadian defence resources. For Canada, the military issues stem largely from the potential capabilities of Soviet long-range cruise missiles and the maritime strategy of the US Navy.[51] Disputes have arisen between Canada and the United States, for example, over the issue of free navigation through the Northwest Passage.

Canada has embarked on a programme of vigorous naval modernization, whose goals are greater flexibility, a more appropriate balance among air, surface and underwater assets and the reorientation of Canadian naval forces towards effective operations in the Atlantic, the Pacific and the Arctic.[52] The Navy has thus been assigned the task of detecting and deterring hostile intrusion in the Arctic. The modernization programme included a plan to acquire 10 to 12 nuclear-powered submarines, which are seen as the only vessels capable of exercising surveillance and control in the Arctic. The submarine project was cancelled in April 1989. Instead, the existing four Tribal-class destroyers will be reconfigured to an area air defence role and twelve new patrol frigates will be built during the next six years.

Greater attention will be devoted to surveillance, both underwater and space-based, and to technologies aimed at assisting the Canadian Forces in asserting sovereignty in the

Arctic. This will include installing a fixed, under-ice surveillance system. The eleven long-range radars of the North Warning System (NWS) became operational at the end of 1988.[53] The NWS of 11 long- and 36 short-range radar installations will stretch from Alaska across the Canadian Arctic and down the coast of Labrador. The system will replace the Distant Early Warning Line (the DEW line) and will be fully operational by 1992.

Earlier, Canada had been committed to transporting a Canadian-based brigade group and two fighter squadrons to Norway in time of war. However, the Canadian government concluded in 1987 that it could make a more effective contribution to NATO by assigning the brigade group to southern Germany, enabling it to field a newly equipped land division there. The two Rapid Reinforcement fighter squadrons were similarly reassigned to Germany. A Canadian battalion group will remain committed to NATO's northern region as part of the ACE Mobile Force (Land).

Iceland

The changing naval strategies of the superpowers can be expected to increase the importance of Iceland as part of the NATO surveillance and intelligence gathering system. Iceland has also become geographically more central to the likely battle area north of the GIUK gap.

The task of the US force in Iceland is to defend Icelandic territory and to assure the security of the neighbouring sea area. Iceland's contribution to NATO's common defence, providing land for an American base, is vital for both NATO and Iceland. As Bjorn Bjarnason notes, "No reasonable argument can lead to the conclusion that it is plausible for Iceland to be in NATO without defence installations on the island itself".[54] Following a policy change in the years 1983-85, Iceland has gradually become more involved within the Alliance. Since 1984 she has been represented by a civilian on the Military Committee, and since 1987 by an observer on the Nuclear Planning Group.[55]

The US operates military bases at Keflavik and Hofn, which are under the operational command of the US Navy. Navy and

Air Force personnel together number around 3000. The importance of the GIUK gap in NATO thinking seems undiminishing: eighteen F-15 fighters, two AWACS aircraft and nine Orion P-3C maritime patrol aircraft are deployed to Iceland. Apart from providing for the defence of Iceland, the main wartime contingency role for the Keflavik base includes ASW operations, air support of naval operations in the North Atlantic and support for reinforcement operations from the United States to Europe. In response to the expansion of the Soviet bomber force and the deployment of cruise missiles, the Icelandic government recently authorized a project to upgrade the air barrier in the GIUK gap by increasing the air defence capabilities of the Keflavik base.[56]

Denmark

Denmark's defence planning recognizes the importance of the country to both NATO and the Warsaw Pact. For NATO, control of Danish territory, waters and airspace is of vital importance to the defence of southern Norway, northern Germany and the United Kingdom. The Soviet Union in turn, would regard control of Denmark of great value to support more sustained operations against NATO sea-lines of communications if an initial blitz failed. The Soviets also see Denmark as a base from which NATO could launch deep strikes into the heart of the Warsaw Pact.[57]

The waters off eastern Greenland have become an important arena for the naval rivalry between the superpowers and the waters west of Greenland are acquiring some real military significance. Greenland will continue to hold considerable strategic interest for the foreseeable future and its role in the defence of NATO and the American continent will continue to be significant. Denmark's Arctic security policy is likely to remain low-profile and reactive.[58]

The defence of Greenland is entrusted to the United States, in accordance with the Treaty of 1951. In the event of war the Danish Greenland Command would become part of SACLANT, and the American bases would continue under the US Space Command.[59] The Faroes would come under the protection of

the UK air defence scheme.[60] Thus, for Greenland and the Faroe Islands, most of the defence effort is expected to be undertaken by allied forces.[61] The US Ballistic Missile Early Warning System station at Thule in Greenland and the radar station at the airbase at Torshavn in the Faroe Islands have been modernized. The future of the four DEW installations in Greenland is uncertain.

The defence of Denmark itself is clearly concentrated upon denying the enemy use of the Western Baltic and passage through the Danish Straits. The defence of Denmark is also closely integrated with the defence of Germany north of the Elbe River, which ties Denmark to the situation in continental Europe. Denmark's national defence forces are largely tailored to defending the Baltic Straits. The Royal Danish Navy consists mainly of light units and both the Army and the Air Force depend on external reinforcements.

The Danish Defence Commission of 1988 viewed measures aimed at creating optimum conditions for reinforcements, coupled with maximum protection in the reception phase, to represent a major task for the Danish defence in peacetime. Careful preparation will in the event help to safeguard deployment of reinforcements and thus have an inherent war-preventive effect, and will also help to give the reinforcement instrument maximum flexibility in the context of crisis management. A stepped-up national effort on the part of Denmark becomes relevant in terms of the United Kingdom Mobile Force and any closer linking of the 9th US Infantry Division to the BALTAP area and in terms of the British and US air reinforcements.[62]

Danish security is often discussed in a Nordic rather than in a broader European perspective. It is difficult, however, to see any direct impact of the strategic developments in the northern waters on Danish security policy, or even on the security issues of Greenland.

Sweden

The opposing interests of the military alliances are of direct concern to the neutral nations of Sweden and Finland in the far north (Lapland) and in the Baltic Sea. As neither borders directly

on the Arctic Ocean, there are similarities in their assessment of the situation in Northern Europe. Increased military activities in the northern sea areas are seen as an indication of heightened military interest.

Since 1814, Sweden has avoided war through a policy of armed neutrality. Although unequivocally aligned with the Western powers, especially in its economic orientation, Sweden nontheless adheres unswervingly to its policy of neutrality. Swedish foreign and defence policies have, in general, followed a relatively placid course since 1945. In practice, the Swedish military has assumed that an attack is most likely to come from the East.

Sweden relies upon a policy of deterrence as well as neutrality for preservation of its national security. As a result, for many decades the Swedish armed forces have been more modern and powerful than those of any other secondary power.

Because of the centricity of Baltic and Continental European concerns in Swedish military thinking, the focus of attention has shifted to the northern flank relatively late. In the report of the Swedish Defence Committee submitted in 1981, the Northern Cap and the Baltic Straits are assumed to be of considerable and equal importance to the great power blocs. According to the Committee, military operations designed to secure control of these areas might be undertaken already in the early stages of a war in Europe. In such a situation NATO might have as its objective to reinforce Norway and Denmark as quickly as possible and to engage the naval and air forces of the Soviet Union. The Warsaw Pact could, at the same time, be expected to attempt to forestall a NATO build-up and secure freedom of operation for its own naval forces. In such a situation demands might be made on the use of Swedish territory as a transit area on land, sea or in the air, or as a base area for air forces.[63]

The Committee of 1978 also foresaw problems arising from the American cruise missiles designed for launching from aircraft and submarines. This could lead to an increased risk of wartime violation of Swedish neutral airspace on the part of both power blocks.[64]

The Defence Committee of 1984 underlined in its first report in 1985 the growing strategic importance of Northern Europe and the North Atlantic area. The basis of this assessment was

the increased military presence and activity in the area on the part of the major powers, as well as the steps being taken to enable them to quickly extend this presence still further.[65]

Suspected violations of Swedish waters by submarines have continued since the grounding of a Soviet Whiskey-class submarine in 1981. The submarine violations provoked an extensive Swedish debate over national security, so extensive that it has somewhat overshadowed the debate over developments in the maritime strategies. Some analysts see a link between developments in the Norwegian Sea, the submarine incidents and the added interest of the major powers in the Baltic Sea.[66]

According to a Norwegian study, the change in the sea-power constellation in the North Atlantic was perceived but had little influence on Swedish security policy until the early eighties.[67] With the worsening political climate between the superpowers, and the submarine incursions in Swedish waters, the situation in the North Atlantic received some attention, but without becoming much more dominant in the thinking of decision-makers. Overall, it would seem that the direct Swedish-Soviet relationship and the military situation in the Baltic are of more importance to the Swedes than the situation in the North Atlantic. Southern Sweden still evidently features most prominently in the strategic thinking and it is assumed that Swedish neutrality would more likely be challenged in the south than in the north.[68]

The latest Swedish Defence Committee (1988) submitted an interim security policy report in January 1990 entitled "Swedish Defence Policy in a Changing World". The report concentrates upon the rapid political developments in Eastern Europe, recent improvements in East-West relations and possible agreements on major arms cutbacks. These changes obviously affect the perception of security challenges and threats in Northern Europe. Political cooperation and mutual confidence may become more prominent elements in the security policy situation in northern Europe and act as a counter-balance to the superpower rivalries in the Nordic area and the tensions dependent upon the new developments in arms technology.

The Committee believes that the air-operative dimension in the strategic significance of the northern areas has continuously

increased. Both NATO and the Warsaw Pact see the whole of northern Europe as a uniform area for operations. During a major crisis in Europe the Nordic areas are likely to be quickly affected. The High North has a fundamental nuclear-strategic importance which will remain strong for a long time.[69]

Sweden's defence planning during most of the 1970s was aimed at a gradual reduction of its most capable air, sea, and land units in the mistaken belief that detente had come to stay. By the mid-1980s, unilateral disarmers were on the retreat. There has also been a growing recognition of the need to pursue a firm and stable policy of armed neutrality that will contribute to stability in the region.[70] The reductions in the Swedish armed forces have not affected the units earmarked for the defence of the Upper Norrland Military Area.

Sweden has tried to maintain her traditional strong air force. In 1982 the domestic JAS Industry Group was contracted to develop and build five JAS 39 Gripen prototypes, and an initial series of 30 fighters. The total requirement of the Swedish Air Force, according to the Supreme Commander's long-term plan, amounts to 350–400 aircraft. The fighter made its maiden flight on 9 December 1988. However, the first prototype crashed during a test flight in February 1989 and the service entry of the initial series will be delayed probably to 1993.

Swedish security policy in the 1990s will be characterized by a combination of stability, activity and flexibility. Stability and continuity as regards the foundations of foreign and defence policies, notably as part of the security pattern in the Nordic area and in Europe, are essential elements in Swedish security policy. An active foreign policy to promote continued positive developments in Europe and to contribute to coordinated international efforts to solve global problems is of crucial interest from the security policy point of view. Flexibility in the choice of the means employed in security policy, to further the objectives of Swedish security, is a permanent requirement which is becoming more urgent in a situation where the pace of change is rapid and assessments of the future are unusually difficult.[71]

There are no strategic targets in Finland which themselves could motivate an attack. The politico-military significance of Finland depends first and foremost on the extent to which Finnish territory can be exploited in efforts to reach strategic targets located close to Finnish territory. An isolated attack against Finland is considered unlikely, but a major East-West conflict in Europe or world-wide would entail a high risk of involving Finnish territory.

Finland's northernmost areas are situated between the two military alliances and in the immediate vicinity of naval bases on the coast of the Kola Peninsula. The significance of the northern waters in the superpowers' global strategies has long been recognized in Finnish military thinking. As early as 1971, the Parliamentary Defence Committee[72] noted that the strategic importance of the Arctic Ocean has increased and that the interests of both NATO and the Soviet Union in the Arctic region require that their navies be able to carry on their activities in northern waters.

During the 1970s, Finnish official statements recognized the sea areas bordering on Northern Europe to be of increasing importance for the great powers. Their air and land strategic aspirations in the area were considered derivatory upon these maritime interests. At the same time, advancing weapons technology – especially the new cruise missiles – was seen as having profound repercussions on the military-political situation of Northern Europe.[74]

In a speech in 1986, President Koivisto echoed the conclusion of security policy reports from all the Nordic countries, that questions of maritime strategy had become considerably more important in Northern Europe. Viewing this development as clearly apparent, he also argued that it could be expected to continue, for several reasons, most of them derivative upon military-technological developments. However, the increasing strategic interest did not necessarily mean that tension was heightening in Northern Europe.[75]

Three years later the President considered a decrease in the strategic significance of the northern waters possible if disarmament measures were to be extended to the navies and if,

as a consequence of the START negotiations, land-based missiles became favoured by the Soviet strategic nuclear forces.[76]

In early 1990 the Finnish Parliamentary Advisory Board for Defence Policy reassessed the European security-political situation and its future.[77] In spite of many encouraging trends, the Board saw signs that the arms race would not slow to a stop but rather would be channelled to new areas. The START counting rules would seem, in fact, to encourage introducing more bombers and air-launched cruise missiles into the superpower nuclear arsenals. Likewise, naval forces and long-range sea-launched cruise missiles, which have an impact on the military-political situation in Northern Europe, are not at the moment covered by the START negotiations.[78]

At the same time the Board noted many encouraging features in the relations between the superpowers and in the general political atmosphere in Europe. These features were expected to have repercussions in the Nordic area in the form of a lessening of confrontation. In summary, Finnish defence policy attaches great importance to the increasing strategic significance of northern Europe and of the northern sea areas in particular, and to the threat created by the deployment of cruise missiles. Finland is very aware that light weapons systems and other equipment designed for the special conditions of northern land warfare are not yet on the agenda of any disarmament negotiations.[79]

From the point of view of both military alliances, Finnish and Swedish air space together constitute a wide buffer zone. At the same time it is clear that, in the event of crisis, the integrity of that air space would quickly come under threat, without any violations of land or sea areas having necessarily occurred. The rapid development of cruise missile systems and their deployment, rather than the maritime strategies themselves, have therefore been of particular concern to both countries.

During the past few years there has been considerable debate in Finland over the dangers associated with US deployment of cruise missiles and the ensuing risk that Finnish – and Swedish – airspace would be violated by missiles heading for targets in northwestern parts of the USSR. Conversely in the case of Soviet missiles, violations could be expected with missiles heading for Norway and the North Atlantic. A cruise missile

penetrating Finnish airspace would clearly constitute an infringement of territorial integrity. Finnish defence planning thus calls for infringements to be met by armed force. Recent improvements in low-altitude radar systems, as well as exercises involving the simulated interception and destruction of cruise missiles, should be seen in the light of Finland's need to address this new threat to its neutrality.[80]

The strategic developments in the North have also led to some concrete measures in Lapland. Finland has strengthened, qualitatively and quantitatively, her peacetime forces in the North. A specially equipped ranger brigade is now operational in Sodankylä. In Rovaniemi a new anti-aircraft regiment and the Air Force Wing of Lapland are deployed. Within the constraints of her resources, Finland is also committed to improving her defences against cruise missile overflight. In June 1988 the Finnish Ministry of Defence placed an order for a French Thomson-CFS Crotale NG surface-to-air missile system. The acquisition of new Air Force interceptor squadrons with look-down, shoot-down capabilities is still pending.

Some analysts in Finland believe that the developments in the High North have had no direct impact on Finnish security. The present set-up may be dangerous but it is not unacceptable. There has been no change in the Norwegian policy of low-level military activity in the north. Nor has there been any significant change in the level of conventional forces on the Soviet side. Finland has strengthened her defences, but neither Norway nor the Soviet Union has interpreted that as detrimental to their own security interests.[81] The maintenance of the territorial integrity of Lapland by Finnish forces is beneficial to the security of all sides.

As much as through military strength, a peaceful future will be secured through political means and confidence-building measures. Significant efforts have been made, for example in promoting a nuclear-weapons-free zone in the North and in pursuing initiatives aimed at banning long-range cruise missiles.

The pattern of the Finnish security policy seeks to counter the perceived threats with political responses in order to ensure that strategic stability, defensive political objectives and relatively low tension continue to characterize the Arctic and Nordic regions in spite of the military buildup that has distinguished

great-power activities in the area. On several issues, such as confidence- and security-building measures, Nordic views are close enough to render coordinated action possible. A basis for this action is provided by the traditional attempt of the Nordic countries to take into account one another's interests regardless of their different security policy solutions.[82]

6 CURRENT TRENDS IN EUROPEAN SECURITY-POLICY

Revolutionary changes occurred in Eastern Europe during 1989 and 1990. The dominance of the United States and the Soviet Union is diminishing in Europe as is the relevance of the hegemonic alliances. The Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe and negotiations on conventional armed forces in Europe have enhanced human rights and promoted confidence-building measures. The arms control agenda is broader, more radical and perhaps more promising than ever before.

Amidst changes on this scale and at this pace it is difficult to forecast the future. The system which has provided 40 years of peace in Europe is eroding rapidly. In the Soviet Union the response to change brings with it the risk of instability and even anarchy.

The European system of security commitments will be seeking new forms. At the moment, however, commercial and economic interests are taking priority over defence considerations. The US influence on European security policies will probably diminish in pace with the emplacement of the new structures of European economic cooperation and efforts to achieve a political community.

The disintegration of the Warsaw Pact is inevitable. Hungary, Czechoslovakia and Poland are clearly moving toward market economies to be integrated with the West. The German Democratic Republic ceased to exist in 1990. The future of the Soviet Union is unpredictable. Some kind of fracturing of the Soviet Union, with the republics acting more independently, appears unavoidable. In terms of strategic decision-making, one of the key questions will be who is in control of the Soviet nuclear arsenal. Most nuclear weapons, though not all, are situated in the Russian republic.

The political climate in Europe has become warmer, and the probability of war has lessened. The United States and the Soviet Union must, however, still be regarded as rival powers and, with their massive nuclear arsenals, as superpowers. The situation in the Persian Gulf is one more evidence that the policies

of the superpowers are derived from their vital interests, not from any ideal of peace on earth at all costs.

The unilateral force reductions announced by the Soviet Union will reduce the imbalance of force levels between the two Alliances. In consequence of the reduced force levels one could conceive of a higher priority being assigned to quality than to quantity, which would encourage an increased operational efficiency of both nuclear and conventional forces. The Conventional parity between the Alliances enhances stability, but it is no guarantee of peace. The force reductions have been concentrated in Central Europe and there has been no accompanying reduction in the Soviet forces in the Leningrad Military District.

The changes in the politico-military environment in the High North have been mainly consequent upon the evolution of military technology. The emergence of the Arctic as an important strategic area means that it can no more be considered as the quiet flank of Europe. The offensive elements of the US and Soviet naval strategies were not necessarily causes but rather consequences of these developments.

The number and size of naval exercises in the northern seas have distinctly declined in the late 1980s. The presence of US naval forces in the Norwegian Sea has not increased. Criticism of the US maritime strategy has also been more vocal. The chief advocates of the strategy – Lehman, Weinberger and Reagan – are all out of office. Greatest pressure comes from attempts to reduce the federal budget deficit, which will result in there being less than 500 deployable US battle force ships in the near future.

The US maritime strategy, as such, is feasible, including the forward operations of the US Navy against the Soviet naval capabilities. The strategy in the area of responsibility of SACLANT can hardly be implemented with less than seven carrier battle groups.

The risk of an armed conflict in the High North has clearly decreased. A realistic analysis can, however, only include an elucidation of the geostrategic conditions and the available military capacity. Good intentions can change for the worse rapidly.

7 CONCLUSIONS

The last twenty years have seen a gradual increase in the strategic significance of the High North. Geopolitics, strategies and weapons technologies have all contributed to the change.

The interests of the superpowers in the High North are tied up with the dynamics of the nuclear arms race. The Soviet Union has a strong physical presence by the Arctic basin. The Kola bases have a strategic value for the Soviet Union, not a regional one. Similarly the US maritime strategy is just a fraction of the global strategy of flexible response where stages of horizontal and vertical escalation are an important element.

The timing and order of importance of world-wide operations will be weighed at the actual time of crisis. If the roots of a crisis lie in the third world, an escalation to the Arctic is not inevitable. A Eurocentric crisis, on the other hand, would rapidly create a sub-theatre in the High North, where even the first shots of the war might be fired. But in no sense could the High North ever be a cause of war, nor will it be an area where the outcome of war is decided.

Neither the risk of war nor the tension in the area has increased. The actions of all parties have been restrained and at least the surface operations continue at a low level.

The dangerous mixture of conventional and nuclear weapons in the navies of both superpowers and the sparse population in the High North could tempt the use of nuclear weapons demonstratively and inadvertently lead to nuclear war. The military presence in the North would then have not only regional consequences, but increase the risk of general nuclear war.

If significant reductions are made in strategic nuclear weapons, changes in threat perceptions in the Arctic can be expected. If cuts are carried out primarily in ballistic missiles, the importance of long-range cruise missiles and other air-breathing vehicles will increase correspondingly. This development would be encouraged by the political difficulties in modernizing short-range nuclear weapons in Europe and by the need to create a strategic missile defence.

Submarine-launched cruise missiles will maintain some

invulnerability, but to maintain firing capability the submarines must operate close to the littorals of the Arctic. The Arctic will also continue to be a major theatre for the operations of manned bombers equipped with ALCMs. The Soviet Union might begin to strengthen its strategic bomber force and to increase its penetration ability. The United States might begin to rebuild her air defences and create a cruise missile defence. As the shortest trajectory of strategic air assets crosses over the Arctic Ocean, both superpowers might decide to extend their surveillance and defences into this man's land.

Northern Europe is no longer a peripheral area. The growing superpower rivalry in the High North presents a threat to Nordic security on the sea and in the air, rather than on the ground. Naval developments have not changed the basic premises of the security policies of the Nordic countries and Canada, which are shaped by many other factors as well. Nor can these countries have much influence on maritime developments.

Owing to their geostrategic differences the Nordic countries and Canada each have a slightly different perspective on military-political developments in the North. A certain slowness in perceiving the changes in the strategic environment has been apparent. Nevertheless, all countries share a concern about the military build-up in the Kola area.

Norway and Canada are the most exposed countries and their security policies are constructed with a strong eye to strategic developments in the High North. The strategic significance of Greenland, Iceland, and the Faroe Islands in surveillance has increased. Denmark depends for her defence on Germany and thus the situation in Continental Europe. Both Sweden and Finland have strengthened their military assets in the northern parts of their countries. Keeping in mind the geographical constraints, these forces would be able to repel a major attack in the northern region. All the Nordic countries and Canada have combined the requirement for a conceivably sufficient defence with an active search for tension-reducing measures.

The Soviet Union will continue to maintain a strong presence in the Arctic. The attention of the United States will be directed to Alaska and to closer ties with Canada, Greenland (Denmark), Iceland and Norway.

Peace and security in the High North is bound to the principle of sustained progress in East-West relations. All indications point to a common interest in preserving a low level of tension in the area.

The Arctic Ocean can be expected to gain in strategic importance in the future and to become an increasingly focal area for military operations. Under-ice operations will increase as the enabling technologies are developed. The air-space of the Arctic will continue to be important for purposes of early warning and as a route for strategic air assets.

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22. See the argument in Dietrich Schroeer, *Science, Technology and the Nuclear Arms Race* (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1984), pp. 86-91, 99-101.
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DOCUMENTATION

Report of the Parliamentary Advisory Board for Defence Policy; 28 February 1990;

AN ASSESSMENT OF THE EUROPEAN SECURITY-POLITICAL SITUATION, ITS DEVELOPMENT PROSPECTS AND ITS IMPACT ON FINNISH DEFENCE POLICY*)

TO THE MINISTRY OF DEFENCE

On 15 December 1988, the Government appointed a Parliamentary Advisory Board for Defence Policy with the tasks of acting as a discussion forum and an information channel between the main political parties and the defence administration, of assessing the security situation of Finland, and of making suggestions and statements on matters administered by the Ministry of Defence as well as other aspects of national defence, when necessary.

Bank Director Jaakko Iloniemi was asked to be the Chairman of the Advisory Board, and a total of 21 representatives of the main political parties and of the state administration were nominated as members, alternate members, and secretaries.

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On 24 May 1989, the Ministry of Defence requested the Advisory Board to prepare a report by the end of 1989 assessing the European security-political situation and its future prospects.

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* First of the two reports prepared by the Parliamentary Advisory Board for Defence Policy. The second report of 19 December 1990, which assesses present capabilities of the Defence Forces and contains the recommendations of the Board on defence expenditures for the 1990s, will be published in the next issue (*Finnish Defence Studies* 3, 1991).

The Advisory Board has now compiled this report, after being granted an extension of two months. The assessment also includes a discussion of the effects of the European security-political situation on Finnish defence policy.

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The report compiled by the Advisory Board consists of three parts. The first part considers the general changes taking place in Europe, the second part deals with the military-political changes, and the third part discusses the effects of the European situation on Finnish defence policy.

The Advisory Board hereby respectfully submits its report to the Ministry of Defence.

Helsinki, 28 February 1990

1 CHANGES IN THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM IN EUROPE SINCE THE SECOND WORLD WAR

The international system is at the moment going through a period of profound transition that will change the existing power structures and the contents of policies as well as influence fundamental security concepts. If the positive developments continue and if serious setbacks are avoided, the chances of escaping from the post-war situation, characterized by confrontation between alliances and by the arms race, will improve. Also, the new global challenges – environmental problems being the most significant – will require increased cooperation and thus promote international security.

The recent changes in Europe have been surprising, rapid and far-reaching. The momentous societal changes in Eastern Europe and the general and rapid acceptance of German unification are significant in terms of security policy. The collapse of political systems based on the supremacy of one political party – which, with the exception of Romania, has taken place peacefully – and the transition towards democratic multi-party systems; the opening of the Berlin Wall; and the recognition of basic human rights are essentially eliminating the division of Europe that was established after the Second World War.

These changes were launched by popular dissatisfaction in each country with the economic and political situation. The fact that the changes have mainly taken place peacefully and that there has been a decline in the degree of confrontation between different political systems has already within a short period of time created strong and apparently well-founded expectations of a peaceful future.

The changes have been so rapid and radical that caution must be exercised in assessing their security policy effects, particularly for the long term.

The post-war international system has been characterized by confrontation and competition between the superpowers – the United States and the Soviet Union – and in Europe between the military alliances, NATO and the Warsaw Pact. This competition has created military-political tension that has fueled a quantitative and qualitative arms race, which has had its main effects in Europe.

Although the structure of military and political relations in post-war Europe has remained stable, the political climate has fluctuated

considerably. The periods of detente have tended to be short-lived. On the other hand, more and more global and regional structures of cooperation have been created in the international system, so that the strict bipolarity of the early Cold War years has lost much of its significance. The creation of new economic and political power centers has had a similar effect.

The expectations from the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe in the mid-1970s were not fully realized. Instead, towards the end of the 1970s, the world faced a tense international situation with poor superpower relations, an extensive arms buildup, increased difficulties in achieving progress in disarmament, and aggravation of regional crises and armed conflicts in various parts of the world. The negative effects of these factors were also felt in Europe, even though the CSCE process continued and its earlier achievements softened the impact of this crisis on our continent.

The summit meeting between the U.S. and Soviet leaders in 1985 in Geneva seems to have been a turning point in this process. At this meeting they reached a mutual understanding on the unacceptability of nuclear war, and on the necessity of preventing other kinds of wars; they revived disarmament negotiations, started to improve their bilateral relations and began to negotiate the settlement of regional conflicts. The political understandings achieved by the superpowers on various issues since then, and the continuous summit-level contacts between them have stabilized the international situation and improved the political atmosphere.

In recent years, the essential improvement in the international situation, based on mutual understanding between the superpowers, has had significant results. With the help of the superpowers, certain regional conflicts in Southeast Asia, the Middle East, Southern Africa and Central America have either been alleviated or settled. Even though the role of the superpowers in these efforts has been significant, it has not always been sufficient by itself. The willingness of the parties involved in regional conflicts to achieve political solutions and the contribution of the United Nations have also been indispensable.

In the improved international atmosphere, even the CSCE process has gained momentum and produced more tangible results. Since it has continued already for almost twenty years as a multilateral negotiation process on many levels, it has clearly become a factor contributing to the stability of the European security system. In spite of some

temporary setbacks, the results and experiences of the CSCE process during the past years have only strengthened the potential of this process.

As a result of the Vienna CSCE follow-up meeting, the traditional "baskets" of the Helsinki Final Act have gained more substance in terms of the human dimension; mutual understanding has for the first time been achieved on the question of follow-up meetings in the field of economic cooperation; and the so-called CSBM negotiations on confidence-and-security-building measures have been launched in the field of military security. Moreover, negotiations on conventional armed forces in Europe between the 23 countries that are members of military alliances are currently being carried out within the CSCE framework. With this new set of negotiations, the CSCE process has also become a forum of cooperation between the military alliances, which is also demonstrated by the Vienna seminar on military doctrines.

The role of the neutral and non-aligned countries in the CSCE process has been important from the start. On the one hand, CSCE has been a unique opportunity for them to express their own views. On the other hand, they have also been able to work out compromises between the other two groups' positions and consensus decisions have often been possible on the basis of these compromises.

The speed of change in the CSCE process since 1986 is promising for the follow-up meeting that will start in March 1992.

It has been proposed that the mandate for a CSCE summit meeting that may convene prior to the 1992 follow-up meeting should include a multilateral discussion of the changes that have occurred in the European political system, so that these changes should not have a negative effect on stability. Thus the CSCE process has become a politically important instrument of controlled change, which is a point that is considered more significant today than ever before in the course of the CSCE process.

In the field of economic relations, regional integration especially within the European Community has developed further and with greater speed than general European cooperation. The EC has announced its goal of completing an internal market by the end of 1992, with a free movement of goods, persons, capital and services. At the same time, negotiations on cooperation between the EC and EFTA have intensified. The goal here is to create a European Economic Space (EES).

The economic crisis in the Soviet Union and in the other Eastern European countries makes it, on the one hand, more difficult for them to solve their societal and political as well as economic and environmental problems. On the other hand, it also weakens their chances of integration into the world economy. It seems that not only total societal reforms but even extensive Western economic aid and investments are needed in order to solve the economic problems of Eastern Europe. In this situation, the Soviet Union and the Eastern European countries are attempting to improve their relations with the economic organizations of Western Europe, i.e., EC and EFTA. The political changes taking place in Eastern Europe tend to make economic, technical and environmental cooperation easier and – by underlining common concerns, needs and interests – to strengthen the concept of common security.

The deepening economic cooperation within the European Community goes hand in hand with efforts to achieve a political community. So far, these efforts have come to fruition primarily in the form of increasing foreign policy cooperation and coordination. At times, defence policy cooperation has been discussed, but this is still a controversial issue. On the other hand, some EC member countries can discuss defence policy cooperation in the Western European Union, WEU, if they wish.

The expansion and strengthening of the EC is about to create the world's biggest unified market, and the competitive potential of the EC in comparison with the United States and Japan is increasing. However, inside the EC there are varying opinions on the final goals of integration and perhaps, above all, on the relation between national states and EC decision-making.

It becomes more difficult to outline a comprehensive picture, if we take into account the efforts to create a European Economic Space and the need to construct cooperative relations with the East European countries as well as to develop all-European economic cooperation. It is, however, quite obvious that the EC will play a central role in the process of change. The differences in the level of economic development between Western and Eastern Europe create instabilities, which, on the other hand, underlines the need for all-European economic cooperation.

The deep changes and the security-political debates of recent years have been accelerated by the Soviet policies of perestroika, glasnost and new foreign policy thinking. This process has clearly increased confidence between the Soviet Union and the West and opened a

dialogue between them. It has also made it possible for a national reform process to begin within the Soviet Union and in Eastern Europe. The difficult economic situation both in the Soviet Union and in Eastern Europe has made societal changes indispensable and also accelerated them. This, in turn, has undermined the political structures created in these countries in the post-war period. On the other hand, the emergence of the nationality issue has in some countries led to an aggravation of national contradictions and even to intra-national armed conflicts.

The general political atmosphere in Europe is improving, and the probability of war has decreased. However, the great societal, economic, political and national changes have brought forward numerous new factors of uncertainty.

2 POLITICAL-MILITARY CHANGE

Recent assessments of the development of the European military situation have been strongly influenced by progress achieved in disarmament negotiations. In particular, the experiences gained through the CSBM measures which were agreed in Stockholm in 1986 - notification and observation of military exercises as well as on-site inspections – have been thoroughly positive. The Stockholm agreement has significantly increased the openness and predictability of military activities in Europe.

The CSBM measures agreed in Stockholm were an important step forward, and the experiences gained through their implementation were used in negotiating the INF Treaty on intermediate-range nuclear weapons in 1987. According to this treaty, all the land-based intermediate range nuclear missiles of the United States and the Soviet Union will be removed from their launchers and destroyed. Moreover, the treaty contains far-reaching compliance and verification measures, some of which are carried out at the gates of missile-producing factories, in missile storage areas and at missile destruction sites. The practical experiences gained in putting the treaty in effect have proven to be positive, especially in the field of verification. Even though the total number of nuclear weapons will not be much reduced by this treaty, it has been a significant step forward in the field of nuclear disarmament. The positive political effect of the treaty has been apparent both in Europe and in relations between the superpowers.

In addition to the results that have already been achieved, progress can be detected in the on-going disarmament negotiations. The United States and the Soviet Union have already outlined in the Geneva START negotiations the principles of a treaty, whose purpose is to reduce substantially the number of strategic nuclear weapons, including a 50% reduction in heavy ballistic missiles.

The United Nations Conference on Disarmament in Geneva has conducted discussions on banning all nuclear weapon tests, but actual negotiations on this issue have not yet been started. Moreover, the United States and the Soviet Union have negotiated on effective verification mechanisms for the Threshold Test Ban Treaty of 1974, and its complementary treaty, the Treaty on Nuclear Explosions for Peaceful Purposes, signed in 1976.

It is still important to guarantee the existing nuclear-weapons-free status of the Nordic region. A working group of officials, which was appointed by the Nordic governments in 1987, is still examining the preconditions for a nuclear-weapons-free zone in the Nordic region as part of detente and disarmament efforts in Europe.

Moreover, there is a possibility that a treaty banning chemical weapons will be completed soon.

The disarmament negotiations conducted within the CSCE framework in Vienna are of central importance for the security of Europe. The breakthrough achieved in the Stockholm meeting in 1986 in developing CSBM measures, and especially in agreeing verification procedures, created preconditions that were needed in order to start negotiating actual disarmament measures in Europe.

It is the task of the CSBM negotiations in Vienna among all 35 CSCE countries to outline and accept several complementary CSBM measures, designed to reduce the risk of military confrontation in Europe. The objectives of the negotiations among the 23 member countries of NATO and the Warsaw Pact on conventional armed forces in Europe (CFE) are to establish a secure and stable balance of conventional forces at lower levels, to eliminate disparities prejudicial to stability and security, and to eliminate, as a matter of high priority, the capability for launching a surprise attack and for initiating large-scale offensive action.

The objectives expressed in the mandate of the CFE talks will be achieved through reductions, limitations, restructuring of armed forces,

common quotas and various stabilizing measures. The subjects of negotiation are land-based conventional armed forces and their armaments and equipment. Dual-purpose systems, i.e., those weapons capable of launching or carrying nuclear warheads in addition to conventional charges, are also included in the agenda of these talks, but the nuclear warheads or chemical weapons themselves are not included. Furthermore, naval forces are excluded from the negotiations.

The objective of the CFE talks is to reduce the number of tanks, armoured combat vehicles, artillery, combat aircraft, combat helicopters and military personnel stationed by the military alliances in Europe. If the presently tabled proposals were realized, it would mean that these armaments and personnel located in the area of application – from the Atlantic to the Urals – would be significantly reduced. In quantitative terms, the reductions would be primarily felt in the Warsaw Pact countries, whose superiority is substantial in most of the weapon categories listed above. For instance, the number of tanks in the Warsaw Pact countries would be reduced to less than 50 % of their present number.

However, even if the treaty proposals were realized, there would still be a total of 40,000 tanks, almost 60,000 armoured combat vehicles, about 40,000 artillery pieces, about 10,000 combat aircraft and some 4,000 combat helicopters left in the area of application.

According to the official proposal of the Warsaw Pact now on the table, both alliances would be allowed to deploy a total of 1.35 million soldiers in the area of application. NATO has not proposed any restrictions on military personnel other than on the U.S. and Soviet troops stationed outside their home countries. According to the NATO proposal, the United States and the Soviet Union would each be allowed to have 195,000 soldiers in Central Europe. In addition, the United States would be allowed to have a total of 30,000 soldiers in Spain, Great Britain, Italy, Greece and Turkey. According to the existing proposals, the number and location of armaments and personnel would be closely regulated by quotas, ceilings and regional sub-limits.

So far, the 23 countries have been able to agree only on the definition of artillery. Such questions as definitions for all the other weapon categories, regional sub-limits, storage areas, stabilizing measures and verification of compliance still remain to be solved. At the moment, the numbers mentioned in the tabled proposals are tentative, and the personnel issue is also awaiting resolution. However, there is strong

political will to conclude a CFE treaty already during 1990, which has been repeatedly stated in the summit meetings of the superpowers and the military alliances.

Strengthening and the further development of the existing CSBM measures are an important part of the CSCE process. This is of particular importance for the countries outside the military alliances.These countries' armed forces can be activated to their full strength only through mobilization and can consequently be characterized as defensive. Therefore, the neutral and non-aligned countries have paid attention to the necessity of broadening the exchange of military information as well as extending it to all military services. Units and weapon systems belonging to the ground forces of the military alliances that have the ability to carry out surprise attacks and deep offensive operations are of special concern in the proposal of the neutral and non-aligned countries tabled in Vienna. The NNA-countries regard airborne and amphibious landing operations as specially threatening, and they have therefore proposed that the obligation to provide information on such operations should be expanded.

The development of the German question is important for the internal situation of the military alliances as well as for their mutual relations. As a result, it is also important for the prospects of disarmament.

The disarmament prospects that have opened up in Europe have a great impact on inter-alliance relations as well as on the situation within the alliances. The direct and indirect effects of disarmament in Europe will obviously be far-reaching.

The Warsaw Pact is going through a profound process of change, where military factors are only a part of the whole. The economic pressures caused by military spending are greatest in the Soviet Union, where the defence expenditure's share of GNP is very high. According to some Soviet estimates, it is as high as 15-20 % of the Soviet GNP.

Therefore, the Soviet Union has announced that it is going to carry out unilateral reductions in its defence budgets and armed forces and reorganize its military forces according to defensive principles. A similar process is going on in the other Warsaw Pact countries. The security-political value of these measures is substantial, even though unilateral cuts have not significantly reduced the capability of the armed forces. Agreements have already been concluded on the withdrawal of the Soviet troops from Czechoslovakia and Hungary, and discussions have continued on withdrawing troops from Poland.

The reorganization and unilateral cuts carried out by the Warsaw Pact countries are prompted both by internal factors and by political-military objectives. Reductions in the personnel of the armed forces will release labour forces, and it is hoped that the re-structuring of the defence industry will release both planning and production resources for the civilian sectors of the national economies. In addition, one goal of reorganization of the armed forces is to increase their capability, eliminate excessive bureaucracy and intensify training.

The process of disarmament will also have a considerable impact on the Western Alliance. Conventional disarmament – although it will primarily lead to a reduction in the offensive power of the Warsaw Pact and to the reorganization of its military forces – will create pressures on both sides of the Atlantic Ocean to reduce American troops deployed in Europe. The Western Alliance has stated that positive results in the CFE negotiations are a precondition for starting negotiations on short-range nuclear missiles. The debate within NATO on these missiles, as well as on just and equal sharing of the defence burden, will continue and probably accelerate. Real cuts have been made in the defence budget of the United States during recent years. As a result, the funds earmarked for NATO will probably be examined with particular care in the U.S. Congress.

In the political sense, the alliances are facing a new situation. The strong emphasis that was placed on building up military forces in the beginning of the 1980s has revealed both in the East and the West the financial strains and limits of arms races. This has greatly accelerated the efforts towards disarmament. The change in military doctrine announced by the Warsaw Pact, characterized as being based on the "defensiveness" and "reasonable sufficiency" of the armed forces, has alleviated antagonisms and changed the customary ways of military thinking. This has led to a gradual change in perceptions of the "enemy" and to a partial collapse of threats. This development has had an important impact on how public opinion both in the East and the West now considers the development of armed forces and military expenditures.

As the disarmament negotiations are still in progress, it is difficult to assess accurately their impact on European security. The political effect of the possible treaties and their impact on the threat perceptions of the alliances will be important. One can talk about a new European security system, in which it will be possible to scale down the significance of armaments and armed forces by multilateral measures. However, on

the basis of the present situation in those negotiations that are of central importance to the Nordic region, i.e., the START negotiations in Geneva and the CFE negotiations in Vienna, one must conclude that the security-political impact of these negotiations in the Nordic region is far from clear.

There are signs indicating that the arms race will not slow down to a full stop but will be channeled into new areas. For example, the unequal counting rules for different types of strategic weapons contained in the emerging START treaty seem to put a premium on introducing more bombers and air-launched cruise missiles into the superpower nuclear arsenals. Naval forces and long-range sea-launched cruise missiles, which have an impact on the military-political situation of Northern Europe, are not at the moment covered by the START negotiations. If the composition of the strategic nuclear triad were changed to favour air-breathing systems and sea-launched cruise missiles, it would increase the military significance of the air space of the northern region.

The outcome of the CFE talks will have its primary effect on the military forces deployed in Central Europe. At this stage of the negotiations, when the regional questions are still to be solved, it is not possible to analyze their effects on Northern Europe with any degree of certainty. However, they may not be very significant. For example, the reduction of land-based armed forces will have a relatively small effect on the correlation of forces between the military alliances in the North. However, it is possible that when great numbers of armaments are withdrawn from Central Europe as the reductions take place there, some of the equipment may be transferred into storage areas located in Northern Europe, or it may be used to replace older equipment now in place in this region. The military alliances have abundant military potential available in Northern Europe, and more can be added in a short period of time, if necessary. This military potential is not going to decrease in real terms in the near future, although military postures may become more defensive as the doctrinal evolution continues.

Neither of the treaties being negotiated is likely to set any qualitative limits to the development of weapons systems. The draft START treaty does not contain any restrictions on improving the technical quality of strategic weapons. In the CFE negotiations, no limitations on developing the capabilities of conventional armed forces have been proposed. Both the alliances have expressly stated that the combat readiness of the remaining armed forces will be raised, and that the mobility, firepower and training of the troops will be improved.

Furthermore, attention should be paid to the fact that military geography and climatic conditions in Northern Europe greatly differ from those in the Central European region which is the main focus of negotiations. Special equipment, lighter weapons systems, better transportation systems, amphibious troops, air transportation equipment, transportation helicopters and airborne troops – to mention only a few examples – will be of particular importance in the North.

Thus the military changes taking place in Europe provide a basis for two different conclusions. Significant results are to be expected in disarmament negotiations in the next few years. As a consequence, the nuclear arsenals of both the Soviet Union and the United States as well as the conventional armed forces stationed in Europe will be considerably reduced from their present levels. In this regard, the outcome of the CFE negotiations will be of great significance for the security of Europe.

However, along with the disarmament negotiations, arms buildups will continue in some fields. The focus of weapons development will be transferred from quantity to quality, and more effort will be directed to increasing the mobility of weapons systems, developing various types of precision-guided munitions that will greatly increase the lethality of firepower, and improving rapid intervention capabilities. In short, the objective will be to build a more efficient military force with the available national resources.

3 CONCLUSIONS FROM THE POINT OF VIEW OF FINNISH DEFENCE POLICY

Several positive features can be detected in the relations between the superpowers and in the political developments in Europe. With the lessening of confrontation, these features are also felt in the Nordic area. Nuclear weapons will retain their strategic importance, even though their credibility as a means of warfare is apparently declining. Military doctrines are becoming more defensive, although both the military alliances still underline the significance of counter-attack capability as part of defensive operations.

The changes that have taken place in Europe have generally been positive. On the other hand, they have been so fast and profound that it is difficult to predict their future pace and direction.

The political effects of the treaties concluded, decisions on unilateral arms reductions and proposals that have been tabled in the on-going negotiations have been considerable. Still, it must be noted that disarmament negotiations have not yet been completed and most of their goals have not yet been achieved. The military buildup continues, and while the numbers of old weapons are decreasing, new and technically improved weapons systems are being deployed. The destructive power of weapons has not yet been reduced by any significant degree.

From the Finnish point of view, the important factors include the increasing strategic significance of Northern Europe, and of the northern sea areas in particular, as well as the threat created by the deployment of cruise missiles. One should also note that relatively light weapons systems and other equipment designed for the special northern conditions are not yet on the agenda of any disarmament negotiations.

Finland's security-political position is stable. By its own foreign policy, its policy of neutrality and its constructive efforts, for example within the framework of the CSCE process, Finland has been able to have a positive impact on its own security-political environment both in the Nordic region and more widely in Europe. The Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance between Finland and the Soviet Union has had and still has an important stabilizing effect on the Nordic situation.

The objective of Finnish security policy is to prevent our country from being drawn into a possible conflict, and to prevent conflicts from spreading to our territory. From the military point of view, the crucial factor is that our neighbours and other countries can rely on Finland's capability to control and defend its territory.

No country has questioned the validity of maintaining sufficient defensive capability, even in the changed European situation. It is still possible to use force or to threaten the use of armed force in relations between states, because considerable military potential will remain even after the various disarmament measures are carried out. In any case, international conflicts might arise to threaten security, and the possible use of military force below the threshold of war must also be taken into account.

From the viewpoint of Finland, there are some permanent factors of military geography in Northern Europe that have an effect on our

defence policy. Lapland and Southern Finland, as well as our national air space, are still strategically important areas for Finland.

The northern areas, in particular the sea area and air space, are important for both the Soviet Union and NATO, and their importance may increase unless disarmament measures are extended to these regions. The Kola Peninsula is the strategically most important base area of the Soviet Union. Northern Norway is a significant region for NATO's surveillance and support systems. The northern parts of Finland are located between the alliances. This is important in crisis situations and for the defence of Finland's air space in particular.

Southern Finland is the most vulnerable area of our country, since the majority of the population and industrial capacity, as well as the capital city are located there. Moreover, the important Soviet city of Leningrad and the capital city of Sweden, Stockholm, are located close to Southern Finland. The Baltic Sea will maintain its importance on the flank of the vital Central European area, since it is a channel of trade and an area of interest between the alliances and the two Nordic neutrals. It is possible that the significance of the Baltic Sea region will increase, as the security situation in Central Europe changes.

Despite all the positive developments taking place in the field of disarmament, considerable quantities of both troops and armaments will remain in Europe.

In order to guarantee the security of Finland and to defend the whole territory of the country, sufficient defensive capability must still be maintained. How strong a capability should be maintained, and how it should be developed, depends on the security-political environment of Finland. The changes now taking place in Europe will naturally have an effect on our assessments, but the final analysis must be made on the basis of lasting long-term trends.

The Finnish defence capability must be of such a quality that we will be able to adjust ourselves to rapidly changing situations, to keep various crisis situations under our control, and to prevent any military operations against our country or through the land or sea territory or air space of our country.

The neutrality of Finland and Sweden, and the credible defence capability of these countries, have been widely seen as factors increasing the stability of the Nordic region. Finnish defence policy is based on

consistent long-term planning and on thorough analyses of the tasks and capability requirements of the Defence Forces. It is important that Finnish defence policy continues to be predictable, even in a changing international situation.

DECISION OF THE GOVERNMENT OF FINLAND ON STIPULATIONS OF THE PARIS PEACE TREATY CONCERNING GERMANY AND LIMITING THE SOVEREIGNTY OF FINLAND, 21 September 1990

Background:

In its decision of 21 september 1990 the Government has stated that the stipulations of Part III of the Peace Treaty signed in Paris in 1947 have lost their meaning, with the exception of the ban on nuclear weapons.

The stipulations of the Peace Treaty concerning Germany are included in Part III of the Treaty. In accordance with them Finland has not been able to acquire or manufacture materiel or civilian aircraft of German origin or design. Finland has also been obliged to cooperate with a view to prevent the rearmament of Germany.

The unification of Germany on 3 October 1990 creates a situation where the stipulations of the Peace Treaty concerning Germany lose their meaning. In the Peace Treaty (Article 10) Finland undertakes to recognize "the full force of ... other agreements or arrangements which have been or will be reached by the Allied and Associated Powers in respect with ... Germany ... for the restoration of peace". The German States and the victorious Powers of the Second World War have concluded the so-called 2+4 talks, which have resulted in freeing united Germany from all limitations of its sovereignty. Therefore it is not justified that the stipulations of the Paris Peace Treaty concerning Germany would continue to limit Finland's sovereignty.

Part III of the Peace Treaty includes also other stipulations which limit Finland's sovereignty. Those are the quantitative and qualitative limitations concerning army, navy and air force. In practice, these limitations have largely lost their meaning already. The limitations concerning army, navy and air force have not formed a substantial impediment to the development of Finland's defence capability. Yet, the prohibition to acquire German materiel (Article 19) has hampered the development of the defence forces. An essentially liberal interpretation of the stipulations of Part III has been adopted. For example, it has been understood that the Peace Treaty does not prevent preparations for mobilization.

The stipulations of Part III are, however, not in harmony with the status of Finland as an independent and sovereign State – a Member

State of the United Nations and participant in the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. Finland was accepted as a Member of the UN in 1955. It is obvious from the history of the Peace Treaty and also from its text (Article 22) that the limitations were originally meant to be temporary, and membership in the world organization was to signify their termination. It was the cold war that caused the postponement of the termination of the limitations.

A ban to acquire nuclear weapons is also included in the stipulations of Part III of the Peace Treaty. Naturally, it retains its significance. Finland has renewed this commitment by becoming Party to the Non-Proliferation Treaty in 1969 as one of the first States.

As the Government states that the stipulations of Part III of the Peace Treaty have lost their meaning, the Peace Treaty as a whole is not touched upon. Finland has faithfully observed the stipulations of the Peace Treaty. The most important of them were the cession of territories, war reparations and the political and economic stipulations. All the other States, which signed a similar Peace Treaty, soon joined military alliances and, with the consent of their allies, did not observe the limitations of their Peace Treaties, although these stipulations were not officially repealed.

The restrictions of the Peace Treaties are remnants from a time when, in the postwar situation, an attempt was made to prevent Germany and its former allies and co-belligerents from rearming themselves. The Peace Treaties, however, became a part of the cold war equilibrium. The fundamental change of the security situation in Europe makes it possible to recognize that the stipulations limiting sovereignty are outdated also with regard to Finland.

The decision of the Government, stating the stipulations of Part III of the Peace Treaty have lost their meaning, does not alter the basis of Finland's security and defence policy.

Britain and the Soviet Union have been informed of the decision of the Government.

Text of the Decision:

After Germany has been united and its sovereignty reinstated, the Government of Finland considers the stipulations concerning Germany in Part III of the Paris Peace Treaty to have lost their meaning.

The other stipulations in Part III of the Peace Treaty limiting Finland's sovereignty do not correspond to Finland's status as a Member State of the United Nations and Participating State in the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. Therefore the Government states that also they have lost their meaning.

The only exception is formed by atomic weapons, the acquisition of which is prohibited under Article 17 of the Peace Treaty. Finland has undertaken not to acquire nuclear weapons also by becoming Party to the Non-Proliferation Treaty in 1969.

Stating that the stipulations in Part III of the Peace Treaty have lost their meaning does not alter the basis of Finland's security and defence policy.

Treaty of Peace with Finland.

PART III.

Military, Naval and Air Clauses.

Article 13.

The maintenance of land, sea and air armaments and fortifications shall be closely restricted to meeting tasks of an internal character and local defence of frontiers. In accordance with the foregoing, Finland is authorized to have armed forces consisting of not more than:

(a) A land army, including frontier troops and anti-aircraft artillery, with a total strength of 34,400 personnel;

(b) A navy with a personnel strength of 4,500 and a total tonnage of 10,000 tons;

(c) An air force, including any naval air arm, of 60 aircraft, including reserves, with a total personnel strength of 3,000. Finland shall not possess or acquire any aircraft designed primarily as bombers with internal bomb-carrying facilities.

These strengths shall in each case include combat, service and overhead personnel.

Article 14.

The personnel of the Finnish Army, Navy and Air Force in excess of the respective strengths permitted under Article 13, shall be disbanded within six months from the coming into force of the present Treaty.

Article 15.

Personnel not included in the Finnish Army, Navy or Air Force shall not receive any form of military training, naval training or military air training as defined in Annex II.

Article 16.

1. As from the coming into force of the present Treaty, Finland will be invited to join the Barents, Baltic, and Black Sea

Zone Board of the International Organisation for Mine Clearance of European Waters, and shall maintain at the disposal of the Central Mine Clearance Board all Finnish minesweeping forces until the end of the post-war mine clearance period, as determined by the Central Board.

2. During this post-war mine clearance period, Finland may retain additional naval units employed only for the specific purpose of minesweeping, over and above the tonnage permitted in Article 13.

Within two months of the end of the said period, such of these vessels as are on loan to the Finnish Navy from other Powers shall be returned to those Powers, and all other additional units shall be disarmed and converted to civilian use.

3. Finland is also authorised to employ 1,500 additional officers and men for minesweeping over and above the numbers permitted in Article 13. Two months after the completion of minesweeping by the Finnish Navy, the excess personnel shall be disbanded or absorbed within the numbers permitted in the said Article.

Article 17.

Finland shall not possess, construct or experiment with any atomic weapon, any self-propelled or guided missiles or apparatus connected with their discharge (other than torpedoes and torpedo-launching gear comprising the normal armament of naval vessels permitted by the present Treaty), sea-mines or torpedoes of non-contact types actuated by influence mechanisms, torpedoes capable of being manned, submarines or other submersible craft, motor torpedo boats, or specialised types of assault craft.

Article 18.

Finland shall not retain, produce or otherwise acquire, or maintain facilities for the manufacture of, war material in excess of that required for the maintenance of the armed forces permitted under Article 13 of the present Treaty.

Article 19.

1. Excess war material of Allied origin shall be placed at the disposal of the Allied Power concerned according to the instructions given by that Power. Excess Finnish war material shall be placed at the disposal of the Governments of the Soviet Union and the United Kingdom. Finland shall renounce all rights to this material.

2. War material of German origin or design in excess of that required for the armed forces permitted under the present Treaty shall be placed at the disposal of the Two Governments. Finland shall not acquire or manufacture any war material of German origin or design, or employ or train any technicians, including military and civil aviation personnel, who are or have been nationals of Germany.

3. Excess war material mentioned in paragraphs 1 and 2 of this Article shall be handed over or destroyed within one year from the coming into force of the present Treaty.

4. A definition and list of war material for the purposes of the present Treaty are contained in Annex III.

Article 20.

Finland shall co-operate fully with the Allied and Associated Powers with a view to ensuring that Germany may not be able

to take steps outside German territory towards rearmament.

Article 21.

Finland shall not acquire or manufacture civil aircraft which are of German or Japanese design or which embody major assemblies of German or Japanese manufacture or design.

Article 22.

Each of the military, naval and air clauses of the present Treaty shall remain in force until modified in whole or in part by agreement between the Allied and Associated Powers and Finland or, after Finland becomes a member of the United Nations, by agreement between the Security Council and Finland.

Reparation and Restitution.

Article 23.

1. Losses caused to the Soviet Union by military operations and by the occupation by Finland of Soviet territory shall be made good by Finland to the Soviet Union, but, taking into consideration that Finland has not only withdrawn from the war against the United Nations but has also declared war on Germany and assisted with her forces in driving German troops out of Finland, the Parties agree that compensation for the above losses will be made by Finland not in full, but only in part, namely in the amount of $ 300,000,000 payable over eight years from September 19, 1944, in commodities (timber products, paper, cellulose, seagoing and river craft, sundry machinery, and other commodities).

2. The basis of calculation for the settlement provided in this Article shall be the United States dollar at its gold parity on the day of the signing of the Armistice Agreement, i.e. 35 dollars for one ounce of gold.

STATEMENT BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC CONCERNING THE FINNISH-SOVIET TREATY OF FRIENDSHIP, CO-OPERATION AND MUTUAL ASSISTANCE, 21 September 1990

Background:

President Koivisto has recorded a statement in the protocol of the session of the Council of State on 21 September 1990 concerning the reference to Germany in the Finnish-Soviet Treaty of 1948 on Friendship, Co-operation and Mutual Assistance (FCMA). Its background is the following:

The unification of Germany takes place on 3 October 1990. The external aspects of the unification were agreed upon in a Treaty concluded by the two German states and the four victorious powers in Moscow on 12 September 1990. This Treaty signifies a final settlement of the Second World War and the restoration of full sovereignty for Germany. It resolves the central problem of East-West confrontation.

The Foreign Ministers of the Soviet Union and the Federal Republic of Germany initialled on 12 September 1990 a bilateral Treaty on good neighbourliness, partnership and co-operation. This Treaty is expected to be signed during President Gorbachev's visit to Germany later this autumn.

The reference to Germany as a possible aggressor, contained in the first Article of the 1948 Treaty, has for long been considered to reflect the situation existing at the time it was signed. The changed circumstances have rendered it obsolete.

In Finland, the standard interpretation of the Treaty has focused on Finland's duty as a sovereign State to repel any attack rather than on the question of a possible aggressor.

The Finnish-Soviet declaration of 26 October 1989 sets as a goal the dismantling of the "threat perceptions of the past".

The reference to Germany in the Treaties between the Soviet Union and its allies (with the exception of Poland) was removed in the 1960's and 1970's.

When the Finnish Government stated on 21 September 1990 that the provisions concerning Germany in the Paris Peace Treaty have lost their meaning, the question may arise concerning the reference to Germany in the Treaty of Friendship, Co-operation and Mutual Assistance. It is therefore necessary that the above interpretation is recorded.

The intention of the Finnish Government is not to open a discussion about modifying the FCMA Treaty. The Treaty functions well also under changing circumstances.

Text of the Statement:

The reference to Germany as a possible aggressor contained in the 1948 Treaty of Friendship, Co-operation and Mutual Assistance (FCMA) between Finland and the Soviet Union reflects a historical appraisal of the situation prevailing at the time of its signing. Such a situation no longer exists. Recent developments, in particular the relaxation of confrontation in Europe, the unification of Germany and the international agreements relating to it signify that the said reference in the FCMA Treaty has become obsolete.

In stating the above, the Finnish Government reaffirms that in the changing circumstances the essential purpose of the FCMA Treaty remains unchanged, i.e. Finland will not allow her territory to be used for an attack against the Soviet Union. The Treaty continues to serve Finnish security interests.

(Source: Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Press Release Nr. 278, 21 September 1990)

FINNISH DEFENCE STUDIES

1 *Evolution of the Finnish Military Doctrine 1945-1985,* Pekka Visuri. 1990.